Not a mere case of bad apples : Acts of state terrorism Budi Hernawan  ;   A research fellow at the Abdurrahman Wahid Center for Interfaith Dialogue and Peace of the University of Indonesia

JAKARTA POST,  18 November 2014

                                                                                                                       

Thirteen years ago on Nov. 10 — Heroes’ Day — the Papuan leader Theys Eluay was found dead in the vicinity of Jayapura city after attending an event at the local headquarters of the Army’s Special Forces, Kopassus. His body was left abandoned in a public place. His driver, Aristoteles Masoka, went missing, and remains unaccounted for. On Feb. 5, 2002, as Papuan Christians celebrated the anniversary of the arrival of the first Christian missionaries in Papua, then president Megawati Soekarnoputri established a national investigation commission chaired by a retired police officer and commissioner of the national rights body, Koesparmono Irsan. The commission’s sole purpose was to investigate the case of Theys’ assassination. As a result, Aristoteles’ fate has been ignored completely since the inception of the commission. In its report to the president, the commission recommended the naming of six suspects from within Kopassus, but failed to offer any explanations as to why the crime was committed. On April 21, 2003, the martial high court in Surabaya found the six Kopassus members guilty of murder and mistreatment and sentenced them to imprisonment. Lt. Col. Hartomo, Pvt Ahmad Zulfahmi, Maj. Hutabarat and First Lt Agus were sentenced to three and a half years’ imprisonment and dismissed from the Indonesian Military (TNI), while Capt. Rionardo and Sgt Asrial were imprisoned for three years. Nothing, however, was ever said about Aristoteles during the trial. Only his family remembers him. Later, the army chief of staff Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, now the defense minister, publicly praised the perpetrators as heroes. Many inside and outside Papua may have forgotten the case. The marker of the site where Theys and Aristoteles were abducted along a hilly road outside Jayapura has been left abandoned. Similarly, Theys’ grave, in a cemetery located across the road from Sentani airport, receives minimal public attention and respect. The story seems to be forgotten. Meanwhile, public display of dead and or broken bodies is not novel in our history. Since the counter insurgency operation against the movements to establish an Islamic state, the DI/TII (Darul Islam / Tentara Islam Indonesia) in the 1950s, this has been a common method of state terror against Indonesia’s own citizens accused of being enemies of the state. The tactic was used extensively during the massacre of suspected communists in 1965. At least 500,000 people were killed that year; many of the killings were carried out in public. The method was again used during the killings of gangsters in the 1980s known as petrus (penembakan misterius/mysterious shootings). Many of their bodies were left abandoned in public spaces as a means of intimidation. Later, in front of the media and the public eyes, the state security apparatus did not hesitate to use the method to disperse the Papuan congress in 2011. Hundreds of Papuans were rounded up and abused. The Papuan activist Mako Tabuni was shot in front of the public on the outskirts of Jayapura; he later died in the Bhayangkara police hospital in Jayapura. Ironically, having been confronted with so many public atrocities, public memory has been normalized. We are no longer sensitive to or repulsed by the message of terror. Terror is designed not only to communicate the message of state power but also to stigmatize the bodies, to make us unwilling to get any closer to them. We do not want to get tainted. As a result, many of us have become bystanders who might believe that these people deserve such treatment because they were enemies of the state. Is the Indonesian state responsible for such crimes? We almost always hear the standard answer from the authorities that it is all about bad apples who operate independently beyond the chain of command or misinterpret orders. Such arguments are no longer valid. It was the Commission of Truth and Friendship for Timor Leste and Indonesia that concluded that the Indonesian state was responsible for crimes against humanity in Timor Leste in 1999. Both Indonesia and Timor Leste came to a “conclusive” truth about the responsibility of the state for what happened in Timor Leste in 1999. This was the first time in our history that a state body held the state responsible and accountable and thus set the precedent that the state and state institutions are not immune to justice. Unfortunately, this investigation has had a minimal impact on our struggle to combat impunity. Just as Theys’ history has been forgotten, so too has the history of Timor Leste been erased from our consciousness. Theys Eluay was not the only one and nor was he the last. He was only one piece of the large mosaic of silenced history of the forgotten. Aristoteles Masoka is even more forgotten. Perhaps it is time for us to restore their dignity as a gesture of solidarity to those who have been silenced and forgotten in our history, in the wake of our commemoration of national heroes. ●

Prabowo or Jokowi for the Jakarta-Papua dialogue? Budi Hernawan  ;   A postdoctoral research fellow at the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV) in the Netherlands

JAKARTA POST,  17 Juni 2014

                                                

                                                                                         

                                                      

