Rupiah dan Daya Saing Indonesia Kiki Verico  ;  Kepala Kajian Perdagangan Internasional LPEM FE UI

MEDIA INDONESIA,  23 Desember 2014

                                                                                                                       

BEBERAPA waktu belakangan ini, pemerintah dan Bank Indonesia disibukkan dengan pelemahan rupiah. Pelemahan sebenarnya sudah beberapa kali terjadi dalam dua tahun terakhir, yaitu awal 2012 dan akhir 2013 hingga awal 2014. Setelah itu, rupiah sempat menguat sampai pertengahan 2014, namun kembali melemah pada akhir 2014. Penyebab pelemahan rupiah dalam beberapa tahun terakhir ini memang beragam, tetapi bisa dikelompokkan dalam dua faktor besar, yaitu domestik dan luar negeri. Jika dilihat dari data dua tahun terakhir, sumber pelemahan di awal hingga pertengahan 2012 ialah faktor domestik, yaitu menurunnya daya saing ekonomi nasional dan jatuh tempo pembayaran luar negeri termasuk impor.Sementara itu, pelemahan pada triwulan terakhir di 2013 disebabkan karena faktor luar negeri, yaitu kebijakan pengurangan stimulus fiskal di Amerika Serikat (tapering-off) yang menjadi sinyal di seluruh dunia bahwa ekonomi Amerika membaik. Aliran modal kembali ke sana dan rupiah melemah. Hal serupa terjadi pada triwulan terakhir 2014, yaitu faktor luar negeri akibat melemahnya ekonomi Rusia dan simpang siur rencana kenaikan suku bunga US$. Indonesia cukup beruntung karena faktor domestik, seperti kenaikan harga BBM tidak terjadi bersamaan dengan faktor luar negeri sehingga tekanan terhadap rupiah tidak terlalu besar. Namun, agar rupiah tahan terhadap fluktuasi, harus kuat secara fundamental dan kuncinya terletak pada daya saing ekonomi nasional. Sebenarnya, pada periode 2012-2013 ekonomi nasional tumbuh lebih cepat dari laju inflasinya, yaitu 6,3% (2012) dan 5,8% (2013), sementara laju inflasi sekitar 4%. Namun, jika dilihat lebih jauh, penarik pertumbuhan ekonomi nasional ialah sektor yang tidak terkait langsung dengan daya saing (non-tradable), yaitu sektor jasa, seperti pengangkutan, komunikasi, real estate, dan jasa perusahaan. Sementara itu, sektor yang terkait langsung dengan daya saing (tradable) hanya tumbuh di subsektor penggalian, pertambangan bukan migas, dan perikanan. Alhasil, pertumbuhan ekonomi nasional tidak sepenuhnya menggambarkan peningkatan daya saing. Saat ini hanya pariwisata yang surplus devisa. Neraca perdagangan bahkan defisit untuk pertama kalinya di 2012, sehingga neraca transaksi berjalan ikut defisit pada periode 2012-2013. Dari sisi impor, dalam periode 20122014, defisit terjadi pada yang terkait minyak bumi dengan rata-rata impor sekitar US$10 miliar, sementara rata-rata ekspor US$ 4 miliar. Langkah pemerintah mengurangi subsidi BBM, mengevaluasi proses produksi domestik, dan impor BBM ialah langkah yang tepat mengingat kita bukan lagi net exporter dan minyak bumi ialah impor mahal yang membebani devisa dan rupiah. Cadangan devisa Indonesia sebesar 111 miliar US$ setara dengan 6 bulan pembiayaan luar negeri. Besaran itu masih di bawah rata-rata dunia sekitar 13 bulan dan secara nominal di bawah negara tetangga, seperti Singa pura (US$273 miliar), Thailand (US$168 miliar), dan Malaysia (US$132 miliar). Bagaimana agar pertumbuhan ekonomi mencerminkan daya saing?  