Kapal Tenggelam ASEAN dan Pilihan Indonesia Lina A Alexandra ;  Peneliti Departemen Politik dan Hubungan Internasional CSIS

KOMPAS, 14 Juni 2021

 

 

                                                           

Pertemuan Ketua ASEAN dan Sekjen ASEAN dengan perwakilan State Administration Council, 4-5 Juni 2021, di Naypyidaw telah menimbulkan reaksi negatif terhadap ASEAN. Aksi pembakaran bendera ASEAN dilakukan oleh berbagai pihak prodemokrasi sebagai ungkapan kemarahan dan pupusnya harapan terhadap ASEAN. Dalam pernyataannya, National Unity Government menyatakan institusi ini tidak akan lagi berharap ASEAN akan mampu menolong Myanmar.   Pertengahan Maret 2021, Presiden Joko Widodo mengambil inisiatif mendorong Brunei sebagai Ketua ASEAN untuk menyelenggarakan pertemuan tingkat tinggi yang secara khusus membahas krisis di Myanmar. Meski akhirnya baru terwujud satu bulan kemudian, pertemuan yang menghasilkan Kesepakatan Lima Poin (Five-Point Consensus) memunculkan secercah harapan terhadap ASEAN.   Di satu sisi, kegagalan ASEAN ini akibat kegagalan Brunei sebagai ketua menindaklanjuti pelaksanaan Five-Point Consensus, khususnya terkait penunjukan utusan khusus ASEAN. Di sisi lain, ini tantangan dan kesempatan Indonesia menunjukkan kepemimpinannya di kawasan.   Dua pilihan   ASEAN saat ini berada di titik nadir. Pilihan apa lagi yang masih tersisa bagi Indonesia untuk menyelamatkan reputasinya sebagai pihak yang sejak awal mendorong peran ASEAN dalam penyelesaian krisis di Myanmar? Ada dua pilihan. Pertama, mengambil peran sebagai mitra pasif di dalam kerangka ASEAN, tetapi tetap kritis. Kedua, memilih menjadi mitra aktif di jalur non-ASEAN.   Jika memilih tetap bersama dengan ASEAN, Indonesia harus memikirkan strategi bagaimana memberikan tekanan lebih keras terhadap Brunei selama beberapa waktu ke depan. Indonesia harus menekan Brunei untuk segera berkonsultasi mengenai perumusan kerangka acuan (terms of reference) bagi utusan khusus ASEAN sesuai dengan aspirasi dari negara-negara ASEAN.   Untuk ini, Indonesia harus menetapkan tenggat yang sangat singkat bagi Brunei mengingat urgensi adanya utusan khusus ASEAN ini.   Di titik ini, Indonesia seharusnya sudah menyampaikan kepada Ketua ASEAN rancangan kerangka acuan yang sangat rinci dan progresif terkait mandat, otoritas, dan sumber daya yang diperlukan bagi utusan khusus ASEAN. Ini sangat penting mengingat perannya yang sangat besar untuk memastikan tercapainya tiga tujuan besar: penghentian kekerasan, mengoordinasi penyaluran bantuan kemanusiaan, dan memfasilitasi dialog politik.   Selain itu, Indonesia harus bisa memastikan terpilihnya figur yang kredibel dan mumpuni sebagai utusan khusus ASEAN. Utusan khusus dari Indonesia seharusnya prioritas yang dikejar mengingat Indonesia sejak awal selalu berusaha mendorong pendekatan yang komprehensif, tak berpihak, dan bebas dari kepentingan sepihak.   Memang, kemungkinan besar akan ada penolakan dari pihak militer Myanmar mengingat Indonesia salah satu negara ASEAN yang paling kritis sejak awal. Namun, jika utusan khusus ini dari Indonesia, setidaknya jalan ke depan menjadi sedikit lebih mulus ke arah tercapainya tiga tujuan besar Five-Point Consensus.   Mengingat Brunei hanya memiliki sisa waktu enam bulan sebelum mengakhiri masa keketuaannya, jika Indonesia memilih bekerja dalam kerangka ASEAN, Indonesia bisa bahu-membahu dengan sejumlah kecil negara anggota lain, seperti Malaysia dan Singapura yang sepaham untuk menekan Brunei agar mempercepat proses penunjukan utusan khusus.   