There are only two options for the next presidency — Prabowo Subianto or Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. They have been portrayed as opposites. While Prabowo’s campaign speaks of “Saving Indonesia” (Selamatkan Indonesia), Jokowi’s proclaims “Indonesia the great” (Indonesia Hebat). Whereas Jokowi is well known for his impromptu visits or blusukan, Prabowo is famous for his rigid instructions and commands. While Jokowi has risen from the level of a small-town entrepreneur, Prabowo has reinvented himself as a populist figure, distancing himself from the perception of a New Order general with a notorious track record. Jokowi’s camp promotes his vision on human rights at length, Prabowo’s vision does not even mention the word “human rights”. Both camps, however, hardly mention anything about the Jakarta-Papua dialogue. Instead, both are preoccupied with the welfare approach for Papua as if it was the magic bullet. That is why, despite this whirlwind of national politics, many Papuans remain bewildered. Some of them ask in whom we trust? Some say trust no one. Some others, like West Papua National Committee (KNPB) activists, call for boycotting the presidential election whereas others who are part of the game work extra hard to secure votes for their candidates. While many Papuan activists seem skeptical about the upcoming election, others are hopeful that Jokowi might be a new entry point for the Jakarta-Papua dialogue. Many are deeply weary of Prabowo due to his legacy in Mapenduma and the human rights record of the Army’s Special Forces (Kopassus) of which he was the commander. So will the new president be true to his promises? “Promise” can be a magic but also dirty word in Papuan politics. Papuans feeling betrayed by failed promises is nothing new. In the 1960s, the Dutch were clinging onto the territory of Papua, promising to prepare Papuans to govern their own country, before signing the 1962 New York Agreement as a legal basis to transfer the territory to the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) and then to Indonesia. Successive presidents offered different promises but not all paid serious attention to engaging in meaningful dialogue with Papuans. The most preferable approach is pursuing economic progress. Sukarno proclaimed his commitment to establishing a prosperous and fair society when he first arrived in Kotabaru (now Jayapura) on May 4, 1963. Similarly, Soeharto was well known for his martial law for Irian Jaya for more than three decades, leaving a legacy of fear. When BJ Habibie took the presidency, he invited 100 Papuan representatives to the Presidential Palace for a national dialogue on Feb. 26, 1999. Instead of achieving any meaningful negotiations, Papuans were told to go home and rethink their call for independence. They have never heard any follow-up since. It was Abdurrahman “Gus Dur” Wahid who took an exceptional initiative to engage in genuine dialogue with Papuans. He crafted a space for Papuans to reclaim their names as “Papuans”, not “Irianese” or any other labels given to them by outsiders. He was also supportive of Papuans’ initiatives when they organized their grand deliberation (Mubes) and congress in 2000. But when his then deputy, Megawati Soekarnoputri, took over the presidency, Gus Dur’s initiatives disappeared. She signed a Special Autonomy (Otsus) deal for Papua in 2001, she issued a presidential decree (Inpres No. 1/2003) to divide Papua into three new provinces, contradicting the spirit and the letter of the Special Autonomy Law. She insistently promoted the economic development approach while allowing the military to operate almost independently. A group of Kopassus soldiers were convicted and punished for assassinating Papuan leader Theys Eluay although the court failed to discover Aristoteles Masoka, the driver. Megawati, of course, is the one promoting Jokowi. In President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s first term, he was successful in ending the prolonged armed conflict in Aceh and religious conflicts in Maluku and Poso, Central Sulawesi. This achievement is internationally acknowledged and greatly appreciated. This credit, however, did not transfer to Papua. During his second term, he invited the Papuan church leaders twice with a promise of a follow-up for dialogue between Papua and Jakarta, but it never went anywhere. While economic stability and prosperity is a conditio sine qua non for the public good of any nation, this is not the only criterion to assess how a government fulfills its constitutional mandate. Questions of justice and human security are not inferior to economy. Conversely, these are paramount for Papua. Gus Dur made it very clear that reconciliatory gestures are the right approach for Papua. Another kind of promise comes from neighboring states. In its 2013 summit communiqué, the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) leaders highlighted their concerns over the worrying human rights condition in Papua. They promised to send a mission to visit Jakarta and Papua to have firsthand information of the situation. Under tight arrangements with Jakarta, the MSG ministerial mission visited Jayapura for four hours and concluded that there were no human rights violations in Papua. Vanuatu, the only UN member publicly supporting Papuans, dissociated itself from the visit and went solo. Last March, former Vanuatu prime minister Moana Carcasses Kalosil rocked the boat of the UN Human Rights Council, requesting a UN expert for Papua to investigate the situation of human rights in the territory. We are waiting for the follow-up on this appeal. What can Papuans make out of these promises? Perhaps Reverend Socratez Sofyan Yoman was right when he said that Papuans had to trust themselves. Instead of looking for outside assistance, he urged Papuans to rely on themselves in crafting their own future. While this suggestion is not novel, it reiterates the need for Papuans to build self-reliance and critical thinking on the most essential things they have to do for their own future. We should not forget, however, that Papuans are entangled in intricate power relations both domestically and internationally. They do not live in a vacuum so that they can independently decide and act without taking into account different power relations that influence and sometimes, determine their fate. Perhaps this is the time they have to seize a new opportunity for dialogue with a new regime, despite the silence of both candidates over the very issue. ●

