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Sabtu, 24 Januari 2015

Diplomacy and the death penalty in Indonesia

Diplomacy and the death penalty in Indonesia

Sunan J Rustam  ;   The writer works for the Foreign Ministry
at the political, legal and security affairs desk
JAKARTA POST, 23 Januari 2015

                                                                                                                                     


When Socrates, Plato and Aristotle deemed that to some extent the death penalty was appropriate, their thoughts apply to the present situation in Indonesia.

Capital punishment in this country is reserved only for serious crimes, such as narcotics and terrorism. Countries practicing the death penalty in the world, including those in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, share similar arrangements.

Interestingly, most executions have been carried out for narcotics cases in those countries. The death sentence is considered the last resort after a selective and prolonged legal process.

Apart from its complicated process, the death penalty also has limitations. Chief among them is the right of clemency where a death-row convict may be pardoned.

Qualifications, for example, children and pregnant women are exempt, serve as additional restrictions as prescribed in the ratified 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Nevertheless, many human rights activists firmly contend that the death penalty violates basic human rights in all aspects.

In Indonesia, this claim was dismissed in 2007 when the Constitutional Court decided that human rights do have limitations and as a consequence, in some cases, the death penalty is acceptable.

In practice, there is relatively little issue about the death penalty for Indonesian convicts, yet when it comes to foreigners, matters are more sensitive and complicated.

With bilateral relations at stake, the death penalty raises a problem of its own, particularly on the issue of clemency and consular notification.

As history has shown, diplomatic and political considerations have played a considerable role in the process of granting clemency.

On many occasions, the president has to make tough and last-minute decisions. Non-legal reasons such as reciprocity, aid and bilateral support have to compete with rule-of-law elements such as protection of Indonesians abroad, the gravity of the crime and the supremacy of the law.

Consular notification is also prone to complexities if not properly exercised. The United States had to learn this the hard way.

In the 2004 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals case, Mexico argued before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that the US failed to inform 51 Mexican nationals of their right to consular access including those sentenced to death row in the US.

The ICJ ruled in favor of Mexico and upheld Article 36 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

Currently, an official publication of the US Department of State that is intended as instructions for federal, state and local enforcement and other officials mandates the right to consular access, particularly for death penalty-related crimes.

Another issue regarding consular notification is re-notification, whether a foreign mission is required to be re-notified when their nationals are sentenced to death or when their clemency requests are denied and the time of execution nears.

The US encourages its officials to carry out re-notification and Singapore mandates 14 days of re-notification in the case of execution. Japan and Malaysia, on the other hand, do not practice
re-notification.

The complexity of the death penalty also comes from international pressure. With the abolition of the death penalty gaining more support, Indonesia has come in for criticism for maintaining capital punishment.

In the diplomatic arena, much of this complexity occupies the work of the Foreign Ministry. As the assigned window to the international world, the ministry functions not only as messenger but also defender of its nationals as mandated by law.

Efforts are continuously carried out to seek relevant legal and political justification both at home and abroad.

At home, diplomatic notes and visits from foreign missions requesting, relaying, confirming and, in some instances, negotiating clemency have become the Foreign Ministry’s day-to-day business.

The arguments put forward in response to these diplomatic notes and visits may seem classic and clichéd, but they are nonetheless valid.

One of the most common arguments conveyed is the notion of an independent judicial system that is beyond the ministry’s reach.

It argues that the legal process is distinct from the political process and the death penalty is a product of the legal process.

Even in the context of clemency where international politics may come into play the final decision is in the hands of the president who holds the prerogative to grant mercy.

As if the arguments are not clear and repeated enough, diplomatic notes and visits remain adamant. The persistency of foreign missions in exercising their consular duty is second to none.

Ideas such as good bilateral relations, respect for human rights and extradition are thrown in, hoping for a possible loophole, if not a miracle.

Ironically, if the situation was reversed, Indonesian missions abroad would simply do the same in exercising their consular function to assist Indonesian nationals.

In some extreme conditions, the Indonesian government has had to go the extra mile to save its nationals from execution, such as those in the Middle East and Malaysia.

In conclusion, as of now the death penalty remains the law of the land in Indonesia and as such diplomacy works in support of enforcing the law.

Albert Einstein put it succinctly in his famous statement that nothing is more destructive of respect for the government and the law of the land than passing laws that cannot be enforced. ●

Senin, 08 Desember 2014

A legal review of the ‘sink the vessel’ policy

                A legal review of the ‘sink the vessel’ policy

Sunan J Rustam ;   The writer, who obtained his doctorate degree in international law from The Maurer School of Law, Indiana University Bloomington,
works for the Foreign Affairs Ministry
JAKATA POST, 06 Desember 2014

                                                                                                                       


President Joko ‘”Jokowi” Widodo’s recent statements in favor of sinking foreign vessels suspected of illegal fishing arouses not only support but also critical questions. Chief among the questions is the legality of such a policy and whether it contradicts the 1982 United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which Indonesia is a signatory.

