Time to move on from ‘military reform’ (Part 2 0f 2)

Time to move on from ‘military reform’ (Part 2 0f 2) Evan A Laksmana  ;   The writer is a researcher with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta and a non-resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States

JAKARTA POST, 16 September 2014

                                                                                                                       

                                                      

The lack of an institutionalized integrated tri-service culture within the Indonesian Military (TNI) means that the procurement process is reduced to a shopping list for the individual services. According to MEF documents, arms spending until 2024 divides the pie almost evenly between the army, navy and air force. This policy however does not take into account the different operational readiness and capability requirements of each service, Indonesia’s predominantly maritime geostrategic position, and the imbalance between force sizes (the army is approximately five and ten times the size of the navy and air force respectively). President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s defense modernization has eventually been directed to better equip the services (the hardware) without overhauling the personnel system and quality (the software) and the organizational infrastructure (the operating system). For one thing, aside from the personnel issues mentioned above, the process of doctrinal revisions — from political to tactical level — has been uneven. With the “dual function” gone and the New Paradigm in place, along with the newly revamped Total People’s Defense, combat and operational doctrines have only recently received attention. Indeed, the TNI’s regular tri-service exercises in recent years were designed to try out different variations of its joint operations doctrine. This process is ongoing and should be supported. But tailoring long-term arms purchases in the absence of a coherent operational doctrine undermines the notion of capability-based defense procurement. For another, if the TNI is serious about joining the ranks of advanced militaries, the process to create the Regional Defense Joint Command — allowing the three services to be integrated under one command — to replace the existing separate territorial command structure should be accelerated. A leaner organization oriented less toward domestic security and more toward the changing external strategic environment, staffed with better-educated and qualified officers, and guided by a coherent doctrine, can better capitalize on advanced technology. But focusing on technological modernization alone is akin to spending generously for a new engine to be fitted onto an old car. Bottom line, modernization does not guarantee the creation a more effective and efficient combat organization. By itself, modernization is a necessary process, but not sufficient. Equal, if not more, attention should be given to personnel development, network-centric integration of existing weapons systems and organizational overhaul. One way to start thinking about how to design and implement these different, and arguably complex, policies is to make a gestalt switch in our conceptual basis from “military reform” to “defense transformation”. As mandated by the 1998 democratic transition, “military reform” implies fixing certain aspects of the military’s “distorted” roles. As we’ve seen above, this meant erasing the legacies of Soeharto’s authoritarian rule. “Defense transformation”, on the other hand, suggests a complete overhaul of the military’s worldview, institutions and even missions and future development. It implies an institutional and paradigm shift on how the military views and structures itself, educates and trains its members, how it equips itself, and how it plans to fight. Also, the focus on “defense” rather than “military” implies that the actors we need to focus on bringing into the process are not just the TNI. Civilian officials at the defense ministry, civil society groups, academics and scientists, as well as corporate officials working within the defense industrial establishment, all play a key role in shaping the transformation process. More importantly however, defense transformation is something for the long haul — it would take around 10 to 20 years to formulate and implement. This means that the process should not be too dependent on who the current president is. Long-term planning also helps the TNI in dealing with the sometimes unruly political process of negotiating its strategic and operational plans with the powers that be. With this in mind, the president-elect should consider different policies to overhaul the TNI’s entire education and training system, accelerate and synchronize its organizational reform plans and doctrinal revisions, and revamp the Defense Ministry’s defense budgeting and management process, along with its acquisition and research and development practices. These policies would lay the foundation during Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s first term for a more thorough defense transformation process. Of course, they would be better coordinated if Jokowi could make the breakthrough that Yudhoyono couldn’t — establish a professionally-led National Security Council in the absence of a long-drawn out national security bill. That being said, critics will point out that I am omitting key “unfinished businesses” from the military reform agenda set in 1998, including the resolution of past human rights abuses, the overhaul of the military justice system and the elimination of any sense of impunity for officers acting beyond the bounds of our legal system. The defense transformation vision offered here may not directly address these concerns head on. But overhauling the personnel and education system is a pivotal policy to prevent future human rights abuses — rather than remedy past ones — or other illegal actions taken by our officers. More concretely, fixing promotion policies could minimize future internal dissent among the rank and file, while better education and training systems could instill a new sense of professional identity. Replacing the territorial command structure and putting in place coherent operational doctrines could provide a new sense of mission and improve readiness amid a rapidly changing strategic environment. In conclusion, fixating on military reform alone will hold us back in the past at a time when Jokowi’s election should give us more push to look ahead. A defense transformation agenda gives us the roadmap to do so. ●

From ‘military reform’ to ‘defense transformation’  (Part 1 of 2) Evan A Laksmana ;   A researcher with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta; A non-resident fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States

JAKARTA POST, 15 September 2014

                                                                                                                       

                                                      

