Tragedi Ikan di Laut Tiongkok Selatan I Made Andi Arsana ;   Head Office of International Affairs Directorate of Partnership; Alumnus and Global Initiatives UGM

                                                        KOMPAS, 05 April 2016

                                                                                                                                                           

                                                                                                                                                           

Kapal nelayan Tiongkok ditengarai menangkap ikan di Laut Tiongkok Selatan, di dekat Natuna. Petugas Indonesia pun ketika itu siap menindak mereka. Ternyata, kapal nelayan Tiongkok itu "dikawal" kapal besar dengan peralatan lengkap. Petugas Indonesia yakin kapal Tiongkok itu masuk ke perairan Indonesia, sementara Tiongkok juga yakin kapalnya beraktivitas di perairan Tiongkok. Apa pasalnya? Berdasarkan Konvensi PBB tentang Hukum Laut (UNCLOS) yang diakui dan diratifikasi oleh Indonesia dan Tiongkok, sebuah negara pantai berhak atas kawasan laut/zona maritim yang diukur dari garis pangkal (garis pantai). Zona maritim itu meliputi laut teritorial (12 mil laut), zona tambahan (24 mil laut), Zona Ekonomi Eksklusif (ZEE) (200 mil laut) dan landas kontinen (dasar laut) dengan lebar bisa lebih dari 200 mil laut. Zona maritim Di Laut Tiongkok Selatan (LTS), Indonesia berhak atas zona maritim yang diukur dari Kepulauan Natuna ke arah utara. Demikian juga negara-negara tetangga-terutama Vietnam dan Malaysia-mereka punya hak yang sama. Karena jarak yang berdekatan, klaim maritim negara-negara itu saling tumpang tindih sehingga perlu penetapan batas maritim. Indonesia sudah menetapkan batas maritim (dasar laut) dengan Malaysia (1969) dan Vietnam (2003), tetapi belum menetapkan batas ZEE. Meskipun garis batas ZEE belum disepakati, Indonesia sudah mengajukan usulan yang dituangkan dalam Peta NKRI. Peta NKRI 2015, misalnya, memuat klaim garis batas ZEE Indonesia di sebelah utara Natuna di kawasan LTS. Meskipun ini klaim sepihak yang masih perlu kesepakatan dengan Vietnam dan Malaysia, Indonesia menjadikan ini sebagai dasar untuk mendefinisikan kawasan laut termasuk wilayah pengelolaan perikanan. Dalam perspektif Indonesia, batas terluar kawasan laut Indonesia sudah jelas meskipun sebagian dari batas-batas ini baru klaim sepihak yang perlu disepakati dengan tetangga. Tiongkok tak pernah dianggap tetangga oleh Indonesia dalam konteks batas maritim. Jika berpedoman pada UNCLOS, hak zona maritim Tiongkok tidak tumpang tindih dengan Indonesia sehingga tak perlu penetapan batas maritim. Namun, Tiongkok punya pandangan lain. Sejak 1947, Tiongkok mengajukan klaim dalam bentuk peta dengan garis putus-putus yang melingkupi sebagian besar kawasan LTS. Konon, dasarnya alasan sejarah meski banyak hal yang belum jelas perihal klaim ini. Inilah yang rupanya menjadi alasan mengapa lokasi insiden itu disebut "Chinese traditional fishing ground" oleh Tiongkok. Garis yang dikenal dengan nine-dashed line itu diprotes semua negara di kawasan, termasuk Indonesia yang