Jawabannya ialah pertumbuhan ekonomi harus juga menghasilkan devisa, seperti meningkatkan ekspor, investasi jangka panjang dari dan ke luar negeri, transfer pendapatan tenaga kerja Indonesia di luar negeri, dan kunjungan turis asing. Jika dilihat dari daya saing perdagangan, produk unggulan Indonesia yang berdaya saing kuat, yaitu RCA (revealed comparative advealed comparative advantage) lebih dari satu, constant market share analysis (CMSA) positif, harga ekspor per harga impor lebih kecil dari satu, dan sebaran pasar atau GHI (gini hirschman index) lebih kecil dari 0,5 ialah hasil sumber daya alam (SDA) nonmineral, seperti minyak nabati dan hewani, kopi, teh, cokelat, kayu, kertas, karet, tembakau, dan SDA mineral, seperti timah, tembaga, dan bijih besi. Sementara itu, produk industri terbatas pada instrumen musik, alas kaki, tekstil, dan perlengkapan mandi. Hasil laut termasuk ikan juga merupakan produk unggulan dan sumber devisa negara sehingga langkah pemerintah menjaga hasil laut dari pencurian ikan ialah langkah yang tepat. Indonesia perlu menggeser daya saing perdagangan dari hasil SDA ke produk industri.Kontribusi sektor industri terhadap PDB terus menurun dari 28% (2008) ke 24% (2013).Jika itu dihubungkan dengan rendahnya kontribusi sektor pertanian pada PDB, yaitu 15% dengan serapan pekerja 42%, yakni 80% di antaranya ialah pekerja informal. Upaya pemerintah mengembangkan industri berbasis pertanian termasuk di dalamnya perikanan ialah kebijakan yang tepat. Langkah selanjutnya ialah menguasai pasar dunia. Caranya bisa dilakukan dengan membantu pendirian restoran dan toko-toko yang menjual kebutuhan pokok Indonesia di luar negeri. Restoran dan toko-toko itu bisa menjadi sarana untuk memasarkan produk industri pertanian Indonesia di seluruh dunia. Selain menghasilkan devisa, cara itu efektif untuk semakin memperluas jaringan industri makanan dan minuman khas Indonesia di luar negeri. Di masa depan pun para pekerja Indonesia di luar negeri memiliki pilihan untuk tidak bekerja sebagai asisten rumah tangga, tetapi bekerja formal di restoran dan toko-toko penjual kebutuhan pokok asal Indonesia. Dari sisi investasi, Indonesia cukup menjanjikan. Proporsi PMA per PDB meningkat cukup baik dari 0,73% (2004) ke 2,18% (2012). Efisiensi investasi juga membaik seiring dengan penurunan ICOR (incremental capital output ratio) dari 4 (2004-2008) ke 3,92 (2009-2012). Indikasi yang paling penting ialah mulai diperhitungkannya Indonesia dalam jaringan produksi global atau kawasan. Indonesia ialah negara penerima investasi ASEAN tertinggi. Cepat atau lambat orientasi investasi asing jangka panjang (FDI inflows) di Indonesia akan bergeser dari memanfaatkan Indonesia sebagai sumber bahan mentah dan pemasaran produk ke salah satu basis produksi atau bagian dari jaringan produksi global.  Indikasi baik itu membutuhkan syarat, yaitu Indonesia harus meningkatkan kualitas sumber daya manusia (SDM). Jika dilihat dari klasifikasi UNESCO (2013), Indonesia masuk dalam kategori negara `menengah', berada di bawah Singapura dan Brunei yang masuk kategori `sangat tinggi', dan Malaysia serta Thailand yang masuk kategori `tinggi'. Saat ini proporsi penduduk dengan pendidikan SMA ke atas meningkat dari 21% (2001) ke 32% (2012). Namun, dari sisi pekerja dengan keahlian tinggi, menurut indikator pengeluaran R&D per PDB, jumlah publikasi di jurnal internasional paten dan jumlah peneliti teknik serta rekayasa teknik per 1.000 penduduk, Indonesia tetap tertinggal jika dibandingkan dengan Singapura, Malaysia, dan Thailand. Itu pekerjaan rumah jangka panjang bagi pemerintah. Selain meningkatkan daya saing perdagangan, manajemen energi, investasi, dan SDM, yang juga harus diperhatikan ialah ketersediaan infrastruktur yang berkualitas dan iklim investasi yang kondusif. Kedua hal itu terkait dengan peran pemerintah dalam menyediakan barang dan pelayanan publik yang baik. Jika semua itu ditingkatkan, daya saing ekonomi Indonesia akan membaik dan rupiah lebih stabil. ●

