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Selasa, 16 Desember 2014

Can IPPs efficiently increase power capacity?

Can IPPs efficiently increase power capacity?

Montty Girianna  ;   A deputy at the Office of the Coordinating Economic Minister
JAKARTA POST,  15 Desember 2014

                                                                                                                       


In the next five years, we aim to increase generation capacity by nearly 34,000 megawatts (MW). Half of this additional capacity is to come from independent power producers (IPPs). This additional capacity is to ensure that our 5-6 percent economic growth can be maintained within the next five years and that we are able to connect nearly all villages with electricity.

But the question is whether IPPs will be able to boost power capacity more than ever before. And if they can, will they deliver the additional capacity efficiently?

IPPs began operations in the early 1990s as captive power producers that sell excess power or all power to state-owned electricity company PT PLN. The state utility company has improved its capacity in tendering projects to IPPs since its first experiences with Paiton I and II power projects in the early 1990s. As a sole contracting agency for procurement of all electricity, PLN has also improved its power purchase agreements (PPAs) to expedite negotiations with potential IPPs and enhance the bankability of power-generation projects.

 IPPs activities seem to be increasing, with the Cirebon and Paiton 3 projects reaching financial close, while other projects include those in Central Java and minemouth IPPs in South Sumatra.

But managing such an ambitious target for new generation capacity requires careful planning and project delivery capability beyond what PLN has today. PLN needs to achieve adequate in-house technical capacity to manage the construction and operation of the required additional generation capacity itself. This is evidenced by the problems it experienced with the fast track 10,000 MW program. Delays have only caused a fraction of the program to be attained.

For the last ten years, IPPs were only able to build less than 20 percent of the new power capacity. Between 2009 and September 2014 IPPs have only developed about 3,000 MW. Since IPPs will likely be able to develop only 700 MW in new capacity annually, it is doubtful they will be able to deliver 15,000 MW within the next five years.

Carefully designed IPPs can provide unlimited access to private financing that would not otherwise be available, and at the same time IPPs can help harness private sector efficiency and innovation for our electricity sector.

Their performance, however, very much depends on how good we are in delivering and maintaining competitive pressure.

Unlike in the mobile telecommunications sector, where competition can easily be increased, it is quite challenging to create and sustain competitive markets in the electricity sector, which has been traditionally recognized as a sector that has natural monopolies. Ideally, head-to-head competition would put pressure on IPPs to reduce electricity costs of production and improve service quality. We are not saying it is impossible, but for the succesfull delivery of IPPs we need robust planning and ongoing supervision.

Margaret Thatcher famously did it in the UK when she unbundled and privatized the Central Electricity Generating Board — the UK equivalent of PLN — to create bulk and retail markets.

A few years later, the state of Victoria pioneered similar restructuring in Australia, in part because it urgently needed to sell some assets to reduce its heavy debt.

IPP ownership does not automatically denote that electricity customers will get good services at lower prices. Market structure and competition are more important than ownership. It is for this reason that the US has long sought to break up private monopolies, with AT&T being one of the more notable cases. In more recent times, California legislated in 1996 to restructure its privately owned power sector so as to enable competition.

Today, we do not have competitive bulk or retail power markets. Following the Constitutional Court’s December 2004 ruling, we are unlikely to have them in the near future. Consequently, IPPs’ portfolios in the electricity sector currently occur either in the form of captive power or through contracts with PLN. Because an IPP can only sell to PLN, developers and lenders require the government via PLN to bear key risks.

IPPs will not accept demand risk, not only because they have no control over the macro and regional factors that influence power demand but also, much more importantly, because PLN manages the development of the transmission and distribution system as well as controlling plant dispatch. Our IPPs’ “take or pay” contracts accordingly require PLN to pay minimum amounts that will enable financial viability even if PLN is not able to take any power.

Once the PPA is signed, the rates and its escalators are locked-in and will not be affected even if other more efficient and lower-rate plants come on line.

We can argue that big IPPs are therefore similar to PLN plants financed with international borrowings inasmuch as both involve long-term US dollar-denominated payment obligations. These payment obligations necessarily affect PLN’s ability to raise money for other projects, meaning that private financing for IPPs is not entirely additional financing from PLN’s perspective.

In other words, IPPs’ long-term obligations payment is reflected in PLN’s accounts. Thus, while there is a huge pool of private financing potentially available, PLN’s ability to enter into new PPAs or to take on new debt is constrained by its balance sheet.

It is also likely that financing-related costs for an IPP plant will be higher than those for a PLN plant because IPP developers require risk-related return on their equity and likely pay higher interest on debt than PLN.

We see, therefore, that an IPP is a cheaper solution for PLN only if the savings costs made possible by its higher efficiency in EPC and power plant operation more than offset its higher financing costs. The main case for using IPPs needs to rest more on efficiency and capacity arguments than on accessing additional financing.

Our key question is therefore what will create the pressures for a prospective IPP to shave its costs. The only possibility seems to be effective competition during the bidding stage — competition for the market. This is where the technical capability of PLN is very crucial to the success of the 3,000MW-per-year IPPs program. ●

Kamis, 09 Oktober 2014

‘Coal-by-wire’ from Sumatra to Java

‘Coal-by-wire’ from Sumatra to Java

Montty Girianna  ;   Deputy for energy and mineral resources
at the office of Coordinating Economic Minister
JAKARTA POST,  06 Oktober 2014




Coal from the island of Sumatra accounts for most of Indonesia’s low-grade lignite, a low-quality coal that receives a poor price in international markets.

