Egypt’s uprising and Myanmar’s democratic transition

Egypt’s uprising and Myanmar’s democratic transition Mario Masaya ;   Master of Science (Asian Studies) from S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

JAKARTA POST, 15 Juli 2013

  

The recent uprising in Egypt ignites the most important issue, which is the question of capability of a civilian government taking control over a long-lasting dictatorship after a revolution. 

It appears that the “Jasmine Revolution” in 2011 did not bring democracy as the people hoped. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s annual meeting in Brunei Darussalam focuses on the issues of South China Sea and international haze that may overshadow other important issues such as democratization in Myanmar. 

Seeing such a chaotic situation in Egypt, how could we avoid such calamity in Myanmar?

First of all, if a peaceful democratic change were to happen in Myanmar, we would need to understand the nature of political legitimacy of the long-lasting junta in Myanmar. By doing so, we could better understand and predict the future of democratic transition in Myanmar. Where does the Myanmar’s political legitimacy come from?

Muttiah Alagappa in the book he edited entitled Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia explained some sources of legitimacy. These include shared norms and values such as ideologies and religion, the proper use of power by the government and consent of the governed. 

In Myanmar, the concepts of legitimacy Alagappa suggested what can be applied using what is divided as the old traditional and the new modern sources of legitimacy.

The old traditional legitimacy includes traditional belief such as ideologies and religion. The junta uses this type of legitimacy since it took power in 1962. The new modern legitimacy sources comprise a more rational-based legitimacy such as consent of the governed and election. The junta tried to attain this type of legitimacy since the “8888 uprising” in 1988.

First, the old source of legitimacy. In Myanmar, the sense of nationalism is a critical drive for legitimacy. During the period of 1962-1988, it was one of the official ideologies of the government’s party, the Burma Socialist Program Party. 

Nationalism always becomes the legitimizing factor to rule Myanmar under the banner “National Unity”. It is argued that the more pressures from the West and international communities on the issues of human rights and democratization, the more integrated the Myanmar people are.

Religion and symbolism are also significant traditional legitimacy tools in Myanmar. Myanmar leaders always associate themselves with Buddhism. U Nu effectively used Buddhism as a legitimizing tool to win the election of 1960 by associating it with the Burmese tradition and the state. He went to the monasteries six times after becoming prime minister and even promised that Buddhism would be the state’s religion.

After U Nu, Ne Win and Than Shwe both created pagoda during their time in office while Khin Nyunt was in charge of repairing the Shwedagon Temple, the most symbolically important pagoda in Rangoon. 

Another significant symbolism in the government’s policy appeared on the junta’s decision to move the capital to Naypyidaw in 2006. The new capital was a sacred palace to designate the royal capital during the Burmese kingdom’s history.

The act also reflects the similar practice under the Burmese kings who moved the capital many times. A more strategic reason behind the capital move is the location of the old capital, which is prone to attack from its adversaries and it is easier to control the ethnic minorities.

Second, a new modern type of legitimacy, which includes the consent of the governed such as through elections. From 1960 to 1990, the junta gave no attention since it was just a one-party socialist system. The junta tried to win the first election in 1988 but failed.

Yet, instead of transferring power to the winner, the junta ruled with decree until the new referendum of the constitution in 2008. In 2010, without Aung San Suu Kyi’s participation, the election was held and the government’s party won more than 50 percent of the vote. It has strengthened the government’s legitimacy to rule Myanmar under a retired military commander, Thein Sein.

How do these old and new sources of legitimacy influence Myanmar’s democratization?

Democratic transition in Myanmar is a process of transfer of legitimacy from the military to the civilian government. For all parties who are hopeful of this transition, these old and new types of legitimacies are important aspects to be kept intact. 

Only by doing so, the country will stay in order; hence, bloodshed could be prevented. Moreover, the future of Myanmar’s democracy also depends on the junta itself.

The changes in the constitution, which allowed Suu Kyi to participate in formal politics, came from the military leaders who have a “reform” mind. The current Myanmar president, Thein Sein, was a former military commander who is considered a moderate and reformist military man. If any outside party forced a revolution in Myanmar as in Egypt in 2011, the same result might also happen in Myanmar.

Having a similar experience in terms of military domination in politics for 32 years, Indonesia could constructively play a more important role in engaging Myanmar and preparing the country for a peaceful transition. 

