Lee Kuan Yew Singapore’s, Southeast Asia’s true leader

Lee Kuan Yew Singapore’s, Southeast Asia’s true leader Sabam Siagian  ;  A senior editor of The Jakarta Post; He interviewed the late Lee Kuan Yew several times

JAKARTA POST, 24 Maret 2015

                                                                                                                                     

                                                                                                                                                           

Lee Kuan Yew was sworn in as prime minister of Singapore on June 5, 1959, when Singapore then was a self-governing state within the British Commonwealth. When the Federation of Malaysia was established in 1963, Lee ushered Singapore into the newly created Federation. His party, the People’s Action Party (PAP), was his strong political base after it overcame some internal problems. In 1964, PAP (with 75 percent Chinese membership) took part in Malaysian national elections based on Lee’s decision. Lee’s belief in multiracialism apparently was viewed differently by the Malay politicians. In August 1965, Lee was told by his Malaysian colleagues in the federal government that Singapore had to leave the federation. An Australian journalist friend who covered the event remembered that Lee with tears on his face softly said to the few reporters present: “We are on our own now.” My friend also noted the determination in Lee’s voice. It is helpful to remember the context of that event, which made the situation faced by Lee and his colleagues challenging indeed. Former president Sukarno who at that stage showed clear indications of megalomania considered the formation of the Federation of Malaysia as Great Britain’s imperialist stratagem to encircle the Republic of Indonesia because of his anti-Western attitude. Sukarno declared what he referred to as Konfrontasi, or confrontation, which in reality was launching a series of military operations against Malaysia and the recently independent Singapore. Lee was indeed very much relieved to see the gradual changes happening in Jakarta after the failed communist party coup on Oct. 1, 1965. Perhaps it took the same time for Lee to comprehend the actions of the newly emerging leader in Jakarta, gen. Soeharto, because of his unmilitaristic decisions. He abolished the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), called for an end to all military operations against Malaysia and Singapore and reactivated Indonesia’s membership at the United Nations. And as acting president since 1967, Soeharto made approaches to Western countries that were willing to provide economic aid to Indonesia, which slowly recovered from a chaotic economic mess with 600 percent inflation thanks to Sukarno’s revolutionary outbursts. In other words, unintentionally, there was a parallel of action and purpose between Singapore’s Lee and Indonesia’s Soeharto. Lee was determined to transform Singapore as a modern state with a sophisticated economy. The end of Konfrontasi made his job easier. And Soeharto quietly made repairing Indonesia’s broken economy his top priority, along with providing basic necessities to the ordinary people that had suffered for so long. Books have been written to describe the Singapore miracle that became the modern hub of Southeast Asia under the leadership of Lee. Indonesia and Singapore’s other neighbors benefit from the modern services that Singapore is able to provide so efficiently. On the other hand, Singapore’s rapid modernization would have been difficult to achieve without political stability in Southeast Asia. That’s why the establishment of the ASEAN on Aug. 8, 1967, in Bangkok was such an impressive political achievement. The situation in 1967 was hardly conducive to promote regional cooperation. True, Konfrontasi was terminated. But there was still lingering suspicion among Indonesia’s neighbors. They were perhaps puzzled to see a military leader with so much combat experience pushing for regional cooperation. It was Lee that from the outset, perhaps based on his fine political instinct, perceived Soeharto as a potential regional leader that would opt for regional cooperation and social economic development. In August 1967, five foreign ministers gathered in Bangkok to discuss the need for regional cooperation. They were Adam Malik (Indonesia), Tun Abdul Razak (Malaysia), Narciso Ramos (the Philippines), S. Rajaratnam (Singapore) and Thanat Khoman (Thailand). They were personalities with differing backgrounds and political views. Nevertheless, they were convinced that only a stable Southeast Asia, free from external interference, with their countries linked with each other in a regional organization would ensure the future of their respective countries. Indonesian diplomats who were members of the Indonesian delegation told me about the hardworking Singapore delegation whose drafting skills in English was instrumental to produce the 1967 Bangkok declaration on the establishment of ASEAN. It is not that difficult to speculate that prime minister Lee instructed his delegation that for the sake of Singapore’s future and the stability of Southeast Asia, the meeting must be successful. Only a stable and cooperating Southeast Asia would create a secure geopolitical environment to ensure Singapore’s progress. Lee became convinced that Indonesia, under Soeharto’s leadership, would act constructively. After all, as the largest archipelago state, Indonesia too requires a stable Southeast Asia. Considering the fluid situation in 1967 (it was the beginning of the third Vietnam War), one has to marvel reading the following paragraph as part of the Preamble of the ASEAN declaration in Bangkok, Aug. 8, 1967: “Considering that the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples.” This paragraph encapsulates the ASEAN spirit. Lee’s farsightedness was instrumental that despite of all sorts of problems affecting the countries of Southeast Asia regional cooperation under the umbrella of ASEAN is still functioning. Singaporeans should be proud to have a great statesman and a true leader such as the late Lee. We in Indonesia too acknowledge Bapak Lee Kuan Yew’s achievement as a true regional leader. ●

AS-Indonesia : Visi Bersama Bukan Front Bersama Sabam Siagian  ;   Mantan Duta Besar RI untuk Australia; Anggota Pimpinan Forum Duta Besar Republik Indonesia