Hal penting lain yang perlu dilakukan oleh ”coalition of the willing” ini adalah mulai mengajak Kamboja sebagai calon ketua ASEAN 2022 untuk lebih terlibat secara proaktif menyuarakan implementasi Five-Point Consensus secara benar. Ini penting untuk memastikan agar kesalahan yang dilakukan Brunei tak terus berlanjut.   Namun, jika tenggat yang ditetapkan Indonesia dilewati oleh Brunei, saatnya telah tiba bagi Indonesia untuk mengeksplorasi pilihan-pilihan jalur lain di luar ASEAN. Secara unilateral, Indonesia bisa menunjukkan berbagai sikap tegas yang menunjukkan keberpihakan yang lebih nyata kepada pihak National Unity Government (NUG).   Pemerintah Indonesia juga bisa memberikan kritik secara terbuka setiap kali ketua ASEAN atau bahkan nanti ketika utusan khusus ASEAN yang ditunjuk ternyata melakukan hal-hal yang tidak sejalan dengan pencapaian tiga tujuan besar dalam rangka penyelesaian krisis di Myanmar.   Secara ideal, sebetulnya Pemerintah Indonesia juga bisa mengingatkan Myanmar untuk menjalankan perlindungan terhadap populasi di dalam negaranya sesuai dengan prinsip Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Hal ini bisa menjadi suatu upaya untuk meluruskan ”kesalahan” Indonesia ketika memilih tidak terhadap resolusi R2P di PBB pada pertengahan Mei lalu.   Upaya multilateral   Agar lebih konkret dan memiliki dampak, Indonesia perlu melakukan upaya multilateral. Indonesia bisa bergandengan tangan dengan sejumlah kecil negara anggota ASEAN yang sepikir, mitra dialog ASEAN, dan organisasi internasional yang juga menginginkan kembalinya stabilitas politik dan perdamaian di Myanmar.   Indonesia bisa mulai membangun komunikasi dengan China, India, Jepang, Korea Selatan, serta bekerja sama dengan AS, Uni Eropa, dan Inggris sebagai pihak-pihak yang selama ini konsisten berusaha menekan militer Myanmar untuk menghentikan kejahatan terhadap rakyat Myanmar.   Menyatukan sumber daya yang ada untuk terus menekan rezim militer, baik melalui embargo terbatas untuk menghentikan bantuan yang bisa memperkuat militer untuk melanjutkan kejahatan kemanusiaannya maupun menyalurkan bantuan kemanusiaan serta dukungan lainnya untuk memperkuat kapasitas kelompok-kelompok prodemokrasi, bisa dilakukan.   Indonesia harus menetapkan pilihan untuk tidak ikut tenggelam dengan kapal ASEAN yang tampaknya akan segera karam. Sulit dimungkiri bahwa modal strategis Indonesia di Myanmar lebih sedikit dibandingkan dengan, misalnya, hubungan militer dan ekonomi Thailand dan Singapura.   Kendatipun demikian, seharusnya kepemimpinan Indonesia di ASEAN yang konsisten dan koheren dapat menggantikan minimnya modal strategis kita di Myanmar.   Pilihan apa pun yang diambil oleh Indonesia, penting untuk diingat bahwa penghentian kekerasan terhadap masyarakat sipil dan kembalinya demokrasi dan di Myanmar merupakan inisiatif yang didorong oleh Presiden Jokowi sejak awal. Untuk bisa mewujudkan misi ini, pilihan yang paling sulit pun harus diambil.   Bahkan jika pilihan itu akhirnya mengerucut pada perlunya bertindak tegas dan menciptakan suatu preseden untuk secara konsisten memperjuangkan prinsip-prinsip yang terpatri di Piagam ASEAN. Mendelegitimasi ASEAN, seperti halnya pil pahit yang harus diminum, mungkin diperlukan untuk menyembuhkan ASEAN. ●

