Challenges
and options
for
Indonesian counterterrorism
Iis Gindarsah ; a researcher at the Department of Politics and
International Relations, Centre for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), Jakarta
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JAKARTA
POST, 31 Desember 2014
Every year in the build-up to the Christmas and New Year
celebrations, the Indonesian police beef up security throughout the
archipelago. The sense of precaution, however, is slightly different this
year.
In the wake of the latest hostage-taking in Sydney and the
arrest of 12 Syria-bound Indonesian nationals in Kuala Lumpur, the country’s
counterterrorism authorities are increasingly concerned with the domestic
ramifications of the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East.
While Iraq attracted militants from around the world between
2003 and 2011, Syria is increasingly become a new hotspot for jihadist
activities. The latter development is arguably comparable to Afghanistan
during the anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s.
This year, the Islamic State (IS) movement emerged as the main
jihadist group in Iraq and Syria. Unlike al-Qaeda’s slow-paced approach to
jihad, the group employs “total war” and “mass casualty” approaches, giving
it credibility within the jihadist community.
The brutal reputation of IS fighters on the battlefield have
further inspired radical-minded individuals seeking instant outcomes and
combat experience to join the notorious terrorist group.
In Indonesia, the operational dynamics of IS have had a profound
impact, radicalizing local Muslim youths and drawing many to the theater of
conflict.
Here, the ultimate challenge for counterterrorism efforts is to
assess whether the country remains a peripheral source of foreign fighters in
Iraq and Syria, or whether the radicalism and violence inspired by IS pose a
clear and present danger to homeland security.
According to the latest official estimates, at least 500
Indonesians have joined either IS or other militant groups.
They travel to war-torn Iraq and Syria for various reasons,
including fighting the authoritarian regime and eliminating the Shiite
population.
Having confiscated numerous IS standards and publications in
many parts of the country, the national police’s anti-terror squad arrested
seven suspected IS sympathizers in Poso, Central Sulawesi, in mid-September
2014.
This further suggests a potentially growing relationship between
IS and local militant groups, although the risk of major terrorist attacks is
currently low.
Learning from the experience of former anti-Soviet combatants in
Afghanistan, some Indonesian militants in Syria and Iraq are potential
leaders of future terrorist cells in the country.
Despite significant improvements in counterterrorist
capabilities, Indonesia has not made meaningful progress in de-radicalizing
home-grown militants and terrorists.
The country’s lack of de-radicalization programs means its
security architecture is ill-prepared to anticipate the future threat of
returning Indonesian militants and the further expansion of violent IS
ideology.
The Indonesian government has declared any form of affiliation
to the group to be categorically “a crime against the state”, according to
Article 139 of the Criminal Code.
Referring to the 2006 Citizenship Law, counterterrorist
authorities have further warned that Indonesians “who pledge allegiance to
any foreign country or entities based in other countries will lose their
citizenship”.
Nevertheless, preventing radicalized individuals from traveling
to the conflict zones and joining IS is a challenging task for many
governments, not excluding Indonesia.
At one level, the current trend appears temporarily expedient as
extremists being drawn out of the country will reduce the risk of immediate
terrorist attacks at home.
At another level, high-profile government participation in the
anti-IS international coalition could alienate some elements of the local
Muslim population, potentially undermining the level of domestic support for
the incumbent administration.
While improving its de-radicalization programs, the Indonesian
government should consider other possible options.
First, to deal with growing support for the IS causes, it must
attempt to crackdown on electronic communication between militant groups
outside the country and the local population.
Relevant regulations and concerted efforts are crucial to limit
the volume of hate speeches, ferocious ideologies and violent broadcasts.
Secondly, while closely monitoring the movements of IS
sympathizers at home, it must work on a comprehensive, integrated and
ready-to-use database of local terrorist networks and radical-minded
individuals.
This capability will enable relevant agencies and personnel on
the ground to detect and identify suspected militants either heading to or
returning from Iraq and Syria.
Third, the Indonesian government should increase the overseas
presence of counterterrorism officers working with its embassies in countries
where foreign fighters transit before entering Iraq and Syria.
This way, it could intensify coordination with local security
authorities on identifying Indonesian militants and preventing their passage
through these countries.
While tracking the newly arriving fighters is of importance,
keeping an eye on those returning home must be the top priority.
Despite the uncertain future of the conflict in Syria, the
government should ponder the grave danger posed by the country’s militants
when they return to Indonesia. While a persuasive approach is essential to
engage moderate combatants, it must prepare another alternative for
worst-case individuals.
Preemptive measures are necessary to deal with violent and
uncooperative militants on their way back to conduct major terrorist attacks
at home.
Here, the military’s special forces are valuable assets for
Indonesian counterterrorism. Given the sensitivity and political risks of the
matter, this option requires selective target acquisition and sophisticated
covert operations for an optimal outcome.
The use of lethal force remains the last resort; it must be
taken only if the goal of a persuasive approach is deemed unattainable. ●
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