KOMPAS,  08 Oktober 2014

DUTA Besar Amerika Serikat untuk Indonesia Robert Blake sejak bertugas hampir setahun yang lalu di Jakarta memaksimalkan kepandaian berbahasa Indonesia untuk lebih mengakrabkan hubungan bilateral Republik Indonesia dan AS. Suatu pertanda dari seorang diplomat yang dinamis yang tak puas cukup duduk di belakang meja kerjanya dan mengirim laporan dengan kawat sandi. Dubes Blake tampak di televisi menyampaikan pesan-pesan persahabatan dengan latar belakang Masjid Istiqlal. Ia tampak ikut menjajaki Sungai Ciliwung dengan perahu kecil bersama para aktivis lembaga swadaya masyarakat yang memperjuangkan kebersihan saluran air bersejarah yang memotong ibu kota RI. Sepanjang jadwal kerjanya memungkinkan, ia mengunjungi daerah-daerah terpencil di wilayah RI yang luas ini. Prestasi yang baru adalah berhasil menempatkan tulisannya di halaman Opini Harian Kompas, Sabtu, 27 September lalu. Namun, melakukan usaha-usaha yang meningkatkan keakraban hubungan bilateral RI-AS mungkin tanpa disadari bisa jadi keterusan sehingga memasuki bidang yang spekulatif. Petanda itu tampak pada tulisan Dubes Blake. Yang menjadi tema utama tulisan diplomat AS itu adalah munculnya apa yang disebut sebagai ”Negara Islam di Irak dan Suriah” dengan segala kekejaman yang telah dilakukan para pendukungnya. Hal itu diuraikan secara rinci yang sebenarnya sudah dapat diketahui dari halaman berita media cetak dan siaran berita media elektronik. Kita tidak usah  mengetahuinya dari sumber diplomatik AS di Jakarta. Teknik meningkatkan keakraban dalam hubungan bilateral RI-AS, sehingga timbul dugaan apakah ada tujuan terselubung, tampak dari kutipan agak panjang berikut dari tulisan Dubes Blake: ”NIIS merupakan ancaman besar bagi semua bangsa dan agama di dunia; mereka mengganggu keamanan dan mengancam perdamaian di Timur Tengah serta berpotensi menyebarkan ideologi mereka yang penuh kebencian di negara kita.  Presiden Susilo Bambang Yughoyono secara tepat telah menyatakan bahwa ajaran-ajaran NIIS adalah ajaran yang sesat dan merupakan ancaman bagi identitas Indonesia sebagai bangsa yang beraneka ragam dan menghormati perbedaan”. Jika paragraf itu diteruskan, yang menyusul adalah pujian tambahan kepada Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Teknik mempererat hubungan bilateral mumpung ada ancaman dari NIIS tampak sebagai tema di hampir seluruh tulisan Dubes Blake. Malahan, mendekati akhirnya, secara samar ada dorongan untuk menyusun suatu kerja sama setelah memuji ketegasan Presiden SBY. Tingkat dewasa Hubungan RI-AS dewasa ini mencapai tingkat dewasa karena kedua belah pihak saling menghormati kepentingan nasional masing-masing pihak dan menjauhi hal-hal yang peka di kedua belah pihak. Sikap RI terhadap bahaya NIIS jelas dirumuskan dalam pernyataan bersama Perhimpunan Bangsa-bangsa Asia Tenggara (ASEAN) yang disiarkan hari Minggu, 28 September 2014. Pernyataan itu menandaskan bahwa ASEAN mengecam semua tindakan perusakan, kekerasan, dan teror dalam semua bentukan dan ungkapan. Diteruskan, bahwa ASEAN bersedia bekerja sama dengan masyarakat internasional. Yang dimaksud agaknya adalah Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa. Pernyataan ASEAN itu dikeluarkan sehari setelah tulisan Dubes Blake dimuat di Kompas. Namun, para diplomat yang bertugas di Jakarta sudah mengetahui pokok-pokok dari posisi RI terhadap NIIS, seperti terungkap pada pernyataan ASEAN, Minggu, 28 September itu. Indonesia sebaiknya bersikap serba cermat dalam menanggapi arahan dan saran seperti dikemukakan dalam tulisan Dubes Blake, umpamanya: ”Bahkan, Indonesia dan AS saat ini secara bersamaan telah melakukan berbagai tindakan serupa. (dalam paragraf sebelumnya digambarkan tindakan-tindakan AS untuk mencegah NIIS serta aksi-aksi mereka). Yang berikut: ”… kita dapat memastikan bahwa nilai demokrasi ’kita’ (yang dimaksud RI dan AS?) berjalan sesuai dengan cita-cita yang terkandung dalam semboyan negara Bhinneka Tunggal Ika dan Pluribus Unum (berbeda, tetapi satu). Terlepas dari soal bahwa dua semboyan itu lahir dalam konteks sosial politik yang beda, karena itu ada nilai-nilai yang tidak dimiliki secara bersama, kita (Indonesia) patut memperhatikan aspek yang lebih luas. AS dan negara Barat lainnya dalam menggalang aksi terhadap NIIS mempunyai muatan ”kepentingan nasional” yang tidak dimiliki oleh ASEAN, khususnya Indonesia. Kalau apa yang dimaksud dalam tulisan Dubes Blake sebagai ”kerja sama internasional” adalah front bersama yang sedang digalang AS dan negara Barat lainnya (Inggris dan Perancis), gagasan itu patut diwaspadai. ●