menolak melalui PBB. Secara legal, nine-dashed line Tiongkok itu "tidak ada" bagi negara-negara di kawasan. Tiongkok sudah meratifikasi UNCLOS sehingga seharusnya mengklaim laut berdasarkan UNCLOS dengan lebar tertentu dan diukur dari garis pangkal. Klaim laut harus jelas jaraknya dari daratan sesuai ketentuan UNCLOS. Nine-dashed line jelas tak mengikuti kaidah ini. Di sisi lain, Tiongkok mungkin bisa berargumen bahwa klaim laut itu diukur dari daratan Kepulauan Spratly yang mereka klaim. Namun, klaim itu masih disengketakan negara lain. Lagi pula, kalaupun klaim laut itu diukur dari Kepulauan Spratly, bentuknya tak akan seperti nine-dashed line. Yang menjadi persoalan, klaim Tiongkok di LTS ini tumpang tindih dengan klaim maritim Indonesia di sebelah utara Natuna. Meski sama-sama sepihak, klaim Indonesia cenderung lebih kuat karena berdasarkan hukum yang berlaku (UNCLOS) dan Tiongkok pertimbangan sejarah. Bolak balik terjadi Kedatangan nelayan Tiongkok ke kawasan laut di sebelah utara Natuna ini sudah terjadi setidaknya tiga kali (2010, 2013, 2016). Indonesia yang meyakini dan ingin menegaskan klaimnya tentu berusaha menangkap atau mengusir nelayan Tiongkok dengan tuduhan illegal fishing. Tiongkok sepertinya telah bersiap diri dan bahkan seakan "mengawal" aktivitas nelayan itu dengan kapal besar. Setiap kali nelayan akan ditangkap petugas Indonesia, kapal "pengawal" hadir melindungi. Menariknya, posisi kapal nelayan Tiongkok memang selalu berada di kawasan dalam lingkup klaim nine-dashed line. Rupanya Tiongkok memang serius menegaskan klaimnya berdasarkan nine-dashed line meskipun jelas-jelas tidak diakui negara-negara lain. Apakah tindakan Indonesia benar? Sebagai negara berdaulat yang mengklaim laut sesuai hukum internasional, Indonesia tidak bisa membiarkan aktivitas nelayan Tiongkok di kawasan itu. Maka, penangkapan dan protes formal menjadi logis. Meski demikian, perlu diingat bahwa garis-garis batas di kawasan itu adalah klaim sepihak yang masih perlu disepakati dengan tetangga. Maka dari itu, mengajukan kasus ini ke pengadilan internasional, misalnya, bukan langkah strategis. Apakah Indonesia dan Tiongkok perlu menetapkan batas maritim di LTS? Posisi Indonesia jelas, klaim Tiongkok yang berdasarkan sejarah itu tidak diakui dan artinya tidak ada tumpang tindih klaim yang perlu diselesaikan. Dalam konteks batas maritim, Tiongkok bukan tetangga Indonesia. Namun, Tiongkok hadir di kawasan itu dan menegaskan klaimnya berdasarkan nine-dashed line adalah fakta. Indonesia tentu tidak bisa mengabaikan ini begitu saja dan harus bersiap-siap dengan strategi terbaik. Semua pihak di Indonesia perlu memiliki pemahaman yang sama terhadap kasus ini. Semangat melindungi sumber daya perlu didukung pemahaman terhadap hukum laut termasuk aspek geospasial sehingga paham konteks legal dan teknisnya. Di sisi lain, kita perlu paham bahwa Indonesia adalah pihak "netral" dalam sengketa wilayah/kedaulatan di LTS dan telah berperan aktif menawarkan solusi. Semangat untuk menjaga kedaulatan itu penting dipelihara sambil tetap memainkan peran pemimpin yang bijaksana dan layak disegani di kawasan. ●

