Reform
must continue in military, police
Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi
Wangge ;
An Arryman Scholar and a visiting scholar at
the Buffet Center for International and Comparative Studies, Northwestern
University, in Evanston, Illinois, US
|
|
The
deadly clashes between the police’s mobile brigade (Brimob) and Indonesian
Military (TNI) personnel have proliferated. The recent case that took place
in Batam, Riau Islands, depicts the high friction between these two state
agencies that were separated in 1999, a year after the downfall of Soeharto.
These agencies have been complicit in a conflict that has repeated itself
annually, with different causes, for almost two decades. They have functioned
as actors of violence rather than the managers of violence under the
democratic state.
Two
mainstream explanations for the most recent clash are access to economic
resources and the organizational problem that led the TNI personnel to
deceive the chain of command.
However,
these two reasons are part of the structural, institutional and agency
factors related to security apparatus under a democracy.
At the
structural level, the security agencies had to deal with instability in
regimes, particularly shortly after Soeharto resigned in 1998. The economic
downturn and political instability led to regional conflicts, while Indonesia
had to struggle as one united country.
The
country also faced terrorism, notably the Bali suicide bombings in 2002 and
2005. These problems encouraged the security apparatus to be more active in
domestic security.
During
the 10 years after retired general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became president
in 2004, the regime still had to deal with terrorism, but generally Indonesia
became a more stable country.
At the
institutional level, the state security agencies struggled to adapt to the
above structural condition. Against distrust of the military, the police was
split from the TNI in April 1999 after 30 years of being together. The aim
was to make the police force less military and more professional and focused
mainly on internal security.
Yudhoyono’s
presidency also marked a key cornerstone of military reform. He was one of
the reform-minded generals in the waning days of Soeharto who appointed the
civilian Juwono Sudarsono as defense minister to manage security and defense
issues. Initially, the government passed the 2004 law on the TNI, followed by
significant endeavors in military reform.
The
focus of the efforts was structural reform, by dismissing all politically
related bodies within the military and placing the TNI under the defense
minister. Another was cultural reform, by introducing human rights and
democratic civilian control, to be taught at every level of military
education. All these efforts were expected to totally change the military
political character to professionalize the military and put civilian control
over it.
However
there was no strong political will to continue military reform during
Yudhoyono’s second term. Institutional problems have remained in place, such
as difficulties in managing military-run businesses and human rights abuses.
In
contrast, the police have not had any internal reform initiatives since 1999.
With no ministry supervision, the police have become more independent and
powerful. There is also no strong political commitment to reform and provide
oversight of the police.
The
police have also misused their power in many ways. It has become the most
corrupt institution, with a Transparency International score of 91 percent,
followed by the legislature at 86 percent in 2013. This description reflects
the predatory policing character that is still pervasive.
Additionally,
the police have gradually increased their militaristic style in dealing with
civilian protests. Cases include officers beating elderly women in Rembang,
Central Java, in a peaceful protest against land grabbing.
Another
example is when the East Nusa Tenggara Police criminalized Rudi Soik, one of
its own officers, after Rudi investigated some senior officers in a human trafficking
case.
All
these structural and institutional problems have a significant influence at
the agency level. Accordingly, military and police officers have seen each
other as competitors rather than as a united security forces.
The
military sees its “younger brother” as taking its privilege in dealing with
domestic security issues. During my research in three army territorial
commands across Java, some officers expressed dislike and jealousy toward the
police force. “The police officers frequently ask for military assistance to
track terrorism networks, and yet rarely admit it publicly,” a middle-ranking
officer once said.
Some
retired officers dislike suggestion of the military’s role in the conflicts
between the two institutions. “We are done with our reform, how about them?”
said one former three-star military general.
In
contrast, some police officers argue that the military should not be jealous
of them. Constitutionally, the military only deals with security issues when
higher civilian authorities request them to back up the police. Instead, the
military is responsible merely for defense issues.
Domestic
security issues, however, are also related to the predatory economic
activities of the security apparatus, leading to a long-lasting power
struggle between the two agencies.
Therefore
the initial effort of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo to meet and hold
discussions with senior ranking officers from both security apparatuses is
commendable, but insufficient to tackle all the problems.
Apparently,
Jokowi supports TNI’s transformation. The idea of changing military reform to
defense transformation is highly praised. However, this idea is at odds with
the real condition at some military commands.