Before engaging in a discussion of legality, let us first discuss the background of the policy. To begin with, the “sink the vessel” remark was a quick response to the finding made by the current Indonesian Marine Affairs and Fisheries Minister Susi Pudjiastuti.

The finding was so chilling that a swift deterrent action seemed needed. The finding discovered that at a certain time on a certain day, over 70 vessels of 50 to 70 gross tonnage entered Indonesian waters.

These vessels were not under the ministry’s vessel monitoring system and were therefore suspected of conducting illegal fishing activities.

It is estimated that the loss sustained specifically at that certain time of day in a certain area of  Indonesian waters was close to US$1 million.

That sum rises to nearly $100 billion in annual losses from illegal fishing in Indonesia, based on the ministry’s official research.

For a newly transformed maritime state that will rely heavily on maritime-related resources, such losses are simply not acceptable.

Accordingly, the policy was introduced to curb illegal fishing practices in Indonesia. Coordinating Maritime Affairs Minister Indroyono Soesilo underlined the legal basis relevant to the policy, i.e. article 69, paragraph 4, Law No. 45 2009 on fisheries.

According to the article, subject to sufficient preliminary evidence, Indonesian authorities may burn and/or sink foreign vessels suspected of illegal fishing in an Indonesian fishing management area. The article, though, lacks a definition of Indonesian fishing management areas, which could create legal issues with the UNCLOS.

The UNCLOS classifies seas into zones, each with its respective recognized rights. The rule of thumb with UNCLOS zones and rights is that the farther from the coast the lesser the rights. Indonesia, as an archipelagic state, has full sovereignty over her territorial sea, internal waters and archipelagic waters.

The lesser rights or sovereign rights cover contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and continental shelves.

There should be no question that the policy is intended for foreign vessels suspected of conducting illegal fishing within the zones where Indonesia has full sovereignty.

In fact, as a matter of law, pursuit into other sea zones is allowed for alleged violations taking place in fully sovereign waters.

Legal questions arise if alleged illegal fishing carried out by foreign vessels takes place in zones of sovereign rights, such as EEZ. Article 73 of the the UNCLOS clarifies what measures may be taken to enforce laws and regulations by the coastal state in EEZ and they do not include the sinking of vessels.

Under the UNCLOS regime, enforcement in EEZ may include boarding, inspecting, arrests and judicial proceedings. Penalties thereof may not include imprisonment and other corporal punishment. Even bonds or security for prompt release of arrested vessels and crews may be reasonable.

What may become a hurdle for Indonesia in implementing the policy is the prompt release obligation governed in paragraph 2 of article 73 of the UNCLOS. Referral to article 292 concerning prompt release of vessels and crews elaborates the possible mechanism should a dispute arise between a flag state whose vessel is being detained and a coastal state.

The flag state and coastal state are given ten days from the time of detention to choose their forum. Failure to do so will automatically revoke the application of forum selection under article 287 of the UNCLOS. Given that Indonesia has not made any declaration under article 287, unless otherwise decided, arbitration will be deemed as the forum.

The next issue is not so much about Indonesia’s record in international dispute settlement as the trend of case law concerning prompt release obligations.

At the moment, Indonesia’s involvement in international dispute settlement is not impressive. Perhaps the hardest lesson Indonesia has had to learn with regard to international dispute settlement was that of the 2002 Sipadan-Ligitan case when the International Court of Justice rejected Indonesia’s claim.

Another occasion with a similar outcome was the 2000 Karaha Bodas case where the arbitral tribunal fined Pertamina, a state-owned company, a substantial amount of money as a consequence of its unilateral breach of contract. Pertamina’s foreign bank accounts are currently still frozen.

In the WTO mechanism, as of October 2014, Indonesia has been involved in 32 cases, either as complainant, respondent or third party. Over half of the cases submitted were ruled against Indonesia. The list could go on but the big picture is clear.

Moving to the trend of case law pertaining to prompt release obligations, decisions of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) may serve as a useful reference. As of 2005, of seven prompt release obligation cases that have been submitted before ITLOS, five were decided in favor of prompt release of the detained vessels.

Nevertheless, all hope is not lost. Indonesia can still achieve a deterrent effect by increasing the amount of bonds for prompt release and penalties afterwards.

In increasing the sum required, consideration, as ITLOS case law suggests, should include the seriousness of the alleged offences, the penalties under the law of the coastal state and the value of the vessel and cargo.

