Science and technology policy : Where are we going? Riwanto Tirtosudarmo  ;   A researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI)

JAKARTA POST, 01 April 2014

                                      

                                                                                         

                                                             

In anticipating the upcoming change in government, over the last three months or so a debate has been underway concerning the increasingly neglected development of science and technology in this country. The discourse centers on the institutional arrangements of higher education such as in universities and the state’s research bodies such as the Research and Technology Ministry. There is a consensus that Indonesia is facing a conundrum in which scientific research is going nowhere; apparently there has been no connection whatsoever made between the development of science and technology and the actual needs of society and industry, the two major users of scientific research findings and technological innovations. Conventionally it is the state universities and national research institutes where the scientific and technological innovations are supposed to be produced. Higher education, of which universities form the major part, understandably has the highest responsibility for the advancement of science and innovations in technology. Among other issues is a proposal that the Directorate General of Higher Education should be given more autonomy and separated from the Education and Culture Ministry, which should focus on basic and secondary education. Some even suggest that higher education should be integrated into the Research and Technology Ministry to fully support the advancement of scientific research and technological innovation. A likely underlying factor fueling the discourse is the significant increase in the allocation of the state budget for education, which stands at 20 percent of the total budget. The huge budget obviously has given the Education and Culture Ministry a herculean task in managing the funds to effectively achieve its targets. The proposal to separate higher education from the education ministry appears to be a sensible solution to this problem. No doubt all the problems concerning the development of science and technology partly result from the continuing lack of coherence both in the formulation and implementation of the state’s science and technology policy. Although a ministerial office responsible for the formulation and implementation of science and technology policy has existed in almost every cabinet since independence, scientific research has always been given a low priority. Fragmented organization has long plagued the effectiveness of national policy as evinced by different ministries and agencies carrying out their own policies without clear demarcation and proper coordination. The major research organizations, namely the Research and Technology Ministry with its main agency for planning and implementing technology; the Education and Culture Ministry with its numerous universities; the research and development (R and D) departments within every ministry; and non-departmental research agencies such as the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), the National Nuclear Agency (BATAN) and many others rarely communicate with each other to set the direction and goals of national policy on science and technology. For too long science and technology policy has been fragmented and uncoordinated often resulting in redundancies, wasted budgets and the increasingly yawning gap between research and social realities. Serious and concerted efforts should be undertaken if we do not want the development of science and technology to become irrelevant in the eyes of our society. Despite the much vaunted campaign rhetoric such as “toward a world-class research institute” or “toward first-class global universities” the number of academic publications from Indonesia remains low internationally. The crux of the matter is indeed institutional rather than individual as many Indonesian academics and researchers have been recognized internationally and many have been employed in prominent foreign universities and research centers in the developed world. As with many other problems that cannot be resolved by the current administration the timing of the discourse on the expected major changes in the national policy on science and technology logically should be proposed by the new administration. It is likely that various lobby groups are currently at play to convince the prospective new administration to change direction toward a more coordinated and visionary national policy on science and technology. ●

The political demography of conflicts in Papua Riwanto Tirtosudarmo ;  A researcher at the Research Center for Society and Culture, LIPI

                                                JAKARTA POST,  10 Februari 2014                

                                                                                                                        

                                                                                         

                                                      

