Can
SBY end China’s dominance in the South China Sea?
CPF
Luhulima ; A researcher at the Centre for Political Studies
at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) in Jakarta
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JAKARTA
POST, 05 Mei 2014
It will
take a long time for ASEAN to deal with the South China Sea (SCS) problem.
ASEAN
was gently pressed to arrive at an arrangement to formulate and sign a
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) in the SCS, a politically dressed
Code of Conduct that ASEAN did not seek.
A joint
working group was set up to draft an action plan, specifying cooperation in
the protection of the maritime environment, navigation and communication at
sea, search and rescue and fighting transnational crime.
Initially,
ASEAN contended it would continue negotiating the terms and conditions first
before meeting China, but China insisted that parties in conflict in the SCS
would have to solve their sovereignty and jurisdictional problems with China
on a bilateral basis, not multilaterally, in the ASEAN 10 plus 1 format.
ASEAN
rejected this and further negotiations were delayed.
The
guidelines for the DOC were only agreed upon after ASEAN sacrificed its
stance of consolidating itself before meeting the Chinese — disparaging ASEAN
in its entirety.
All
parties to the DOC would thus conduct their dialogue and consultation
jointly, not in the ASEAN format of 10 + 1, but under a new format of 11.
Where is
the ASEAN centrality we so proudly proclaimed to the world?
ASEAN
violated its own concord on defending its centrality and role as a prime
mover in its relations with all its dialogue partners. By giving in to China,
ASEAN sacrificed its unanimity.
The most
tragic event was the 45th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Phnom Penh in 2012.
The
controversy involving the Philippines and Vietnam on the one hand, and
Cambodia as the host, reflected parties that adhered to the respective
principle of ASEAN centrality versus ASEAN plus China as an entity, a soccer
team. This breakup among ASEAN members on the SCS cannot be justified.
Here
again, China “dictated” how conflict in the SCS had to be dealt with, not
jurisdictionally but politically.
Ever
since the problem in the SCS first emerged, it could and would not determine
the coordinates of the nine-dotted lines it claimed were its final
territorial boundaries. It kept harping on about its historical rights.
ASEAN
has drafted the ASEAN Proposed Elements of a Regional Code of Conduct in the
South China Sea (COC), followed by Indonesia’s Zero Draft on the COC.
But
China has discarded both, adhering to the DOC to manage conflicts in the SCS.
ASEAN
must decide on leaving the soccer team format to manage the SCS disputes with
China and regenerate the 10 + 1 format in its dealings on the sea in
question.
Here,
Indonesia must take the lead. The request of ASEAN Secretary-General Le Luong
Minh to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in late 2012 to assist in managing
SCS tensions should be taken as a constructive gesture.
The
problem of the SCS can no longer be managed at the level of foreign ministers
alone. The Phnom Penh debacle brought ASEAN to the brink of “balkanization”,
the breakup of ASEAN for China’s sake.
The
extraordinary endeavors of the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, Thailand and Vietnam to mobilize ASEAN’s unity in
Phnom Penh have grossly failed to bring Cambodia back into ASEAN’s political
fold.
The
restoration of ASEAN solidarity must be conducted at the ASEAN Summit level,
in the format of summit diplomacy. Indonesia seems to be the only party able
to take the initiative at the leaders’ summit.
Aside
from being ASEAN’s de facto leader and “by far the largest economy and
population in Southeast Asia — the only country that matters to China and the
only influential voice that can redirect regional efforts to change things,
(May Hong, The Jakarta Post), Indonesia should channel the trend in the
management of the SCS in ASEAN’s favor.
China is
a threat, starting with its dominance in managing tensions through a DOC and
completely discarding ASEAN’s efforts at formulating a code of conduct.
It even
makes fun of ASEAN in disputes in the South China Sea. If China succeeds in
its effort and ASEAN succumbs, balkanization will set in with many
consequences for Indonesia and the other ASEAN members.
Who can
guarantee that one day China will not claim the northern part of the Natuna
sea as part of its territory as well?
Yudhoyono,
toward the end of his term, should help revitalize ASEAN’s unity on the SCS
issue. Indonesia must reinvigorate an “integrated” Southeast Asia (as in the
Soeharto years), in line with the current form of an ASEAN
Political
and Security Community — both Indonesian initiatives to integrate the region
into an ASEAN Community.
Indonesia
must reembrace the Philippines and Vietnam in formulating ASEAN’s stance on
China in the SCS, to rekindle the attitude of “ASEAN first” in
internationalizing this problem.
In line
with a new presidential decree on an official reference to China, Indonesia
may have to change the term “Laut Cina Selatan” (South China Sea) to “Laut
Tiongkok Selatan”, acknowledging the ocean as China’s sea.
Meanwhile
the Philippines has started to coin the term “West Philippines Sea” and the
Nguyen Thai
Hoc
Foundation in California is suggesting the term “Southeast Asia Sea”.
Why do
we not initiate the term the “ASEAN Sea”, as raised by the political analyst
Riefqi Muna, to project the ASEAN Political and Security Community in waters
to the north, east and west of ASEAN?
The time
has come to liberate ourselves of China’s dominance and revitalize ASEAN’s
spirit in the managing of the South China Sea on its terms.
Indonesia’s
initiative is crucial, as China recognizes Indonesia as ASEAN’s de facto
leader.
It is
time we acted more assertively in the SCS, to make it the ASEAN Sea. ●
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