Tampilkan postingan dengan label Budi Kurniawan. Tampilkan semua postingan
Tampilkan postingan dengan label Budi Kurniawan. Tampilkan semua postingan

Kamis, 11 Oktober 2012

Mengapa KPK Hadir?


Mengapa KPK Hadir?
Budi Kurniawan ;  Mahasiswa Master Public Policy Spesialisasi
Bidang Korupsi Politik di Australian National University (ANU), Canberra
REPUBLIKA, 10 Oktober 2012


Guarding the guard atau menjaga penjaga adalah alasan utama Independence Commission of Anti-corruption (ICAC) atau KPK-nya Australia bisa hadir di Australia. Sebuah negara yang menurut Transparency International sebagai negara yang dikatgorikan 10 besar negara paling bersih.

Tidak hanya di Australia, kehadiran ICAC di Hong Kong pun karena hal itu. Jika menilik dari sejarah berdirinya ICAC, sungguh sangat wajar Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) di Indonesia menangani kasus korupsi yang ada di kepolisian. KPK adalah lembaga yang seharusnya memang hadir untuk itu.

Konteks kelahiran KPK di Indonesia justru seharusnya membuat lembaga ini kuat, bukan sebaliknya diperlemah. KPK di Indonesia lahir dari ketidakpercayaan publik terhadap lembaga peradilan dalam menangani kasus korupsi sangat besar. KPK pun hadir di Indonesia pada saat supremasi hukum sangat lemah dan di sisi yang lain era demokrasi berjalan.

Indonesia memang telah berhasil mereformasi lembaga politiknya untuk memfasilitasi demokrasi. Indonesia telah berhasil menempatkan sistem ekonominya on track, bahkan menjadi kebanggaan pemerintah SBY di sidang PBB yang lalu. Sayangnya, Indonesia belum berhasil mereformasi lembaga peradilan, termasuk kepolisian. Padahal, lembaga ini adalah garda terdepan dalam pemberantasan korupsi dan tentunya yang lebih luas, supremasi hukum.

Demokrasi bisa jadi gagal total jika tidak diikuti dengan supremasi hukum. Dan, dalam konteks demokrasi yang berdasarkan supremasi hukum inilah KPK lahir. Bukankah salah satu indikator demokrasi yang menjadi landasan pengukuran kualitas demokrasi adalah supremasi hukum? Sebab, demokrasi tanpa supremasi hukum adalah anarki.

Lembaga Sampiran

Lalu, siapa yang mengawasi KPK? Pertanyaan inilah yang menjadi bahasan utama di Senayan sehingga DPR pun berkeinginan merevisi UU KPK. Ada kesalahan berpikir dari anggota DPR dalam melihat posisi KPK. Para wakil rakyat kita masih memahami KPK sebagai lembaga negara.

Kesalahan orang DPR adalah tidak memahami bahwa KPK adalah lembaga sampiran negara. Paradigma mereka masih menggunakan paradigma lama, trias politica, yang artinya setiap lembaga negara diawasi lembaga negara yang lain, bukan oleh masyarakat sipil.

Padahal, makna negara itu sendiri sudah berubah, dia tidak lagi aktor tunggal pemegang kekuasaan. Negara harus dikontrol oleh masyarakat sipil karena pada kenyataannya tidak efektif jika dikontrol oleh kekuasaan legislatif.

Sehingga, kemudian legislatif, eksekutif, dan yudikatif itu dikategorikan sebagi satu paket sebagai sebuah “negara” karena merekalah yang memiliki kekuasaan secara sah. Dan, untuk mengontrolnya perlu lembaga sampiran negara yang dibentuk negara untuk mengontrol dirinya sendiri. Dan, biasanya lembaga sampiran negara hadir atas inisiatif dan desakan masyarakat sipil.

Selain KPK, lembaga itu contohnya adalah Komisi Yudisial, Komnas HAM, Ombudsman. Dengan kata lain, lembaga sampiran negara adalah lembaga negara dalam artian hukum, tetapi merupakan bagian masyarakat sipil dalam cara kerja dan dalam kacamata ilmu politik. Oleh sebab itulah, paradigma mengawasi KPK adalah paradigma yang salah dan bertentangan dengan demokrasi.