Is a UN resolution on Papua impossible? Budi Hernawan ;   An independent scholar based in Jayapura, Papua

JAKARTA POST,  21 Maret 2014

                                                                                                                       

                                                                                         

                                                      

At the 25th session of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) in Geneva, Switzerland, on March 4, Vauatu Prime Minister Moana Carcasses Kalosil called on the council “to consider adopting a country mandate on the situation of human rights in West Papua”. What does this motion mean? This motion is not novel. Rather, it is a renewed call by Kalosil, which he had previously presented to the 62nd session of the UN General Assembly last November. Although it is not unusual for a UN member state to request an investigation into the state of human rights in another state, such a motion is largely unfavorable among member states and generally meets fierce opposition from targeted countries and their allies. Growing concern among the UN groupings has contributed to the politicization of the development of a country mandate, as this has been labeled a “naming and shaming” tactic. During the era of the Human Rights Committee, the council’s predecessor, the African grouping, for instance, viewed the mandate as a continuation of Western colonialism in disguise. As a result, the African grouping managed to end the country mandates for their continent. The Asian grouping shared the same point of view, despite its failure to achieve a unified voice to advocate for this position. Currently, there are 14 country mandates, including six mandates for the African grouping, six for the Asian grouping, one for the Eastern European grouping and one for the Latin America-Caribbean grouping. None is assigned for the Western grouping. In contrast to the thematic mandates, which rapidly multiply, the country mandate remains significantly low in number within the HRC. The more important question, however, is why Vanuatu is so persistent in raising the issue of human rights in Papua and West Papua at the UN forums, despite minimal support from its neighbors in the Pacific and its own Asia-Pacific grouping within the UN itself? In its right of reply, Indonesia played down Vanuatu’s endeavor. It argued that the issue of Papua simply served as a commodity for Vanuatu’s domestic politics, not for Papuans. This argument also pointedly refers to a recent visit by the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) to Jakarta, Ambon, Malukku, and Jayapura, Papua, as well as the existing bilateral cooperation agreement between Indonesia and Vanuatu. While the MSG’s visit took place on the invitation of Jakarta, the purpose of the visit significantly changed. Instead of implementing the 2013 MSG communiqué, the visit put a strong emphasis on economic cooperation with Indonesia, not on the human rights situation of Papuans. That is why Vanuatu officially withdrew itself from the delegation. The visit to Jayapura was meaningless. No meeting was organized for the delegation to meet with survivors of human rights abuses or civil society organizations. The only meeting was held between the MSG delegation and bureaucrats and politicians. As a result, the Papua New Guinea delegation was quoted in online media stating there were no human rights abuses in Papua. Such a conclusion is understandable, given that the delegation only met bureaucrats and politicians who may not be subject to gross human rights abuses. A harder question that Vanuatu has to answer is its existing ties with Indonesia. Vanuatu cannot pretend that the agreement on bilateral cooperation in development does not exist. Surely, Vanuatu can argue that it is acting on the principle of responsibility to protect (R2P) principle, which was recently endorsed by the UN. Grounded in Article 24 of the UN Charter, the principle redefines the essence of state sovereignty as a responsibility, rather than simply immunity from public scrutiny. The state holds the primary responsibility for the protection of its people. Where a population is suffering serious harm, such as a genocide, crimes against humanity, an internal war, insurgency or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibility, the principle yields to the international responsibility to protect. As Kalosil emphasizes, Papua has long suffered not only from crimes against humanity committed by Indonesian state actors but also from the negligence of the international community to act. It is arguable, therefore, that the R2P is applicable for Papua. Nonetheless, we are all aware of the high politics that exist within the UN system, to which Indonesia is no stranger. On the contrary, it is a significant player within the HRC as well as the UN system at large. Indonesia actively engages in the UN Peace-building Commission to promote peace around the globe. It also continues to contribute troops to MONUSCO, the UN peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of Congo, one of the deadliest protracted conflicts in the Great Lakes area of Africa. Having managed to sign a peace deal with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), Indonesia has also been sought by ASEAN countries for advice in dealing with armed conflict in the region. Indonesia possesses sufficient credentials as a peace promoter. Vanuatu, on the other hand, is no novice either. Together with Nauru and Timor Leste, among others, it managed to put French Polynesia back onto the agenda of the UN Decolonization Commission. Of course, a resolution on Papua cannot be secured overnight. It will be a long and painful journey for Vanuatu if this small and politically unstable country persistently works on it. It has to mobilize support within the UN to secure enough votes to pass a resolution, which will probably not happen in the near future. In the meantime, Papuans should be well aware of the reality that this is just the beginning. ●