Given this low pricing combined with high transportation costs and the fact that most reserves are located in landlocked areas, it is not feasible to export Sumatra’s coal out of the island.

It is more efficient to use Sumatra’s coal for a mine-mouth power plant, an approach in which we develop a power plant very close to where mines are located, use the low-calorie coal from the mines to feed the plant, and transmit the electricity, rather than transporting a low-value commodity, out of the mines.

With mine-mouth, we no longer require either barges or expensive railway-heavy infrastructure to transport coal; rather we need to have long-distance high-voltage transmission lines to bring “coal-by-wire” from mines to consumer centers, either regions in Sumatra and/or Java-Bali.

Essentially, with “coal-by-wire” we are transporting a higher-value commodity by wire from mines to customers. Coal stays in the landlocked areas and feeds mine-mouth, coal-fired power plants.

“Coal-by-wire” would definitely boost the development of a domestic market for low-grade coal. Today, our market for coal is very thin as we are one of the world’s leading exporters of thermal coal of a high quality in the international market.

Our exports have increased very significantly within the past decade on account of demand from fast-growing Asian economies. More than 80 percent of our coal currently produced is exported.

Indeed, coal is currently the most important source of energy for our economy. For decades coal has accounted for more than half of our power-generation capacity. And this will continue for a half century to come before alternative and cleaner energy sources other than coal become affordably available.

Our economy is also growing, and of course will require more electricity power and therefore coal – challenges that have to be met. Electricity generation now consumes close to 75 million tons per year, and will almost triple in the next 10 to 15 years.

However, domestic use of coal today notoriously suffers from infrastructure bottlenecks. Congested barges and ports, as well as a shortage of railways limit the transportation of coal from coalmines in two coal-producing regions, Kalimantan and Sumatra, to demand centers in Java-Bali, where most of our power plants are located.

The majority of our coal reserves in the two regions are located in landlocked areas that require rail transportation infrastructure to reach ports for export.

Either truck haul or rail is needed to transport the coal to barge ports and terminals.

Truck operating costs are about twice that of rail, but existing rail transportation infrastructure is severely insufficient.

Indonesia’s attempts to improve coal-transport infrastructure for the domestic market have not been very successful. Dedicated coal ports in Kalimantan have been planned for many years, but implementation has again faced bottleneck issues.

Specialized railways for coal in Sumatra have also been initiated, but this concept is still under development and has not yet received a higher-level mandate or legal authorization.

Delays in expanding the capacity of barge and transportation infrastructure cause inefficiencies and high transportation costs in domestic coal utilization. These high costs and infrastructure bottlenecks have held back the development of the domestic market for coal.

Our high-voltage transmission lines are also astonishingly limited. The state-owned electricity company (PLN) operates approximately 40,000 kilometers of transmission lines, with less than 15 percent of this total serving the island of Sumatra.

If we can build more mine-mouth, coal-fired power generation plants we will need to expand our transmission network across the island, interconnected to other transmission systems in Java-Bali.

A new set of lines of a high-voltage of 500 kilovolts and medium-voltage of 275 kV needs to be developed as a backbone network across the island, i.e. providing long-distance, reliable and stable transmission.

The distribution system and transformer capacity also need to be expanded to service a larger coverage of costumers and demand centers.

We are required also to develop an interconnected transmission system, as existing electricity transmission is not compatible across regions due to different systems and manufacturer standards adopted in the past.

The current initiative of developing inter-island interconnection lines between Java and Sumatra with 500kV High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) lines needs to be completed in harmony with the mine-mouth development.

These long-distance transmission and distribution lines, as well as interconnected systems are required to exist before a system of mine-mouth power plants is commissioned to ensure that electricity produced can be transmitted in a timely manner and with minimum cost.

Both the central and local governments must work hand-in-hand to endorse incentives to encourage the private sector — independent power producers (IPPs) — to develop mine-mouth power plants.

Incentives need to be designed to enhance the financial viability of IPPs’ mine-mouth power plant projects.

PLN as an off-taker of IPP plays a fundamental role as the “coal-by-wire” agent, and has to be ready to absorb all of the risks associated with the development and operation of the system, including the difficulties in land acquisition and intra-regional compatibility of transmission systems.

Sumatra with its huge resources of low-grade coal can secure its own electricity supply and, eventually, can be the source of low-cost electricity with its energy radiating not only to Java, but also to every corner of the country. ●

Selasa, 09 September 2014

Resolving oil, gas supply barriers

Resolving oil, gas supply barriers

Montty Girianna  ;   Deputy coordinating energy and mineral resources minister at the Office of the Coordinating Economic Minister
JAKART POST, 08 September 2014

                                                                                                                       
                                                      

Indonesia has become a net oil importer, as domestic production meets less than 50 percent of total consumption. Today, oil imports are a major contributor to the balance of payments deficit.

 The discovery of new oil reserves is quite small. Of the almost 2 billion barrels oil equivalent (BOE) found in Southeast Asia over the past 10 years to 2012, only less than one quarter was discoveered in Indonesia.

This mismatch between production and consumption has raised the issue of our energy independence and security due to excessive energy imports and subsidies.

Insufficient investment in exploration and production, and the inadequate deployment of secondary and tertiary oil recovery are the major reasons for production decline.

Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs), which have been an important part of our oil and gas sector over many decades, face an unprecedented risk for their existence. Uncertainty — regulatory risk — surrounding the extension of existing PSCs has affected the confidence of PSC investors and constrained efforts to increase production.

As of now, close to half the active PSCs in place for current operations and supply of oil and gas will end within the next 10 years. The expiry of existing PSCs has reduced incentives for exploration of both new deep-sea oil reserves and secondary/tertiary oil recovery.

To decrease our excessive reliance on oil, we have begun to increasingly utilize gas as an important alternative source of domestic energy supply. Our National Economic Committee (KEN) has emphasized the use of natural gas to meet long-term domestic demand.

However, this has not been without fundamental challenges. As a key liquefied natural gas (LNG)world exporter for a number of decades, we have had to balance our export obligations — long-term LNG contracts — with increased domestic demand.

We have also followed a policy to maintain low domestic gas prices to encourage large industrial customers and power generation. But this, together with perceived regulatory risk, has discouraged PSC holders from making further investment.

Gas transmission and distribution pipelines — necessary for gas to flow from gas blocks to demand centers — are not well integrated due to a lack of open access arrangement. Shale gas and coal-bed methane have been very limited because of low incentives.

As a result, while production of gas has remained steady in recent years, domestic gas supply is insufficient to keep up with our demand for oil substitutes. This, accordingly, requires imported LNG, which is, of course, more expensive.

To resolve supply constraints and fulfill demand, the new government has to immediately carry out a comprehensive analysis of regional oil and gas basins to identify new potential reserves to be offered to PSC holders.

Early exploration in a number of strategic hydrocarbon basins, such as East Natuna and the deep-sea Kutai basins, should be given high priority. These basins have sizable reserves with a high percentage of recoverable natural gas. Once gas is found, exploitation from these basins will provide significant long-term energy sources for economic development, domestic industries and the local economy.

Focus is also needed to increase production in existing oil wells through the application of Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) technologies. With more than three-quarters of today’s oil and gas production being extracted from 40-year-old blocks, EOR will be the solution to maintain a high production rate through secondary/tertiary recovery.

Issues with respect to the property rights of EOR technologies, as well as the cost of acquiring the technologies, need to be resolved between the new government and PSC holders. Cooperation in conducting research, preparing feasibility studies and the application of EOR pilot projects is necessary.

A cost-sharing mechanism to absorb some of the costs of implementing expensive EOR technologies needs to be invented.

Moreover, the provision of proper incentives for secondary/tertiary recovery, such as profit sharing and credit-investment mechanisms, will be essential.

In addition, reforms to the existing PSC allocation and extension mechanism should be made an urgent priority.

Fundamentally, when a contract expires, the concession belongs to the government, which is free to do with it as it wishes, of course, for the benefit our country and people. We can allow the existing PSC holder to carry on for a further period, with or without additional commitments; we can terminate the contract and carry out a tender for the license; or we can award the concession to our state-owned oil company.

The prerogative to extend a PSC, or award a new one, is with the government. But it is important to have an investor-friendly PSC-extension mechanism.

It is crucial to have the decision–making process for the transfer of expiring PSCs made in a timely fashion, with a decision made long before the PSC expires.

This is so PSC holders have certainty to inject the necessary funding for operations, as well as continuous investment, and will not let field production decline when licenses are expiring.

Both the implementation of EOR and a clear mechanism for PSC extension/termination will help resolve oil and gas supply constraints.

Failure to execute the two will jeopardize not only our energy supply through loss of supply capacity but also our economy. ●

Rabu, 02 Oktober 2013

Oil downstream industry – from patronage to competitive market

Oil downstream industry –
from patronage to competitive market
Montty Girianna  ;  Director for Energy, Mineral Resources, and Mining at the National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS)
JAKARTA POST, 01 Oktober 2013



For decades, we maintained fuel prices below international levels through subsidies. For years, we granted state-owned oil firm Pertamina exclusive access to distributing subsidized fuels. This setup was not without its reasons. 

The “patronage” for consumers has been well-maintained, considered a way to share the benefits of our natural resources with our citizens. That notion is, however, definitely misguided.

The rising demand for fuel, as our economy grows, requires increasing subsidy outlays to a point where the availability of funds for public investment in health, education and infrastructure places a severe strain on the overall budget. Attempts to reduce the subsidy by increasing domestic fuel prices, as witnessed recently this year, provided a remedy that was only partially successful.

Still, the government is being challenged to forecast the necessary funding levels in the highly volatile international oil-pricing environment, as fuel has to be bought from the international market. This has inevitably retained a major element of uncertainty for fiscal planning and public budgeting.

Because our state-owned firm has exclusive access to distributing subsidized fuels, the company effectively maintains its monopoly position by controlling the supply of the majority of fuels delivered for domestic consumption.

Consequently, other market players are effectively excluded from supplying subsidized petroleum fuels, about 60-70 percent of the fuel market. This monopoly in the downstream fuel market, with a single company taking care of everything in the supply chain of fuel, can no longer fulfill the demand. Demand for gasoline, for example, is predicted to grow at a rate of 10-12 percent per year for the next 10 years.

This growing demand has expanded the domestic fuel market so much that a single company cannot efficiently service the market. The demand is and will be too huge for a single company to efficiently serve.

It is not surprising that this market structure has led to prolonged underinvestment in fuel infrastructure and distribution logistics. Currently, we do not have sufficient infrastructure to hold operational fuel stocks as well as emergency fuel stocks of any kind. We do not have enough capacity in our oil refineries to produce fuel from our crude.

