The
dependency of an Islamic State on Sharia
Nurrohman Syarif ;
A
lecturer at the Sunan Gunung Djati State Islamic University, Bandung and the
Bandung State Islamic University (UIN)
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JAKARTA
POST, 19 September 2014
One reason used by some groups who insist
on establishing a caliphate, such as conveyed by supporters of the Islamic
State movement (IS, formerly the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) in
Indonesia is their concern for how sharia should be practiced in the context
of the state. The term “caliphate” (khalifah) in Muslim political history has
a specific meaning.
Inspired by Ibn Khaldun, the caliphate is
distinct from a mulk (sultanate). Rosenthal in his book, Islam in the Modern
National State, defined the caliphate as a state ruled by sharia while a mulk
is a state with a mixed constitution, based on sharia and on the political
law of the rulers.
Although Ibn Khaldun admitted that both
kinds of state could be accepted, he argued that a caliphate was better than
a mulk. Some Muslim scholars in the modern age, such as Al-Maududi from
Pakistan, also follow this path
As Muslims believe Islam is a complete
civilization that includes a political system, some groups aspire to
establish a state fully ruled by sharia in the form of a caliphate through
the formalization of Islam and Islamic law.
At this juncture, sharia needs a state and
a state in order to be called a caliphate needs regulation derived from
sharia. This is the logic behind the struggle to establish a caliphate. This
logic is based on the assumption of the dependency of sharia on the Islamic
state. The jargon of Islam as din wa dawlah (religion and state) originates
from this way of thinking.
On the other hand, there are scholars who
argue that sharia is basically a moral or ethical norm derived from the
revealed will of God. Based on this argument the most important grounds for
accepting sharia is faith; one practices what is understood as Islamic law
whenever and wherever one resides based on one’s ability. What Muslims need
is protection from the state. This is what is called the credo theory
proposed by Juhaya S. Praja, professor in Islamic law at the Bandung State
Islamic University (UIN).
This theory is supported by strong
arguments.
First, the Koran is not a book of law, it
is a holy book comprising moral guidance. It is true that the Koran is the
primary source of Islamic law, but Islamic law can also be inferred through
many other sources (dalil). Wahbah al-Zuhaily, in his book Al-Wajiz fi Ushul
al-Fiqh (The methodology of Islamic jurisprudence), mentioned 11 sources of
sharia.
Besides being derived from the Koran and
Sunna (written traditions of the Prophet Muhammad), most sharia sources are
derived from public opinion, local wisdom and good traditions that are easily
understood by common sense through the principle of equality and justice.
Second, the Prophet is basically a moral
and spiritual leader. Although many experts acknowledge Muhammad as a prophet
and statesman, such as evidenced by his effort to make common ground with a
plural society in the “Medina constitution” issued in his lifetime,
Muhammad’s involvement in state affairs was not his main mission. He admitted
himself that he was sent to perfect morality.
In the history of Islam, Islamic law is
developed by experts or Islamic jurists privately and independently.
Therefore it is not surprising that Islamic law is diverse, depending on the
schools of law and their respective methodology. Some Islamic jurists have
rejected attempts to have their school of law officially adopted by the state
through codification. So in Islamic history many experts in Islamic law have
actually distanced themselves from state intervention.
The early Abbasids attempted to make
Islamic law, which was then still in its formative shape, the only law of the
state. They did not succeed in achieving a permanent fusion of theory and
practice, of political power and sacred law.
Currently, Muslims can be broadly divided
into the groups of Islamic politics and Islamic ethics; those who aspire for
Islam to be formalized by state laws and those following Islam as their
private way of life. Therefore what is important for Indonesia is to
encourage dialog about the Constitution, so the aspiration of each camp can
be adopted in a moderate way.
This is because many factors cause someone
to become an extremist, radical or even a terrorist, and many are vulnerable
to being lured by extremist movements.
Muslims who aspire to political Islam would
find it worthwhile considering the speech of a leading Indonesian Muslim
politician, Muhammad Natsir, at Pakistan’s Institute of International Affairs
on April 2, 1952.
The former prime minister said that
“Pakistan is decidedly an Islamic country by population and by choice as it
has declared Islam as the state’s religion. So is Indonesia an Islamic
country by the fact that Islam is recognized as the religion of the
Indonesian people,” although the Constitution does not decree Islam as the
state’s religion.
“But neither has Indonesia excluded
religion from its statehood. In fact it has put the monotheistic creed in the
one and only God, at the top of Pancasila [the state ideology]; the five
principles adopted as the spiritual, moral and ethical foundations of the
state and the nation.
“Thus for both our countries and peoples
Islam has its essential place in our lives, which does not mean, however,
that our state [...] is theocratic”.
From the above explanation, it is safe to
conclude that in practicing sharia Muslims do not need to establish a
caliphate let alone a theocratic or oligarchic one. ●
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