For
instance, some scholars propose the building of a respectable defense force
in Asia equipped with billion-dollar weapons, yet some lower-ranking officers
are still unable to afford a worthy school for their children, even after
spending 20 years preparing to become a soldier. The case of Batam is another
example of the ambitious and elitist idea of “transformation”, while some
fundamental problems remain unresolved at the grassroots level.
Jokowi
has to show strong political will and take firm measures to review all
security approaches. Urgent measures include, first, re-asses the act of the
National Security Council under the presidency’s oversight.
This
council should comprise all security and defense stakeholders, plus related
NGOs ranging from security to human rights groups, on the selected committee
boards.
These
various actors can discuss how to assess threats and determine appropriate
integrated security and defense policies.
The
second measure is putting the police under ministry oversight. A ministry is
not only the symbol of civilian democratic control; its oversight would be
needed to create transparency and accountability within the police, which has
long resisted external supervision.
The third is reviewing TNI’s stalled reform, though Jokowi will
certainly face some conservative generals, including those in his own camp.
He has to prove a tough president given his constitutional right to govern
and initiate policies without any pressure whatsoever from powerful figures. ●
|
Will Jokowi be a
truly great leader for the Papuans?
Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi
Wangge ;
An Arryman Scholar and a visiting scholar at the Buffet Center for
International and Comparative Studies (BCICS),
Northwestern University
|
|
During his presidential campaign, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo visited the
easternmost province of Papua three times. He made one key promise to
Papuans: he would pay more attention to Papua. This pledge included promoting
the welfare approach rather than the security approach, building more
infrastructure and providing more access to education and health care.
The same promises were made by Jokowi’s predecessor Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono when he took office in 2004
Three factors should be examined in order to measure the extent of
Jokowi’s ability to keep his promises to the Papuans, namely affirmative
action, welfare policy and the military approach. In this regard, we should
review what the previous government did for Papua in the last 10 years.
Yudhoyono combined affirmative action and welfare policies without
thoroughly reviewing the military approach in Papua. During his 10-year
tenure, Yudhoyono appointed three Papuan ministers. In 2010, he initiated the
mega investment project called the Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate
(MIFEE) at the expense of customary rights on land that belongs to Papuans;
in 2012 he proposed the Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and
West Papua (UP4PB) which has had no impact whatsoever.
Yudhoyono failed to review the security approach that has been in place
since this province was integrated into Indonesia in 1969. Reports of
human-rights abuses allegedly involving the military have continued to be
rampant.
Military reform that Yudhoyono promoted in his first term has had no
impact in Papua. Antonius Made argues that military reform has failed at the
domestic level, particularly in conflicted regions (Supriatma, Indonesia, April 2013). Three indicators of the
failure are military deployments and their relation to the rise of
human-rights violations and the military’s involvement in local politics and
business in Papua.
When it comes to Jokowi, many Papuans believe that he will overhaul the
current situation in Papua. And yet it seems his government will continue
what has been done so far. Shortly after he was inaugurated, he appointed
Yohana Susana Yembise, the first female Papuan minister, as part of
affirmative action. Furthermore, there is no policy yet directly addressing
the Papuan issue.
Another concern is about how Jokowi deals with development in Papua.
This concern is related to the investment-oriented agenda he presented to
business leaders at the APEC forum in China a couple of weeks ago. Whether or
not there will be another project like MIFEE is still a major question.
In terms of welfare reforms, Jokowi’s government has obviously moved
one step forward by providing three cards, namely the Prosperous Family Card
(KKS), the Indonesia Health Card (KIS) and the Indonesia Smart Card (KIP).
All of these cards are related to the welfare program he promised during the
presidential campaign.
However, these cards seem to have trouble dealing with the conditions
in Papua. The basic prerequisite of this program is infrastructure readiness
and its stakeholders. In Papua, as Bobby Anderson argues in Inside Indonesia
(July-September 2013), it is about not only hospitals or schools, but also
who will be working as a doctor, nurse or teacher. In this regard, the
central government has to review all welfare programs in Papua before
promoting other programs.
Another crucial policy that will be launched in the coming months is
the transmigration policy. The new Villages, Disadvantaged Regions and
Transmigration Minister Marwan Jafar proposed a transmigration program for
people from other islands, primarily from Java, to go to Papua. Shortly after
the announcement, many Papuans raised their concerns and firmly rejected the
policy.