Demography is rearing its ugly head, and as a result, political development in Papua has become convoluted. This issue was a major topic during the recent seminar on Papua organized by the Research Center of Politics at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI).  The convolution of demography and politics were exposed in at least two cases — the increasing number of non-Papuans and the demographic manipulation in the creation of new districts. What is worrying is the contribution of a political demographic nexus to the increasing political and communal conflicts in Papua.  The perception that in-migration to Papua has resulted in the marginalization of the indigenous population has been around since the early 1980s, when Soeharto’s New Order government accelerated the relocation of people from Java and Bali under the transmigration program to Papua. The transmigration policy was criticized for endangering both the local population and the environment as new settlements destroyed the surrounding tropical forests. The transmigration program had practically ceased in the early 1990s as the financial capacity of the central government began to shrink. Yet, voluntary migration cannot be stopped, as in-migration continues to be driven by the process of equalizing economic and human resource gaps between different areas.  The last two decades of the voluntary movement from Java to other islands is perhaps a major contribution to rapid social transformation in this archipelago. As the result of 2010 population census showed, the in-migration rate to Papua and West Papua province was the highest in Indonesia. While the actual number of people who migrate to Papua might not be as high as the number of migrants who move to, say, Riau province. However, given the low population in Papua, the movement consequently has higher social, economic and political impacts than in Riau. Since the political problems in former East Timor and Aceh have been resolved, Papua is now the most politically troubled place in the country. Bitter decolonization in the early 1960s and its aftermath were followed by grievances resulting from structural injustices committed by the Indonesian government in Papua. Papuans continued to be restless while any attempts to resolve the problem had different responses from different groups of Papuans. The fragmentation of Papuan society, which stems from the enormous ethnic heterogeneity, constitutes the underlying factor that significantly contributed to the divisive nature of political leadership in Papua. The decentralization policy, the product of the post-Soeharto regimes, granted regional autonomy to regency and municipal level governments. An initial idea that autonomy should be given to the province was totally rejected by the military. The response by the local elites on the locus of regional autonomy at the regency level, however, is unprecedented. Expectations of fund disbursements and the opportunity to hold local power have driven the rapid creation of district governments all over the place, particularly outside Java.  In the case of Papua, apart from the establishment of special autonomy, the decision to create the second province, West Papua, was originally perceived as part of Jakarta’s rule and divide policy, to weaken the potential separatist movement in Papua. Yet, as the local elites saw the economic and political benefits, the drive to create new regencies rapidly accelerated. The manipulation of demographic statistics to meet the requirements for creating new districts is therefore, uncontrollable. The role of local political elites both in the issue of the impact of in-migration and demographic manipulation in the creation of new districts is indisputable. In the case of in-migration issues, violence usually occurs in the form of sporadic attacks by Papuan militia groups against the migrant communities.  In the case of demographic manipulation in the creation of new regencies, a study by Sidney Jones from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflicts (IPAC) shows that the direct link with the political mobilization by the local elites is driven by the need to create new regencies, and the political and communal violence in several highland districts. Jones, who presented her case at the LIPI seminar, argued that the conflicts among Papuan elites in the creation of new regencies indicated that the idea of divide-and-rule from Jakarta was no longer necessary as Papuans had now divided themselves. The problems and the dilemmas of initiating a dialogue to find a peaceful solution for the Papuan conflicts are separate from the extreme prejudice from Jakarta toward the Papuans. As Muridan Widjojo the leader of the LIPI research group noted in the seminar, the issues were also clearly based on the fact that no single  authority represented the Papuans. Muridan strongly argued that the strategy that must be adopted should not simply mirror the way Jakarta resolved the Aceh conflict. Muridan, who also leads Jaringan Damai Papua (Papua Peace Network) with Father Neles Tebay, reminded us all that we had to face a long and tedious process, just to lay the initial foundations for a dialogue to resolve the conflicts in Papua. ●

International migration and global inequality

International migration and global inequality Riwanto Tirtosudarmo  ;   A Senior Researcher at the Research Center for Society and Culture, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI)           JAKARTA POST, 30 Juli 2013

The main challenge of any world development agenda is ultimately whether or not it can reduce, if not solve, economic inequality between countries or regions. 

Globalization is much praised for benefiting many parts of the world, but has also been indicated as a source of worldwide widening income inequalities. 

In any country, eventually only the rich and the middle class are able to harvest the fruits of globalization, while the majority of poor people will be left behind.

International migration is often seen as a market economic mechanism to level off income inequality at the global level. While it might be true in the case of temporary or circular migration, it is certainly not the case for permanent migration. 

The movement of skilled workers and professionals from poor to rich countries has caused what is popularly known as “brain drain”, which is the result of further income inequality between the sending and receiving countries.

The strongly supported argument by the World Bank and its advisors on the so-called remittance effects that go back to sending countries from their fellow workers abroad, in reality, have been criticized as the money is mostly being used for consumption rather than for generating local economies. 