Ambalat Lagi    I Made Andi Arsana  ;   Dosen Teknik Geodesi UGM; Peneliti Isu Perbatasan Internasional

KOMPAS, 04 Juli 2015

                                                                                                                                                           

                                                                                                                                                           

Pada 2005 silam hubungan Indonesia dan Malaysia sempat memanas karena sengketa Blok Ambalat di Laut Sulawesi. Satu dekade berlalu, ternyata Ambalat mencuat lagi dan menimbulkan keresahan yang hampir sama. Perihal perbatasan memang tidak sederhana. Indonesia berbagi daratan dengan Malaysia di Borneo sebagai konsekuensi dari kolonialisasi Inggris dan Belanda. Prinsip bahwa wilayah dan batas wilayah suatu negara mengikuti penjajahnya dianut berbagai negara di dunia dewasa ini. Meski garis batas darat sudah jelas, garis batas lautnya belum ditetapkan. Garis batas darat antara Indonesia dan Malaysia berakhir di sisi timur daratan Borneo, memotong Pulau Sebatik. Idealnya, garis batas yang memotong Pulau Sebatik inilah yang diteruskan ke arah Laut Sulawesi sehingga menjadi pembagi kawasan laut bagi kedua negara. Sayangnya, garis ini belum kunjung terwujud sehingga pembagian laut di Laut Sulawesi belum tuntas hingga kini. Pelanggaran? Jika demikian, mengapa ada berita pelanggaran? Mengapa kita bisa yakin menuduh Malaysia memasuki wilayah Indonesia di Ambalat? Perlu dipahami bahwa meskipun Indonesia dan Malaysia belum bersepakat tentang pembagian kawasan laut, kedua negara sudah mencoba mengklaim secara sepihak. Tidak saja mengklaim, sejak 1960-an Indonesia bahkan sudah menetapkan kawasan konsesi dengan membuat kavling/blok dasar laut yang mengandung minyak atau hidrokarbon lainnya. Blok konsesi ini dieksplorasi perusahaan profesional yang mendapat izin. Salah satu kavling tersebut bernama Ambalat (1999) dan satu lagi bernama East Ambalat (2004). Malaysia tidak protes secara eksplisit, seakan-akan menyetujui. Meski demikian, pada 1979 Malaysia mengajukan klaim sepihaknya melalui sebuah peta yang tumpang tindih dengan klaim Indonesia. Indonesia menganggap Malaysia salah karena mengklaim apa yang sudah diklaim Indonesia. Namun, perlu diingat, di Laut Sulawesi belum ada garis batas maritim yang disepakati sehingga belum jelas secara hukum internasional kawasan laut milik Indonesia maupun Malaysia. Keadaan memburuk ketika pada 2005 Malaysia memberikan konsesi atas blok yang sebelumnya sudah dikonsesikan Indonesia. Pecahlah kasus Ambalat jilid 1. Perlu diingat lagi, Ambalat adalah blok dasar laut, bukan pulau, bukan daratan. Nama Ambalat ini diberikan Indonesia, sedangkan Malaysia menyebutnya ND6 dan ND7. Milik siapa blok tersebut? Indonesia mengklaimnya, Malaysia juga. Keduanya belum bersepakat karena pembagian kawasan laut di Laut Sulawesi belum tuntas. Sampai kini Indonesia dan Malaysia masih merundingkannya secara intensif. Maju, tetapi belum tuntas Sejak 2005 sekitar 30 perundingan sudah dilakukan. Ada kemajuan, tetapi belum tuntas. Memang tidak mudah menetapkan batas maritim. Indonesia dan Vietnam perlu 25 tahun, dengan Singapura bahkan hingga 41 tahun untuk batas maritim yang relatif pendek. Jika melihat peta NKRI tahun 2015, tampak bahwa Indonesia menganggap Blok Ambalat adalah bagian dari NKRI. Sementara itu, menurut peta Malaysia 1979, Blok Ambalat dianggap bagian dari Malaysia. Tumpang susun peta Indonesia dan Malaysia memperlihatkan klaim tumpang tindih. Itulah yang saat ini dirundingkan. Indonesia tentu punya argumen kuat akan klaimnya. Malaysia mungkin punya keyakinan yang sama. Mengapa tidak dibagi dua saja dengan garis tengah? Konvensi PBB tentang Hukum Laut (UNCLOS) sebagai dasar hukum tidak mengatur secara eksplisit metode yang harus digunakan. UNCLOS mewajibkan dua negara bersengketa untuk mencapai "solusi yang adil", yang artinya "terserah" kepada kedua negara. Maka, peran negosiator sangat penting. Jika tidak selesai dalam negosiasi, kasus ini bisa dibawa ke lembaga peradilan, seperti Mahkamah Internasional atau International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea meski tanda-tandanya belum ada. Untuk menyelesaikan kasus perbatasan dengan Malaysia, Indonesia menunjuk utusan khusus, yaitu Duta Besar Eddy Pratomo. Tugasnya tidak hanya menyelesaikan kasus Ambalat di Laut Sulawesi, tetapi juga kawasan lain yang belum tuntas: Selat Malaka, Selat Singapura, dan Laut Tiongkok Selatan. Kini kedua negara harus mempercepat penyelesaian batas maritim dan menahan diri untuk tidak melakukan tindakan provokatif di kawasan yang masih dalam sengketa. Media juga bertanggung jawab menyajikan berita obyektif agar masyarakat tidak mudah tersulut. Membela bangsa itu wajib, tetapi tidak dengan menebar kebencian kepada bangsa lain. Membela bangsa harus dengan nasionalisme yang cerdas dan terhormat. ●

Mapping good fences with Timor Leste

Mapping good fences with Timor Leste I Made Andi Arsana  ;   A Lecturer at the Department of Geodetic Engineering, Gadjah Mada University (UGM), Yogyakarta

