Nuclear Power the hand of God Frederick Situmorang  ;   The writer has a master’s degree in maritime policy from the University of Wollongong, Australia, and a postgraduate diploma in strategic studies from Massey University, New Zealand

JAKARTA POST,  24 Maret 2014

                                      

                                                                                         

                                                      

When Albert Einstein formulated his famous equation of E = mc², he knew that he had created the most devastating weapon of all time. The multiplication of mass loss by the “c” factor square (“c” is the speed of light or it is three followed by eight zeroes); has a significant meaning. A small particular matter can generate massive energy. Then the idea was to transform that matter into a small transportable bomb and detonate it within the enemy’s territory. For example, the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, the “Little Boy”, was only fueled with 64 kilograms of enriched Uranium 235. Yet, the destruction was equal to “1,200 tons of incendiary bombs, 400 tons of high-explosive bombs and 500 tons of anti-personnel fragmentation bombs.” The fallout was even greater. It caused years of radioactive fallout, killed people through cancer and other radiation sicknesses. The overwhelming reality of nuclear warfare leaves no option but total annihilation of the belligerents. Thus, the initial doctrine for nuclear warfare was Mutually Assured Destruction (known as MAD). Subsequently, since no state was mad enough to launch a nuclear strike against its enemy, nuclear states’ lowered their policy to no first use. Furthermore, major nuclear states tended to maintain their nuclear arsenals at the “second strike capability”, which was also more feasible to their national economies. The balance of nuclear capability, mainly by the two superpowers and the rest of the nuclear states, created some kind of a stable situation, namely the “nuclear peace”. No major war took place during or after the Cold War. Within nuclear peace, a nuclear state tends not to fight with another nuclear state. Hence, stability in international relations may occur. Nevertheless, as major war by nuclear states becomes off limits, proxy wars are the means for resolving any conflict of interests. As such it has created a new phenomenon of “stability in instability”. In general, no major war happens, yet low-intensity conflicts continue happening. Hence, Kenneth Waltz, a political scientist, argues, “the more may be better”. He claimed that if more world states became nuclear states, proxy wars might become less of an available option, and therefore, low-intensity conflicts would diminish. Notwithstanding the “Game theory” created by the existence of nuclear weapons, there are several reasonable grounds for a state to procure nuclear capability. First, it is obvious that having nuclear weapons will instantly elevate a state’s deterrence against foreign-power intervention. Unfortunately, procuring nuclear capability is the easiest capability to procure. Yet the consequences are provoking. Once a state has a nuclear weapon, its neighbors will feel threatened. The new nuclear state will be under the international microscope, especially by “Big Brother”. Second, if a state is able to manipulate nuclear power, it will greatly expand its armed forces’ fighting range. For example, supercarriers are only feasible as moving war platforms if they use nuclear as their power plants. They can reach any place in the world — without refueling — carrying planes, troops and other war machines that are sufficient to take on a state. Therefore, if a state has a supercarrier, it can push the war boundary far beyond its geographical boundaries. Similarly, a nuclear submarine may enhance a state’s strategic attack range. The war machine is able to penetrate any state line of defense stealthily, bringing the war to the enemy’s front door. When fueled by nuclear, it can travel all over the world and expand the owner’s strategic attack coverage extensively. Third, with the depletion of fossil fuels and the struggle for a new form of energy, nuclear is the most feasible alternative at hand. As an illustration, “a kilogram of U-235 can generate energy similar to 10,000 kg of mineral oil or 14,000 kg of coal [or equal to 45,000 kilowatt hour of electricity].” Nuclear fuel is even better than fossil fuel. Nuclear fuel does not produce gases that pollute the air and thus it does not create the greenhouse effect and extreme climate change. With these advantages, it is most likely all states will acquire nuclear technology after all. Regarding Indonesia, perhaps the last two grounds are more sensible than the first. Although, Indonesia does not need to expand its strategic attack capability, to procure a supercarrier or a submarine is a geographical necessity. These two naval platforms could overcome “the tyranny of distance” of Indonesia’s vast archipelago — in order to act robustly in a timely manner if ever a security concern is raised in any spot. The amount of fuel used would be enormous if conventional warships or conventional submarines performed such duties. The cost would be even greater if this conventional navy became the backbone of the regular duties of patrolling Indonesia’s entire waters. As a result, a nuclear-powered navy is the future solution for Indonesia’s archipelagic security challenges. In the bigger picture, nuclear power is the hope for the future energy scarcity. Even though Indonesia is a big petroleum producer such natural resources are limited. According to British Petroleum’s data, “Indonesia may run out of oil by 2024” or it is less than 10 years from now. Although there may be new oil-resource discoveries these resources will be depleted eventually. Hence, if Indonesia does not start considering nuclear as an alternate source of energy, it will face an energy crisis within the near future. Overall, nuclear technology seems to be God’s hand within the contemporary realm. It lays a boundary between that which is acceptable and which is not. It gives so much power to control but brings so much responsibility to cope with. The right utilization may result in peace and prosperity, but misuse will bring the world straight to its doom. For Indonesia, this is an unavoidable item on the agenda. ●