Worse is the fact that the social costs and the burden of migration, especially for families left behind, is immeasurable.

What is often overlooked in discussions on economic globalization is the fact that the driving force for international migration is never singular. Yet no one will dispute the fact that the gap between prosperous and destitute countries is widening despite all the efforts by the World Bank and many other international organizations to solve these problems. 

In the last 10 years or so, international migration has shown its new dynamics as a result of the changing geopolitical situation in some parts of the world.

Despite the problems caused by the current financial crisis, the European Union (EU) has been regarded as relatively successful in easing cross border movement between its member countries. 

This decision understandably has reduced economic tension created by the income gaps through international labor migration, particularly for poor countries in eastern and southern Europe. As a single market, the EU has revolutionized not only the most rhetorically applauded free trade zone but also the free labor zone.

Such a radical change, however, will unlikely is emulated by ASEAN, which set 2015 as the beginning of the so-called ASEAN Community. 

The ASEAN free trade zone will likely be easily accepted, but a free labor zone is untenable as the income gap is so wide between, for example Malaysia and Singapore on the one hand, and Indonesia and the Philippines on the other. 

As we all know, migrant workers has always been a sensitive issue that tends to be avoided in open discussions among ASEAN member countries. In ASEAN, labor issues have been more safely discussed bilaterally between the countries concerned rather than regionally.

Another pressing issue that needs to be resolved regionally is the issue of boat people heading toward Australia. As a prosperous country in the region and the signatory of 1951 Refugee Convention, Australia is becoming the target country for refugees seeking asylum. 

The waves of boat people from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar, have already created a serious problem, as we are witnessing in Nauru, one of the countries in the Pacific that is being used by Australia to dump the boat people who entered the Australian waters. As Christmas Island is no longer able to accommodate the boat people, Australia has persuaded its neighboring countries to accommodate them.

As the case in Nauru — with some analysts predicting that it will also occur in PNG — is escalating, the Kevin Rudd labor government is running into trouble as the opposition ,as well some civil society organizations, are pressing the government to find a new solution to the crisis. 

The recent decision by the Rudd government to signal the boat people make a detour has been met with mixed feelings among the Australian public. As Australia will hold an election on Sept. 14, immigration is understandably a recurrent hot issue and will obviously be highly politicized, as usual.

The case of boat people heading toward Australia shows the complex nature of international migration and global inequality. It has been more than a decade since the 2001 Tampa incident and Australia and the region seem to not have found a solution to the problems posed by boat people.

Unless Australia and its neighboring countries in the region can solve the problem, we will witness the continuation of worsening conditions, human tragedy and global inequality. ●

Indonesia, a transit country for Australia

Indonesia, a transit country for Australia Riwanto Tirtosudarmo  ;   A Researcher at the Research Center for Society and Culture, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI)

JAKARTA POST, 15 Juli 2013

  

As a prosperous country in Asia, Australia has become a major destination for both forced and economic migration for almost a century. For Australia, immigration has become the source of economic development as well as contentious politics. 

While economic migration is generally less contentious and lately accepted as part of globalization processes, the movement of forced and displaced people poses political and ethical problems for Australians as they could claim humanitarian protection under the 1951 refugee convention, which Australia has ratified. 

A carefully crafted immigration policy combined with the highly developed surveillance technology has always been an important part of both domestic and international politics in Australia.

As a close neighbor with a population 10 times larger than Australia, Indonesia indeed posits a potential demographic threat for Australia. Such a perceived threat, however, has never materialized as political turmoil has never produced a wave of migration to other countries.

Australia-Indonesia relations concerning international migration, however, began to change in the last 10 years as Indonesia has become a major transit country for thousands of refugees, displaced people and economic migrants mostly from South Asia and the Middle East who are attempting to cross illegally to Australia. 

It is estimated that 1,000 people have been killed in the Indian Ocean on their way to Australia. It is no secret that people smuggling and human trafficking practices are deeply involved in this tragedy.

Following the 9/11 terrorist attack in New York, the wars waged by the US against Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2002 have displaced the civilian population in these two Islamic countries. 