Padahal, demokrasi itu dalam definisi substansialnya adalah supremasi masyarakat sipil. Jika DPR mengawasi KPK, itu artinya supremasi negara atas masyarakat sipil. Ini artinya, kita kembali ke zaman orde baru.

KPK juga bukanlah lembaga ad hoc yang akan bubar dengan sendirinya jika lembaga peradilan berfungsi kembali. Selama polisi dan lembaga peradilan mempunyai kekuasaan untuk memeriksa dan mengadili maka akan selalu mempunyai potensi untuk penyimpangan kekuasaan. Inilah alasan utama mengapa KPK akan selalu ada. Selama ada kekuasaan peradilan, selama itu pula KPK akan hadir.

Lantas, siapa yang dapat mengakhiri konflik Polri dan KPK serta kasak-kusuk DPR untuk melemahkan KPK? Jawabannya tentulah presiden. Presiden pun dapat kemudian meyakinkan dan memerintahkan Polri bahwa KPK memang hadir untuk mengawasi lembaga seperti polisi.

Polisi tentulah bukan lembaga tersendiri di luar pemerintah. Dia adalah bagian dari pemerintah. Dia di bawah komando presiden. Presiden yang dipilih sebagian besar rakyat Indonesia ini mempunyai wewenang untuk mereformasi tubuh kepolisian republik ini.

Sungguh tidak wajar jika seorang presiden berdiam diri dan tidak mempunyai keputusan pada tuntutan masyarakat sipil untuk menyelamatkan KPK, yang berarti menyelamatkan Indonesia.

Walaupun presiden telah pidato dan berani menyelesaikan konflik KPK-Polri, tetapi perlu ada pemahaman dari istana dan DPR bahwa KPK itu adalah lembaga yang memang hadir untuk mengontrol lembaga penegak hukum. KPK adalah lembaga sampiran negara sehingga segala usaha untuk mengontrolnya sama dengan usaha nondemokratis untuk mengontrol masyarakat sipil.

Rabu, 18 Januari 2012

Democracy and corruption in Indonesia


Democracy and corruption in Indonesia
Budi Kurniawan, LECTURER IN GOVERNMENT STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LAMPUNG
Sumber : JAKARTA POST, 17 Januari 2012



Indonesia today faces an enormous problem related to corruption. Almost every day we read in the newspapers about corruption cases implicating state officials.

Given Indonesia’s shift to democracy more than a decade ago, many have been tempted to question whether rampant corruption during this period is actually the fruit of democracy.

Evidence shows democracies create more dangerous corruption than authoritarian regimes. A study by Olson (2002) of the Eastern Europe post-communist era found that the number of corruption cases climbed in newly democratic countries.

Olson did not talk about the link between democracy and welfare directly. His research simply questioned why welfare did not follow the fall of a bad government (communist authoritarian).

The reason was that the political transformation from authoritarianism to democracy in these countries only changed the type of corruption, or in Olson terms, a change from a “stationary bandit” to a “roving bandit”.

A stationary bandit refers to corruption in communist regimes. Stationary bandits know they will rule for a long time. They sell protection to small bandits thanks to their monopoly of power.

However, when the regime changes to democracy, the type of bandit changes into a roving one, which is more dangerous than when stationary. Roving bandits are aware that they only have a short time to rule because of democracy, therefore they engage in massively corrupt practices while in power.

Democracy encourages rent seeking behavior among businesspeople and politicians. Politicians need money to win elections, and businessmen provide the money to the politicians.

After the politicians are elected, they pay back the money to businesspeople in the forms of privileges and benefits from state policies.

As a consequence, elected politicians do not care about the interests of their constituents, such as poverty eradication, improvement of healthcare and education.

They just think how to pay back the costs of the election process. This reality is not democracy but plutocracy, the term from Aristotle refers to the domination of rich people in controlling the government.

The other effect of rent seeking is oligarchy. Indonesia, after an
authoritarian regime, shows that most of the political elite and
leaders focus on debating against each other and how to obtain power rather than how to develop Indonesia’s economy.

Hadiz and Robison (2004) show that true democracy never happened after the Soeharto era. The power of the business oligarchy took more control over Indonesian politics than did politicians and
civil society, even though most Western leaders praised Indonesia as the biggest democratic, Muslim country.

Some scholars argue that free media will put the government under the public’s control and therefore create transparency.