As Myanmar is becoming more open to the international community, it is the right time for Indonesia, an ASEAN brother, to initiate a more intense engagement with Myanmar to avoid a misstep that could lead to an undesirable situation like in Egypt. Regional stability is, after all, the republic’s own national interest. ● 

ASEAN and EU regional identity building : What went wrong?

ASEAN and EU regional identity building : What went wrong? Mario Masaya ;   A Student at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

JAKARTA POST, 16 Februari 2013

The European Union (EU) received the 2012 Nobel Peace prize for its contribution to regional and global peace. On the other side of the world, another very important regional organization that works to brings peace to its region is the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).  Although the two are different in many ways, they share the same difficulties in building regional identities. On the eurozone crisis and the South China Sea issue, they try to stay together, integrated and face problems. Both opt to use the notion of identity as an integrating factor. However, the outcomes have not been so satisfying. According to the pollster Eurobarometer77, the feeling of attachment of Europeans toward the EU stood at only 46 percent in 2012. While 52 percent of European citizens surveyed do not feel any connection with the EU, 15 percent felt no attachment at all.  There are few reliable surveys on the attachment of ASEAN’s citizens to the region, although one survey conducted by Thompson and Thianthai in 2008 revealed that even among elite university students, only 60.7 percent of respondents were familiar with ASEAN. So what went wrong? There are two explanations for this question: the empirical-practical and the fundamental-conceptual.  The first reason argues that the EU is still seen by European citizens as an elite club. Political support for the EU is very limited. The main reason for this, according to Neil Fligstein, is that the integration has resulted in uneven outcomes for individuals.  It has only benefited a small group of people among European elites who have had the opportunity to travel, speak other languages and communicate with other Europeans.  Moreover, according to Yeo Lay Hwee, the development of the EU has been top-down and elite driven. The push toward market integration was seen as an elite effort to achieve economic efficiency in a way that disregarded the public discourse on political and social impact. In other words, the fast development of the EU as an institution was not followed by the Europeanization of the citizens.  An example of this gap between the institution and the Europeanization of the citizens is the enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25 member states in 2004, which was seen as “advancement” by EU elites.  However, the enlargement did not get significant support from the citizens of the first 15 member countries. Eurobarometer data in 2004 said that only 42 percent of EU citizens agreed to the enlargement, while 39 percent were against.  ASEAN does not have a different story. There are not as many policies that directly touch upon the citizens of ASEAN, except the 30-day free visa. There is no single passport, like in the EU, nor is there as much freedom of movement as the European Schengen provides.  The second explanation considers a fundamental reason rather than an empirical policy basis. We are still living under the Westphalia model of world order where nation-states are the main international actors. Citizens in regional organization always feel a greater sense of “nationality” rather than “regionality”.  In a way, the concept of the nation-state in the current world order hinders the establishment of regional identity, as the identity of a nation will always overshadow the identity of a regional community.  In the global world community such as in the United Nations, all nation-states represent themselves. All votes are all based on nationality. Development of a regional identity, therefore, has been undermined. The national government thus creates a national notion of everything within its territory, such as national language, national history books, national education system, etc. These national characteristics are the main factors that help to create the identity of a national citizen. A common national language is considered a strong foundation in creating a community’s identity.  An attempt to have a common language in ASEAN is not there yet and might never be there. English has commonly been used in ASEAN and in the EU in their interactions, but its use has been limited to elite groups only.  As long as the approach of an organization that governs a particular area is still based on nationality, it will be difficult to have a strong sense of regionality. So does the government wholeheartedly promote regionalism or still stick to nationality? In a seminar held by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in December, Joseph Maila said that French identity is more important than the identity of any other group. In the case of ASEAN, the finding of Farish A. Noor’s research in 2012 about the history of Indonesia shows a very nationalistic perspective and very few stories about ASEAN. Sadly, the most frequent mention of another ASEAN member nation was the case of konfrontasi with the Federation of Malaysia in 1963-1965.  These examples show that if a nation-state educates the people in its territory too narrowly about the history of their nation, say Indonesia or Cambodia, at the expense of the history of Southeast Asia, it will be very difficult to build a common identity.  Too nationalistic an approach will shape their culture, character, and hence their national identity somewhat underlines the importance of their regional identity. As a result, the sense of belonging to Europe or Southeast Asia will be overshadowed. Only the willingness of the government and the citizens can save the day. Changing too nationalistic approaches with a more regional approach may be the answer, bringing ASEAN to the grass roots. It should start from now as the clock is ticking. The ASEAN Community 2015 is only two years away. ●