The
prospects for Indonesian foreign policy
Hadianto
Wirayuda ; The writer is pursuing his PhD degree in
international relations at the London School of Economics and Political
Science, London
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JAKARTA
POST, 30 Mei 2014
Prabowo Subianto and
Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, the two presidential candidates, have published their
programs for government. While the manifestos cover a wide range of issues, I
am particularly interested in interpreting the foreign-policy sections by
assessing the prospects for Indonesia’s foreign affairs vis-à-vis their
foreign policy agendas.
Prabowo, through his
manifesto, emphasized revitalizing Indonesia’s role in international
diplomacy by using the late Michael Leifer’s notion of entitlement — highlighting,
inter alia, Indonesia’s size advantage and its vast natural resources — as
foreign policy assets. Such a pride in Indonesia’s entitlement has led
Prabowo to maintain the spirit of nationalism in his foreign policy
preferences. An example is his stance in responding to the Ambalat dispute
with Malaysia, in 2009, where he publicly claimed his readiness to “act as a
soldier again” in order to defend Indonesia’s sovereignty.
Regarding regional
cooperation, Prabowo’s manifesto underscores the need to “revisit the
outdated Indonesian foreign policy”, while maintaining that “ASEAN
regionalism has been an artefact in Indonesia’s diplomatic history”, thus,
“Indonesia must not continuously rely on the toothless ASEAN solidarity.”
Taking the aspects of nationalism and regional aspiration into account, the
prospects for Indonesia’s foreign policy are, in this regard, worrisome.
There are two reasons
for this. First, Indonesia remains committed to resolving border issues by
peaceful means, focusing on diplomacy instead of the military approach. This
has been the preference since the Soeharto era. The continued preference for
peaceful means during the Reform era can be linked to the idea maintained by
Indonesian leaders about the appropriate action of a democracy with regard to
dispute resolution.
If Prabowo’s policy
preference, as demonstrated in the Ambalat case, is sustained, it would be
possible for him to embark upon aggressive external behavior whenever
confronted by sovereignty problems. This behavior would disregard Indonesia’s
democratic credentials and its regional leadership. In practice, however, an
aggressive external behavior may not necessarily be possible given that
Indonesia is still renewing its military infrastructure.
Second, Prabowo’s
foreign policy would potentially neglect the importance of ASEAN. If
sustained, this approach would contradict Indonesia’s traditional foreign
policy concentric circles — which put ASEAN at the core — and also discredit
Indonesia’s regional entitlement, an aspired basis of Prabowo’s diplomacy.
In practice,
undermining regional cooperation may not be easy given that Indonesia, as the
perceived regional leader, must ensure the implementation of the ASEAN
Political-Security Community in 2015 by consistently promoting democracy and
human rights, an activity that is not included in Prabowo’s foreign policy
manifesto.
Overall, if Prabowo
decided to pursue his foreign policy approaches in the ways described, this
might contradict the ideas stipulated in the first paragraph of his own
foreign policy manifesto: “to be consistently active in [the creation] of a
peaceful world”.
While Jokowi also
emphasized Indonesia’s repositioning vis-à-vis global issues, it is not
entirely clear how in practice this repositioning would be applied.
However, at the
textual level, Jokowi’s foreign policy ideas reflect foreign policy
continuity, especially the agenda that was pursued during the Megawati
Soekarnoputri period.
Underscoring
Indonesia’s archipelagic identity, Jokowi’s manifesto identifies a number of
diplomatic activities that reflect the importance of sovereignty. This is
similar to Prabowo’s focus on stressing the prominence of nationalism in
Indonesia’s foreign policy.
Despite the
similarity, at the textual level, the means to use nationalism as a foreign
policy instrument are different.
Jokowi’s proposal
identified diplomacy as the means to solve territorial disputes. We can,
therefore, assume that the military approach would not be his first priority.
Regarding regional
cooperation, Jokowi’s proposals noted the importance of ASEAN and, thus,
“consolidating Indonesia’s leadership in, and reassuring the centrality of,
ASEAN”. The challenge, however, rests on Jokowi’s limited foreign-policy
exposure and his lack of experience in national leadership, which would lead
to him relying on his foreign minister in overseeing the conduct of
Indonesia’s foreign policy.
This indicates a
continuity of Megawati’s foreign policy, with Jokowi focusing on a
well-tested foreign-policy course. Megawati’s decision to revitalize
Indonesia’s role in ASEAN reinstated Indonesia’s leadership by way of
promoting democracy and human rights in ASEAN. This allowed for the
association to transform itself from being a club of authoritarians into an
entity that recognizes democracy as a principle of its intra-mural
cooperation, as the ASEAN Charter stipulates.
Jokowi’s manifesto
also indicates his reliance on the Foreign Ministry in foreign policy-making
by having it restructured, emphasizing “internal capacity building with
regards to, inter alia, economic diplomacy and public diplomacy to include
public participation in the decision-making process.”
While this also
demonstrates a continuity of Megawati’s foreign-policy agenda (as the
ministry’s first bureaucratic reform was launched in 2002), foreign
policy-making is likely to remain top-down. This is because the public is
thought to be ill-informed on foreign-policy issues. For instance, a 2009
public survey showed that 82 percent of the population believed that ASEAN is
a security community with special security forces, and only 13 percent
perceived ASEAN as a regional organization.
Therefore, if Jokowi
relied heavily on public preferences, Indonesia’s foreign policy could become
irrational. This could affect Jokowi’s aspirations for a leadership role in
ASEAN.
In summary, the
prospects for Indonesia’s foreign policy are likely to involve change and
continuity. Notwithstanding this the election winner, in general, nationalism
— manifested in the focus on the importance of sovereignty — will remain a
feature of Indonesia’s foreign policy.
Specifically,
Prabowo’s manifesto indicates that Indonesia’s foreign policy is likely to
change, projecting primarily a post-ASEAN strategy, and Jokowi’s proposals
highlight the likelihood for continuity, pursuing the preferences that were
previously applied by Megawati. ●
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