If our objective is to ensure the security and sustainability of adequate fuel supplies to our fuel market, we must invest in infrastructure. At the very least, we have to spend US$50 to 75 billion over the next five to 10 years to secure fuel supply and stocks. With this magnitude of investment, we cannot expect our oil and gas company alone can deliver all required infrastructure.

There is only one option — we must allow new entrants to enter our petroleum fuel market and gradually establish a competitive structure, which leads to the abolition of our state-owned company’s position as a monopoly. With a more open market allowing new entrants, the financial and operational burdens of fuel security can then be shared between our state-owned oil company and other players, i.e., the private sector.

A shift from the “patronage” regime cannot be achieved merely by taking administrative steps to remove longstanding fuel subsidies. This rationalization of fuel prices is of course necessary but insufficient, but it should be seen as the initial step. More fundamental is to change our philosophy on how we see fuel markets. Every day we have to buy fuel at price levels formed by market competition, which is beyond our influence.

Those price levels express the real value of the fuel we consume and apply not only to our land but also to the entire market of the world — international prices. When we intervene to insulate our economy in varying degrees from international prices, consumers inevitably receive wrong price signals, leading to a distortion on the real value of fuel.

Next is the restructuring of our fuel market. Of course, the opening of this market will need to be phased-in to bring new entrants and initiate competition. Both are aspects that are provided for in the Oil and Gas Law, but today effectively non-existent.

It is also important to reform the operation of our state-owned company in parallel or even somewhat ahead of the fuel sector market opening. The reform has to allow our oil and gas company to efficiently operate and be competitive.

Pertamina has gradually moved to a more independent entity, gaining momentum from corporate reforms in the best long-term interest of its shareholder. We have to support these transformation efforts and respect the rules governing a limited liability company, as well as to allow the company to operate with commercial independence. Any social obligations that are imposed on this company must be adequately compensated.

A greater level of transparency is a must and we have to support any efforts to attain such transparency. It is therefore fundamental from a market opening and corporate reform standpoint for the company to unbundle its operations. Refining, pipelines and storage, wholesale and retail operations should be accounted for as separate profit centers.

The opening of the petroleum products market and restructuring of our state-owned company will take time. The design and management of this transition should be well-planned and overseen pursuant to a high-level policy initiative so that the government is well prepared to handle such a complex set of reforms.

The overall aim is to attain sufficient security and sustainability of adequate fuel supplies in our fuel market. The current market regime cannot support this objective. Price rationalization and the deregulation of downstream oil industry is a must. Our oil state-owned company has to be further strengthened to become internationally competitive and a respected national petroleum company.
●

Rabu, 03 Juli 2013

Geothermal energy – challenges and innovation

Geothermal energy – challenges and innovation
Montty Girianna ;  Director for Energy, Mineral Resources and Mining at the National Development Planning Board (BAPPENAS)
JAKARTA POST, 01 Juli 2013


The driving force behind geothermal development is Article 33 of the Constitution on development of the energy sector. From independence up to the decentralization in 1998/1999, this was done through state-owned enterprise Pertamina. 

All geothermal development in that period was through joint venture agreements with Pertamina who managed geothermal resources on behalf of government. The current geothermal capacity is 1.2 gigawatts with the majority of the plant using steam supplied by Pertamina.

After deregulation, geothermal resources were carved up between the national and local governments. Which local government entity would have control was defined by the location of the resources. These could be one or two districts or the provincial government. 

The geothermal law of 2003 provides the key to allocation of control with the right to develop geothermal resources resting now with local governments. Local people can now protect geothermal resources, in a similar way to forestry practices. This has certainly given local governments plenty of opportunities, but with them have come big challenges.

In such systemic change, opportunities are not always immediately recognized. Often, these changes are first seen as obstacles. In this case, due to local opposition, geothermal fields are often not developed, but when development goes hand-in-hand with the local population, both the government and local people are better off. 

In the long run, geothermal electricity can provide a stable electricity supply at a lower price than average. Forests surrounding the fields can be preserved due to the irrigation water brought by geothermal powers and jobs can be brought to local people operating and managing the steam-fields. 

This what we find in Lahendong, Sulawesi and Mount Salak, just north of Bandung, to mention but two.

It really is a big challenge. Local governments can only provide licenses for 5 years, or a maximum of 10 years if they are reelected for second terms. Due to the enormous upfront investment, geothermal projects need to operate, undisturbed and without petty politicians meddling in their terms and conditions or financial arrangements, for a period of at least 25 years. This mismatch between the duration of licenses and the financial life of geothermal assets remains a fundamental obstacle for large-scale geothermal development.

A number of efforts to address this challenge have been made, some very successful. The Indonesia Infrastructure Guarantee Facility provides guarantees for local and foreign investors against political changes, just like the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency of the World Bank does for international investors. While the institution has been created, we need to improve it and learn the lessons that come equally from successful and unsuccessful applications.

Under the geothermal law, the national government is responsible for defining geothermal working areas and the local governments manage the exploration. This has also created a number of problems for local governments that should gradually be addressed. Building on the work of the national government, based on limited sub-surface surveys, the local government has a duty to guarantee the presence of the resource (i.e. the resources is confirmed and can be exploited for a well defined capacity). 

Not only that, the local government has to attract qualified investors, prepared to work closely with the local people. The national government has the resources to invest and develop, but local governments are often handicapped by a lack of resources.