 

Becoming a ‘middle power’  Lina A Alexandra ;   A researcher with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta

JAKARTA POST,  28 Mei 2014

                                                

                                                                                         

                                                      

What will Indonesia’s foreign policy look like after the election? This particular question has been raised within the past few months since both the domestic and international community are eager to see whether the Garuda, our iconic eagle, can soar high in a changing global order. An interesting hint can be seen in the vision, mission and programs of presidential candidate Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and his running mate Jusuf Kalla. One important aim related to foreign affairs is “to increase Indonesia’s global role through middle power diplomacy, which places Indonesia as a regional power with selective global engagement”. How do we understand this term of “middle power”? Some scholars, particularly those discussing the Cold War concept, may refer to powers as defined by hard or material capabilities, such as military, natural resources or economic indicators, the size of population and so on. These refer to countries that are bigger than smaller countries but still considered weaker than major states in the international system. However, the “revisionists” tend to emphasize behavior rather than material capabilities of states, to define middle power. Cooper et.al (1993) say a middle power plays particular roles, as catalyst; facilitator, building coalitions, setting agenda; and manager, building institutions, confidence and credibility. Daniel Flemes (2007) then distinguished power roles into four categories: superpower, great power, middle power and regional power. In brief, middle power, according to him, is characterized as a power with a level of military strength, resources and strategic position, which although not as best as great powers or even superpowers, but certainly sought for support by major or great powers. A middle power also has a strong interest in creating a stable and orderly environment through its active role in various international and multilateral organizations. Such a power also seeks to share global responsibility in maintaining international peace and security, particularly to assume a role as mediator in dealing with various conflicts and crises. Flemes also added that a middle power usually assumes characteristics of a “functional leadership” which emphasizes expertise in certain areas. What about Indonesia? Despite our domestic challenges, the country indeed has a level of material capabilities, as well as showing indications that it seeks a position as a middle-power country. Such a concept is nothing new in the discourse of the Foreign Ministry in the past few years. However, the strategies on how precisely such a vision is going to be realized, is eagerly waited. To undertake “middle power diplomacy” Jokowi-Kalla mention five programs: namely to develop capacity to ensure safety of Indonesian overseas; prioritize protection of Indonesian migrant workers; promote multilateral cooperation in the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Organization of the Islamic Conference; promote a balance and relevant cooperation at the G20; and engage actively in conflict resolution and peacekeeping. Such programs are indeed very important. For other countries to respect Indonesia’s position and role as a middle power, it is important for the government to first respect its own people by developing clear policies, capacities and measures on how to protect Indonesians, including migrant workers. Then, the government should actively negotiate such policies and guidelines with the host countries to apply strict measures to protect Indonesian workers abroad. In promoting cooperation with various multilateral organizations, it is important for Indonesia to define its specific interests and goals. Indonesia should start using a middle power mind-set, meaning it should make good use of its membership to contribute in finding solutions to global problems, such as climate change, energy security, a balanced trade system and global financial stability. Regarding Indonesia’s active role in conflict resolution and peace keeping, and also including peace building, the country should continue its high contribution to UN peacekeeping missions to maintain international peace. It is also important to enhance this participation by contributing civilian capacities in peacekeeping, which are particularly needed in more complex peace operations. Moreover, in conflict resolution, Indonesia should continue to develop its capacities to mediating conflicts since more and more countries believe in our experiences in dealing with internal struggles and persistence to be independent in foreign policy. Indonesia’s initiative to share its democratic transition experiences can be also seen as an important element of its soft power. Finally, what is needed now is commitment and consistency. Considering such tasks are not easy, it is hoped that the upcoming leader, whether Jokowi or Prabowo Subianto, will not be preoccupied too long with internal political transactions, so they can fully direct all energy and attention to implement their commitment. ●

What the Rome Statute means for Indonesia?