TNI smart power, more than just hard and soft power

TNI smart power, more than just hard and soft power Frederick Situmorang  ;   The writer has A Master’s Degree in Maritime Policy from the University of Wollongong, Australia, and A Postgraduate Diploma in Strategic Studies from Massey University, New Zealand

JAKARTA POST, 17 April 2013

Smart power is a not-so-new concept in global politics. In fact, it was introduced in the early 1990s. Smart power is the continuation of soft power as an alternative power that can change the traditional paradigm about the balancing of “hard power” between countries. Thus, smart power is a mixture of both hard and soft elements of power.  Nevertheless, smart power has recently attracted more studies and exploration, and smart power as a buzzword is becoming used more often by countries’ elites and political leaders. Hillary Clinton, for example, in her farewell address called for the need of smart power for contemporary and future US foreign policy. She emphasized that it was necessary not because US power was declining; rather, the power as well as threats were diffusing and “the world becomes ever more interdependent and interconnected”. In Indonesia, smart power is also increasingly gaining in attraction and popularity. On several occasions, the Indonesian Military (TNI) elite has used the term to explain how the defense force must cope with future multidimensional threats and challenges. Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro, for example, asserted that, “the concept of smart power is principally the potential synergy of civilian and military”. His deputy, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, spoke of a similar theme, although he inferred it as the use of power smartly (small but effective and efficient) with due regard to TNI minimum essential forces (MEF). The TNI commander, followed by his staff, also expressed the need for smart power implementations.  These simply demonstrate how the smart power concept has affected the military leadership in Indonesia as well as within the TNI as an organization. According to Joseph S. Nye, who coined the term, smart power is the right combination of hard and soft elements of power in order to achieve the national goals. At first, it was for compensating for limited usage of the US hard power in the contemporary political realm. Nye asserts that the US cannot rely merely on its military and economic might. Moreover, he believes that a US heavy-handed posture may not only be ineffective but also may backfire, hurting the US interests, as the interdependency among states has been growing even larger.  In contrast, Nye offers the manipulation of such interdependency by the optimization of the US “co-optive power” derived from ideological and cultural attraction as well as institutional credibility — namely, soft power. He even confirms that soft power may become the new instrument of power (IoP), just like the prior grouping of elements of national power, DIME (diplomacy, information, military and economy). With the right proportion and timing application between hard and soft power, comes the new form of power: smart power.  As we know, TNI is the hard power resource. The question now is whether TNI has soft power that can form smart power.  The thesis built here is that TNI may have soft power as a capability for at least three reasons. First, Indonesia secured independence through (or mostly known) armed struggle. In this case, the role of TNI was so vital and central that Indonesia’s independence seemed impossible without it. In other words, TNI history shapes Indonesian history as a whole.  Furthermore, there is a TNI ideal, which is transferred from generation to generation: TNI is the strongest unifying force that stands above all Indonesians in their inherent diversity. This also has made the TNI persona so popular. One example is the way former high-ranking TNI personnel are able to occupy many eminent public posts, although contemporary Indonesia falls under civilian supremacy. With the 2014 election drawing closer, several surveys show that presidential candidates with military backgrounds lead in the popularity rating. Second, it is so fortunate for TNI that Indonesia is a hierarchical society originated from previous kingdoms. The knights, soldiers or military in the contemporary sense, are a prominent class within society. This cultural characteristic was amplified by the Indonesian war-dominated history. Even after independence, the soldier class has dominated Indonesian culture for more than four decades (prior to the Reform era).  As a result, the military still characterizes the new Indonesian democracy. This is apparent in how political parties structure their organizations, which treat their party leaders like the military commander. The easiest observation is the way political parties dress up their so-called task force with military-like camouflage and berets. In the soft power context, such cultural attraction equals co-optive power or an entry point to have the other act according to our own agenda. Third, although in contemporary Indonesia, the military is already out of politics, TNI still has an inescapable political influence because of its institutional environs. The simplest explanation is like this. TNI has more than 600,000 members that have at least five people with an affectionate or emotional connection. With the Indonesia kinship society model, for example, wife, children, parents, siblings and those who are akin that see the TNI member in their (extended) family as a role model. Hence, 3 million people or almost 2 percent of the population are TNI sympathizers. TNI used to be political power. Although it has stopped, the infrastructure is still intact within society. For example, the army has a territorial structure that ranges from provincial level down to every village. Those TNI-civilian interfaces have existed long enough among the people so that they have become focal points for solving social issues. Therefore, it is unsurprising that people sometimes also go to the local military authority, rather than police, when facing security problems.  Such sympathy and legitimacy, both are the source of soft power. The three reasons above confirm that TNI has soft power. TNI can enhance those sources of power up to the next level to realize power as outcome. Several developing methods are: reintroducing TNI values upon the people; organizational transparency that is free from corruption, public audits, not being too sensitive in sharing information, opening bases for public usage and active participation in solving social issues. Within the near future, it is possible to reconsider TNI participation in the presidential election or a TNI justice system for civilians.  In conclusion, since TNI may possess soft power then it may also have smart power. TNI soft power will act as an enhancer and an enabler for its hard power. If all civilian agencies agree that TNI’s character is the role model for their member’s character building, and the money for doing so is around 5 percent of their budget, TNI virtually will save 5 percent of its spending.  Furthermore, if TNI wins the people’s legitimacy, it enables TNI to do what is best for TNI since it is also the best for the people. This is actually how smart power works. ●