While Iran and Pakistan, also Islamic countries, did not experience direct war with the US and its allies, they continue to be in a state of political instability that also forces people to migrate. Ethnic war in Sri Lanka that culminated in 2009 has pushed out the Tamils. 

Many were stranded in Indonesia before moving to Australia. The current political instability in Egypt and Syria will further result in migration; many of them might also use Indonesia as a transit to Australia.

Political instability produces a displaced population that consists of a mixture of people with different reasons, while some are genuine refugees; many are just simply people who want to find better economic opportunities abroad. Those who qualify as refugees according to the 1951 refugee convention might have been a smaller proportion.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the agency that has a mandate to process and to provide refugee status. To be processed by the UNHCR, these displaced people mostly seek asylum in second countries. 

The UNHCR will examine their application based on the evidence that they fled because of fear of political prosecution in their own country. 

If they qualify as refugees they will get the refugee status and be entitled to be resettled in the countries that signed the 1951 refugee convention. 

Australia and New Zealand are among some of the countries in Asia that are signatories of the 1951 refugee convention.

As Indonesia is not one of the signatory countries of the 1951 refugee convention it is not obliged to accept refugees. This is the current dilemma that Indonesia has to confront as thousands of people seeking asylum in Australia have been stranded in Indonesia. 

The often diplomatic rifts between Indonesia and Australia concerning hundreds of people, who want to enter Australia, warrant a proper understanding from both sides on this apparently delicate political matter between these two close neighboring countries. Despite many differences in its social and political structure, Indonesia and Australia are two sovereign states destined to be geographically closed.

The geographic proximity between Indonesia and Australia should be wisely seen by leaders of the two countries as an opportunity rather than a problem. Good relations historically have been maintained since Indonesia declared its independence from the Dutch in 1945 in which Australia was among one of the first countries to show its important political support. 

Looking from this historical perspective, the current problem of thousands of stranded international migrants facing Indonesia and Australia should also be wisely managed and should not jeopardize the good relations between Indonesia and Australia.

Among many bilateral agreements between Australia and Indonesia was the so-called Lombok Treaty of 2006. This treaty was a bilateral agreement between Indonesia and Australia to work together on a broad range of cross border non-traditional security issues. Among these were people smuggling and human trafficking. Indeed we need to put the often diplomatic rift between Indonesia and Australia into a proper perspective.

There are currently diplomatic negotiations under way in finding the best solution for the thousands of people that use Indonesia as their transit country on their way to Australia. In principle, both Indonesia and Australia have to share the international burden of burgeoning displaced people escaping from their war torn countries.

As President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is struggling to have an international standing, it is only logical that his government has to be more serious in contributing a solution to the international problem of displaced people.

An area in which Indonesia needs to improve is its weak immigration policy. Indonesia’s immigration border is too porous to prevent people from entering illegally. Learning how to handle immigration policy from Australia could be a good thing for Indonesia. ● 

The political economy of cultural heritage

The political economy of cultural heritage Riwanto Tirtosudarmo ;  A Researcher At the Center for Society and Culture, Indonesian Institute of Sciences