Trade challenges and Indonesia’s ideal response

Trade challenges and Indonesia’s ideal response Kiki Verico ;   The writer is co-editor of Journal of Economics and Finance in Indonesia (EFI) published by the Institute for Economic and Social Research at the University of Indonesia’s School of Economics, currently living in Canberra

JAKARTA POST, 15 Februari 2013

In mid-January this year, the World Bank (WB) released its Global Economic Prospects that showed that the source of global economic growth was still largely contributed by developing countries’ economic growth. The WB estimates that economic growth of developing countries may potentially increase from 5.1 percent in 2012 to 5.7 percent in 2013 while economic growth of developed countries in 2013 is estimated to stand still at 1.3 percent as it was in 2012. An important engine of developing countries’ economic growth is international trade, also known as “trade-led growth”, which requires fair trade circumstances. Yet, the recent global economic turmoil that decreased global market demand can easily deceive countries to gain trade surplus by imposing protectionism on the demand-side economy using either tariffs or quotas. If this happens then the classic mercantilism doctrine is likely to reemerge worldwide. The doctrine itself was proven to fail hundreds of years ago because of its inability to predict “retaliation actions” from trade partners. International economic theory has warned that import protection does not come without a cost. Banning import policy on trade partner products in a country’s domestic market will encourage similar banning policies from its trade partners in their respective domestic markets. Protection is myopically popular for the short-term yet actually generates “deadweight loss” and costs the economy in the long run. This deadweight loss can be seen from an increase in domestic prices. It often burdens net buyers and worsens both urban and rural poverty. Besides, protection induces rent-seeking behavior. Take for example the recent bribery case on Indonesia’s beef import quotas. On the other side of the coin, protection will oppress exporting countries and in the end, fluctuate the international price. At the global level, when countries are trapped in this trade retaliation, international trade will naturally be set back into a “lose-lose situation”.  Trade protection stimulates a global trade protection as the “dominant strategy” which resembles a cycle of revenge. This causes international trade to be caught in a severe recovery path. In order to prevent international trade from being held hostage by this retaliation trap, the WTO has to impose its important role in “dispute and settlement” issues and resolve any trade quarrels. Its member states must comply with multilateral agreements in order to maintain both conditions where (1) no country turns to be “the only country that imposed such trade barriers” and (2) the international trade system remains on the right track. An emerging economy like Indonesia needs to be cautious in formulating its trade policies because the impact will not only affect its domestic market but also the global economy. This year Indonesia is appointed to be the host for the ninth Ministerial Conference, the topmost decision-making body of the WTO. The world will witness whether Indonesia is in fact on board to harmonize the pendulum between her domestic interests and the multilateral economic rationales. My own calculations on Indonesia’s trade comparative advantage with the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) index before the global economic crisis (2006-2008) and afterward (2009-2011) shows that Indonesia‘s comparative trade advantage still remains in the primary sector of agricultural and food products, fuels and mining and the labor intensive sector of textiles and clothing products. My other calculation, using the constant market share analysis (CMSA) method, shows that after the global economic crisis, Indonesia’s manufacturing exports have been growing faster than those of global exports. The latter indicates that recently Indonesia has not only relied on the primary and labor intensive sector but has in fact gone up into a higher value-added sector of manufacturing exports. Hence, what about Indonesia’s supply-side economy?  One of the useful figures is the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum (WEF) that describes the supply-side economy of countries and frames them in ranks. In its 2012-2013 report, it shows that Indonesia’s competitiveness rank has slightly decreased from 44 out of 139 countries (2010-2011) to 50 out of 144 countries (2012-2013).  Indonesia’s situation is rather interesting, market size-wise. Indonesia’s rank for this factor is 16 out of 144 countries which establishes her to become one of the G-20 member states. In addition, Indonesia has performed great on the macroeconomic environment at rank 25 and rather good on innovation and business sophistication factors at rank 40. However, this report shows Indonesia still has to work harder in enhancing its supply-side economy: one, for basic requirements of infrastructure due to her fairly low rank of 78, institutions (72) and health and primary education (70). Two, for efficiency enhancers of labor market efficiency due to her lowest rank of 120, technological readiness (85), higher education and training (73), financial market development (70) and goods market efficiency (63). For mercantilism doctrines to have net export surplus by simply protecting demand-side economy through the implementation of import trade barriers, with no regard to managing production base competitiveness, is simply counterproductive. To increase economic growth via trade, a country needs to boost its supply-side economy.  This requires an immense and comprehensive effort as the main objective is to achieve both the country’s comparative and competitive advantage. Ideally, each country including Indonesia should focus on strenghtening its supply-side economy instead of risking becoming entangled in the demand-side protectionism and trade retaliation trap. ●

Can ASEAN achieve economic community?

