Can SBY end China’s dominance in the South China Sea? CPF Luhulima  ;   A researcher at the Centre for Political Studies at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) in Jakarta

JAKARTA POST,  05 Mei 2014

                                                

                                                                                         

                                                      

It will take a long time for ASEAN to deal with the South China Sea (SCS) problem. ASEAN was gently pressed to arrive at an arrangement to formulate and sign a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) in the SCS, a politically dressed Code of Conduct that ASEAN did not seek. A joint working group was set up to draft an action plan, specifying cooperation in the protection of the maritime environment, navigation and communication at sea, search and rescue and fighting transnational crime. Initially, ASEAN contended it would continue negotiating the terms and conditions first before meeting China, but China insisted that parties in conflict in the SCS would have to solve their sovereignty and jurisdictional problems with China on a bilateral basis, not multilaterally, in the ASEAN 10 plus 1 format. ASEAN rejected this and further negotiations were delayed. The guidelines for the DOC were only agreed upon after ASEAN sacrificed its stance of consolidating itself before meeting the Chinese — disparaging ASEAN in its entirety. All parties to the DOC would thus conduct their dialogue and consultation jointly, not in the ASEAN format of 10 + 1, but under a new format of 11. Where is the ASEAN centrality we so proudly proclaimed to the world? ASEAN violated its own concord on defending its centrality and role as a prime mover in its relations with all its dialogue partners. By giving in to China, ASEAN sacrificed its unanimity. The most tragic event was the 45th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Phnom Penh in 2012. The controversy involving the Philippines and Vietnam on the one hand, and Cambodia as the host, reflected parties that adhered to the respective principle of ASEAN centrality versus ASEAN plus China as an entity, a soccer team. This breakup among ASEAN members on the SCS cannot be justified. Here again, China “dictated” how conflict in the SCS had to be dealt with, not jurisdictionally but politically. Ever since the problem in the SCS first emerged, it could and would not determine the coordinates of the nine-dotted lines it claimed were its final territorial boundaries. It kept harping on about its historical rights. ASEAN has drafted the ASEAN Proposed Elements of a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC), followed by Indonesia’s Zero Draft on the COC. But China has discarded both, adhering to the DOC to manage conflicts in the SCS. ASEAN must decide on leaving the soccer team format to manage the SCS disputes with China and regenerate the 10 + 1 format in its dealings on the sea in question. Here, Indonesia must take the lead. The request of ASEAN Secretary-General Le Luong Minh to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in late 2012 to assist in managing SCS tensions should be taken as a constructive gesture. The problem of the SCS can no longer be managed at the level of foreign ministers alone. The Phnom Penh debacle brought ASEAN to the brink of “balkanization”, the breakup of ASEAN for China’s sake. The extraordinary endeavors of the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, Thailand and Vietnam to mobilize ASEAN’s unity in Phnom Penh have grossly failed to bring Cambodia back into ASEAN’s political fold. The restoration of ASEAN solidarity must be conducted at the ASEAN Summit level, in the format of summit diplomacy. Indonesia seems to be the only party able to take the initiative at the leaders’ summit. Aside from being ASEAN’s de facto leader and “by far the largest economy and population in Southeast Asia — the only country that matters to China and the only influential voice that can redirect regional efforts to change things, (May Hong, The Jakarta Post), Indonesia should channel the trend in the management of the SCS in ASEAN’s favor. China is a threat, starting with its dominance in managing tensions through a DOC and completely discarding ASEAN’s efforts at formulating a code of conduct. It even makes fun of ASEAN in disputes in the South China Sea. If China succeeds in its effort and ASEAN succumbs, balkanization will set in with many consequences for Indonesia and the other ASEAN members. Who can guarantee that one day China will not claim the northern part of the Natuna sea as part of its territory as well? Yudhoyono, toward the end of his term, should help revitalize ASEAN’s unity on the SCS issue. Indonesia must reinvigorate an “integrated” Southeast Asia (as in the Soeharto years), in line with the current form of an ASEAN Political and Security Community — both Indonesian initiatives to integrate the region into an ASEAN Community. Indonesia must reembrace the Philippines and Vietnam in formulating ASEAN’s stance on China in the SCS, to rekindle the attitude of “ASEAN first” in internationalizing this problem. In line with a new presidential decree on an official reference to China, Indonesia may have to change the term “Laut Cina Selatan” (South China Sea) to “Laut Tiongkok Selatan”, acknowledging the ocean as China’s sea. Meanwhile the Philippines has started to coin the term “West Philippines Sea” and the Nguyen Thai Hoc Foundation in California is suggesting the term “Southeast Asia Sea”. Why do we not initiate the term the “ASEAN Sea”, as raised by the political analyst Riefqi Muna, to project the ASEAN Political and Security Community in waters to the north, east and west of ASEAN? The time has come to liberate ourselves of China’s dominance and revitalize ASEAN’s spirit in the managing of the South China Sea on its terms. Indonesia’s initiative is crucial, as China recognizes Indonesia as ASEAN’s de facto leader. It is time we acted more assertively in the SCS, to make it the ASEAN Sea. ●