The first step to address these challenges has been the creation a financial instrument, managed by the Government Investment Agency (PIP), which local governments can use to finance exploration. However, this has proven difficult in practice. Technical expertise is needed to determine what exact risks are associated with a single exploration and how the instrument can properly mitigate such risks.

Another innovative approach is to use the Clean Technology Fund (CTF), a climate change facility managed by international development banks, now considering extending their portfolio to finance geothermal exploration. The question that needs to be addressed is not what happens if drilling is successful, rather what happens when the drilling is unsuccessful — dry hole — and how will the fund be reimbursed. 

The national government utilized CTF funds for the development of Ulebelu in Lampung and Lahendong, co-financing with a sovereign soft-loan from the World Bank. How can this work for local governments? How can dry hole risks be mitigated when the fields are owned by local governments? There is no system to on-lend the funds to local governments or developers for exploration.

The easiest way to address this risk is the pledge of shares of the joint venture company that is formed between the local government and private sector developers. Aceh has chosen to do this in developing Seulawah. In turn, a private developer can address this issue by operating an existing fossil fuel utility, and provide a guarantee for the repayment of the debt used for exploration.

What is important to consider is not so much the cost of the risk, but how these risks can be mitigated in the most effective way. The fund needs an opportunity to recover the debt as risk capital through innovative approaches, like providing a guarantee of repayment through the operation of a power plant using 
different fuel. 

We should explore regulations that facilitate this option. The fundamental of the innovation is providing developers not only the right to exploit geothermal resources, but granting that right with the obligation of providing electricity from other sources, in case the geothermal resource is commercially not attractive. ●

Senin, 06 Mei 2013

Rescue for global climate change – country-by-country efforts


Rescue for global climate change
– country-by-country efforts
Montty Girianna ;   Director for Energy, Mineral Resources and Mining
at the National Development Planning Agency, BAPPENAS
JAKARTA POST, 03 Mei 2013


As a country with over 15,000 islands, climate change will have a significant impact on our economy and the welfare of our people.

A change in the rainy season affects a cycle of our harvesting schedule, and a shift of shorelines towards hinterlands definitely influence the fertility of our priceless lands. Not to mention the weird cycle of floods in a number of our big cities, making most of our people living in urban areas uncomfortably uneasy.

No choice, we are forced to adapt to all of these unexpected changes of nature.

Our president is now leading the world’s effort to reduce carbon emissions. He not only brokered an international commitment during the Bali Climate change summit in 2007, but as a Non Annex 1 country, he made us commit at the G20 meeting in Pittsburgh in September 2009 to a voluntary set target of reducing CO2 emissions to 26 percent below a business as usual scenario.

Furthermore, with international collaboration, we can work together to a further reduction to 41 percent over business as usual emissions by 2020.

Yes, it is our commitment to undertake the required changes. We do not and we will not forget that commitment. A national action plan for emission reduction is being implemented across regions and less energy consumption technologies are being searched for acquisition.

We have also prepared less polluted fuel, such as gas and geothermal, to be used for power generations. Challenges, however, remain to significantly reduce oil consumption. We can speak from experience that reducing fossil fuel subsidies is not only an environmental necessity but also an economic necessity.

As everyone recognizes, there are significant issues of a political and social nature that prevent us from rapidly reducing these subsidies. We are struggling to escape from this long debate of political economy on our fiscal policy. We live in a resource-abundant land in a country that stands out as a successful gas and coal exporter, but our overall record as a country with high-fossil fuel subsidies is so disappointing — a paradox of plenty.
For an equitable world economic development, we also need to recognize that these subsidies are in place not only to support the poor, they are also in place to maintain the comparative advantage industrialized countries maintain, by not reducing their carbon emissions.  These facts are too often hidden behind a screen of intellectual observations and proposed uniform solutions to be applied on a worldwide scale. Most of the time we are blind to this collective action voiced by those who happen to have comparative advantages.

We are in full support to address the fossil fuel subsidy issues.  The continued volatility of fossil fuel prices and the often less than transparent supply and demand is definitely hurting the economies of our nation — all nations.  But we must recognize also the need to hedge against this volatility by creating efficient and effective energy portfolios, built on a larger share of sustainable energy sources.  But such an approach needs to be built up from an island to island, network to network, nation to nation basis and cannot be addressed globally.

We have also observed that neither the Durban nor the Doha Conferences of the Parties (COP) on climate change have reached international acceptable treaties. While we continue to fully support the efforts by the COP members to reach a global solution, we would advocate that, contrary to the recommendation of establishing another global facility, full recognition is given to the fact that the opportunities provided in moving towards a greener economy is an opportunity, which is different for each region and each country.

The lesson learned from the current initiatives such as the Clean Technology Fund (CTF), which have become so difficult to implement due to over complex procedures, is that our good intentions appear ineffective.

We should not make another mistake. The whole point of creating the global facility was to help countries willing to contribute in mitigating a global danger of carbon emission but having limited access to resources.

In response to the findings of the Extractive Industry Report prepared under the guidance of our former minister of environment Emil Salim, the World Bank made a commitment in June 2004 in Bonn, Germany to increase its support for new renewable energy and energy efficiency by 20 percent per year and defined the impact its support has had in improving lives for 5 years.

Let us consider in light of the climate crisis, but also to promote equitable development between and within countries, to double these efforts and recommend that the Bank will increase its lending for renewable energy and energy efficiency not with 20 but 50 percent a year at least until 2020, or until an international treaty on regulating carbon emissions is in place.