Can ASEAN achieve economic community? Kiki Verico ;  A Researcher at the Institute for Economic and Social Research Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia (LPEM FEUI); He obtained his doctorate from Waseda University in Tokyo

JAKARTA POST, 24 Desember 2012

The history of regional economic integration in Europe tells us that an economic community is an essential stage prior to achieving a common market (CM).  Economic community begins with the free flow of goods (trade integration) to the free flow of capital (investment integration), then service sector liberalization and the free flow of people.  These are all necessary conditions for a common market. ASEAN is attempting to achieve comprehensive regional economic integration through its economic community scheme, ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 2015.  ASEAN is in the early stages of regional economic integration, which is in intra regional trade with the role of AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area). Although ASEAN intra-regional trade increased from 17.5 percent in 1990 (before the implementation of AFTA) to 24.5 percent in 2009 (after the implementation of AFTA), average ASEAN intra-investment share is still fairly small at around 14 percent of total FDI inflows in ASEAN.  To achieve economic community, ASEAN needs to enhance its trade and investment integration. The EU needs a custom union (CU), but ASEAN does not have a custom union. Yet, an ADBI study on the Asian-wide economic community highlights an attainable option for ASEAN: “Once a region-wide FTA is formed, it may also be easier for Asian Countries to establish a custom union […] as the European Economic Community did in 1968” (ADBI, 2010) This shows that regional economic organizations in Asia could achieve economic community throughout the “region-wide frameworks”. ASEAN has two two frameworks: the ASEAN Plus and AFTA Plus One. Could these be ways for ASEAN to achieve economic community as the EU did?  There are two essential differences between ASEAN and the EU that explains why ASEAN’s economic integration pattern is dissimilar to the EU’s. But despite the differences, ASEAN could still attain economic community. First, ASEAN economic integration is slightly market-driven, while the EU is government-driven. The fact that ASEAN is market-driven makes it feasible for it to adopt “open regionalism” framework, which widens ASEAN’s economic cooperation to non-member states, whereas the EU’s custom union is an exclusive trade liberalization among its member states.  Second, ASEAN’s decision making process model is bottom-up with an intergovernmentalism mechanism known as soft regionalism, while the EU’s is top-down with a supra national body mechanism known as hard-regionalism. It is believed that the latter model helps accelerate the decision making process in the region. Yet the soft-regionalism model is compatible only with open-regionalism, therefore it is feasible for ASEAN to widen its regional economic cooperation to non-member states.  In Asia, trade creation effects are higher than trade diversion effects (Urata and Okabe, 2007). Trade creation is effective in the enhancement of intra regional investment. Recent data also shows that intra ASEAN investment has demonstrated significant growth, particularly after the Asian economic crises and the implementation of the CEPT in 2003. Since ASEAN’s trade creation is higher than trade diversion, the enlargement of ASEAN’s economic cooperation to non-member states will, in the long-run, increase FDI investment inflows in ASEAN.  Moreover, this will increase the effectiveness of AFTA in attracting FDI inflows. Recently, AFTA has only been effective in enchancing intra regional trade. The combination of AFTA and the enlargement of ASEAN regionalism to non-members using the “ASEAN Plus and AFTA Plus One” will help ASEAN achieve comprehensive trade and investment integration in the economic community.  In addition, this ASEAN-wide regionalism will create a “win-win solution” for the member states, non-member states and the multilateral agreements (WTO). For its member states, regional enlargement under the “ASEAN umbrella” will defunct the complicated direct individual Bilateral FTA (BFTA) among ASEAN’s members and non-members. ASEAN enlargement will also protect ASEAN member states from the “hub-spoke” problem that can emerge when a member state deals directly with non-member states (BFTA). In ASEAN’s case, BFTA also substitutes the role of AFTA in attracting FDI inflows while weakening ASEAN’s intra regional trade. The latter proves that a “noodle-bowl” exists in ASEAN (Verico, 2011). For non-member states, regional-wide FTA will minimize discriminative action against non-members (Drysdale, 2006; Garnaut, 1994; Yamazawa, 1990). This effect is in line with the main objective of non-dicriminative action among countries (Most Favored Nation), and this confirms that a regional-wide arrangement is complementary to the WTO multilateral agreements (Lamy, 2007).  The world will see that a regional economic organization can achieve economic community through either the utilization of a custom union like the EU or the implementation of regional-wide frameworks such as ASEAN-wide regionalism. The latter will complete the WTO’s main purpose of reducing trade discrimination among countries and shifting the ASEAN economic integration from regional free trade area to regional economic community. Back to my initial question, is it possible for ASEAN to achieve economic community without facing major difficulties? ●