Revisiting Indo-Oz defence treaty sans mutual trust   Sabam Siagian and Endy M Bayuni  ;   Senior editors at The Jakarta Pos;  Siagian served as Indonesia’s ambassador to Australia in 1991-1994

JAKARTA POST, 09 September 2014

                                                                                                                       

                                                      

The agreement on the code of conduct on surveillance signed by Indonesia and Australia marks the resumption of full normal ties between the two countries that drifted apart after revelations in November that Canberra had been tapping the phone of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, his wife and a number of top Cabinet ministers. The agreement, signed by the countries’ respective foreign ministers Marty Natalegawa and Julie Bishop in Bali on Aug. 28, should lead to the restoration of all security and defense cooperation programs that Yudhoyono revoked when he downgraded bilateral ties. But nice diplomatic parlance aside, there is one thing that neither side can restore immediately, if ever: mutual trust. An essential ingredient in any relationship, Australia’s belligerent attitude in the wake of the espionage scandal made sure that whatever trust the two governments had painfully built over the years went out of the window. The agreement was hastily pushed by both sides, without looking deeper into the implications the spy revelation had on bilateral ties, presumably to provide Yudhoyono with a respectable exit as he leaves office in October. After all, he had invested his personal reputation in strengthening bilateral relations more than any Indonesian president had ever done. If he felt deeply betrayed by his Australian friends, this agreement probably soothed his feelings a little. But the message from Canberra is loud and clear: Australia has no intention of stopping the espionage activities on Indonesia. It never has, even from the beginning when the espionage activities were first disclosed by the Snowden files. The code of conduct signed in Bali flies in the face of Indonesia’s good neighbor foreign policy. It took Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott all this time to agree to sign this agreement and, even then, Canberra insisted on calling it a “joint understanding” ; hence the wordy official title: The Joint Understanding on a Code of Conduct between the Republic of Indonesia and Australia in implementation of the agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and Australia on the Framework for Security Cooperation. The code of conduct, or joint understanding, is supplementary to the existing umbrella defense and security cooperation agreement the two governments signed in 2006, known as the Lombok Treaty — so named after the Indonesian island where it was signed. Can the Lombok Treaty seriously be retained given the loss of mutual trust that had pinned their relationship on defense and security cooperation? With the Yudhoyono factor out of the picture, incoming Indonesian president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo would do well to review this aspect of the relationship with Australia. A recent Reuters item from Sydney reported that Abbott is pursuing “a muscular foreign policy that has moved him closer to the United States on crises like Iraq and Ukraine, but has some worried over the risk of alienating China.” In pursuing relations with its southern neighbor, Indonesia should not allow itself to be dragged into a position that contradicts its active and independent foreign policy, which historically has been its principled position. Now Indonesia knows better that Australian intelligence operates independently from the administration’s declared foreign policy. Next time an Australian prime minister states that “no country is more important to Australia than Indonesia”, echoed first by Paul Keating in 1994 and repeated by all his successors since, including Abbott, we should take it with a grain of salt. As far as their intelligence operation is concerned, Indonesia is still treated as a potential enemy and a threat to Australia’s security. The fact of the matter is that when it comes to intelligence operations, Australia is beholden to the masters in Washington through a complex web of alliance treaties dating back to the Cold War era. Then prime minister John Howard was revealing Canberra’s true identity when he described Australia as “America’s deputy sheriff” in 2004. The Lombok Treaty may not have to be abrogated, but we need to send it back to the drawing board to allow Indonesia’s foreign and defense officials to review and adjust to the real Australia we have come to know now. With little or no mutual trust, relations in defense and security should be pragmatic at best, if not strictly businesslike: We should ask what Indonesia can get out of it, in the same way that Australia will be asking what it can get out of Indonesia. Indonesia and Australia should continue to forge all other aspects of their relationship, from trade and investment, education and cultural exchanges, scientific research, to tourism, civil aviation, meteorology and others not related to security and defense. Some security cooperation such as fighting the drug trade and counter-terrorism can continue, but all others will have to be frozen, terminated or scaled down. We should be cautious about any suggestion to elevate relations up a notch to a “comprehensive partnership”. Comprehensive partners do not spy on each other. Given the close linkages between Australia and US intelligence agencies, clearly Indonesia and Australia have different strategic outlooks. More specifically, we recommend that the periodic meeting between the heads of government be scrapped, as they can always meet on the sidelines of international summits like APEC, G-20 and the East Asia Summit. The joint meetings of foreign and defense ministers should also be postponed. They can meet when the need calls. Indonesia should review the many joint strategic cooperation programs since the countries do not necessarily share the same interests. On the perceptions of the China threat, the people-smuggling problem and the spread of radical Islamic ideology, the overlapping areas of common interests are not as large as many assume. Cooperation in these areas should be limited to where Indonesia really benefits from it. Australia is coming up with a new 2015 defense white paper, while Indonesia has long passed the 2013 deadline to publish its own defense white paper. These documents will outline their respective threat perceptions. In addition, Jokowi will likely want to implement his foreign policy vision of Indonesia as an “Indo-Pacific” axis of power, and a maritime power, which is a major departure from current policy. Indonesia, with a long coastline facing the Indian Ocean, will cooperate with Australia and other littoral states within the framework of the Indian Ocean Rim Countries Organization to establish a cooperative regime. All these developments as well as the changing nature of the relationship should be taken into account as Indonesia reviews its defense and security ties with Australia. Australia will continue to be an important neighbor for Indonesia by geographical definition, although now less so in terms of shared geopolitical interests. If Australia regards Indonesia as a potential enemy, Indonesia too should consider Australia as a potentially hostile neighbor. As far as defense and security cooperation, relations beyond this point and for the foreseeable future should be kept cordial in the absence of mutual trust. That probably works in the best interests of the two nations as long as Australia is not quite ready to conduct an independent and active foreign policy befitting a sovereign nation. ●

Why should the US be involved in Asia?

