Attack against the Ahmadis are new
Akh Muzakki, Chairman
of East Java’s LP Ma’arif Nahdlatul Ulama,
Lecturer at the State Institute of Islamic Studies
(IAIN) Sunan Ampel in Surabaya
SUMBER
: JAKATA POST, 01 Mei 2012
Cosmopolitan tolerance is
now at a crossroad, as seen in the violent acts against minority groups
represented exclusively by Ahmadiyah.
The public then may ask: Why has violence frequently been targeted at the Ahmadis in a collective level? Why do the Ahmadis tend to be publicly perceived as “illegal” in Indonesia recently? And why is cosmopolitan tolerance now absent from popular responses, particularly to Ahmadiyah?
Such questions become stronger and critical when associated with the fact that Ahmadiyah entered Indonesia in 1925, long before its independence.
Therefore, following such public questions, an intriguing question may be asked: Is it true that attacks against the Ahmadis were triggered by factors of purely theological beliefs, particularly concerning the position of Prophet Muhammad? If so, why didn’t violence occur in the past on a massive scale?
Such public questions most likely will never stay in the minds of the people. The reason is so simple. Attacks against the Ahmadis have repeated every year, the latest targeting Ahmadiyah mosque, Baitul Rahim, in Tasikmalaya, West Java, on April 20. The incident seemed to present strong and hard evidence of the long-lasting hostility against the Ahmadis in Indonesia.
Indeed, opposition to Ahmadiyah and the Ahmadis is not a novelty. During the 1920s and 1930s in Indonesia, opposition was already there. History records that HOS Tjokroaminoto, as an intelligent and influential figure in Islamic history of Indonesia in the first half of the 20th century, had translated in 1928 the monumental work of the Lahore Ahmadiyah leader, Abdullah Yusuf Ali. The work is an exegetical commentary titled The Holy Qur’an: Arabic Text, Translation and Commentary.
When Tojokroaminoto wanted to publish his translated work, opposition was brought about by a number of Islamic groups, especially the Muhammadiyah. The strong opposition was reportedly triggered by differences in theology.
The translation by Tjokroaminoto has ultimately never surfaced, and people were never able to read it. This is because it has been lost with time following the strong protests and pressure by Muhammadiyah figures. Tjokroaminoto and many other leading Muslims were strongly regretful of this incident.
Although Tjokroaminoto claimed his work was approved by prominent leaders of the Muhammadiyah, such as KH Fachruddin and KH Mas Mansur, the Muhammadiyah as an organization still refused to issue it. Tjokroaminoto then accused the Muhammadiyah of being afraid of losing their market dominance over Islam in Indonesia if the work of translation of scientific books on Ahmadiyah was to be published.
Following the lack of publication about it, Ahmadiyah gained no thorough understanding from many people in Indonesia. Instead of understanding, misunderstandings often occur. The ban, expulsion, destruction and even the practice of physically violent acts are just examples that follow.
The distinction between the Lahore Ahmadiyah (under the Ahmadiyah Movement in Indonesia/GAI) and the Qodian Ahmadiyah (under the Indonesian Ahmadiyah Congregation/JAI) was never fully understood.
I do not dismiss that the basic theological differences in beliefs can be a factor of the recent mass outbreak of violence. However, it should be understood that theological factors meet at a certain point with the fact of the weak capacity of the state in upholding the Constitution’s messages about freedom of belief.
The reform movement in the country has lost the enthusiasm that is vital to being a guarantor and protector of religious freedom of its citizens.
The state tends to be helpless in the face of religious communities. Over the repeated violent acts against the Ahmadiyah across the country, the state has never taken a firm stance. As a result, the same violence constantly reared up and overrun the Ahmadiyah in some places in Indonesia.
In fact, far more ironically, the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) fatwa against Ahmadiyah as a heretical belief has proved capable of forcing the state to hesitate in upholding the Constitution, which explicitly protects the freedom of belief.
On one hand, the above conditions occur because the state does act as a neutral force on the basis of a multicultural, multiethnic and multireligious society. On the other hand, the state fails to demonstrate its capacity to protect the lives and religious rights of citizens, including the minorities.
The state can fall under the control or pressures of the majority groups. As a result, minority groups tend to be the subaltern groups in the tradition of post-colonial theory.
These subaltern groups do not have the capacity to articulate their sociocultural and political interests. The country’s lessening capacity to have the authority to maintain its neutrality has led to a tyrannical majority group opposing a minority group. Failure to perform its functions, in practice, provides a fertile ground for radicalization among followers of religions on the ground.
At the time when Tjokroaminoto wished to publish the translation of the work of the Ahmadiyah cleric, Yusuf Ali, in 1928, public reactions were no more than a prohibition on the issuance of the book. Physically, violent acts were still likely to be avoided.
But now, not only have ideas of banning Ahmadiyah arisen, acts of violence in the form of persecution, expulsion, destruction and the burning of houses of worship have also already occurred repeatedly.
