Korea-Japan rivalry beyond Asian Games John Lee ;   An adjunct professor at the University of Sydney; A senior fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington DC; A visiting fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore

JAKARTA POST,  27 September 2014

                                                                                                                       

As we settle in for the 17th Asian Games in Incheon, South Korea the sporting sub-plot is that South Korea and Japan will be engaging in a rivalry to see who can win the second most medals after runaway favorite China. But this sporting rivalry — friendly on the field — has a political context. South Korea is engaged in a simmering and worsening political spat over unresolved World War II issues with Japan, Asia’s other shining post-war example to the world. Although Korean wartime sores such as the use of its citizens as “comfort women” for Japanese troops are genuine, Seoul’s tendency to allow this terrible history to dominate current political interaction with Japan to the point of refusing bilateral meetings at the head-of-government level is counter-productive to South Korea’s and the region’s strategic interests. As these Games, with the slogan “Diversity Shines Here” take place, a good first step towards political rapprochement is for President Park Geun-hye to accept Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s offer of a bilateral summit between the two leaders on the sidelines of an international meeting before the end of the year. Putting aside the question of whether the dozens of apologies issued by Japanese leaders only conceals a profound national reluctance to take responsibility for past actions, or whether South Korea’s leaders have periodically moved the goalposts of what constitute genuine remorse for domestic political gain, Park’s decision to push resolution of these historical issues as a condition for stronger South Korean-Japanese relations will not advance Seoul’s interests in a number of ways. First, it is clear that much of Asia is in a “strategic holding pattern”, watching intently to see whether the post-World War II American-led system of alliance and security partnerships can endure but also evolve in a way that can effectively respond to China’s rise. Gradually, but still cautiously, countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and even Vietnam are using their collective weight to create a strategic balance favorable to America, and offer use of their territories to enhance the presence of American military assets in Asia. But it is clear that despite the growing list of countries lining up to create such a strategic balance, Japan’s size and capabilities make it the key Asian player. Still the second largest and most advanced economy in Asia, its highly advanced and world-class Self-Defense Forces remains more than a match for China’s People’s Liberation Army. With America’s relative military pre-eminence being continually eroded by the PLA’s advancing budget and capabilities, the post-war alliance and security system is unlikely to hold and evolve sufficiently without a more pro-active Japan, both as a United States alliance partner and a stand-alone force. Yet, the South Korea’s persistence in using wartime history to argue against the desirability of a more pro-active Japan, and erode regional enthusiasm for such a Japan, is clearly against Seoul’s strategic interest. After all, South Korea is one of Asia’s great export-manufacturers, while it imports around 97 percent of its energy. Continued stability in sea-lines-of-communication (SLOC), and confidence of open access to SLOCs essential for maritime trade, will increasingly depend on a confident and outward looking Japan, rather than a permanently chastised and introverted one. Second, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s recent reinterpretation of its Constitution to allow collective self-defense is in the South Korea’s military interest — meaning that Seoul’s lack of enthusiasm for a more proactive Japan is counter-productive to its own interests. If North Korea were to launch an invasion of South Korea, it is likely that America would need to utilize Japanese airbases and seaports to support such mass deployments, a logic aided by the vulnerability of South Korean bases to attack from the north. It is also likely that America would want to use Japanese airbases for launching attacks against North Korea as airbases in South Korea would not be adequate. Without Abe’s constitutional reinterpretation, such assistance would have been prohibited. Third, every significant capital in Asia — except for Seoul and Beijing — has put aside still sore wartime memories to welcome the emergence of a more confident and can-do Japan for the strategic reasons articulated above. Moreover, and according to a July 2013 Pew Survey, around 80 percent of populations from countries that suffered at the hands of Imperial Japan during the war such as Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Australia viewed Abe’s Japan favorably — no doubt reassured by a post-war Japan that has been a “model” regional and international citizen for over seven decades. In contrast, 77 percent of South Korean respondents joined the 90 percent of Chinese respondents who viewed Japan unfavorably. Outside China, North Korea and South Korea, a confident and proactive Japan is seen as essential to the prospects of the Asian Century remaining peaceful and prosperous. As a result, the weight of regional and American opinion will eventually grow increasingly critical of countries that use the past as obstacles to a brighter future. To persuade the region that “Diversity Shines Here” and advance its standing beyond putting on a good show, the South Korea will need to show that it wants to genuinely work with Japan to forgive. ●