Why should the US be involved in Asia? Sabam Siagian and Endy M Bayuni  ;  Senior Editors of The Jakarta Post and Former Editors-In-Chief of the newspaper; They are Class 1979 and Class 2004 of the Nieman Fellowship program for journalists at Harvard University; Siagian was formerly Indonesia’s ambassador to Australia JAKARTA POST, 09 Oktober 2013

The year was 1957. Two CIA operatives James D. Haase and Tony Poe had just landed by an amphibious plane on Lake Singkarak in West Sumatra on an assignment to assist an armed group that was rebelling against Jakarta. 

To their dismay, the rebellion army and weapons their Indonesian contact had promised were nowhere to be seen. Many years later, when relating this story in the book by Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison Feet to the Fire – CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia (1999, Naval Institute Press), Poe poignantly commented: “Why the f*** did we come?”

When looking at US involvement in Asia, it is always advisable to pose Poe’s introspective question, albeit in more elegant language. 

In the past, the answer was often obvious. 

In Korea in 1950 it was to thwart the advance of the communist regime in the North. In Vietnam a decade later, it started with a handful of military advisors, but soon expanded into a full scale war against the communist North, only for the US to be strategically defeated in 1973. However, one positive upshot of this ugly Asian war was the US détente with China’s Mao Zedong.

The military adventure in Indonesia was not a project of some overambitious CIA operatives, as Audrey R. Kahin and George McT Kahin wrote in their 1995 acclaimed book Subversion as Foreign Policy - The Secret of Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia. 

An earlier meeting of the National Security Council at the White House presided over by president Dwight Eisenhower himself endorsed the goals of breaking up Java and Sumatra to prevent the Indonesian Communist Party from spreading its influence and of a possible regime change to replace the left-leaning president Sukarno. 

As history proved, the mission failed.

With this historical background, it is understandable why many in Asia were skeptical about America’s intentions when President Barack Obama announced in 2011 the US return to the region and essentially heralding a new policy in Asia.

Declaring America as an Asia- Pacific power, his pivot to Asia has come down to no more than reallocating more (of the shrinking) US military resources from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific region. From the language used, including the call to strengthen security cooperation with its traditional allies and partners, everyone understood that the US pivot was intended first and foremost to contain the rise of China.

Less than two years later, Obama’s entire foreign policy doctrine, and not just his Asian policy, are running into trouble. The recent dramatic developments ignited by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s emerging role in the Syrian crisis, and a friendly 15-minute phone conversation between President Obama and Iranian President Hassan Rohani have put the conduct of US global policy in a new framework.

The Washington policy establishment too is beginning to have doubts. The International Herald Tribune last week ran two articles scrutinizing the Obama doctrine, and both questioned whether the United States had lost the “mojo” that comes with being the lone superpower. 

In “For Obama, an evolving doctrine on use of force” David E. Sanger, the eminent foreign policy specialist of the New York Times, said Obama was struggling with the question of whether America is still willing to act as the world’s policeman. Former CIA vice chairman Graham Fuller in “Breaking the mold on US foreign policy” welcomed what he described as a straying into the radical reforging of American foreign policy. 

Obama has quietly put the pivot to Asia on the backburner. In his speech before the UN General Assembly last week, he said that for the remainder of his term until 2016, he would focus on finding diplomatic solutions to Iran’s nuclear weapons program and the peace between Israel and Palestine. 

The implicit message from his UN speech is that Obama is moderating US foreign policy ambitions. Whatever critics say, this is an implicit recognition of the limits of US global influence. 

Fuller rightly said that many of the enshrined axioms that had guided Washington in the past decades may now be unraveling, including American exceptionalism, unilateralism, its role as a global cop, a moral commentator, global hegemony and as an architect of a world order. 

While power balances have dramatically shifted, attitudes in Washington’s foreign policy circles remain in much the same triumphant mood that erupted immediately after the Cold War. Russia and China are rising, still not as powerful as the United States, but they seek a larger role in shaping the world. 

Domestic opinion is ahead of Washington in accepting this reality, refusing to give the President a carte blanche to launch yet another expensive and senseless war abroad. Obama recognized this much when he said, on more than one occasion, that the nation-building that mattered most to Americans is not the one in Iraq or Afghanistan, but the one at home. 

The 2008 economic recession took its toll on US military capabilities. And the shutdown of the federal government this month has compounded the problem. 

In light of these changes and in light of Obama’s new foreign policy priorities, the US will need to come up with a new Asian foreign policy. It will still take into account the strategic security interests of the US, its allies and friends in the region, but it should be a policy that put first and foremost its diplomatic and not its military resources. 

China may be the elephant in the room, but for every country in Asia, China is also its largest trading partner. As these countries adjust their respective China policy to this new reality, so too should the United States. 

In crafting its new Asian policy, the US should get more creative, deploying more soft power than hard power to stand a better chance of winning the hearts and minds and the trust of its friends in Asia.