However, in democratic countries the media are part of the industry. Under democracy, an independent media does not truly serve as a “watch dog” of the government.

There is no truly independent media. The media only follow the political interests of their owners. If their owners are part of the government coalition, they will not report issues that can endanger the government’s credibility, such as corruption scandals involving politicians linked to the ruling coalition.

On the other hand, if they are part of the opposition, they will blow up those issues to attack their government’s credibility.

In these circumstances, the powerful media (in capital power) frames public opinion, particularly on development issues.

The influential media also frames the view of voters in relation to the best candidates and parties that they will vote for.

In this media hegemony, businessman Silvio Berlusconi can win the top post in Italy.

Finally, these circumstances are the main reason why in new democratic countries the supremacy of law is extremely important.

However, in several cases, law enforcement agencies remain under the control of the authoritarian system.

These are reasons why reformists should establish new and strong institutions, such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK).

The most valuable element of the KPK is its capability to arrest corruptors. A strong law enforcement agency like the KPK would be useless if it lacked the power to eradicate corruption.

Rabu, 07 Desember 2011

Indonesia Needs Powerful KPK


Indonesia Needs Powerful KPK
Budi Kurniawan, A LECTURER IN GOVERNMENT STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LAMPUNG
Sumber : JAKARTA POST, 7 Desember 2011




In his article that appeared in the Nov. 28, 2011 edition of The Jakarta Post, House of Representatives member Fahri Hamzah argues that the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is a very powerful institution in a democratic regime.

He further emphasizes that there should be no strong institution or superbody in democratic countries.

However, there is a fallacy in Hamzah’s point of view. The main point is the way Hamzah thinks about democratic regimes. Could democratic countries form strong institutions like the KPK?

The key element of democracy is the supremacy of law. There are no democracies without supremacy of law.

In some countries, an era of transitional democracy indeed creates more massive corruption in the absence of the supremacy of law.

Olson in Power and Prosperity (2002) finds an increase in the number of corruption cases in new democratic regimes in Eastern Europe after the fall of Communist regimes.

The transformation of the political system from authoritarian to democracy in these countries only changed the corruption type. In Olson’s terms, there was a change from “stationary bandits” to “roving bandits”.

In the context of Indonesia as a transitional democracy, corruption is considered a big problem. It is deemed an extraordinary crime that can be found in every institution, even in political parties.

In order to resolve this problem, the KPK was established as a strong institution to deal with the entrenched corruption.

The KPK indeed was designed as an auxiliary state institution. Auxiliary state institutions are needed when formal institutions, such as the police and the Attorney General’s Office, cannot perform.

An auxiliary state institution works like a civil society organization to control the state, including political parties. In a transitional democracy, when an authoritarian system is still working in state institutions, auxiliary state institutions are needed.

However, Hamzah frames democracy as checks and balances among the state institutions, which is an old institutionalism paradigm in political science. In the old institutionalism political paradigm, indeed, the meaning of democracy is about checks and balances among the institutions. However, this paradigm applies only in a normal situation when the state institutions work properly.

The old institutionalism paradigm frames democracy as only a problem of checks and balances among state institutions. It ignores civil society and policy networks, including auxiliary state institutions, as important actors.

Furthermore, nowadays the problem of democracy focuses on the control of the state by civil society. The KPK paves the way for the civil society’s control of the state. This is also the main reason why KPK leaders must have backgrounds in civil society organizations, such as NGO and universities.

The KPK is therefore an ideal model in the context of Indonesia. The Singapore and Hong Kong model suits an authoritarian regime where the state plays a dominant role and civil society is weak.

Furthermore, in Hong Kong and Singapore the state has proven its commitment to eradicating corruption.

On the contrary, in Indonesia, the state as well as political parties lack awareness of corruption eradication and have even acted as main actors of graft. Civil society, on the other hand, has a strong concern for corruption eradication.

Hamzah also forgets that the United States model, in which no strong anticorruption commission has been in place, cannot be compared with Indonesia apple to apple.

The US has from the beginning of its process to establish state institutions never adopted an authoritarian regime like that of Indonesia. The US has never experienced a transitional era from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. This is the reason why the US does not need a commission like KPK.

However, I agree with Hamzah’s argument that the KPK is no longer needed if state institutions like the police and Attorney General’s Office are freed from the old-authoritarian corrupt system. The crucial question now is when that will happen.