Schapelle Corby vs Filep Karma

Schapelle Corby vs Filep Karma

Budi Hernawan ; A Franciscan Friar, Is A Former Director of The Office for Justice and Peace of The Catholic Church in Jayapura, Papua, Indonesia. Currently he is A Phd Scholar at Regulatory Institutions Network, The Australian National University

SUMBER :  JAKARTA POST, 28 Mei 2012

On May 15, in an unusual style, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono granted clemency for Schapelle Corby, a convicted Australian drug smuggler, on humanitarian grounds.

Corby’s lawyer told the public that his client suffered from mental illness and was struggling with life in Bali’s Kerobokan prison. The clemency slashed five years off Corby’s 20-year sentence for smuggling 4.1 kg marijuana from Australia to Bali in 2004.

While Australian Foreign Minister Bob Carr denied there was any trade-off with Indonesia, Indonesian officials suggested something different. While dismissing any suggestion of a reciprocal arrangement between the two countries, Law and Human Rights Minister Amir Syamsudin said that Corby’s release “should encourage Australia to release Indonesians detained in Australia or reduce their sentences” (The Jakarta Post, May 24).

In parallel, we have a long list of petitions submitted to the President to release Filep Karma, a Papuan political prisoner who was sentenced to 15 years in jail for raising the outlawed Morning Star flag in Jayapura in 2004.

Just like Corby, Karma has struggled with life at Abepura’s Prison. Doctors at the Jayapura state hospital declared he urgently needs medical treatment in Jakarta. But the government takes no action.

In response to this, on Sept. 2, 2011, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention stated that the imprisonment had deprived Karma of his rights. This act breaches international law, particularly the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, to which Indonesia is a party. Therefore, “the Working Group requests the government to take the necessary steps to remedy the situation, including the immediate release of Mr. Karma and providing him with adequate reparation.”

A few days ago, this appeal was explicitly echoed by the German delegation during the session of Universal Periodic Review (UPR) on Indonesia at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva.

If we juxtapose the cases of Corby and Karma, the contrast is striking. This contrast, however, is not about who suffers the most. Such comparison is unethical and unacceptable because human suffering is unique and incomparable between individuals. Rather, it is all about equal treatment before the law.

Under Indonesian law, both are convicted of serious crimes. Hence, both have posed serious threats to society, according to the Indonesian authorities. Importantly, Corby is a foreigner whereas Karma is not. Corby’s nationality puts her in a relatively stronger position than Karma in demanding justice.

Portrayed as a victim of a corrupt Indonesian justice system, Corby features regularly in the media, both in Australia and Indonesia, drawing wide public attention. Eventually, Corby became an issue discussed at the highest political levels of both countries. She is not just another tourist. So, when Corby requested clemency on humanitarian grounds, all of these elements arguably persuaded President Yudhoyono.

Karma is a completely different story. During the court hearings, he refused to acknowledge his Indonesian citizenship but technically he remains an Indonesian national.

Unlike Corby, who has her government on her side, Karma is convicted for treason. This means he is seen as an enemy by the Indonesian state. Being a political prisoner, Karma does not feature much in both Australian and Indonesian media, and perhaps only human rights groups and a Papuan audience will know of him.

Unlike Corby, who requested clemency, Karma refused to take this path and maintained his position that the Indonesian state has breached his rights, not the other way around.

Therefore, it might not be so surprising that the government pays minimal attention to Karma, even though the UN Working Group has made a strong statement on his case and the UPR session reiterated this concern.

One of the indicators is the government’s unwillingness to intervene when Karma urgently needs medical treatment. In other words, for the government, Karma is just another Papuan considered an enemy of the state.

What lessons can we learn from these two cases? It is obvious that nationality matters. More importantly, the principle of equality before the law can be compromised if it comes to the interests of the state.

Corby’s and Karma’s cases suggest that the rule of law can be replaced by the rule of exception if the interests of the state are at stake. Unlike Corby, Karma does not have Australia in his corner.

