Sabtu, 31 Mei 2014

The prospects for Indonesian foreign policy

The prospects for Indonesian foreign policy

Hadianto Wirayuda  ;   The writer is pursuing his PhD degree in international relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, London
JAKARTA POST,  30 Mei 2014
                                                
                                                                                         
                                                      
Prabowo Subianto and Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, the two presidential candidates, have published their programs for government. While the manifestos cover a wide range of issues, I am particularly interested in interpreting the foreign-policy sections by assessing the prospects for Indonesia’s foreign affairs vis-à-vis their foreign policy agendas.

Prabowo, through his manifesto, emphasized revitalizing Indonesia’s role in international diplomacy by using the late Michael Leifer’s notion of entitlement — highlighting, inter alia, Indonesia’s size advantage and its vast natural resources — as foreign policy assets. Such a pride in Indonesia’s entitlement has led Prabowo to maintain the spirit of nationalism in his foreign policy preferences. An example is his stance in responding to the Ambalat dispute with Malaysia, in 2009, where he publicly claimed his readiness to “act as a soldier again” in order to defend Indonesia’s sovereignty.

Regarding regional cooperation, Prabowo’s manifesto underscores the need to “revisit the outdated Indonesian foreign policy”, while maintaining that “ASEAN regionalism has been an artefact in Indonesia’s diplomatic history”, thus, “Indonesia must not continuously rely on the toothless ASEAN solidarity.” Taking the aspects of nationalism and regional aspiration into account, the prospects for Indonesia’s foreign policy are, in this regard, worrisome.

There are two reasons for this. First, Indonesia remains committed to resolving border issues by peaceful means, focusing on diplomacy instead of the military approach. This has been the preference since the Soeharto era. The continued preference for peaceful means during the Reform era can be linked to the idea maintained by Indonesian leaders about the appropriate action of a democracy with regard to dispute resolution.

If Prabowo’s policy preference, as demonstrated in the Ambalat case, is sustained, it would be possible for him to embark upon aggressive external behavior whenever confronted by sovereignty problems. This behavior would disregard Indonesia’s democratic credentials and its regional leadership. In practice, however, an aggressive external behavior may not necessarily be possible given that Indonesia is still renewing its military infrastructure.

Second, Prabowo’s foreign policy would potentially neglect the importance of ASEAN. If sustained, this approach would contradict Indonesia’s traditional foreign policy concentric circles — which put ASEAN at the core — and also discredit Indonesia’s regional entitlement, an aspired basis of Prabowo’s diplomacy.

In practice, undermining regional cooperation may not be easy given that Indonesia, as the perceived regional leader, must ensure the implementation of the ASEAN Political-Security Community in 2015 by consistently promoting democracy and human rights, an activity that is not included in Prabowo’s foreign policy manifesto.

Overall, if Prabowo decided to pursue his foreign policy approaches in the ways described, this might contradict the ideas stipulated in the first paragraph of his own foreign policy manifesto: “to be consistently active in [the creation] of a peaceful world”.

While Jokowi also emphasized Indonesia’s repositioning vis-à-vis global issues, it is not entirely clear how in practice this repositioning would be applied.

However, at the textual level, Jokowi’s foreign policy ideas reflect foreign policy continuity, especially the agenda that was pursued during the Megawati Soekarnoputri period.

Underscoring Indonesia’s archipelagic identity, Jokowi’s manifesto identifies a number of diplomatic activities that reflect the importance of sovereignty. This is similar to Prabowo’s focus on stressing the prominence of nationalism in Indonesia’s foreign policy.

Despite the similarity, at the textual level, the means to use nationalism as a foreign policy instrument are different.

Jokowi’s proposal identified diplomacy as the means to solve territorial disputes. We can, therefore, assume that the military approach would not be his first priority.

Regarding regional cooperation, Jokowi’s proposals noted the importance of ASEAN and, thus, “consolidating Indonesia’s leadership in, and reassuring the centrality of, ASEAN”. The challenge, however, rests on Jokowi’s limited foreign-policy exposure and his lack of experience in national leadership, which would lead to him relying on his foreign minister in overseeing the conduct of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

This indicates a continuity of Megawati’s foreign policy, with Jokowi focusing on a well-tested foreign-policy course. Megawati’s decision to revitalize Indonesia’s role in ASEAN reinstated Indonesia’s leadership by way of promoting democracy and human rights in ASEAN. This allowed for the association to transform itself from being a club of authoritarians into an entity that recognizes democracy as a principle of its intra-mural cooperation, as the ASEAN Charter stipulates.

Jokowi’s manifesto also indicates his reliance on the Foreign Ministry in foreign policy-making by having it restructured, emphasizing “internal capacity building with regards to, inter alia, economic diplomacy and public diplomacy to include public participation in the decision-making process.”

While this also demonstrates a continuity of Megawati’s foreign-policy agenda (as the ministry’s first bureaucratic reform was launched in 2002), foreign policy-making is likely to remain top-down. This is because the public is thought to be ill-informed on foreign-policy issues. For instance, a 2009 public survey showed that 82 percent of the population believed that ASEAN is a security community with special security forces, and only 13 percent perceived ASEAN as a regional organization.

Therefore, if Jokowi relied heavily on public preferences, Indonesia’s foreign policy could become irrational. This could affect Jokowi’s aspirations for a leadership role in ASEAN.

In summary, the prospects for Indonesia’s foreign policy are likely to involve change and continuity. Notwithstanding this the election winner, in general, nationalism — manifested in the focus on the importance of sovereignty — will remain a feature of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

Specifically, Prabowo’s manifesto indicates that Indonesia’s foreign policy is likely to change, projecting primarily a post-ASEAN strategy, and Jokowi’s proposals highlight the likelihood for continuity, pursuing the preferences that were previously applied by Megawati.

Tidak ada komentar:

Posting Komentar