Indonesian military gears up for maneuver warfare

Indonesian military gears up for maneuver warfare Lis Gindarsah ;  A Researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta

JAKARTA POST, 12 Oktober 2012

In his speech to mark the 67th anniversary of the Indonesian Military (TNI), President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono reiterated his commitment to the strengthening of national defense. With a positive economic outlook for the foreseeable future, the Indonesian government should have adequate resources to meet the country’s defense needs. For more than a decade, Defense Ministry and TNI headquarters have attempted to transform the military establishment through selective arms modernization programs as well as doctrinal innovations. Looking at recent developments, there are at least three strategic trends in the Indonesian military’s transformation. First, given the enormous threats Indonesia has to face, the TNI is likely to develop a multi-spectrum force structure in anticipation of high-intensity combat maneuvers and low-intensity missions, such as peace-keeping and humanitarian relief. Specifically, under the minimum essential forces (MEF) planning, the Defense Ministry aims to upgrade the military’s capabilities and operational readiness to a sufficient level to enable rapid force deployment to key flash points, including Indonesia’s archipelagic sea lanes and exclusive economic zones. Second, the ongoing arms dynamic in the region also places external pressures upon the TNI to keep up with the current military technological developments. Such a trend is apparent in Indonesia’s recent arms acquisitions, which includes multi-role combat aircrafts, anti-air defense systems, tactical submarines, missile-guided frigates, multiple launcher rocket systems and, not forgetting, battle tanks. Third, new requirements for future operations and the further sophistication of military technologies have infused a new dynamic in Indonesia’s military thinking. In the past, the TNI leadership tended to overvalue attrition strategy to fight a superior enemy with asymmetric means, while overemphasizing single-system solutions to address battlefield deficiencies. Nowadays, however, attrition warfare has become obsolete due to protracted armed conflict and the resulting high rate of human casualties and material losses. Achieving military victory with such dire consequences ultimately exhausts Indonesia’s national resources. Given the atrocities of protracted war, many of Indonesia’s military officers have turned their attention to the subject of maneuver warfare and combined-arms. Unlike attrition strategy, maneuver-warfare proponents deem the key to military victory is not found in direct confrontation or physical destruction of hostile forces. Instead, it stresses rapid dislocation through decisive combat maneuvers focused on the adversary’s “center of gravity”, defined here as critical vulnerability. Maneuver-warfare theory envisages the TNI commanders to mass their strength against the opponent’s critical vulnerabilities, such as their command and control systems, fire-support capabilities, logistic supplies and key terrains or facilities. The neutralization or disruption of such objectives would inevitably paralyze the strength of hostile forces at any given critical moment, thus rendering them useless and irrelevant to the fight. Ultimately, the logic of maneuver warfare demands the TNI leadership to develop a combined-arms doctrine, rather than single-system approach to address battlefield deficiencies. The development of maneuver-oriented doctrine would correspond positively to the aspiration of Indonesia’s recent defense guidelines for greater interoperability among TNI’s armed services and systems. A combined-arms doctrine applies its magic charm to military campaigns and battles through two key aspects of “combat multiplier effects” that it imposes upon the adversary. The first aspect is the dynamic of “complementary effect” within friendly forces. Each combat unit and weapon inherently has different strengths and weaknesses. Complementary effects are created by combining various combat arms with different characteristics under a unified command and control. The dynamic of such combinations should enable TNI commanders to nullify the vulnerabilities of each arm with another arm’s strength in order to multiply the combat potentials of friendly forces. Picture infantrymen and tanks for example, the former is known for their ability to operate in closed terrain and to move quietly, but they are exposed in open terrain due to lack of speed and lethality. On the contrary, despite their strengths such as high velocity, armor protection and great firepower, tanks are vulnerable in restricted terrain and typically noisy in their maneuvers. However, when different combat arms work together, the sum of their combat potentials is greater than single-arm battle approach. Infantrymen, for instance, can hinge on tanks for lethal fire support, while the latter needs not be frightened to operate in a closed terrain as long as the infantry unit secures their moves. Of course, tanks and infantry are not the ultimate units of a combined-arms team. Artillery, naval platforms and combat aviations also play critical roles for successful combat maneuvers. The second aspect of combined-arms relates to psychological impact of complementary effect upon the adversary. Creative combinations of combat units and weapons seek to confront the enemy not with a problem, but rather with “unsolvable dilemma”. The latter is essentially a situation in which the enemy commander has to cope with two or more equally bad options. Imagine the plight of an enemy regiment against an advancing friendly infantry force that has artillery support. The combat situation develops as the latter charges with coordinated direct and indirect fires. In effect, the enemy is caught up in a tactical dilemma — either he moves but gets shot, or he stays but gets blown up. To make matters worse, suppose the friendly force pushes with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, it could conduct an effective maneuver to attack the enemy’s flank or penetrate swiftly into operational depth. Such movement further complicates the enemy’s combat calculus with the fear of being outflanked and the threat to its supply lines. Such examples illustrate combat multiplier effects of combined-arms warfare. Applying a weapon type or a tactical function in battle does not produce such effects. Instead, it merely exposes an adversary to a problem that can be resolved with a likely solution. Hence, any attempts that exclusively emphasize the use of single-system approach in military campaigns or battles would probably result in error. Having said all that, the logic of maneuver warfare would continue to gain more grounds in the TNI’s military thinking. While the acquisition of sophisticated weapon systems presents the armed forces with a complex of new capabilities. The development of new war-fighting concepts ultimately leads the TNI to excel in future military operations. In this light, substantial progress of the military transformation and future victory depend on the clear vision of Indonesia’s national and military leadership. Dirgahayu (congratulations) TNI. ●