With a greater share of renewables in the energy portfolio, we not only reduce carbon emissions, we also hedge our economies against the volatilities of the fossil fuel market, we add to local energy security, to have not only access to energy, but also to affordable energy produced locally. Affordable, of course, is not only for today but also in 30 or 50 years from now.

Such a commitment needs to be based not on a global fund, but on a country-by-country effort, with strong support for the efforts of the people themselves, the communities and the private sector. The multilateral development agencies can help countries to do that.

We suggest that these agencies, such as the World Bank, considers a country by country approach to increase by 50 percent of its lending for renewable energy each year, at least until 2020, or until such a time that an international climate change treaty has been agreed, if there will be any.

To make such a portfolio feasible for the member countries, each country should have access to a significant amount of grant made available by the Annex 1 countries. We need these funds to prepare the required renewable energy resources, to prepare master plans for each country and to familiarize the benefits of renewable energy both at a community level and at national macroeconomic levels.

In a nutshell, expectation from the global facilities has been too excessive. Little has also been implemented from CTF. Until a new treaty on global funds is in place, a local initiative rooted from within, facilitated by development agencies, addressing countries specific efforts is a rescue for the global climate problems. ●

Sabtu, 04 Mei 2013

Mengakhiri Subsidi BBM


Mengakhiri Subsidi BBM
Montty Girianna ;  Direktur Sumber Daya Energi, Mineral, dan Pertambangan Bappenas
KOMPAS, 04 Mei 2013