‘Wawasan nusantara’ vs UNCLOS

‘Wawasan nusantara’ vs UNCLOS Frederick Situmorang ;  The writer got Master’s Degree in Maritime Policy from the University of Wollongong, Australia, and a postgraduate diploma in Strategic Studies from Massey University, New Zealand

JAKARTA POST, 29 Januari 2013

Wawasan nusantara is the fundamental standpoint of Indonesian geopolitics. Literally, wawasan nusantara means the archipelagic concept; contextually the term is more precisely translated as the “Indonesian archipelagic vision”. Wawasan nusantara is a way for Indonesia to look at itself (geographically) as a unity of ideology, politics, economy, sociocultural, security and defense issues.  The concept attempts to overcome Indonesia inherent geographic challenges —a state that comprises of thousands of islands as well as thousands of sociocultural backgrounds. Vis-à-vis the state craving unification, the water between the islands must become the connectors rather than separators. Under the previous International Sea Law, the coastal state territorial water was only 3 miles seaward of its coastline. Accordingly, Indonesia archipelago encloses many high seas within, for instance: The water between Jawa and Kalimantan (the Java Sea), between Kalimantan and Sulawesi (the Makassar Strait), the Banda Sea or many other places wider than 6 miles. Even with the latter recommendation of a 12-mile seaward territorial water, Indonesia would still have several high seas within its archipelago.  Thus, wawasan nusantara is the inevitability in uniting Indonesia’s diversity.  The concept, conveyed in the Djuanda Declaration, has become the principal teaching for all Indonesians, as early as kindergarten. Djuanda asserted that the water areas within an islanded state  must be treated as its internal water. This means that the state will have complete jurisdiction — equal to its land territory.  Thus, in the legal terms expressed in the wawasan nusantara, Indonesia practically demands full sovereignty over its territory, both the land and water. Any foreign interest lies within should become the government of Indonesia discretion only. Unfortunately, it is not the case. When the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982 came into force, it had accommodated the island states under its provisions. Under Part IV, it even specifies those states with the name: Archipelagic states.  The UNCLOS provisions define an archipelagic state as a state that comprises “one or more archipelagos and may include other islands”. In addition, the comparison between the land area and water is 1 to 1 and 1 to 9 with only 3 percent of the connecting baselines (the archipelagic baselines), that may exceed 100 nautical miles (nm) — at maximum of 125 nm.  Fulfilling those requirements, a state may claim the 12 nm of territorial sea, the 200 nm of exclusive economic zone (EEZ), including the continental shelf from its archipelagic baselines. Under the third UNCLOS, Indonesia now has a globally accepted framework that can accommodate its ideal of wawasan nusantara.  Indonesia can claim itself as an archipelagic state. It has 2:3 ratio between land and water, around 17,000 islands and has only 18 long baselines that exceed 100 nm or 2.7 percent out of 183 baselines in total — the longest is 122.74 nm, which is also less than regulated limit of 125 nm.  Using the third UNCLOS delimitation for the water jurisdiction, Indonesia sovereignty and sovereign rights enclose more than 5.8 million square kilometers. This is even larger than Djuanda’s assertion since the Declaration did not include the EEZ.  