JAKARTA POST, 08 April 2013

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono met with Timor Leste Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao on the issue of borders and ASEAN (The Jakarta Post, March 21). This reminds us that Indonesia and Timor Leste have yet to settle their shared land and maritime boundaries. I remember my involvement in land-boundary mapping back in 2003. Ten years after the survey, the land boundaries have still not been completed. It seems that the talk on settling boundaries is in line with the spirit of Timor Leste’s President Taur Matan Ruak. Within the first few days after his election, President Ruak made a reasonably strong statement regarding the issue of maritime boundaries between Timor Leste and Australia. The Sydney Morning Herald (April 17, 2012) wrote, “New East Timor president to take tough stance on boundary issues”. Furthermore, Ruak was quoted as saying ‘’I see Australia is always a problem in negotiations because they want to get a bigger percentage. Most of their agreements depend just on political, not legal, negotiations.’’ It seems that President Ruak views the issue of maritime boundaries, especially those with Australia, as a top priority of his administration. I remember in 2004 meeting with Ramos Horta, the then foreign minister of Timor Leste, when he gave a talk in Sydney. He argued how important it was for Timor Leste to secure its entitlement over oil and gas in the Timor Sea through certain divisions of the maritime area. In line with his statement, Mari Alkatiri, the then prime minister of Timor Leste, termed maritime boundary delimitation with Australia as a matter of “life or death”. Following this, in 2006, Australia and Timor Leste agreed on the Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS). It seems that Timor Leste’s leaders pay a great deal of attention to maritime boundaries with its neighbors. This is understandable since maritime boundaries are essential for the country to have access to the oil and gas on which its economy heavily relies. This begs the question, however, “How about maritime boundaries with Indonesia?” How does Indonesia view the urgency of maritime boundary settlement with Timor Leste? Timor Leste is Indonesia’s 10th neighbor with which maritime boundaries need to be settled. Even though the maritime boundary issue with Timor Leste is not as pressing as that with Malaysia, for example, it does not mean that settlement is unimportant. Up to now, negotiations on the maritime boundaries with Timor Leste have yet to start. The main reason for the delay is that land boundaries between the two countries have yet to be finalized. Indonesia and Timor Leste have managed to demarcate around 97 percent of the total land boundaries: on eastern and western sides. These two sets of land boundaries are the consequence of the fact that Timor Leste has two main land territories on Timor Island that are separated by Indonesian territory. Oecussi is an enclaved land territory of Timor Leste that is geographically located within Indonesia’s territory. This also generates complicated consequences regarding the movement of people and goods between the two separated territories. In addition, this also causes a convoluted maritime delimitation between Indonesia and Timor Leste. There are three locations where maritime boundaries need to be settled: the Ombai Strait, Wetar Strait and Timor Sea. While all the three are equally important, it is fair to say that maritime boundaries in the Timor Sea are more urgent since that ocean hosts a larger amount of fishing and other economic activities. Unfortunately, pending land boundaries have prevented both countries from starting negotiations on the maritime boundaries. This is, to an extent, understandable since the terminal/end point of any land boundary will serve as the starting point of the maritime boundaries. Ideally, Indonesia and Timor Leste will finalize their land boundaries first before starting maritime boundary negotiations. However, this is not the only way to proceed. There are a number of things to discuss in relation to maritime boundaries and “defining the starting point” of the boundary line is just one of them. Therefore, negotiations could start before the completion of land boundaries. The two countries can start to discuss the possible methods and approaches to maritime delimitation. If it is done properly, it is not impossible that intensive discussions on maritime boundaries could also indirectly speed up the land boundary demarcations. Indonesia’s preferred boundaries with Timor Leste are clearly depicted on the official map of Indonesia. Meanwhile, Timor Leste seems to base its position on its Maritime Zone Act, which details its maritime claims. In delimitation, it is likely that both countries would prefer, at least to start with, negotiations, even though mediation and arbitration are also possible. However, there seems no urgency for the two countries to approach a third party, such as the International Court of Justice, for maritime delimitations. It is worth nothing that Timor Leste is now party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (CLOS). It ratified the convention on Jan. 8, 2013, and is the latest country to ratify. This can help the negotiations between Indonesia and Timor Leste as the two can now use the CLOS as their legal basis in conducting their negotiations. However, it is worth noting that maritime boundaries are a matter of mutual agreement and the existence of a common legal basis is no guarantee of success. The spirit of the leaders of Indonesia and Timor Leste on border issues is a positive sign to accelerate the maritime boundary negotiations between the two. Defining boundaries is essentially mapping good fences between the two neighboring countries. This is important; as Robert Frost once asserted in his poem, “Mending Wall”, “good fences make good neighbors”. ●

Are we losing more island after Sipadan-Ligitan?

Are we losing more island after Sipadan-Ligitan? I Made Andi Arsana ; The writer is a lecturer at the department of geodetic engineering, Gadjah Mada University; He is currently an Alison Sudradjat Award Scholar for research fellowship at the Australian National Center for Ocean Resources and Security, University of Wollongong