As president-elect Joko Widodo — popularly known as Jokowi — prepares his first Cabinet and plans to govern, it is perhaps a good time to take a step back and consider the broader picture of Indonesia’s military reform. After all, he did campaign on a reformist platform; he even had more detailed defense policy ideas than his rival, Lt. Gen (ret) Prabowo Subianto. What have we accomplished thus far in reforming the military following the end of Soeharto’s authoritarian New Order? How has the process of military reform evolved and what should we expect next? What would defense policy and military reform look like under Jokowi’s first administration? Should we expect more continuity rather than change from President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono era when it comes to military reform? After the fall of Soeharto, military reform between 1999 and 2004 under presidents B. J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri essentially focused on erasing the legacies of authoritarian rule. The Indonesian military changed its name from the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) to the Indonesian Military (TNI) when the separation from the police officially took place in 1999. The TNI then abolished the “dual function” doctrine that had previously allowed officers to hold various political and economic posts throughout the country. Its non-elected legislative seats were eliminated by 2004, along with any official ties to any political parties. Additionally, Law No. 34/2004 on the Indonesian Military not only banned military officers from running for office but also mandated the eventual transfer of the TNI’s recorded business and commercial enterprises by 2009. In short, the focus has been on getting the military out of politics and business, ending its domestic security and policing roles, and returning its function as the primary actor for national defense. By one account, the TNI issued 29 institutional reform policies to follow these broad visions from 1998 to 2006. Believing that the New Order’s legacies had been erased, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004 – 2014) went on to focus on rebuilding the TNI’s overall combat effectiveness and readiness. Indeed, then-defense minister Juwono Sudarsono claimed in 2008 that military reform was 85 percent complete. As Indonesia’s economic strength grew during Yudhoyono’s presidency, soldiers’ welfare was gradually increased in terms of salaries and benefits; education and training began to gain importance (as seen from the establishment of the Indonesian Defense University), and technological modernization took center stage. Indeed, with the Minimum Essential Forces (MEF) as the main guiding vision, the defense budget more than tripled, from approximately US$2.1 billion in 2003 to about $7.7 billion in 2012. It is further estimated that completing the MEF shopping list requires around $7 to $10 billion. Arguably, MEF is the centerpiece of Yudhoyono’s defense modernization vision, which represents the next step in Indonesia’s post-authoritarian military reform. The passing of the 2012 defense industrial law further cemented this vision. What should we expect therefore from the president-elect? According to Jokowi’s campaign platform documents, he has four main defense priorities. First, continue supporting the professionalism of the Indonesian military by improving soldiers’ welfare and its main weapons systems by increasing the defense budget to 1.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) within five years. Second, seek defense independence by reducing foreign technological imports, strengthening the domestic defense industry and diversifying Indonesia’s defense partnerships. Third, complete the MEF blueprint and build the military to eventually become a respectable maritime force in East Asia. Finally, place defense policy as an integral part of a comprehensive and resilient national security system that reorders various defense, internal security, public safety and human security functions managed by the National Security Council (DKN). Assuming Jokowi takes his campaign promises seriously, these priorities suggest that he would build on and continue many of Yudhoyono’s defense modernization policies. This vision, however, should be taken with an extra pinch of salt. First and foremost, with more money being spent on technology, personnel development is taking a back seat — despite the fact that a military is only as effective as the men and women running it. According to IHS Jane’s projections, spending on personnel between 2010 and 2017 will, on average, be around $4.79 billion annually. While these figures represent around two thirds of the defense budget, they seem minuscule when we think about the level of expertise needed to boost technological innovation and to effectively run and maintain high-tech military systems. This is particularly the case when we consider Indonesia’s mediocre human capital development. In 2013, we were ranked 61 globally by the World Economic Forum’s education measures. Presumably, the low quality of our human capital spills into the TNI’s manpower quality as well. Additionally, a review of the TNI’s educational curricula — from the academy to the National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas) — suggests that while sociopolitical courses are fewer now than under the New Order, they continue to make up a significant proportion of available classes. And even though overseas education and training opportunities have expanded, messy personnel policies have created promotional logjams, with the number of posts shrinking while the officer corps grew from 46,168 in 2004 to 52,940 in 2009. Consequently, tours of duty have become increasingly shorter and higher educational qualifications are becoming less relevant, if not detrimental, for officers competing for a small number of billets. All of these are counterproductive to the long-term development of a professional modern military career pattern. Secondly, the Yudhoyono-led process of technological modernization for the past decade has had some harmful, unintended consequences for the TNI’s weapons platform readiness and maintenance. As defense planners have been more concerned initially with procuring weaponry from suppliers who would not impose political conditions of usage, the military has been incrementally stocking up platforms from various different countries. As of 2006, the TNI had been operating 173 different medium and advanced platforms imported from 17 different countries. While “partner diversification” sounds politically convenient, complex weapons systems do not work that way. Indeed, such a “rainbow mix” entails significant costs in terms of maintenance and personnel training and has affected operational readiness due to inter-operability problems. ●