In conclusion, the “sink the vessel” policy is permissible for alleged activity in Indonesia’s territorial sea, internal waters and archipelagic waters. As for illegal fishing in EEZ or other sovereign rights zones, Indonesia is under the obligation to follow the UNCLOS mechanism. ●

Selasa, 28 Januari 2014

Australia’s turn-back boat policy : There is always a choice

Australia’s turn-back boat policy :

There is always a choice

Sunan J Rustam  ;  The writer, who obtained a law doctorate degree from Indiana University, works for the Foreign Ministry
JAKARTA POST,  27 Januari 2014
                                                                                                                        
                                                                                         
                                                      
When Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa identified three main challenges facing the Asia Pacific in 2014, one of them was at home — a trust deficit in bilateral relations between Indonesia and Australia. 

 A new spat over spying has taken its toll on the two neighbors, bringing their relations to a new low. Indonesia summoned its ambassador from Canberra, froze security and defense cooperation and made it crystal clear that Australia had to follow a six-point roadmap if relations were to return to normal. Australia has been reluctant to do so and in reply exercised a policy of turning back boats carrying suspected asylum seekers.

Australian Border Protection Command (ABPC) recently interdicted, boarded, towed, forced and steered boats carrying suspected asylum seekers to Indonesian waters, heaping more pressure on diplomatic relations between the two states. 

The media reported Australia had apologized while Indonesia emphasized it would protect its sovereignty at all costs and reiterated its rejection of Australia’s policy. 

The incident may have been resolved diplomatically. Nevertheless, given the nature of the issue, it will not be long before a similar incident takes place. Next time, things could turn ugly, with two navies possibly facing each other to protect their interests, as happened in the Ambalat spat between the Indonesian and Malaysian navies a few years ago.

The Australian government argues that denying these particular boats is permissible under international law, provided the policy does not endanger the safety of the people on board. 

In practice, exercising this act can be challenging, if not daunting, considering the length of distance and the minimum preparations these boats have made. 

Many times the media has highlighted the poor condition of the people onboard these boats. They are either in urgent need of help or are unaware of their situation. It is unclear how the ABPC rendered its decision to turn back these boats, particularly when the people on board were in a poor condition.  

The Indonesian government says the turn-back boat policy does not solve the issue as it will only create an endless vicious cycle. It does not take a genius to understand how the cycle works if all related states — be it origin, transit or destination states — practice the same approach. 

It is the people on the boats that will suffer the most should the turn-back policy be adopted by all related states.

Given the aforementioned conditions, there are at least two main issues at hand. First is sovereignty — being the acts of boarding, towing and forcing boats to another state’s waters — and second is the humanitarian issue — with regard to the safety of the people aboard the boats. 

On the first issue, towing and forcing boats out of one’s waters may be justifiable under international law, particularly under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) where both states are parties, but certainly a clear violation thereof is if such acts are stretched to steering into another state’s territorial or contiguous waters. The rule of the thumb of the international law on sovereignty is that consent of the relevant state is mandatory — consent that is clear and explicit and does not rely on the doctrine of acquiescence or an assumed one.  

The ABPC should first secure Indonesia’s explicit consent before the former decides to tow, force and steer boats to the latter’s waters. 

The requirement of consent continues that before boarding the boat, the ABPC must also obtain explicit consent from the relevant flag state. Thus, if the boat is under the Indonesian flag, then the ABPC not only must secure boarding but also steering consent from the Indonesian authorities. 

In the absence of such consent, the Indonesian authorities have every right with the necessary means under international law to protect the country’s sovereignty and interests. In some extreme cases, it is considered an act of war to board a foreign boat without the consent of the relevant flag state, let alone infringing another state’s waters.  

With regard to the second issue — humanitarian concerns — the UNCLOS mandates member states to render assistance to any person or boat found in danger on the high seas. Further, a regional arrangement is called upon coastal states to ensure safety on and over the sea. 

The 2013 Jakarta Declaration on addressing the irregular movement of persons and the 2002 Bali Process on people smuggling, trafficking in persons and related transnational crime were among the answers to the call. 

Alas, these answers are now only pro forma due to the standoffs between the two major players. Taking into account the final destination of these boats, Australia carries a relatively higher burden to render assistance compared to that of origin or transit states.

Australia may continue the turn-back boat policy, but Indonesia’s strong protests indicate that this issue is not cricket. Although Indonesia is not designed to be invasive in character, history has shown that when it comes to an infringement of sovereignty, its people will defend their territory at all costs.

As a matter of choice, Indonesia has set out the six-point roadmap as a prerequisite for the resumption of cooperation on security and defense, including on the irregular movement of persons. It is not clear whether Australia will agree and go along with the prerequisite, but looking at its response by exercising the turn-back boat policy, including the alleged infringement of Indonesia’s sovereignty, one can assume it will be long before cooperation on the irregular movement of persons takes full effect. 

In the meantime, flocks of boat people, including women and children, will continue to stream into the region. Similar incidents will likely to occur in the future. Do we have a choice to resolve the issue? Yes we do. 

In his book, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono argues that there is always a choice for everything. I could not agree more with the President and in the current context the choice is clear — it’s either with us or against us.
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