  
Undang-undang mengamanatkan pemerintah untuk menyediakan energi, termasuk BBM. Selain menjamin ketersediaannya, pemerintah juga ditugaskan menyediakan BBM dengan harga terjangkau. Karena itu, pemerintah melakukan dua kebijakan bersamaan, yakni membuka keran impor BBM dan memberlakukan harga BBM bersubsidi. Namun, akhir-akhir ini kedua kebijakan ini cukup berat untuk tetap dipertahankan.
Selain ketergantungan terhadap impor BBM semakin tinggi, subsidi BBM pun membengkak. Ini memengaruhi postur APBN secara negatif. Mau tak mau pemerintah harus memperhitungkan kembali kebijakan ini dan secara bertahap melepaskan harga BBM bersubsidi ke harga pasar. Namun, opsi ini terkendala kemungkinan gejolak sosial.
Akhir tahun lalu, pemerintah didesak menaikkan harga BBM dan mengurangi subsidi BBM. Namun, desakan itu tak cukup kuat untuk menghilangkan kekhawatiran gejolak sosial yang mungkin terjadi sehingga pemerintah kembali memberlakukan harga BBM bersubsidi. Pada tahun berjalan ini, subsidi BBM dipatok Rp 193,8 triliun dan subsidi listrik Rp 78,6 triliun sehingga total subsidi energi Rp 272,4 triliun, sekitar 18 persen dari belanja APBN. Adapun impor BBM diproyeksikan 30 juta-32 juta kiloliter atau 46-48 persen dari total konsumsi nasional.
Konsumsi BBM tak pernah turun, bahkan pada tahun-tahun terakhir laju pertumbuhan permintaan jauh di atas pertumbuhan ekonomi. Tahun lalu, konsumsi BBM sekitar 70 juta kl. Jika melihat pola konsumsi BBM, konsumsi akan terus meningkat dari tahun ke tahun. BBM jenis bensin akan tumbuh 11 persen per tahun, sementara solar 5 persen. Meski proyeksi ini belum memperhitungkan upaya penghematan, gambaran ini memberikan magnitude konsumsi BBM yang cukup mengkhawatirkan.
Yang justru lebih mengkhawatirkan, tren peningkatan konsumsi BBM ini tak dibarengi peningkatan produksi BBM. Bahkan, produksi cenderung menurun. Produksi BBM nasional terkendala dua hal: kapasitas kilang dan pasokan minyak mentah.
Saat ini, kapasitas kilang sekitar 1,2 juta barrel per hari (bph), dengan produksi BBM sekitar 38 juta kl. Produksi minyak mentah sudah lama tak menyentuh 1 juta bph. Tahun lalu, produksi tak lebih dari 0,9 juta bph, sekitar 20 persen diekspor, padahal kebutuhan minyak mentah untuk intake kilang 1 juta bph. Artinya, perlu impor minyak mentah sedikitnya 25 persen dari kebutuhan intake nasional.
Padahal, dulu, produksi minyak pernah 1,4 juta bph lebih. Mulai 2005, produksi di bawah 1 juta bph. Saat ini, dua lapangan minyak yang memberikan kontribusi terbanyak adalah Duri dan Minas- Sumatra Light Crude. Dalam 5-10 tahun mendatang, kontribusi kedua lapangan dipastikan jauh berkurang. Bahkan, pada 2020 produksi lapangan Minas praktis akan habis.
Impor Tak Terbendung
Untuk memenuhi permintaan BBM, keran impor BBM terus dibuka. Impor BBM sudah lama dipraktikkan, tetapi belakangan porsi impor kian tak terbendung seiring meningkatnya konsumsi dan menyusutnya produksi BBM. Tahun lalu, impor BBM 32 juta-35 juta kl, lebih kurang setengah dari kebutuhan BBM nasional. Angka ini jauh lebih besar dibandingkan impor BBM 10 tahun lalu yang 5 juta kl. Dengan jumlah impor BBM yang besar ini, eksposur fluktuasi pasar minyak internasional terhadap keamanan pasokan BBM—ketahanan energi nasional—terbilang membahayakan. Jika harga minyak dunia tinggi, dengan sendirinya biaya penyediaan BBM juga meningkat, subsidi menggunung, dan APBN kian terpangkas.
Postur APBN semakin ramping, ruang fiskal kian menyempit, sehingga belanja untuk kepentingan lain, seperti infrastruktur, pendidikan, dan kesehatan, jauh berkurang.
Tak hanya itu, fluktuasi pasar minyak internasional juga langsung diserap APBN, mengakibatkan APBN sering direvisi. Dalam satu tahun anggaran, revisi bisa berkali-kali. Ini untuk menyesuaikan asumsi harga minyak dengan harga internasional yang berlaku. Ini perlu mengingat asumsi APBN mengenai harga minyak Indonesia (ICP) merupakan fungsi dari harga minyak internasional dan berpengaruh, baik terhadap perhitungan penerimaan negara maupun perhitungan besarnya subsidi BBM.
Penerimaan negara dari sektor migas bersumber dari PPh migas dan PNBP migas yang jumlahnya meningkat dari tahun ke tahun. Tahun lalu, Rp 289 triliun atau sekitar 17 persen dari total penerimaan negara. Di lain pihak, kenaikan volume BBM impor, yang sering diikuti kenaikan harga BBM impor, menyebabkan belanja subsidi BBM meningkat. Sepuluh tahun lalu, belanja ”hanya” Rp 35 triliun, tahun lalu Rp 216 triliun. Ditambah subsidi listrik (Rp 93 triliun), subsidi energi Rp 310 triliun. Penerimaan negara dari migas praktis habis untuk subsidi energi, yakni BBM dan listrik.
Eksekusi Kebijakan
Dalam 10 tahun mendatang, gap kebutuhan dan produksi akan terus membesar kecuali dibangun beberapa kilang baru. Saat ini, produksi BBM dalam negeri hanya mampu memenuhi 40 persen konsumsi BBM nasional jenis bensin. Dengan melihat kecenderungan konsumsi BBM jenis bensin saat ini, pada 2025 perlu sekurang-kurangnya 10 kilang baru, masing-masing berkapasitas 300.000 bph. Pembangunan tiga kilang baru, yang menurut rencana on-stream 5-8 tahun mendatang, hanya mampu mereduksi sepertiga dari impor BBM bensin, belum memenuhi semua kebutuhan domestik.
Kebijakan impor dan subsidi BBM yang kini berlaku memang mampu mempertahankan harga BBM tetap terjangkau masyarakat luas, tetapi juga berdampak negatif cukup serius, mulai dari bengkaknya konsumsi BBM, belanja impor BBM, dan ketidakpastian APBN dalam menyediakan fasilitas sosial dan mendasar lain. Di samping upaya penghematan tak kunjung ada hasil, memproduksi BBM di dalam negeri juga terkendala kapasitas kilang dan pasokan minyak mentah. Menaikkan harga terkendala persepsi kemungkinan gejolak sosial.
Tentu pemerintah kini tengah menggodok strategi jitu untuk mengatasi membengkaknya konsumsi BBM sekaligus mengurangi subsidi BBM. Beberapa opsi penting untuk dikaji. Pertama, segera kurangi ketergantungan impor BBM dengan secara bertahap membangun kilang di dalam negeri. Kedua, segera melakukan penjaminan pasokan minyak mentah melalui kerja sama dengan negara-negara kaya akan minyak mentah, serta mengupayakan peningkatan produksi minyak mentah di dalam negeri.
Ketiga, secara bertahap menaikkan harga BBM di dalam negeri dan memfokuskan target subsidi BBM pada sektor-sektor yang mampu membuka lapangan kerja bagi masyarakat miskin, seperti nelayan, sektor informal, dan usaha kecil. Keempat, secara cermat segera mengkaji potensi the true social unrest akibat kenaikan harga BBM dan memisahkannya dari gejolak sosial yang direkayasa, serta melakukan upaya mitigasi risiko/potensi gejolak sosial. Kelima, menekan konsumsi BBM melalui diversifikasi energi, dengan memanfaatkan bahan bakar gas, terutama di sektor transportasi dan pembangkit listrik.
Opsi-opsi itu sudah tentu bukan hal baru. Yang penting bagaimana mengeksekusi strategi itu mengingat banyak pihak terlibat dan berkepentingan. Menurunkan harga BBM harus merupakan bagian dari orkestra strategi meningkatkan ketahanan energi secara nasional. ●

Rabu, 17 April 2013

Will PLN be a future ‘anchor’ of gas customers?


Will PLN be a future ‘anchor’ of gas customers?
Montty Girianna  ;  Director for Energy, Mineral Resources, and Mining at the National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS)
JAKARTA POST, 16 April 2013

  
We have a large and growing domestic gas market. In the next 10 years, we must secure a 10,000 million metric standard cubic feet per day (mmscfd) supply of gas, more than double the current supply. 

However, even today, we see that the market can be characterized as a mismatch between gas demand and supply.

We can reduce this imbalance by a combination of increasing gas supply and improving gas infrastructure to deliver gas to the centers of demand. Efforts to combine these two approaches have been made, albeit sporadically and hardly successfully.