If the third UNCLOS has been so openhanded in embracing the archipelagic principle in general, is it really sufficient as well as compatible to the Indonesia’s wawasan nusantara in particular?  In fact, the answer lies in the retroactive of an archipelagic state and the loose wordings that embed within the Archipelago provisions. First, since freedom of navigation is still the main spirit of the Sea Law the existence of an archipelagic state should not be significantly affected. Any archipelagic state should provide sea routes within its archipelago. The third UNCLOS refers to such routes as the Archipelagic Sea Lane (ASL). Such routes must be as convenient as when it was not archipelagic water. Differing from innocent passage, the ASL falls under the transit passage regime that cannot be suspended. For Indonesia’s archipelago, the ASL must accommodate the two sea traffic directions namely the west-east and the north-south. Therefore, if Indonesia only provides north-south ASLs, the west-east routes will be at the transiting ship’s own discretion referred to as “the normal routes used for navigation”.  It means that any ship can freely choose its own way when transiting through the Indonesian Archipelago beyond 12 or 24 miles of the coastlines, without any intervention from the Indonesian authority. The ASL passage is similar to the high sea regimes. Furthermore, in the generally accepted interpretation of ASL, the transiting ships may deviate from the axis up to 25 nm, or 10 percent of the distant between the bordering islands.  Thus, since providing ASL is mandatory and it is almost uncontrolled like the high sea, the archipelagic water does not entirely belong to the archipelagic states.  For Indonesia, since the length of its ASL is more than 4,000 miles the routes will enclose roughly more than 200,000 square miles. Such conditions do not represent the unification spirit of wawasan nusantara. Another exacerbating factor is the terminology of “normal mode” that is used to regulate the ASL transit. No globally accepted definition is appropriate to describe as such. Some, who have a global interest, will presume their “normal mode” as submerging their submarines while transiting, flying their aircraft over their carriers’ ADIZ (air defense identification zone), or any other manner that they consider as their “normal mode”.  Conversely, the archipelagic states are not happy with such definition as it allows the other states moving around uncontrolled inside their “archipelagic territory”.  Yet again, the wawasan nusantara principle of unity in security and defense will not prevail under such circumstance. Overall, the archipelago provision under the third UNCLOS is the best deal Indonesia can get for now. Nevertheless, it is not enough to be the final goal for the wawasan nusantara precept.  What Indonesia currently needs is not legitimacy on paper, but rather the effective control of the archipelago, particularly the ASL. Although, the effective control will not change the Indonesia rights before the law, but merely winning the status will also be useless without the capability to exploit it. Perhaps Indonesia can learn as such from its neighbor, Singapore. In certain places, albeit Indonesia owns the sky above, still it has to ask Singapore permission to fly it over because the airspace falls under the control of the Singapore flight information region (FIR). ●