Gus Dur’s Islamic indigenization vs radicalism Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir  ;  The writer is a lecturer of sociology at Jakarta State University and an alumnus of Ciganjur Islamic boarding school

JAKARTA POST,  03 Januari 2014

                                                                                                                       

One of the central ideas proposed by Abdurrahman “Gus Dur” Wahid in the context of the cultural Islamic movement in Indonesia is what is referred to as the indigenization of Islam.  This idea remains very relevant, four years after Gus Dur’s demise on Dec. 30, 2009, amid the rise of Islamism and Islamic formalization efforts in the country.  However, how relevant is this idea in preventing religious radicalism?  I argue that the idea of the indigenization of Islam may indeed be the answer to religious understanding that is not contextual and rigid, but not enough to provide a solution to the problem of Islamic radicalism. This is because religious radicalism is not solely emerging from a group that has a puritanical religious understanding. A group like the Salafi, for example, also seeks to purify the doctrine by ignoring local elements that are regarded as heretical. Yet, they clearly show an apolitical stance.  According to Olivier Roy, a professor of political Islam, such a group is referred to as neo-fundamentalists who only seek to enforce public morality without the intention of changing political institutions, especially by means of violence.  However, the term “apolitical”  actually categorizes them as supporters of political regimes that endorse religious legitimacy over policies. There are also other aspects that must be considered in analyzing how Islamic radicalism emerges. The strengthening of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia has more to do with how the government deals with elements of the Islamic movement. Without such a local context, Islamic political ideas imported from outside that contain biases of Arabism will not flourish in Indonesia.  This is also true for apolitical Salafi groups that tend to be supported by the government.  To put it simply, the puritanical Islamic movement does not just show up without any local context that allows it to be accepted. This is clearly observable from the experience of the New Order’s political history when political Islamic movements were marginalized; ranging from banning Masyumi former senior figures in political activities, co-optation of Islamist parties through the formation of the United Development Party (PPP) to the bloody events such as the Tanjung Priok massacre in 1984.  Organized Islam is considered as dangerous as communism, although some elements of Muslims have played an important role in eliminating communism at the beginning of the New Order era. Nevertheless, the silencing of political Islamic aspirations by the regime led to radical forms of reaction through underground movements. Some examples of cases that can be observed here include the bombing of the Borobudur and the two branches of Bank Central Asia, the case of Warman terror and Komando Jihad, as well as the Garuda plane hijacking in Bangkok in 1981. Therefore, the expression of religious radicalism must also be understood as a reaction to the political pressure by the regime, which perceived Soeharto as an enemy that must be fought. Mohammed Hafez (2003 in Sidel, 2007) in his book Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World states that “the cumulative effect of political repression, exclusive organizations, and anti-system ideology is a protracted conflict against a secular ruling regime and ordinary civilians who are perceived as sustaining that regime”. The rise of the radical Islamic movement after the fall of Soeharto thus, can also be understood as a result of the treatment regimes that are considered as favoring the policy of “the Global War on Terrorism” as echoed by the US government, which adopts a security approach in dealing with religious radicalism. Comparative observations in other countries, such as the Pattani Muslim group in Thailand, as well as the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines, can also provide a similar explanation regarding the development of religious radicalism.  The first example relates to the violent means used by Islamic groups in Pattani, Thailand, associated with repression by the regime of Thaksin Shinawatra who entrusted the military to crush the Islamic movement right from the beginning of his reign.  Second, a minority Muslim movement in Moro, the Philippines, is seeking to free itself from the Philippines because of the repressive actions of the regime.  In addition, the conflict in Moro is also a product of the historical construction of the colonial regime. As a result, the political pressures from the regime that led to the cases of political and economic marginalization facilitates the proliferation of a puritanical religious understanding. In this context, such religious understanding is seen as providing ammunition to criticize and oppose the oppressive regime.  In contrast, the religious understanding of Islamic cultural groups considered likely accommodating and less critical of the regime. In addition, contiguity with issues of global Islamic solidarity in Afghanistan, Palestine, the Philippines and in Myanmar has established the belief that there is real oppression against the Muslim world and therefore needs to take up the fight. However, because religious radicalism is more of a reaction,  as stated by Sidel (2007), these symptoms actually indicate a weakness and fragmentation of the radical Islamic movement rather than strength and solidity.  Therefore, overreaction that sees religious radicalism as a threat to social integration is actually irrelevant because it can deliver a counterproductive solution.  To conclude, the excessive political pressure, such as the use of the security approach in de-radicalization efforts in the democratic era, are in fact very similar in to the methods used by Soeharto against the political Islamic movement.  Thus, it is not only the understanding of Islamic radical actors that should be changed to be more adaptable to the local context through the indigenization of Islam, the treatment regime through the repressive state apparatuses should also be changed to be more persuasive than offensive. ●