What has been lacking is recognition of the large and reliable demand for gas by customers. 

To secure supply, we have to ensure that the market has a sufficiently large and reliable source of demand — gas customers — and offers gas at a price that can justify the necessary investment required to ensure a gas supply.

Developing gas markets, if we follow international best practices, can be carried out through reliance on anchor customers whose demand represents a considerable part of planned supply capacity. Base-load gas power plants are ideal anchor customers, provided they are able to pay an adequately high price.

At a sufficient price, the anchor customers will be able to provide the revenue certainty required to finance investment in gas fields or for upstream development and the development of midstream and downstream infrastructure.

The largest consumer of gas in our country is the electricity sector — power generations. As gas-fired power stations, including everything from base plants, which run fairly continuously, to peak-shaving plants, which have continuously variable requirements and demand a continuous gas supply to produce electricity.

But, under existing gas policies, we find it is difficult to obtain anchor customers. Current gas allocation strategy, which gives priority to fulfill the demand for fertilizer and electricity generation, is potentially hindering the development of our gas market. As both fertilizer and electricity are now heavily subsidized, this strategy has led to the provision of gas to customers at prices below-market levels.

This allocation and pricing strategy has been ineffective in preventing prolonged shortages of gas supply, and definitely is not going to maximize the economic value of our gas resources.

The shortages have forced state-owned electricity company PLN not to rely on new gas-fired base-load generators for its main Java-Bali grid. The company’s 2020 business plan projects only 12 percent of total new power plant development will be gas-fired, leaving the majority to be coal-fired.

Much of these new gas-fired plants will be in the form of smaller isolated plants with peak capacity and in the form of open-cycle gas turbines to replace diesel generators.

In the eastern part of the country, mini-LNG is expected to be the main source of gas, given the isolated locations of planned gas-generation plants and small demand. In the northern part of Sumatra, peak capacity would be supplied from LNG imported through the ARUN terminal. Around Jakarta, peak capacity would be supplied by LNG via a floating storage regasification unit (FSRU) recently built. In none of these cases does PLN expect significant new demand for piped gas.

Probably, the most significant single new gas-fired will come from two power plants in Java, each with a 750 megawatt capacity, with the first to be commissioned in 2016 and the second in 2021. 

Together, projected gas demand from these two units will account by 2020 for 60 percent of the total increase for the PLN Java-Bali grids, which seems to be the most likely new anchor customer over that period.

With a declining role of gas in PLN’s generation mix, given its emphasis on developing coal-fired generation to supply base load energy, PLN appears to be unlikely to serve as a significant anchor customer gas demand. The reduced emphasis on gas for future base-load generation definitely reflects PLN’s concerns on the reliability of gas supply, despite the supposed gas allocation priority given to power generation.

There is, however, potentially sizeable demand from the substitution of diesel and fuel oil at existing power plants using natural gas. 

Last year, PLN’s Java-Bali grid consumed 4.3 billion liters of diesel and 1.6 billion liters of fuel oil. Assuming that this largely represents fuel used in combined-cycle and open-cycle gas turbines, it would represent potential gas demand of around 550 mmscfd. 

This number is large enough to constitute an anchor customer, compared to last year’s actual gas supplies on the grids of close to 650 mmscfd and PLN’s planned requirement of approximately 950 mmscfd in 2013.

This potential cannot be realized unless concern on the reliability of gas supply is resolved. With the reluctance of PLN to develop new base-load gas-fired generation raises a fundamental question of where future anchor customers to support the development of domestic gas infrastructure will come from. 

If PLN does not expect major new gas-fired base-load generation and instead prefers to focus on LNG and CNG supplies to peaking plants, then the electricity industry is unlikely to provide many new gas anchor customers.

This demand uncertainty will of course influence the level of gas supply and makes it more challenging to define the appropriate level of gas infrastructure development. 

On the other hand, with a projected growth of our gross domestic product (GDP) of 6 to 7 percent per year for the next 10 years, we will see the demand for electricity is expanding rapidly.

What do we do then? A revisit is necessary to existing gas priority allocations to allow gas price to naturally dictate allocations. 

The resulting impacts of this new regime on subsidy levels can be compensated by increased revenues from upstream production. Of course, any such change should be phased in over a transitional period to allow existing users time to adjust to new regime of gas prices.

Next, a review is also necessary on the consistency of PLN’s planning policies with other policy objectives including development of the domestic gas market. 

The plan for capacity extension for base-load gas power plants must be further reviewed, taking into account the wider implications for domestic gas market and viability of domestic as industry, and reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.

This is about the time for policy makers to review overall planning policies, particularly to strengthen consistency between the national electricity development and the intention to broaden domestic gas markets. 

Specifically, as the demand for electricity expands, further development of gas-fired generation is a must to help trigger the domestic gas market, which in turn will ultimately benefit through reliable gas supplies. 

Gas-fired capacity can be constructed relatively rapidly, probably in three years or so from today, if a decision is taken now to develop additional gas-fired generation. 

The decision is so crucial, as we cannot let coal-fired plants excessively dominating the national power generation, due to the real danger of their carbon dioxide emission.

In summary, for electricity to be the anchor of gas customers, first, a current strategy for gas allocation and pricing is critically reviewed allowing gas price to dictate allocation. Second, a new regime of gas pricing must be designed to trigger the development of PLN’s gas-fired base load generation. Third, the new regime should be phased in over a transitional period to allow gas consumer’s adjustment. ●