He is unable to mobilize such a wealthy neighbor and a strong supporter for Indonesia in the Pacific region. He may have to face the reality that the Indonesian government will do little for him. ●

In memory of the 1999 Papua dialogue

In memory of the 1999 Papua dialogue

Budi Hernawan, a Franciscan friar and former director of the Office of Justice and Peace of the Catholic Church in Jayapura, Papua,

He is currently pursuing a doctorate at the Australian National University

Sumber : JAKARTA POST, 1 Maret 2012

Thirteen years ago today, Papua’s “Team 100” was invited by then president BJ Habibie to hold a national dialogue to discuss the Papua issue at the Presidential Palace in Jakarta.

It was no ordinary event. On the contrary, it was an extraordinary gathering of Papua’s leaders prompted by a widespread call for independence in the nation’s easternmost province.

It was marked by public demonstrations and the raising of the Papuan flag in a several cities.

All of this met with a harsh response from security forces. All of this occurred in the wake of the euphoria of Indonesia’s transition to democracy.

During the meeting 13 years ago, Team 100 leader Tom Beanal bluntly expressed Papuans’ desire to form an independent state separate from Indonesia.

This unexpected call shocked Habibie, as well as his Cabinet, who responded by asking Tom to return home and think things over.

The meeting did not result in anything meaningful. However, it became a milestone for Papuans, who presented their political aspirations with dignity and honor.

It must be underlined that none of Team 100 were arrested or charged with treason, as is now happening with the president of the so-called Federal Republic of West Papua, Forkorus Yaboisembut, and four of his followers who are being tried for alleged treason and are facing life imprisonment.

Thirteen years on, Papua’s cry for dialogue remains loud. In response, the Yudhoyono administration has held private and formal meetings with Papuan church leaders twice.

 President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has also appointed two special representatives, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Bambang Darmono and Dr. Farid Hussain, to address the issue of dialogue through different mechanisms.

What next in the last two years of Yudhoyono’s presidency? What can we expect as follow up? Will we see political negotiations, as we have seen in Aceh? All these questions remain unanswered.

As we know, dialogue is not the only game in town. Some Papuans do not share this view and have publicly expressed their determination to pursue international legal mediation to bring independence to Papuan.

However, it remains unclear to the public how this option could be achieved. Others have been advocating for Indonesia to recognize the sovereign state of Papua.

These advocates have been charged with treason and now are standing trial.

In daily life, we are confronted with other questions that. For instance, what will happen when Papua finally holds its long-delayed gubernatorial election?

Can the continuing violence in Papua’s highlands and the area near PT Freeport Indonesia’s operations be terminated?

The violence in those areas have caused a lot of tension, damage and deaths that urgently need to be addressed.

On the government side, we also observe a number of different interpretations on how to conduct a dialogue.

One approach holds that the dialog should be about Papua and not between Jakarta and Papua, as proposed by many voices in Papua. The logic of this argument is that Papua is part of Indonesia.

So the polarization of Jakarta and Papua will not help solve the problem. Rather, all stakeholders in Papua should have an equal opportunity to discuss the fate of Papua.

Following the Aceh model, other proponents argue that negotiations should be bipartisan, involving representatives from the Indonesian government and their Papuan counterparts. But this approach still augurs the question of who Papua’s representatives are and whether Papuans can be united.

Another approach asserts limits on any negotiations on the territorial integrity of Indonesia while preparing to offer a wide range of concessions, including granting amnesty for political prisoners, reviewing the 1969 Act of Free Choice, addressing human rights abuses and reviewing the implementation of special autonomy for Papua.

The last approach co-opts the whole point of dialogue by creating parallel events to discuss the same issues, albeit infused with completely different notions.

In the long run this may cause distraction and confusion if negotiations between Jakarta and Papua are realized.

Obviously, for the government, a Papuan dialogue is not the only game in town either. The Yudhoyono administration confronts many equally pressing issues, such as its energy policy, which has already sparked strong opposition from political opponents.

Meanwhile, unresolved corruption scandals continue to undermine the government’s legitimacy and its capacity to deliver public service.

Nevertheless, if we look back to 1999, Papua’s call for dialogue has not been resolved after 13 years, whereas preliminary engagement between Jakarta and Papua has signaled something positive.

It is time to take advantage of the goodwill from both sides despite all differences, which are common in any political settings.

The window of opportunity under the current administration will not be open for much longer and none of us can guarantee whether the next administration will still be willing to engage in dialogue.

It is also the time for Yudhoyono to conclude his final term by contributing to Indonesia’s democracy and resolving the problem of Papua once for all. ●