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Let me start with what the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meant to Indonesia as it was declared on
Aug. 16, 1966, at the opening session of the 1966/1967 House of
Representatives by former president Soeharto in his role as chairman of the
presidium of the AMPERA Cabinet.
He declared at the session that Indonesia would reinvigorate “Maphilindo in
a broader environment in order to be able to achieve a Southeast Asia
cooperating in various fields of activity, specifically in the fields of
economics, technology and culture. If an integrated Southeast Asia can be
achieved, this area will be able to meet challenges, intervention from
outside, both economically and militarily.
A cooperative Southeast Asia, an integrated Southeast Asia will be a very
strong fortress and base to meet imperialism and colonialism in whatever
form and from whatever direction it may come.”
It was the Konfrontasi policy that taught us that proclaiming a “free and
active foreign policy” and co-designing the Asia-Africa conference and the
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Initiative of Five, as an attempt to thwart
the Cold War, should be based on a solid geopolitical environment in
Indonesia’s immediate neighborhood, Southeast Asia.
Maphilindo was too small as a starter to design regional stability and
security. That was the reason why Soeharto broadened the regional base for
creating a security zone around Indonesia. Indonesia’s foreign policy was
focused on its immediate neighborhood. The NAM was then put on the back burner
until 1992 when Jakarta hosted the 10th NAM Summit.
The regional integration Indonesia devised was to be achieved not through
economic cooperation, but primarily through political cooperation, by
developing each nation’s national resilience, so much so that collectively
they would develop into regional resilience, by both recognizing the
national sovereignty of each nation and non-interference in each other’s
internal affairs.
These principles were later formulated into the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
(TAC) in Southeast Asia, which became the legal basis for ASEAN’s
cooperation (Chapter I, Article 2) and remains sacrosanct in ASEAN’s
principles of regional cooperation and developing relations with the
outside world.
ASEAN thus become not so much the “cornerstone” of Indonesia’s foreign
policy as its conceptual base: Southeast Asia’s stability, security and
prosperity become Indonesia’s core strategic interests. An unstable,
insecure Southeast Asia would have a direct impact on Indonesia’s stability,
security and prosperity.
Furthermore, Southeast Asia, in Indonesian eyes, should be independent,
capable of upholding its autonomy in the rivalry between and competition of
extra-regional powers. Indonesia’s response to the Sino-US rivalry is a
“hedging strategy”, specifically directed towards the uncertainty in
actions of both the US and China in the region.
TAC was the basis for extra-regional countries to join the East Asia Summit
inaugurated in Kuala Lumpur in 2005 with ASEAN in the center, as the
driving force. China, Japan and South Korea became party to the treaty,
joined by India, New Zealand and Australia, and later the United States and
Russia in 2011. The external parties, and also China and the United States
accept ASEAN’s centrality in this equation as it accords with their
strategic interests.
The new regional architecture with ASEAN as the center is primarily
intended to incorporate the big powers, China and the United States of
America, as well as India, Russia and Japan in the design of a peaceful,
surprise-free Asia-Pacific. A region devoid of conflicts, including in the
South China Sea. Lest we forget, Indonesia proposed that India be added to
the ASEAN plus three set up. As India’s addition alone would have been too
obvious as a political counterbalance to China, Indonesia proposed that
Australia and New Zealand be added to the set up to become the ASEAN plus
six configuration, which then became the East Asia Summit.
The full development of Indonesia’s foreign policy is highly dependent on
how stable ASEAN and its wider security area are, encompassing the wider
East Asia region. Hence, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s government’s foreign
policy vis-à-vis the extra-regional world, and more specifically the great
powers, Marty Natalegawa’s concept of “dynamic equilibrium”, of urging,
together with other ASEAN members, “peaceful coexistence among the great
powers in Asia” are expressions of Indonesia’s attempts at developing
Indonesia’s foreign policy in a stable, secure and prosperous Southeast
Asia or ASEAN.
An unstable and insecure Southeast Asia will force the government to turn
its attention inward and reinstate solidarity in ASEAN and collectively
face the external powers that are considered to be the main cause of
instability and insecurity. This is Indonesia’s primary task in sustaining
ASEAN’s solidarity and cooperation.
However, what happened in Phnom Penh at the 2012 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
and the ASEAN Summit proved that consolidating ASEAN’s cooperation and
solidarity is still a huge task. Indonesia’s initiative in finding a
solution to the disharmony among the ASEAN member states at the Phnom Penh
meeting in July 2012 by producing the six-point “consensus”, was more an
act of firefighting rather than an act of affirming ASEAN’s stance of
rejecting non-interference, by any external power, in its affairs in
accordance with TAC.
Similarly, at the close of the ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh on Nov. 18, 2012,
when the summit chairman said that there was an “agreement” not to
internationalize the South China Sea issue, this was challenged by the
Philippines and Vietnam, as well as Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore, by immediately submitting letters formally disagreeing with this
view, which forced the chairman to delete the reference, ASEAN again acted
as a firefighter.
Frustration with a member country for not holding the ASEAN line has
frequently occurred in ASEAN’s history. That was clear from the very
beginning. The difficulty of nurturing regional cooperation through
harmonizing each member nation’s interests with the regional goals was
already identified by Singapore’s first foreign minister, S. Rajaratnam, in
1967, at ASEAN’s creation:
“We must think not only of our national interests but posit them against
regional interests: that is a new way of thinking about our problems. And
these are two different things and sometimes they can conflict. Second, we
must also accept the fact, if we are really serious about it, that regional
existence means painful adjustments to those practices and thinking in our
respective countries. We must make these painful and difficult adjustments.
If we are not going to do that, then regionalism remains a utopia.”
His second reminder was much more serious: “We want to ensure a stable
Southeast Asia, not a balkanized Southeast Asia.”
Hence, ASEAN’s tremendous task is indeed to remain relevant and
self-confident and resilient in the unfolding power game in the wider
region of East Asia. ASEAN is challenged with “maintaining the centrality
and proactive role of ASEAN as the primary driving force in its relations
and cooperation with its external partners in a regional architecture that
is open, transparent and inclusive,” as the ASEAN Charter directs us.
And this should be the stance of Indonesia’s foreign policy beyond 2014. ●
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