If Washington is looking for a display of soft power policy that works, it needs to look no further than to what the US Permanent Representative to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Ambassador David L. Carden, is doing.

Carden travels extensively through the 10 ASEAN member countries, building extensive networks with local institutions to jointly address wide-ranging issues such women empowerment, education, old city preservations, labor rights and the environment. 

He has even retained a science advisor attached to his office in Jakarta. Granted, he is not burdened by time consuming bilateral protocols that other US ambassadors in the region must go through 
every day.

There are more than 1001 reasons why the United States can be and must be part of the Asian Century, and while the presence of the Seventh Fleet and the Marines is still necessary, it should not be the one Washington is touting. 

On regional security, Washington will be better off negotiating a new power sharing arrangements with Beijing, instead of seeking to contain the rise of China by rounding up its allies and friends in the region. One forum these two giants can use to prevent the polarization of Asia into two camps is the annual East Asia Summit, where they can address security concerns jointly with other medium powers in Asia, including ASEAN.

For their part, ASEAN countries could help ease the escalating tension in the South China Sea by resolving their overlapping territorial claims with one another. 

Asia would welcome a US policy that will, of necessity, be vastly different from the 2011 pivot, and one that is more realistic and less gung-ho. ●

Searching for more modest global role : America cannot make it alone

Searching for more modest global role : America cannot make it alone Sabam Siagian and Endy M Bayuni ;   Senior Editors of The Jakarta Post and are Former Chief Editors; They are recipients of the Nieman Fellowship for Journalists at Harvard University; Siagian has served as ambassador to Australia

JAKARTA POST, 03 Juli 2013

The hegemony of the US, as we know it, ended in June in California, at least symbolically. 

At their June 7-8 introductory meeting, US President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping may have struck a cordial note and may have agreed on many things, including the usual agreement to disagree, however, it is also clear that this was markedly different from earlier summit meetings held between US and Chinese leaders.

We should not read too much into the meeting. An economically powerful China is still far from being the equal of the US, both in terms of its political and military prowess, and besides, Beijing still has to prove it can live up to the responsibilities that come with being a superpower, globally and particularly in Asia.

However, the California summit is a recognition — and in the case of the US is an admission — of the limitations of American power and influence that have gone virtually unchallenged for more than two decades since its triumph in the Cold War.

The US can no longer see itself as the only “light on the hill” and it will increasingly have to turn to alliances and partnerships, including with China, in managing the world as it pursues its geopolitical interests.

Whether we are heading back to a bipolar world dominated by the US and China, or moving toward a multipolar one with more than two superpowers, is a question in the minds of foreign policy experts all over the world. 

Those directly involved in foreign policy-making would inevitably want to make sure that whatever global order emerges in the coming decade, it serves to protect their national interests.

Thus, on the eve of July 4 while Americans will be celebrating the remarkable birth of their republic, the search for a new global role — one that should be more realistic given the changing strategic scene and the limitations of domestic political and economic resources — goes on. 

A bitter fight is emerging within the US foreign policy establishment in Washington in the wake of Obama’s 2012 decision to rebalance the US military presence (and hence the pursuit of its interests) to Asia at the expense of the Middle East and Europe, which had been the focus of its foreign policy for decades. While it represents a major departure, it has not gone without challenge, interestingly not so much from outside but from inside the Washington Beltway.

This much is clear from our reading of the book The Dispensable Nation — American Foreign Policy in Retreat by Vali Nasr, the dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins University. The title is misleading since Nasr — who served as senior advisor to the late Richard Holbrooke, the special White House representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan — advocates that the Asian pivot should not see a diminishing US role in the Middle East and Europe. Otherwise, he argues, such a trade-off would make the end of US power and influence a self-fulfilling prophesy.

Nasr expresses his belief that the US should maintain a robust global role and writes:

“American leadership is still critical to the stability of the world order and the health of the global economy — to the expansion of trade and the continued development and prosperity of nations. There is no other power today that could play America’s role on the world stage or is willing to step into America’s shoes. Nor would the world be better off were that to happen, or even if any and all of the rising BRIC nations and those following in their footsteps tried their hands at it. The world America has built still needs America to lead it. America remains the world’s pivotal nation”.

He recognizes that the world has changed and is still changing. That is why Nasr recommended that the US — in implementing its global mission — should return to the practice of active diplomacy and economic engagement.

However, we believe that the problem lies not in the manner of engagement with the world at large but the underlying conviction that the US has this “manifest destiny” to save the world.

There is no question, however, that America’s place in the world will remain important. It is far from dispensable and it is equally incorrect to describe its foreign policy as in retreat, unless one is a pessimist.

Like the rest of the world, America will have to make adjustments to its foreign policy to fit with new realities. Unipolarity under US hegemony is already out of the window. Whether bipolar or multipolar, the pursuit of its geopolitical interests will have to be conducted through the formation of alliances and partnerships. Americans simply cannot go it alone anymore.

A new US foreign policy is clearly still in the making given the raging debate in Washington. It is timely for both camps to read the 1952 seminal work The Irony of American History. 

The author, Reinhold Niebuhr, a keen student of American history who taught Christian social ethics at the New York Theological Seminary, saw many contradictions in America’s global exercises, as inherent within the “messianic sense of mission” that America was destined to act “as a tutor of mankind in its pilgrimage to perfection”.

