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Tampilkan postingan dengan label Indonesian foreign policy - Prospects. Tampilkan semua postingan

Rabu, 24 September 2014

New focus for Indonesian foreign policy

New focus for Indonesian foreign policy

Omar Halim  ;   A retired senior United Nations official with over 28 years experience dealing with economic and social affairs, public information, politics and peacekeeping; He was also special representative of the secretary-general to Armenia and Azerbaijan on the question of Nagorno Karabakh and to Cameroon and Nigeria on the question of the Bakassi Peninsula
JAKARTA POST, 22 September 2014

                                                                                                                       
                                                      

Because of historical and political reasons, the “world issues” focused on by the world press have been (a) issues between or among developed countries and (b) issues related to developed countries involved in matters of developing countries.

Historically, there have been developing countries, large and small, which have been able to sustain high rates of economic growth and this has resulted in their ability to “catch up” with developed countries, such as South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Mexico, Peru, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, South Arica, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya and others.

On the other hand, developed countries have been growing at much lower rates and even at anemic and negative rates, such as Western Europe and Japan.

Naturally, because the initial discrepancy in per capita income levels is so large, it will take quite some time for these developing countries to equal or exceed the income levels of the developed countries.

Within a span of a few decades, developing countries experiencing sustained and high growth rates should be able to increase their capacity in developing infrastructure, human resources, technology and even military capacity.

The establishment of the G20 indicates the recognition among the developed countries that certain developing countries should be playing an increasingly greater role in world affairs. It is in this context that Indonesia should take the opportunity to develop a new and different government and in the longer run, much closer cooperation and coordination with developing countries located in south and east Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Pacific Island countries and South America.

 What is the basis of Indonesia’s capacity to assume this role? Concerning connectivity, the incoming Indonesian government has stated that it would establish an “ocean toll”, which means better transportation links between eastern and western parts of the country. This will integrate regions much more closely.

 Another policy objective stated was a special emphasis on the development of the eastern part of Indonesia which, if successful, could significantly increase the dynamism and economic growth of the eastern regions of Indonesia.

 The attainment of these two policy objectives will no doubt make the Indonesian economy much more integrated and dynamic.

Not only would this result in the narrowing of the distribution of income and wealth between the eastern and western parts of the country, but by having a much more integrated and dynamic economy, Indonesia would be in a much better position to become a node of transportation and trade between or among developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, as well as with the eastern parts of Asia, which are predicted to be the fastest growing regions in the world for the foreseeable future.

 Indonesia has to take the initiative to develop much closer cooperation with countries in the southern hemisphere, primarily because Indonesia has historical, geographic, economic and political reasons to do so.

 After independence, Indonesia, together with a few other developing countries, established the idea of cooperation and solidarity among Asian and African countries. The idea is still very much alive and remembered by Africans. Later on, Indonesia championed the expansion of the idea of cooperation to include Latin American countries.

In this way, Indonesia has expanded its relationships with African, Asian and Latin American countries. Geographically speaking, Indonesia could become the center of transportation and trade among developing countries in the southern hemisphere.

With increased transportation and trade among these countries, their economies would be able to grow faster and become more dynamic. The cooperation among these countries could be expanded to include the fields of technology, investment, information, tourism and others.

 If this materializes, developing countries in the southern hemisphere would be more dynamic, contributing to a more just world economy. Indonesia would become one of the countries contributing to this noble objective.

 The Indonesian initiative will take some time to bear tangible results, but the incoming government has to take a first step now. 

 Indonesian foreign policy has to start building the required blocks to systematically interlace the political and economic relationships among the developing countries in the southern hemisphere.

In the future, Indonesia will play a much more important role in world affairs. This is an opportunity that no other country has.

This new initiative will be complementary to the existing foreign policy, which has to strive for Indonesia assuming a maximum role in world affairs within the existing conditions.

Sabtu, 31 Mei 2014

The prospects for Indonesian foreign policy

The prospects for Indonesian foreign policy

Hadianto Wirayuda  ;   The writer is pursuing his PhD degree in international relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, London
JAKARTA POST,  30 Mei 2014
                                                
                                                                                         
                                                      
Prabowo Subianto and Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, the two presidential candidates, have published their programs for government. While the manifestos cover a wide range of issues, I am particularly interested in interpreting the foreign-policy sections by assessing the prospects for Indonesia’s foreign affairs vis-à-vis their foreign policy agendas.

Prabowo, through his manifesto, emphasized revitalizing Indonesia’s role in international diplomacy by using the late Michael Leifer’s notion of entitlement — highlighting, inter alia, Indonesia’s size advantage and its vast natural resources — as foreign policy assets. Such a pride in Indonesia’s entitlement has led Prabowo to maintain the spirit of nationalism in his foreign policy preferences. An example is his stance in responding to the Ambalat dispute with Malaysia, in 2009, where he publicly claimed his readiness to “act as a soldier again” in order to defend Indonesia’s sovereignty.