JAKARTA POST, 30 Januari 2013

On Jan. 19, okezone.com reported that Indonesia’s Semakau Island had been claimed by Singapore. In Indonesia, news about island claims, sovereignty issues and international disputes easily attract more attention compared to other matters. Such issues are sexy content for the media to play with.  In response to that, the governor of Kepulauan Riau, HM Sani sent a letter to Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, for clarification. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs clarified that there was more than one island called Semakau and the one in question was in fact Singapore’s. The issue came about because Semakau Island was depicted on an official Singaporean map, apparently the governor thought that the island depicted on the Singaporean map was Indonesia’s.  It is now clear that was not the case. Ramadhan Pohan, deputy chairman of the House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Commission I, also clarified the issue by providing comprehensive data obtained from both Indonesia and Singapore (JPPN.com, Jan. 22). This case reminds us of another similar case in 2005 regarding Berhala Island.  It was found that Malaysia promoted Berhala Island as a tourist destination and some parties in Indonesia thought that the one promoted was Indonesia’s. In fact there are several islands called Berhala and the one promoted was Malaysia’s.  Lesson learned: Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are similar in many aspects, so it is not uncommon to have similarities even island names. Now, enough with Semakau and Berhala: The most important question is “are we really losing more islands?” Is it really true that the case of Pulau Sipadan and Ligitan, which Indonesia lost in 2002, can happen to other islands?  The case of Sipadan and Ligitan is always cited whenever cases concerning sovereignty over islands are raised. Indonesia, with thousands of islands, is likely to face similar issues concerning island claims and even sovereignty disputes in the future. How are we required to anticipate these potential issues in the future? First and foremost, it is important for us, citizens, and especially government officials, to know the geographic configuration of our country as well as other neighboring countries. It certainly is not nice to panic or to be confused about such a serious thing as sovereignty just because we do not know that other country shares island names.  Second, it is important to understand that the sovereignty of an island that has been officially part of one country’s territory cannot be taken over easily by other country through effective occupation.  The case of Sipadan and Ligitan is completely different. Malaysia won the case for the reason effective occupation because those islands were ownerless (terra nullius) when they were disputed by Indonesia and Malaysia.  Many people misunderstood, thinking that the two islands were once Indonesia’s and then taken over by Malaysia.  It was not the case. Indonesia and Malaysia claimed the islands and they did not manage to settle the dispute through negotiation so they brought the case before the International Court of Justice. The court then decided the case based on a principle called “effectivités” or effective occupation. It confirmed that Malaysia and its predecessor, Great Britain, had done a lot to the ownerless islands compared to Indonesia and its predecessor, the Netherlands, had done.  As a senior government official once said and I agree, Indonesia did not lose any islands it just failed to add two more. This might sound like a joke but the statement explains the situation nearly perfectly. Third, it is important to take care of small islands — especially the outer ones. For an archipelagic country like Indonesia, those small outer islands are essential in defining baselines, the imaginary lines from which maritime areas are measured. It is worth noting that taking care of those islands should not be motivated by a phobic reason: Not to lose them.  We take care of small islands not because we are afraid that other countries will take them away from us but for the prosperity of people residing on or around the islands. Sending a lot of people from the capital to hold a flag-raising ceremony on a small island might be a good idea but we should not forget that people residing in the island need more than just a-few-hours of happiness on Independence Day.  A flag-raising ceremony can certainly boost the spirit of nationalism but it will not solve the problems they are facing: Education, health, transportation, to name a few. Fourth, it is a good idea to have a general understanding of cartography, how maps depict territory of countries. It is important to understand that the inclusion of an island belonging to country A in a national map of country B does not necessarily mean a sovereignty claim by country B. A complete Indonesian map, for example, may also show Singapore and other neighboring countries.  The use of color, tone, intensity and legend in particular will tell what a map really means by showing an object of territory. So, are we losing more islands? As much as we should take care of small islands, we are not doing it merely to prevent other countries from claiming them.  We are doing it for more practical reason: Prosperity. So no, we are not losing more islands. ●

Three decades of the Constitution of the Oceans

Three decades of the Constitution of the Oceans I Made Andi Arsana ;  A Lecturer at the School of Geodetic Engineering, Gadjah Mada University, A PhD Candidate with the Australian Leadership Awards at the University of Wollongong, Australia

JAKARTA POST,  07 Januari 2013

  