What the Rome Statute means for Indonesia? Lina A Alexandra  ;   A Researcher at The Department of Politics and International Relations, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and Guest Lecturer at The Postgraduate School of Diplomacy, Paramadina University, Jakarta

JAKARTA POST, 09 April 2013

  

After a long debate, the step taken by the Indonesian government to finally ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court should be welcomed as a gesture that shows more commitment to the protection of human rights in this country.  At the ASEAN level, Indonesia will be the third party to ratify the statute after Cambodia (2002) and the Philippines (2011), and extends the overall list of states that have done so to 122.  The Rome Statute, which was issued in 1998 and came into force on July 1, 2002, essentially regulates the establishment and work of the International Criminal Court (ICC).  The ICC has jurisdiction in four limited crimes, namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression.  If we look further into the document, the crimes in question not only threaten human life but also include violence or destruction against physical infrastructure or buildings that have significant functions for humanitarian purposes, such as hospitals, as well as religious and cultural identities.  As stated in Article 12 of the statute, the ICC applies its jurisdiction in three ways.  First, when a situation in which one or more of the above-mentioned crimes appears to have been committed and is referred to the prosecutor by a state party in accordance with Article 14.  Second, when a situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed and is referred to the prosecutor by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.  Third, the prosecutor will initiate an investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance with Article 15 based on the information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC.  Until now, the ICC has heard cases occurring in African countries, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, the Central African Republic, Sudan (Darfur), Kenya, Libya, Cote d’Ivoire and Mali. So far, more than 30 people from those countries have been indicted, with some of them being taken into custody either by the ICC or national authorities, and others still on the run. On one side, if the step to ratify the statute is being perceived as clouded by political interests, I would think that this action is rather late, since the application of this statute is non-retroactive in nature.  It means that the ICC can only bring to justice cases that take place after a state ratifies the statute. In the Indonesian context, the atrocities that followed the referendum in Timor Leste in 1999 and the May 1998 riots, for example, do not qualify for the ICC hearing.  Nevertheless, this ratification is still very important since it will prevent people or groups from perpetrating gross human rights violations in the future.  The ratification will require the government, judiciary power and law enforcement authorities to reform themselves to be able to bring such crimes, if any are committed, to the ICC, without having to debate whether such a trial would be deemed as damaging state sovereignty. By ratifying the statute, Indonesia will take part in the global movement against impunity.  The view that insists that Indonesia should not rush to ratify the statute simply because developed countries like the US are not yet parties to it, is misleading.  Ratifying the statute is testament to Indonesia’s maturity and willingness to protect human rights to the maximum. By doing so, Indonesia will play a significant role in strengthening the statute to become an international law that universally binds and puts more pressure on countries to bring serious crimes at home to the international court.  Furthermore, Indonesia’s accession to the statute will inspire other countries to follow suit. The concern that the ICC is an instrument of developed and powerful countries in intervening in developing countries’ domestic affairs is exaggerated, since the ICC clearly states its full respect for the judicial mechanism at the national level. Article 17 of the statute rules that a case is admissible for the following reasons: if the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a state that has jurisdiction over it, unless the state is unwilling or genuinely unable to carry out the investigation or prosecution; if the case has been investigated by a state that has jurisdiction over it and the state has decided not to prosecute the individual concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the state to prosecute; if the person concerned has already been tried for conduct that is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the court is not permitted under Article 20, paragraph 3; and if the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the court. Therefore, if a state where the crime takes place has a willingness to bring the case to justice, there is no reason for the ICC to hear the case.  Although Indonesia is now currently under urgent circumstances that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC, recent developments have indicated the potential for such crimes to take place in the future.  Violence against certain religious followers or certain ethnic groups, which government or law enforcement officials tend to ignore, has been rampant in the country.  The course of national politics, which is still very unpredictable, has also provided a loophole for certain actors to justify any means, including the committing of serious crimes, to achieve or maintain their political goals.  Thus, ratification of this statute will underline the responsibility of the state to protect its people from any serious crimes against humanity. The statute will also deter the state from committing the violence itself. ●