Niebuhr expresses his penetrating observation:

“The American situation is such a vivid symbol of the spiritual perplexities of modern man, because the degree of American power tends to generate illusions to which a technocratic culture is already too prone. This technocratic approach to problems of history, which erroneously equates the mastery of nature with the mastery of historical destiny, in turn accentuates a very old failing in human nature: the inclination of the wise, or the powerful, or the virtuous, to obscure and deny the human limitations in all human achievements and pretensions”.

How astonishing that six decades after Niebuhr’s observation, not only has it maintained its relevancy, but perhaps is becoming more relevant. It would be helpful if “the wise and powerful” of the US foreign policy and defense establishment, in their search for a new US role in global affairs, would ponder Niebuhr’s statement. 

Perhaps they would reach the conclusion that a more modest global role working in tandem with other nations is a recommended proposition in jointly managing our planet. ●

What actually happened in Cebongan prison (Part 2 of 2)

What actually happened in Cebongan prison (Part 2 of 2) Sabam Siagian  ;   A Senior Editor at The Jakarta Post, A Recipient of the Nieman Fellowship for Journalists at Harvard University, Class of 1979

JAKARTA POST, 05 April 2013

  

Everywhere, including in democratic countries, gaps are always noticeable between strong and clear statements delivered by their leaders and concrete actions implementing those statements.  However, it is saddening to observe, in the closing years of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s administration, how that gap is noticeably becoming ever wider. “Trust”, which Gen. Pramono Edhie Wibowo so keenly expected from the public, is indeed becoming a rare commodity. The formation of an Army investigative panel announced during the Good Friday press conference already creates doubts on its efficacy. It is headed by the deputy commander of the military police, with the eight other members representing the Diponegoro Military Command, the subregional command, the local sectorial command, and last but certainly not least, the Army’s Special Forces (Kopassus). Initial responses from various civil society organizations have been quite positive, but one also notices among the public the keenness to see a concrete result in a short time. Indeed, Yudhoyono in a Cabinet meeting on Monday again expressed his clear stance that the investigative efforts regarding the prison raid at Cebongan should be “transparent” and “accountable”. He said he would support the separate investigations by the Yogyakarta provincial police and by the Army headquarters. And herein lies the problem. There are now at least three investigations going on. Besides the two mentioned, the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) is conducting its own investigation. Its chairperson, Siti Noor Laila, is quite ambitious in outlining the commission’s working agenda. She said she intended to summon the Diponegoro Military Commander, the subregional commander and others. “We will not visit the officials related to this case individually. We will call them to appear before the commission.” Pramono has diplomatically welcomed the rights commission’s investigative efforts. “However, there are established procedures that should be followed before a military officer is allowed to appear before the commissioner,” the general stated in his Good Friday press conference. One can sense that efforts are in the pipeline, in case, for instance, the commission summon the commander of the Kopassus’ Group II. It’s only logical that the commission would like to find out what sort of movement was recorded on March 13. Frankly, we are skeptical whether all these investigations will produce the results expected by an anxious public despite the lofty pledges by the President and the Army chief. Differing goals, as pursued by at least the three investigations, will hamper thorough efforts to tackle the roots of the problem. The Army headquarters’ investigative panel is too incestuous in its make up in which at the end of the day rank will be a determining factor. Let us assume, for discussion sake, that commandos were involved based on records and evidence. Will the Army headquarters’ investigative panel recommend the demotion of the Kartasura-based commander? Or will it “sacrifice” a mere sergeant to protect the reputation of the red berets, especially after prominent former Kopassus commanders appealed to Pramono that he should never forget his red beret roots. The pseudo-tribal culture tends to be pervasive among elite military units. And the police? As a matter of fact, the Yogyakarta provincial police have plenty of relevant material related to the Cebongan raid, but for obvious reasons — weakened after recent revelations of mind-boggling corruption cases — are reluctant to be “transparent” and “accountable” as instructed by the President to whom the National Police are accountable. After becoming aware of relevant materials circulating in the social media, the police are apparently conducting a sort of psychological warfare by indirectly releasing some of the data available to shape public opinion to their advantage. The lame duck in this Cebongan drama is the National Commission on Human Rights. It does seem courageous its intention to summon military officials to be intensely interviewed regarding the facts surrounding the Cebongan prison raid. Alas, due to recent internal bickering, the commission has lost considerable weight and prestige. It is not so difficult to predict that its efforts will be stonewalled by all sorts of bureaucratic red-tape. Most probably, the commission will then publicly complain that the military and the police are being uncooperative and do not respect the basic right of the Indonesian people to learn what actually happen that made blatant cold-blooded murder possible. Consequently, the overall relations between the ruling elite and the public will sour. The “trust” that Pramono is so anxious to seek will remain elusive. What then needs to be done? The President should set up a national commission on law enforcement related to the Cebongan case. A presidential decree should be issued outlining its mandate and specific tasks. Prominent civil society leaders should be asked to serve, such as Adnan Buyung Nasution (former member of the Presidential Advisory Body), Todung Mulya Lubis (a prominent human rights lawyer), Azyumardi Azra (Muslim scholar from Syarif Hidayatullah Islamic State University) and Mahfud MD (former chief of the Constitutional Court). In order to ensure a level of linkage to the center of power, probably it would be tactical to appoint the coordinating political, legal and security affairs minister and Air chief Marshall (ret.) Djoko Suyanto as the panel chairpersons. The three existing bodies should complete their investigative tasks. The national commission on law enforcement related to the Cebongan case could benefit from their findings. But it would have to submit its own recommendations. What is at stake here is safeguarding public trust in state governance in order to prevent social anarchy. That’s why a piecemeal approach in tackling the Cebongan case is so woefully inadequate. ●