I was lucky enough to attend the celebration of the 30th anniversary of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) at the UN Secretariat in New York on Dec. 10, 2012. Tommy Koh, Singapore’s ambassador at large, described UNCLOS as the “Constitution of the Oceans” and viewed it as the most comprehensive legal guideline governing oceanic affairs and the law of the sea. In his short speech, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon asserted that the convention had been playing an important role in ocean governance and it would continue to do so. He also called for universal commitment to the convention.  With 163 countries and the European Union having ratified the convention, now the majority of counties in the world are party to UNLCOS. This indicates that provisions in the convention have been accepted by almost the entire world. Almost, because there are some key countries like the United States that have yet to ratify the convention. In his inspiring speech to the general assembly, Ambassador Tommy Koh, who served as the president of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea that produced UNCLOS, urged the United States to ratify UNLCOS.  I believe that Ambassador Koh is not alone in this desire. While the presence of the US might not make a dramatic change in relation to UNCLOS implementation, to have such a big and powerful country like the US on board UNCLOS would certainly build confidence.  This was well responded to by the US delegation during its remarks by asserting that the ratification of UNCLOS had support from US President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.  It is true in fact that the Obama administration might be close to UNCLOS ratification. However, the plan seems to take a long time to finalize and one cannot expect that the US will act swiftly in this regard. Having listened to speeches from different regions and countries during the commemoration, I remembered the role of Indonesia. Five years ago, I also attended the celebration of the 25th anniversary of UNCLOS in New York and Hasjim Djalal of Indonesia was one of the keynote speakers. Unfortunately, he was not in New York for the 30th anniversary.  Even though UNCLOS veterans from Indonesia were not present during the celebration, Indonesia’s role in the birth of UNCLOS is undeniable. Mochtar Kusumaatmaja and Djalal are among the Indonesians who played important roles during the nine-year negotiation of UNCLOS.  The adoption of the archipelagic-state concept cannot be separated from Indonesia’s proposal supported by other countries with similar geographical configurations.  Before the incorporation of the archipelagic-state concept in UNCLOS, a country like Indonesia could only claim the maritime area (territorial sea) around the coast of each island. Consequently, there were high seas (free seas) between islands for example between Java and Kalimantan that did not belong to Indonesia, which was viewed as a disadvantage.  The archipelagic concept in UNCLOS fixes this issue by allowing archipelagic states like Indonesia to enclose their entire archipelagoes by designating archipelagic baselines connecting the outermost points of its outer islands. This enables Indonesia to secure the entire waters within its archipelago as archipelagic waters over which it has full sovereignty. UNCLOS 1982 also introduced the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) regime that allows coastal states to utilize the resources of waters and seabed up to 200 nautical miles from their baselines/coastlines. In addition, UNCLOS 1982 also provides certainty on the definition of the outer limits of the continental shelf (seabed) a coastal state is entitled to (article 76).  For the purpose of defining the outer limits of the continental shelf, especially those beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines, coastal states need to survey and map the seabed and then make a submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) for consideration.  Indonesia for its part has done this and the submission has also been recommended by CLCS, allowing Indonesia to confirm around 4,000 square kilometers of seabed beyond 200 nautical miles from its baselines in the area to the west of Sumatra. Article 76 may be considered as the most effective provision in UNCLOS to accelerate surveying and mapping for better understanding of the global ocean seabed. The writer is a lecturer at the Department of Geodetic Engineering at Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta. He is currently an Alison Sudradjat Award scholar at the University of Wollongong, Australia, researching on maritime boundary issues. Apart from all the benefits of UNCLOS, there are challenges it is currently facing. Maritime boundary delimitation with 10 neighbors is one of the challenges. We all have witnessed how pending maritime boundaries have caused serious tensions with neighbors. I am aware that Indonesia has been negotiating pending maritime boundaries and hoping that the process can accelerate.  Second, Indonesia needs to produce more experts in oceanic affairs and the law of the sea, including those with technical expertise such as in the geospatial and geoscience fields. Third, information dissemination on oceanic affairs and the law of the sea to the general public is essential. For instance, traditional fishermen need to be briefed properly on how maritime boundaries work in relation to fishing activities so that border incidents can be prevented. Undoubtedly, there have been success stories in oceanic affairs and the law of the sea during the last three decades of UNCLOS. Indonesia contributed significantly to the birth of the Constitution of the Oceans and has benefited from its presence. However, there is still a lot to do to protect this world of water. ●

RI’s position in the South China Sea dispute

RI’s position in the South China Sea dispute I Made Andi Arsana ;  A Lecturer at the School of Geodetic Engineering, Gadjah Mada University, A PhD Candidate with the Australian Leadership Awards at the University of Wollongong, Australia

JAKARTA POST, 29 September 2012

  

For those interested in international relations and maritime affairs, it is hard to miss the tension building in the South China Sea (SCS). Some opine that the SCS is one of the hottest territorial and jurisdictional disputes in modern history. 

The territorial dispute involves sovereignty over relatively small islands/rocks/low-tide elevations (LTEs) in the region. Since the maritime area of islands and rocks are measured from their coastline/baselines, water column and seabed, they too are subjects of dispute in the SCS.

The SCS is a semi-enclosed sea surrounded by China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam, the Philippines and Taiwan. The region has hundreds of small islands/rocks/LTEs disputed by a number of countries. Some studies also indicate that the SCS is relatively rich in living and non-living resources, which undoubtedly adds further complexity. Due to the complexity of the SCS issue, for the first time in history, ASEAN could not reach a consensus in its recent meeting.

Indonesia, for its part, is not a claimant to any disputed territories in the SCS (Spratly, Pratas, Paracels Islands, etc). However, Indonesia is entitled to maritime area in the SCS as in the Natuna Islands. As it is an archipelagic country, Indonesia may claim territorial sea, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf measured from archipelagic baselines, which connect the outermost points of its outer islands. 

Consequently, Indonesia could theoretically claim a large area of waters in the SCS. On the other hand, Malaysia and Vietnam, two of Indonesia’s closest neighbors in the region, are also entitled to maritime areas, which to a large extent overlap with Indonesia’s. To deal with this issue, Indonesia has delimited seabed (continental shelf) boundaries with Malaysia (1969) and Vietnam (2003). However, maritime delimitation for water column has yet to be done.

