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Since
Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (MRC) released the outcome of its
survey earlier this month, which ranked the Democratic Party third after
the Golkar Party and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) in
terms of electability, many within the ruling party have deemed their
chairman Anas Urbaningrum as most responsible for this decline.
As a consequence, they say, Anas must be replaced. The move to oust Anas
has since been taken forward in several stages.
In the first stage, on Feb. 8, the party’s general assembly transferred the
executive authority from Anas to the assembly chairman President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono under the aegis of the “eight steps to rescue and
consolidate the Democratic Party”.
The steps stipulate, among other things, that the supreme assembly chairman
is responsible for leading the rescue and consolidation of the party, with
the assembly taking all decisions, actions and direction of strategic
importance, including restoration of the party’s credibility and integrity,
and with all party elements directly answering to the assembly. Anas keeps
his chairmanship intact, but must focus on the legal case he is facing.
If we read carefully the eight-item measure, it is clear this is the first
step to dismantle the authority of Anas as the party chairman. He remains
the deputy chief of the assembly, but his powers have been taken entirely
by Yudhoyono. In other words, Anas has been stripped of his authority.
The second step is the release of “10-point integrity pact” that all ranks
of party executives — both in the central board and regional chapters —
must sign.
One of the points of the pact is a willingness to resign after being named
a graft suspect. There is nothing new about this pact — it was part of the
party’s code of ethics in the first place.
There was speculation that the pact was issued because Anas would have
resisted it on the grounds that he was embroiled in a scandal centering on
the misappropriation of state money in the construction of the Hambalang
sports center in Bogor. In fact, Anas signed it.
The way Anas put pen to paper on the integrity pact showed he remained
powerful and his leadership in the party was still very strong. This was
evident when party executives loyal to him followed suit.
By asking all party executives to sign the pact, Anas displayed his
integrity and sent a signal that he was still “in command”.
In that regard, Anas maintains effective leadership in the party. Borrowing
the view of Joseph S. Nye Jr.: “An effective leader is a person capable of
mixing between the hard power of coercion and the soft power of
persuasion.” His ability to know when to use hard power and when to use
soft power means that Anas possesses smart power.
In the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections, Yudhoyono displayed the soft
power of persuasion. He was able to attract many people to accept and share
his vision.
He also knew how to co-opt his followers to walk in step with him to
achieve a common goal. The slogan “Together we can” was the motto with the
magnetic power in the 2004 election, which he maintained in 2009.
However, lately it is his militaristic nature that appears to have
prevailed over his democratic nature.
Yudhoyono’s move to control and consolidate the party he found is
understandable only from a military perspective, as he seized the
opportunity to save the party at the expense of Anas. Unfortunately, this
scenario is far from perfect.
For example, “pressure” on Anas to focus on the legal case in which he is
involved, which is being investigated by the Corruption Eradication
Commission (KPK) apparently predates the law.
The leaking of a KPK letter to start a formal investigation into Anas as
part of the pressure on the KPK did not work as not all of the antigraft
body leaders signed it. It only gave the impression that the Presidential
Palace had attempted to intervene. The Palace dismissed any link to the
leaking of the document
Step number three of the war of attrition against Anas took the form of the
party’s National Leadership Meeting on Feb. 17, which was expected to
increase the pressure for an extraordinary congress to replace Anas, which
would have been the fourth stage of the effort to unseat Anas.
As the public has witnessed, participants of the leadership meeting
displayed no urge to organize an extraordinary congress.
If all the measures to dethrone Anas fail, the party’s supreme assembly has
no other choice but to reinstate Anas’ powers as party chairman. A failure
to do so will push the party’s electability rating down further because of
the internal fuss about the party’s provisional list of legislative candidates
to be submitted to the General Elections Commission (KPU) in March.
The crisis, if it happens, will certainly serve as a negative campaign for
the ruling party. To consolidate the party, Anas’ authority may need to be
restored.
If the infighting is prolonged, the party may fail to meet the 3.5 percent
parliamentary threshold required to sit in the House of Representatives
following the 2014 legislative election. If that occurs, the party will be
consigned to the Indonesian political history books.
Is this the legacy that Yudhoyono will leave behind? ●
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