What actually happened in Cebongan prison (Part 1 of 2)

What actually happened in Cebongan prison (Part 1 of 2) Sabam Siagian  ;   A Senior Editor at The Jakarta Post, A Recipient of the Nieman Fellowship for Journalists at Harvard University, Class of 1979

JAKARTA POST, 04 April 2013

  

On Good Friday, March 29, Army chief of staff Gen. Pramono Edhie Wibowo gave a rare press conference at the historic Army headquarters, which is located on the corner of Jl. Medan Merdeka Utara and Jl. Segara. Up until the mid-1950s, it was the Dutch army headquarters where the two general offensives against the Republic of Indonesia were prepared. Pramono convened the meeting on the public holiday in order to underline the urgency of the matter to be discussed: the commando-style raid on a prison in Cebongan, Sleman regency, Yogyakarta. Four detainees were killed execution-style: Johanes Juan Manbait, Gamaliel Yeremianto Rohi Riwu, Adrianus Candra Galaja and Hendrik Angel Sahetapy, alias Deki. The raid occurred on Saturday morning, March 23. The four detainees had been accused of killing Sgt. Heru Santoso, a former Army’s Special Forces (Kopassus) member in a fight at Hugo’s cafe in the Sleman area. Police observers reported that 17 persons took part in the raid, all wearing masks except for two persons — one who knocked at the entrance gate and another who held a stopwatch to monitor the duration of the raid. The entire operation was completed within 15 minutes.  The weapons carried by the assailants were identified as possibly being AK-47s, FN pistols and hand grenades. This latest blatant violation of the law by what seemed to be military-trained men was a crowning event of a series of recent clashes involving military and police personnel. These incidents have created a sense of instability and lawlessness. No wonder President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono made a forthright statement through spokesperson Daniel Sparringa three days after the raid. The President rightly considered the execution-style killings as a direct attack on the state’s authority. In his instructions to National Police chief Gen. Timur Pradopo, Yudhoyono ordered a thorough investigation, the arrest and the legal prosecution of the perpetrators. This is such a tough presidential instruction given the rife speculation that it was highly probable that the assailants were military personnel given the precision displayed. Diponegoro Military Commander Maj. Gen. Hardiono Saroso overseeing Central Java and Yogyakarta strongly denied the speculation. In a statement, he guaranteed that no military personnel under his command could possibly have taken part in the Sleman raid. He also stated that AK-47s were no longer used by the military. One can only guess whether the general was dallying in double-talk, considering the rife speculation that commandos, dressed in civilian clothing, were most likely involved. It is well-known that a Kopassus forward base (Group II) is located in Kartasura, near Surakarta, less than a two-hour drive from Sleman. Technically Hardiono was not lying, since operationally special commandos are not directly under his command, but receive operational instructions from the Kopassus headquarters in Cijantung, south of Jakarta. And the Kopassus commander reports directly to the Army chief. That’s why Pramono in his Good Friday press conference defended the Central Java regional commander by saying that based on incomplete information at that time, Hardiono had to issue a clear statement in order to ensure regional order and security. As is the case with special commandos in a number of countries, the Indonesian red berets have a colorful history. Pramono’s late father, Lt. Gen. Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, was commander of the red berets in 1965 and 1966 and a popular figure among the anti-communist student movement. Gen. Soeharto used Sarwo Edhie’s red berets as an effective instrument in neutralizing remnants of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) after their clumsy grab for power in early October 1965. The commando unit was established in mid-1952 by the illustrious Col. Alex Kawilarang, commander of the West Java Siliwangi division. (He came from a family steeped in military tradition. His father, Maj. Kawilarang, was one of the few Indonesians who reached that rank in the Dutch East Indies Army, KNIL). Alex himself graduated from the Royal Military Academy in Bandung on the eve of the Japanese invasion in February 1942. In order to establish security and order in West Java and overcome the increasing vicious attacks by the Darul Islam movement, which was determined to establish an Islamic state, Col. Kawilarang decided to establish a commando unit specializing in anti-guerilla operations. Given its long history and significant role during crucial moments of Indonesian modern politico-military history (to mention just two events: the daring airborne operation in Pekanbaru, Riau, to neutralize the proclaimed counter government in West Sumatra, the PRRI, in February 1958; and the 1965/1966 operations to neutralize the PKI) and Pramono’s personal attachment as a former Kopassus commander, obviously he had to perform a balancing act during the Good Friday press conference. We would like to compliment him for his skillful performance. On the one hand, he stated forthrightly that the Republic of Indonesia is a law-based state. “Everybody has to respect the law”. “Trust us. Scrutinize us. We will be transparent. I pledge, whoever is proven guilty will be punished — whoever is clearly innocent will be defended. Now is the time to be transparent.” Such strong words from the Army chief. Now we are waiting to see whether all those lofty words will be acted upon. ●

Andi Mallarangeng trips – but count on him making a comeback

Andi Mallarangeng trips – but count on him making a comeback Sabam Siagian and Endy Bayuni ;   Senior Editors of The Jakarta Post and Former Editors-In-Chief of The Newspaper