Regarding regional cooperation, Prabowo’s manifesto underscores the need to “revisit the outdated Indonesian foreign policy”, while maintaining that “ASEAN regionalism has been an artefact in Indonesia’s diplomatic history”, thus, “Indonesia must not continuously rely on the toothless ASEAN solidarity.” Taking the aspects of nationalism and regional aspiration into account, the prospects for Indonesia’s foreign policy are, in this regard, worrisome.

There are two reasons for this. First, Indonesia remains committed to resolving border issues by peaceful means, focusing on diplomacy instead of the military approach. This has been the preference since the Soeharto era. The continued preference for peaceful means during the Reform era can be linked to the idea maintained by Indonesian leaders about the appropriate action of a democracy with regard to dispute resolution.

If Prabowo’s policy preference, as demonstrated in the Ambalat case, is sustained, it would be possible for him to embark upon aggressive external behavior whenever confronted by sovereignty problems. This behavior would disregard Indonesia’s democratic credentials and its regional leadership. In practice, however, an aggressive external behavior may not necessarily be possible given that Indonesia is still renewing its military infrastructure.

Second, Prabowo’s foreign policy would potentially neglect the importance of ASEAN. If sustained, this approach would contradict Indonesia’s traditional foreign policy concentric circles — which put ASEAN at the core — and also discredit Indonesia’s regional entitlement, an aspired basis of Prabowo’s diplomacy.

In practice, undermining regional cooperation may not be easy given that Indonesia, as the perceived regional leader, must ensure the implementation of the ASEAN Political-Security Community in 2015 by consistently promoting democracy and human rights, an activity that is not included in Prabowo’s foreign policy manifesto.

Overall, if Prabowo decided to pursue his foreign policy approaches in the ways described, this might contradict the ideas stipulated in the first paragraph of his own foreign policy manifesto: “to be consistently active in [the creation] of a peaceful world”.

While Jokowi also emphasized Indonesia’s repositioning vis-à-vis global issues, it is not entirely clear how in practice this repositioning would be applied.

However, at the textual level, Jokowi’s foreign policy ideas reflect foreign policy continuity, especially the agenda that was pursued during the Megawati Soekarnoputri period.

Underscoring Indonesia’s archipelagic identity, Jokowi’s manifesto identifies a number of diplomatic activities that reflect the importance of sovereignty. This is similar to Prabowo’s focus on stressing the prominence of nationalism in Indonesia’s foreign policy.

Despite the similarity, at the textual level, the means to use nationalism as a foreign policy instrument are different.

Jokowi’s proposal identified diplomacy as the means to solve territorial disputes. We can, therefore, assume that the military approach would not be his first priority.

Regarding regional cooperation, Jokowi’s proposals noted the importance of ASEAN and, thus, “consolidating Indonesia’s leadership in, and reassuring the centrality of, ASEAN”. The challenge, however, rests on Jokowi’s limited foreign-policy exposure and his lack of experience in national leadership, which would lead to him relying on his foreign minister in overseeing the conduct of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

This indicates a continuity of Megawati’s foreign policy, with Jokowi focusing on a well-tested foreign-policy course. Megawati’s decision to revitalize Indonesia’s role in ASEAN reinstated Indonesia’s leadership by way of promoting democracy and human rights in ASEAN. This allowed for the association to transform itself from being a club of authoritarians into an entity that recognizes democracy as a principle of its intra-mural cooperation, as the ASEAN Charter stipulates.

Jokowi’s manifesto also indicates his reliance on the Foreign Ministry in foreign policy-making by having it restructured, emphasizing “internal capacity building with regards to, inter alia, economic diplomacy and public diplomacy to include public participation in the decision-making process.”

While this also demonstrates a continuity of Megawati’s foreign-policy agenda (as the ministry’s first bureaucratic reform was launched in 2002), foreign policy-making is likely to remain top-down. This is because the public is thought to be ill-informed on foreign-policy issues. For instance, a 2009 public survey showed that 82 percent of the population believed that ASEAN is a security community with special security forces, and only 13 percent perceived ASEAN as a regional organization.

Therefore, if Jokowi relied heavily on public preferences, Indonesia’s foreign policy could become irrational. This could affect Jokowi’s aspirations for a leadership role in ASEAN.

In summary, the prospects for Indonesia’s foreign policy are likely to involve change and continuity. Notwithstanding this the election winner, in general, nationalism — manifested in the focus on the importance of sovereignty — will remain a feature of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

Specifically, Prabowo’s manifesto indicates that Indonesia’s foreign policy is likely to change, projecting primarily a post-ASEAN strategy, and Jokowi’s proposals highlight the likelihood for continuity, pursuing the preferences that were previously applied by Megawati.