In addition to claiming sovereignty, some countries also occupy small islands in the SCS. Spratly Island, for example, is occupied by Vietnam in the forms of a settlement, airstrip and a monument. Others are also occupied by a number of countries. Additionally, many of the features in the SCS have names in multiple languages, adding to the confusion and uncertainty regarding the exact number of disputed islands.

Countries in the region also claim maritime areas around disputed islands/rocks/LTEs. China, for example, has claimed almost the entire SCS by issuing a map depicting dashed lines enclosing land and maritime area in the region. The map was issued in 1947, depicting dashed lines that are now known as “nine-dashed line” for it has nine segments (Li and Li, 2003). 

Unfortunately, it is not clear whether the nine dashed line intends to claim only islands/rocks in the region or include maritime areas around them. Since the claim is depicted by a dashed line, not a continuous one, it is hard to tell which areas are precisely included in China’s claim.

Assured of its neutral position, Indonesia, through Prof. Hasjim Djalal, initiated workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the SCS. Interestingly, in the 1993 workshop, the Chinese delegation presented a map illustrating its country’s “historic waters” that showed that China’s claimed areas overlapped with Indonesia’s EEZ adjacent to the Natuna Islands. Consequently, it was suggested that Indonesia was being “drawn into the fray” of the South China Sea disputes (Johnson, 1997).

Indonesia asked for clarification from China regarding the claim, but China offered no explanation. Instead, china offered a negotiated solution that Indonesia rejected, since Indonesia does not see the need for maritime negotiation with China. 

Indonesia further confirmed its rejection by stating that that the nine-dashed line map of China “lack[s] international basis” and therefore its purpose is “tantamount to upset[ting]” the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In other words, Indonesia does not consider China one of its neighbors with which it must settle maritime boundaries.

On the other hand, China seems to have a different view. In 2010, for example, Chinese fishermen were caught fishing in waters off the Natuna Islands, which Indonesia unilaterally considers as part of its EEZ. When patrolling Indonesian officers approached to arrest the vessels, a large Chinese vessel arrived and demanded that the vessels be released. 

This gives the impression that the fishing vessels were guarded by a large vessel known as the “Chinese fishery administration vessel”. It can be inferred that China has extended its maritime claim up to the area that Indonesia believes to be its.

The aforementioned incident implies that Indonesia is not totally free from the SCS conflict. Even though it is not disputing the sovereignty of any small islands/rocks/LTEs in the region, Indonesia’s entitlement over maritime area in the SCS can generate an overlapping area that leads to maritime delimitation. EEZ delimitation with Malaysia and Vietnam is inevitable for Indonesia.

A geospatial technical analysis shows that there is also a possibility of overlapping maritime claims between Indonesia and China. Unfortunately, China has never declared the precise coordinates of its claim so the analysis was performed using several assumptions. 

However, even a rough examination of Chinese and Indonesian maps easily shows the possibility of overlapping claims. Indonesia’s claim over its EEZ that extends beyond its continental shelf (seabed) in the SCS indicates a possibility that the overlapping claim with China is even larger, not to mention that with Vietnam and Malaysia. 

Chinese fishermen fishing in waters around the Natuna Islands is further evidence of Chinese’s assertive claim. This may to a certain extent change Indonesia’s view regarding its involvement in the SCS dispute.

In conclusion, Indonesia can never completely avoid the complexities in the SCS. Like it or not, Indonesia is involved in maritime division in the area, at least with Malaysia and Vietnam. 

Meanwhile, the need for maritime delimitation with China will highly depend on clarification of China’s maritime claim. Indonesia, on the other hand, is firm in its stance that China is not one of its neighbors with which maritime delimitation is required. 

It is also worth noting that Indonesia is not in any way involved in territorial land disputes in the region. However, it is quite clear that Indonesia is not without any interest in the SCS. ● 

RI toward a naval power? 54 years of Djoenda Declaration

RI toward a naval power? 54 years of Djoenda Declaration

I Made Andi Arsana, A LECTURER AT THE DEPARTMENT OF GEODETIC ENGINEERING,

GADJAH MADA UNIVERSITY

Sumber : JAKARTA POST, 14 Desember 2011

On the day Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands, its territory and jurisdiction were less than what we see today, especially for the maritime area. The maritime area between Kalimantan and Java, for example, was considered as high seas (free seas) where foreign vessels could sail freely.

At that time, Indonesia inherited law regarding maritime area from the colonial power, the Netherlands. It was the 1939 Ordinance concerning Territorial Sea and Marine Environment under which Indonesia is entitled to only 3 nautical miles (around 5.6 kilometers) of territorial sea measured from the baselines (usually coastline) of each island. Consequently, the Indonesian archipelago was divided into several groups of territories separated by one another.