This concern is perfectly understandable. According to the Justice and
Peace Secretariat of the Diocese of Jayapura (2006), huge numbers of
transmigrants have affected the indigenous population by subordinating
Papuans in the cultural, political, and economic spheres. This shift in
population leads to never-ending conflicts between the settlers from the
outside islands and the indigenous people.
Furthermore, the transmigration policy will exaggerate Papuan
demographic structure and also the relation between the central government
and the Papuans.
The decline in the indigenous population is obvious. According to
Anderson, migrants from other islands now compose almost half the population
of Papua province. In addition, he presented the ratio of the indigenous
people and the non-indigenous people as 52-48 in 2010 (Anderson, 2014).
In the security arena, there will not be any significant change, particularly
relating to the presence of a huge number of troops in Papua. This tendency
can be seen by the appointment of one of the most controversial and
conservative generals, Ryamizard Ryacudu, as the Indonesian defense minister.
Papuans still remember him as the general who praised as heroes the Kopassus
soldiers who killed Theys Elluay.
Other former generals with bad human-rights records, such as
Hendropriyono, Wiranto and Sutiyoso also have been in Jokowi’s inner circle.
All of these figures will maintain the military’s conservative value of
defending the unity of the country by wiping out all rebellious groups, even
at the expense of civilians — as it has over the years.
All the policies and actions have been proposed so far clearly describe
the elitist way of thinking on the Papuan issue. For example, Jafar is a
former politician from the National Awakening Party (PKB) that has supported
Jokowi.
As a politician without sufficient background in the Papuan issue,
Jafar clearly has been initiating an ill-constructed policy. He thinks by
sending many migrants to Papua, the problem of poverty in some densely
populated islands, will partly be resolved without looking at the real
condition of the Papuan people.
Accordingly, one can argue that Jokowi lacks ministers who can absorb
his vision deeply. Because he has to compromise with those elites, oligarchs
and former generals, he has to sacrifice the people’s hope. This is an irony
of democracy. Jokowi has been elected constitutionally, but he cannot fully
exercise his right to govern because he has to deal with those shadowy
figures who have no constitutional rights whatsoever.
Beyond these challenges, Jokowi has to execute a long-awaited dialogue
with the Papuans. This is the prominent solution to deal with all problems in
Papua. Consultations are the only way to understand deeply and thoroughly
what Papuans need. In turn, the central government can form policy that
positively affects Papuans.
The Papua Peace Network (JDP) formed by the Indonesian Institute of
Sciences (LIPI) has been conducting preliminary consultations that can be
used as a gateway to create a more intensive and comprehensive dialogue with
the Papuans.
A network of various political actors in Papua has been set up through
these consultations, and it would be constructive if the central government
gradually held discussions with various actors, such as local activists,
student activists, religious figures, if possible the armed-group
representatives and particularly those who are struggling for Papuan
independence from abroad.
Dialogue itself was one of Jokowi’s “trademarks”, besides the impromptu
visit, when he was mayor of Solo, Central Java, and governor of Jakarta.
This is a real opportunity for Jokowi to begin a dialogue with the
Papuan people. By supporting consultation with the people, the government can
send a strong signal about building trust and eliminating suspicions
regarding Papua. ●
|
Populist
leaders must maneuver corrupt system
Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi
Wangge ; A visiting
scholar in the equality development and globalization studies program at the
Buffet Center for International and Comparative Studies, Northwestern
University, the US
|
|
Why are
populist figures in Indonesia being challenged to operate in a corrupt
political system? This is a critical question prior to the legislative and
presidential elections, and the issue concerns Jakarta Governor Joko “Jokowi”
Widodo and Surabaya Mayor Tri Rismaharini. Nationally, both figures have
good, clean reputations, yet they have to face unyielding challenges, namely
from oligarchs and elites.
The
“corrupt political system” refers to a political system dominated and abused
by a few powerful people or groups for their own interests. These people are
oligarchs and members of the elite. Elites are certain people or groups who
have highly concentrated coercive power, mobilizational power and official or
party positions, distributed in a highly exclusive way. In contrast, as the
political scholar Jeffrey Winters writes, oligarchs are those with
significant fortunes accumulated from economic wealth.