If not responded wisely by all parties, the concoction of theological problems and the increasingly weak capacity of the state as a protector of its citizens will lead to religious fundamentalism in the era of globalization.
The spirit of cosmopolitan tolerance will then be merely a dream. ●
The public then may ask: Why has violence frequently been targeted at the Ahmadis in a collective level? Why do the Ahmadis tend to be publicly perceived as “illegal” in Indonesia recently? And why is cosmopolitan tolerance now absent from popular responses, particularly to Ahmadiyah?
Such questions become stronger and critical when associated with the fact that Ahmadiyah entered Indonesia in 1925, long before its independence.
Therefore, following such public questions, an intriguing question may be asked: Is it true that attacks against the Ahmadis were triggered by factors of purely theological beliefs, particularly concerning the position of Prophet Muhammad? If so, why didn’t violence occur in the past on a massive scale?
Such public questions most likely will never stay in the minds of the people. The reason is so simple. Attacks against the Ahmadis have repeated every year, the latest targeting Ahmadiyah mosque, Baitul Rahim, in Tasikmalaya, West Java, on April 20. The incident seemed to present strong and hard evidence of the long-lasting hostility against the Ahmadis in Indonesia.
Indeed, opposition to Ahmadiyah and the Ahmadis is not a novelty. During the 1920s and 1930s in Indonesia, opposition was already there. History records that HOS Tjokroaminoto, as an intelligent and influential figure in Islamic history of Indonesia in the first half of the 20th century, had translated in 1928 the monumental work of the Lahore Ahmadiyah leader, Abdullah Yusuf Ali. The work is an exegetical commentary titled The Holy Qur’an: Arabic Text, Translation and Commentary.
When Tojokroaminoto wanted to publish his translated work, opposition was brought about by a number of Islamic groups, especially the Muhammadiyah. The strong opposition was reportedly triggered by differences in theology.
The translation by Tjokroaminoto has ultimately never surfaced, and people were never able to read it. This is because it has been lost with time following the strong protests and pressure by Muhammadiyah figures. Tjokroaminoto and many other leading Muslims were strongly regretful of this incident.
Although Tjokroaminoto claimed his work was approved by prominent leaders of the Muhammadiyah, such as KH Fachruddin and KH Mas Mansur, the Muhammadiyah as an organization still refused to issue it. Tjokroaminoto then accused the Muhammadiyah of being afraid of losing their market dominance over Islam in Indonesia if the work of translation of scientific books on Ahmadiyah was to be published.
Following the lack of publication about it, Ahmadiyah gained no thorough understanding from many people in Indonesia. Instead of understanding, misunderstandings often occur. The ban, expulsion, destruction and even the practice of physically violent acts are just examples that follow.
The distinction between the Lahore Ahmadiyah (under the Ahmadiyah Movement in Indonesia/GAI) and the Qodian Ahmadiyah (under the Indonesian Ahmadiyah Congregation/JAI) was never fully understood.
I do not dismiss that the basic theological differences in beliefs can be a factor of the recent mass outbreak of violence. However, it should be understood that theological factors meet at a certain point with the fact of the weak capacity of the state in upholding the Constitution’s messages about freedom of belief.
The reform movement in the country has lost the enthusiasm that is vital to being a guarantor and protector of religious freedom of its citizens.
The state tends to be helpless in the face of religious communities. Over the repeated violent acts against the Ahmadiyah across the country, the state has never taken a firm stance. As a result, the same violence constantly reared up and overrun the Ahmadiyah in some places in Indonesia.
In fact, far more ironically, the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) fatwa against Ahmadiyah as a heretical belief has proved capable of forcing the state to hesitate in upholding the Constitution, which explicitly protects the freedom of belief.
On one hand, the above conditions occur because the state does act as a neutral force on the basis of a multicultural, multiethnic and multireligious society. On the other hand, the state fails to demonstrate its capacity to protect the lives and religious rights of citizens, including the minorities.
The state can fall under the control or pressures of the majority groups. As a result, minority groups tend to be the subaltern groups in the tradition of post-colonial theory.
These subaltern groups do not have the capacity to articulate their sociocultural and political interests. The country’s lessening capacity to have the authority to maintain its neutrality has led to a tyrannical majority group opposing a minority group. Failure to perform its functions, in practice, provides a fertile ground for radicalization among followers of religions on the ground.
At the time when Tjokroaminoto wished to publish the translation of the work of the Ahmadiyah cleric, Yusuf Ali, in 1928, public reactions were no more than a prohibition on the issuance of the book. Physically, violent acts were still likely to be avoided.
But now, not only have ideas of banning Ahmadiyah arisen, acts of violence in the form of persecution, expulsion, destruction and the burning of houses of worship have also already occurred repeatedly.
If not responded wisely by all parties, the concoction of theological problems and the increasingly weak capacity of the state as a protector of its citizens will lead to religious fundamentalism in the era of globalization.
The spirit of cosmopolitan tolerance will then be merely a dream. ●