JAKARTA POST, 14 Desember 2012

The bushy moustache failed to conceal the look of dejection on the face of former youth and sports minister Andi Alfian Mallarangeng, so graphically displayed last week by an Antara news agency photo. Months of fighting a losing battle had taken a lot of the optimism and vibrancy that Andi had conveyed in all his previous public appearances since he emerged as one of Indonesia’s young and promising political figures more than 14 years ago. When Andi announced his resignation from the Cabinet on Dec. 7, he effectively placed his political career on hold. Whether this is a permanent or temporary setback, much depends on how he now handles the corruption allegations leveled against him in the coming months. At 49 years old, he still has a lot going for him. This much was also clear from the mixed public reaction to his departure from the Cabinet and also from the Democratic Party. There was no chorus of boos that had accompanied officials making similar exits in the past. In fact, most people were left pondering a question: Whatever had happened to the young, vibrant, intelligent, articulate (some would throw in sympathetic and affable) politician who made such a big public impression more than a decade ago? His political rivals, including some in the Cabinet and the Democratic Party, may be gleefully rejoicing at his elimination from the 2014 presidential race. Many who had worked with him, or had come to know him, would attest to his demeanor and sincerity, even when he clearly had strong ambitions for power. Close friends and supporters still could not believe or accept that he had committed the crime as accused by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). It would be premature to write his political obituary. In fact, his decision to resign was more intended to save the party, as he rightly said in his announcement: “I don’t want to become a burden to the party.” The Democratic Party, which emerged as the largest party in 2009 after only its second participation in a general election, has seen its popularity plunge in the past year following a series of corruption scandals revolving around its former treasurer Muhammad Nazaruddin. Most surveys today put the party third behind the Golkar Party and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). It is dropping further and at this rate will be lucky to make it into the top five in 2014. Nazaruddin has already been convicted for using his party position to secure lucrative contracts and siphoning off commissions back to the party’s coffers, sometimes through intermediaries in the party. Convicted, he has been determined to making sure he does not go down alone. He has mentioned other party members as accomplices, including Andi, who was named a suspect by the KPK on Dec. 6. Andi is equally determined to prove his innocence and will fight to clean his name in court. It remains unclear whether his actions alone will be enough to save the party’s fortunes. The party’s chairman, Anas Urbaningrum, also named by Nazaruddin, has doggedly resisted calls from party members to resign. We can only speculate why the political career of Andi, one of Yudhoyono’s most promising princelings, should have reached such a tragic end. With a doctorate in political philosophy from Northern Illinois University, Andi, from the Bugis ethnic group, was culturally ill-equipped to deal with the intricate complexities of pseudo-Javanese court politics at Yudhoyono’s family compound in Cikeas, east of Jakarta. His naivety was exposed when he and Anas locked horns in 2010 for the chairmanship of the Democratic Party. Andi may have spent time in Yogyakarta as an undergraduate student, but he was outsmarted by Anas, who was more nimble in dealing with Javanese dynastic politics. Anas won the contest simply because he had the support of “mother superior”, Yudhoyono’s mother-in-law, who clearly held the real power in the family dynasty. As part of the deal, Anas accepted the appointment of Edhie “Ibas” Baskoro Yudhoyono, the President’s son, as secretary-general.  He used this relationship effectively: When his name first came up in Nazaruddin’s corruption investigations, he traveled the country to meet with the party’s rank and file with Ibas at his side. For the time being, Anas has acquired political immunity. Andi had at one time been considered a serious presidential prospect among an up-and-coming generation of politicians that would rise up through Indonesia’s more open and democratic political system that he helped create. He joined various teams set up to rebuild Indonesia’s political institutions in the early years after the end of the Soeharto regime in 1998.  Aspects of the current political system, such as a more open and transparent electoral system and the decentralization of administration were among the work that he personally contributed to. He was also a popular political commentator in the early years of Reform before he joined Yudhoyono in 2004 to become his spokesman. Whenever the going was rough for the President, Andi would appear on television to make himself the public punching bag and deflect criticism from his boss. He knew how to take punches and still kept his wide smile. After helping Yudhoyono win the election again in 2009, he was rewarded with a Cabinet post, which on reflection, may have been a trap that led to his downfall. The Cabinet post was in a second-class ministry with inadequate professional staff, certainly not equipped to handle mammoth projects such as the Hambalang sports complex, worth over Rp 1 trillion (US$103.8 million). Was it Andi’s brilliant idea to develop such a huge project with two purposes rolled into one, namely that he would be known as the pioneering sports minister who spearheaded Indonesia’s quantum leap as a globally prominent achiever in sports while simultaneously contributing to the party’s coffers? In the end, the Hambalang project was too big and too tempting for too many greedy officials, and the wheeling and dealing around the project may have slipped out of Andi’s control. The rise and fall of Andi is such a vivid case of Yudhoyono’s failure as party and national leader to groom a stable of educated young men and women with adequate political schooling to help develop a vision for this vast archipelagic nation to follow in the 21st century. Will Andi ever make a comeback? The Bugis people know he remains one of their favorite sons, even if he once turned his back on them. In 2009, when he was campaigning for Yudhoyono’s reelection, he was asked why he was not supporting then vice president Jusuf Kalla, a fellow Bugis who was challenging the incumbent. “The time was not ripe for a Bugis president,” was his blunt reply that invited a storm of criticism, mostly from his own people.  Ironically, it may be Kalla who brings Andi back from the political wilderness, especially if the former can progress his own campaign to stage a political comeback in the 2014 race. ●