Both
elites and oligarchs can have similar interests in inhibiting potential
challenges or radical demands that threaten them. They can form a collective
action such as a political party. In the case of Jokowi, the party has
“detained” him to meet public demand. Similarly, in Risma’s case, it is not
only the local legislative council, but also her own party that has been
dominated by businesspeople and party elites who resist her populist
policies.
Jokowi
has been performing well in managing Indonesia’s most populated city; for
example, he battled the government regarding the cheap car policy, preferring
to improve public transportation. Jokowi has rejected Vice President
Boediono’s idea of selling “low-cost green cars” to Jakarta’s residents.
It was
widely believed that automobile business groups were behind this proposal,
targeting Indonesia as a potential market for low-price cars.
Above
all, the public is looking forward to knowing whether Jokowi will run as the
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle’s (PDI-P) presidential candidate. The
decision is in the hands of PDI-P chairperson Megawati Soekarnoputri.
Apparently, Megawati has not given up on the idea of her third bid as the
party’s candidate, even though that option is unlikely to increase her
party’s odds of winning the election.
In the
case of Risma, the collaboration between party elites and oligarchs in the
legislative council was a significant challenge to her public service
policies. In particular, as reported by the weekly magazine Tempo, three
issues have prompted Risma to step down as Surabaya’s mayor.
First,
the battle over the construction of a toll road across Surabaya, in which
Risma favored improving the city’s public transportation. Second, following
this, Surabaya’s city council — supported by the PDI-P — attempted to oust
her, but failed. The rejection of Risma by the PDI-P and its oligarchic
component continued, when she wanted to raise the billboard advertising tax.
In these
two cases, the shared interest of business people and political elites was
the obvious motivation behind the resistance to Risma’s ideas. And third, the
“punch” against Risma was the covert appointment of PDI-P’s local head and
deputy speaker of the city council, Wisnu Sakti Buana, as the new deputy
mayor — a move that Risma believed was another attempt to topple her.
Thus,
populist figures have been captured by the corrupt political system. On the
one hand, they are personality-based figures, who differ from mass
mobilizational figures, such as Lula Da Silva and Evo Morales in Latin
America. Da Silva and Morales were able to transform their societal support
into populist parties. Accordingly, they received full support to implement
populist policies without strong resistance from parliament or their own
parties.
Yet
Jokowi and Risma are also elites, since they received official positions.
These two prominent leaders emerged from the middle class. Jokowi was a
carpenter-turned-politician and Risma was a true-blue bureaucrat. They had no
mass political mobilization to challenge established political elites and
oligarchs.
The only
option they had was to enter a well-established political party, namely the
PDI-P, to be eligible to run for governmental positions.
There is
a huge gap between elite and grassroots levels in terms of building strong
political influence. In Indonesia’s modern history, the banned Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI) was widely known for its intimate relationship with the
grassroots movement. The masses could be mobilized to support certain party
policies, whether in favor of or against the government. However, since
Soeharto took over the government in 1966, Indonesian society has been
distanced from politics.
The
concept of a “floating mass” was
widely disseminated by Ali Murtopo, Soeharto’s right-hand man; it meant that people
would not play any political roles or organize any political movements and
therefore would devote all their efforts to economic development. Since then,
no populist figures have arisen from a grassroots level.
What we
are seeing today are politicians emerging from the middle class. On the one
hand, the emergence of populist figures is the result of a deficient
political system, creating conditions that are ripe for populism.
On the
other hand, these figures have no political-based organizations that can
continually draw support from society to impose populist policies. They must
frequently abide by the party’s rules. Occasionally, pro-people policies are
at odds with party interests.
In this
regard, populist policies have to fall in line with the party’s instruction.
So far, the case of Risma has illustrated this pattern clearly.
Furthermore,
populist figures in a corrupt political system risk being used by other
political parties. Certain parties, such as the National Mandate Party (PAN),
the Democratic Party and the Golkar Party have expressed interest in making
Jokowi their own candidate.
However,
these moves were blocked by the PDI-P. Similarly, if Risma quits as mayor,
the Gerinda Party, Golkar and even the Democrats are willing to put her
forward as a strong running mate. For these parties, Jokowi and Risma are
vote magnets.
This is a very pragmatic reason to recruit them, but it does not
guarantee that, in the future, party elites will not continue to threaten the
performance of these two leading populist figures. ●
|
|
|