This was disadvantageous because it “could not contain the archipelago within a single jurisdictional blanket” (Djalal, 1990).

To deal with this situation, prime minister Djoeanda Kartawidjaja declared new Indonesian maritime claims through the Djoeanda Declaration on Dec. 13, 1957. It asserts that the entire archipelago was enclosed by a belt of baselines (islands and waters between islands) that must be regarded as one integral unit and integral parts of Indonesia. By doing so, Indonesia was claiming the status of an “archipelagic state”.

Indonesia’s unilateral claim of an “archipelagic state” status, however, was not easily accepted by the international community. Indonesia did not give up and diligently sought for support from other countries.

The fight was finally fruitful as the concept of an “archipelagic state” was adopted in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. The Convention is the latest and is considered as the most comprehensive ocean-related international convention, which often referred to as the “constitution of the ocean”.

Indonesia, through its prominent diplomats, such as Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Hasjim Djalal,
has proven its invaluable contribution to the establishment of the convention.

Indonesia ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1985 through Law No. 17/1985. In addition to other ocean affairs, the convention also governs maritime zones of jurisdictions. A coastal state is entitled to, i.e. 12 nautical miles of territorial sea, a contiguous zone out to 24 nautical miles, an exclusive economic zone out to 200 nautical miles and a continental shelf out to 350 nautical miles or more.

Pursuant to the convention, Indonesia is entitled to much larger maritime areas compared to what it possessed at the time of independence. It is fair to say that this is the most peaceful possession of territory and jurisdiction with no single bullet being shot.

The convention also deals with maritime delimitation/division between States on the occurrence of overlapping entitlement. In this regards, Indonesia considers itself to have at least 10 neighbors with which maritime boundaries need to be settled.

Indonesia is reasonably productive in establishing maritime boundary agreements. It has agreed upon various maritime boundaries with seven neighbors such as Malaysia (1969, 1970), Thailand (1971, 1975), Australia (1971, 1972, 1997), Singapore (1973, 2009), Papua New Guinea (1973, 1980), India (1974, 1977) and Vietnam (2003).

Unilaterally, Indonesia has also made a submission to the United Nations on the outer limits of its continental shelf (seabed) beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines for the area to the southwest of Aceh. Through this submission Indonesia has confirmed an “additional” seabed area the size of which equals Madura Island (around 4,000 square kilometers).

While Indonesia has been quite productive in defining its boundaries, various segments are left to settle. As per December 2011, Indonesia has yet to settle more than 20 maritime boundary segments in around 15 locations. Pending maritime boundaries have been evident to cause maritime disputes and incidents.

The case of the Ambalat Block (2005, 2009), Tanjung Berakit incident (2010) and the Malacca Strait incident (2011) are three incidents involving Indonesia and Malaysia due to pending maritime boundaries between the two. In the Timor Sea, where maritime boundaries have been settled between Indonesia and Australia, maritime incidents are not absent either.

Lack of information causing border crossing and illegal fishing activities seem to be the reason of Indonesian fisherman seizure in the area.

After defining maritime limits and boundaries, boundary administration (management) becomes critical. Well-established “fences” at sea are not the end of the story. The fences need to be guarded to prevent border crossings and other illegal activities, especially those related to resource utilization. For these purposes the Indonesian Navy, water police, ministry of marine affairs and fisheries patrolling force, should be equipped with sophisticated operational facilities.

However, the current situation is still far from ideal. It is widely known that Indonesia has yet to add a number of vessels to guard its large maritime area.

While it is true that illegal fishing offenders should be prosecuted for deterrence purposes, it is Indonesia’s responsibility to guard its maritime area from such activities. Analogically, the law may prohibit anyone from stealing anything from somebody’s premises but it is the owner’s responsibility to lock its door for security reason.

Another important agenda is to enhance the expertise concerning ocean affairs and the law of the sea in general. This expertise should cover technical and non-technical issues. For example, Indonesia requires more geoscientists (geodesists, geophysicists, geographers, geologists) with interest in the law of the sea.

Ocean affair is, eventually, not only about legal aspect but also technical consideration. Indonesia’s journey toward a naval power is not only about modernizing main weaponry system (Alutsista) but also preparing future generation with adequate expertise.

What Indonesia has managed to secure in terms of territory and jurisdiction cannot be ignored and abandoned. Large maritime area does promise a lot of opportunities but it also comes with great responsibility. On the 54th celebration of Djoeanda Declaration, it is worth recalling an old song.

Nenek moyangku orang pelaut // Our ancestors were sailors;Gemar mengarung luas samudera // They sailed across the oceans;Menerjang ombak tiada takut // Challenged waves fearlessly;
Menempuh badai sudah biasa ... // Were used to weathering storms … ●