JAKARTA POST, 25 Januari 2013

Last year we noticed greater attention being paid, both by the government and the public, to issues related to cultural heritage.  Having been nominated for several years, subak in Bali was finally accepted by UNESCO onto the World Cultural Heritage list. Reports in the media said Borobudur, on the World Heritage list since 1991, was not being sufficiently maintained and not of much benefit to the surrounding population. Most controversial of all is perhaps the pyramid found in Gunung Padang, Cianjur, West Java. The controversy derived from the various opinions on the remains of what appears to be a megalithic place of worship with the President’s special staff claiming it to be a tomb older and bigger than the pyramids in Egypt. At the national policy level we also saw the decision to return the culture department from the Tourism Ministry to the Education Ministry, and the appointment of a deputy minister to oversee cultural policy.  We are also informed that that a World Cultural Forum to be staged in Bali is planned by the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono government to be a showcase of the Indonesian government’s attention to the role of culture in global development. All in all culture seems to be on the rise and perceived as leverage at a time when the planet is becoming more globalized. As the French historian Denys Lombard has noted, the Indonesian archipelago, particularly Java, has long been an area where multiple layers of culture historically influence its inhabitants. The indigenous cultures were Indianized through Hinduism and Buddhism, then Islamized through trading networks and finally westernized by Western colonization. No wonder that Indonesia is in fact very rich in cultural heritage. Yet we observe that most of our cultural heritage is actually in danger as the government generally neglects supposedly priceless national treasures. The seemingly confusing legal basis regarding the preservation and utilization of cultural heritage is another issue that also reflects the slow and non-committal attitude of the state to the policy of cultural heritage.  The regulations on cultural heritage rooted in colonial times were replaced by Law No. 5/1992. In 2010 new legislation was drawn up (Law No. 11) but until now the government regulation to implement this law has not yet been completed. Political decentralization that provides for local autonomy in authorizing policies might also create a problem in relation to the management of cultural heritage sites. In some cases, like the Muaro Jambi archeological site, conflicting interests have already occurred as natural resources have been located underneath the site.  Local government and private mining companies might be the biggest threats to the preservation of the site as an item of cultural heritage. Recognizing the significance of cultural heritage as the manifestation of collective memory for Indonesia as a young nation, the Research Center for Society and Culture at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences initiated a longitudinal study to investigate issues and problems concerning cultural heritage in Indonesia.  To start with, three important archeological sites were selected: Borobudur in Central Java, Trowulan in East Java and Banten-Lama in Banten. The three sites represented chronologically a Java-Buddhist civilization (ninth century), a Java-Hindu Kingdom (12-13th centuries) and the Islamic sultanate (16-17th centuries). We are conducting the study over three years, from 2012 until 2014, and employ a political economy perspective to map out various stakeholders and their roles in the process of preserving as well as in utilizing cultural heritage. The study also pays particular attention to the societies surrounding the respective archeological sites as we believe that the local populations have a major stake in the success or failure of managing cultural heritage sites. The result of our first year of study has shown the complex relationships among diverse stakeholders who are involved in every cultural heritage site. Compared to the others, Borobudur shows the most advanced achievement in terms of its successful restoration.  As we know, Borobudur has been a worldwide attraction since it was rediscovered by Sir Thomas Raffles, the British governor of the Indies in 1814.  In the 1970s and 1980s, foreign donors like Japan and UNESCO were involved in the restoration of this giant and beautiful monument. Trowulan, which is regarded as the Majapahit Empire’s ancient capital city and Banten-Lama as the site of the Islamic sultanate however continue to suffer from the government’s lack of attention.  These two historical sites are in an alarming condition, serious and concerted efforts need to be mobilized to restore and preserve these important historical sites. The political economy perspective provides us with a tool to analyze the different interests of the various stakeholders who seek to obtain economic and political benefits from cultural heritage.  The result of conflict and cooperation between the state, the private sector, international organizations and society constitutes the measurement of the current condition as well as the likely future of our cultural heritage. ●

Demography, development and citizen’s rights

Demography, development and citizen’s rights Riwanto Tirtosudarmo ;   A Researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta

JAKARTA POST, 06 November 2012

Demography will remain one of the toughest challenges for Indonesia’s future. The silent nature of demographic pressures, however, makes the general public unaware of its profound impacts, economically and politically. Managing demographic pressures requires a proper understanding of demographic characteristics and their interplay with other variables.  The most noticeable characteristics of Indonesia’s demography are its large size and its uneven distribution between Java and other islands. In the past, reducing population growth through family planning programs was considered a success, especially during the New Order period.  Efforts to reduce the uneven distribution through various programs of relocating people from Java to other islands, however, only had very limited results.  Widjojo Nitisastro, the main architect of economic development under Soeharto’s New Order regime, was deeply aware that demography should be controlled for meaningful development to be achieved.  While opening the market economy, Widjojo, an economic demographer, was aware that the majority of the population was poor and mostly engaged in agriculture.  He argued that although the acceleration of economic development was the primary goal, a commitment to reduce the number of poor people could not be negotiated. Under Widjojo, poverty was significantly reduced by a combination of economic development and population control. Recently, I was involved in an expert meeting to discuss a draft report on population and development. The report prepared by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) aims to review the implementation of recommendations from 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo.  The ICPD meeting in Cairo was a landmark as for the first time, individual rights were strongly advocated in the discourse on population and development. The inclusion of individual rights in the praxis of population and development was a result of strong lobbying from feminist groups who perceived that family planning programs, as the main device to control population growth, grossly violated the human rights of women.  For Indonesia, the pressure of a new discourse on population and development that emphasized the importance of individual rights contradicted the long practice of family planning programs.  Although several adjustments in the implementation of family planning programs have been made as an official response to the new international pressure on Indonesia’s preoccupation with population control, the policies generally persist.  After Soeharto stepped down from power in 1998, the state no longer had the power to force the people to practice family planning as before.  In the beginning of the 21st century, the demise of authoritarian regime was followed by the dawn of a political landscape that advocated political liberalization, decentralization and human rights.  It is then only a coincidence that the individual rights that were propagated by 1994 ICPD met with the new Indonesian political system in which the state no longer had the luxury to impose its will in matters related to population control.  The question however still remains: How deep is our actual understanding and consciousness about the notion of individual rights? Two years before commemorating the two decades since the ICPD conference in Cairo, the UN is anticipating another ICPD conference in 2014. Now is therefore an appropriate time to reflect on the nexus of individual rights and development in the context of Indonesia’s current political landscape. Following the collapse of Soeharto’s authoritarian government, surprisingly, macro-economic development continues producing relatively high levels of economic growth. Internationally, Indonesia is recognized as one of the so-called developing economies and has become a member of the G20.  This phenomenon shows that the technocratic principles laid out by Widjojo Nitisastro and his economic team in the 1970s through the 1990s have apparently been institutionalized and constitute the basis for macroeconomic endurance in Indonesia.  In the longer perspective, the sharp decline in economic growth during the 1997 financial crisis can be seen only a hiccup in the overall figure of economic growth.  The problem of economic development, as many observers have noted, is not in growth but in its uneven distribution, both socially and geographically.  The increasing number of those in the middle income group, who mostly live in Java’s urban areas, indicates the continuation of a colonial dual economy between Java and the outer islands. The promise of decentralization and regional autonomy apparently has not resulted in the evening of economic prosperity of the Indonesian citizens.  This situation is serious and calls for the government to play a more assertive role and to not let market forces dominate the economy. So, what should we do about demography and related population issues that continue to challenge the state and its social, economic and political development?  The new political landscape should not be seen as a burden of the state in managing demographic pressures as the existing demography also partly resulted from the state’s own policies.  A new mindset is critically needed in managing demographic pressures in which the rights of individual as citizens should form the center of the new strategy. Trust between the state and its citizens should be strengthened and citizens’ rights and responsibility to control their own body and family have to be given a high priority.  The consciousness of citizens on their rights and responsibilities is indeed a condition that is unlikely to change if they are economically poor and the level of their political consciousness is also low.  Apart from continuing development strategies to reduce poverty, a strategy to advocate for citizens’ rights and responsibilities through citizenship education is therefore very urgent in order to support a rights-based strategy for addressing demographic challenges. ●

‘Rendang’, ‘Subak’ and the politics of culture

‘Rendang’, ‘Subak’ and the politics of culture

Riwanto Tirtosudarmo ; A researcher at the Research Center for Society and Culture, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI)
JAKARTA POST, 10 Juli 2012

William Wongso, our culinary expert, provided an intelligent view when he said that Indonesians should not be apprehensive about rendang (slow-cooked beef in a rich lemongrass and coconut sauce) being claimed by other countries, especially Malaysia (The Jakarta Post, June 28).

He suggested that there is no need to patent rendang, and cited the Japanese foods of sushi and sashimi, as well as the Korean fare galbi (grilled short beef ribs), as foods that had not been patented.

According to Wongso, the Japanese and Korean governments have never registered the dishes for patents and are, instead, delighted that their dishes are recognized and eaten everywhere.

A few days ago, we heard that the “Cultural Landscape of Bali Province: The Subak System as a Manifestation of the Tri Hita Karana Philosophy” has finally been accepted by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site.

 According to the news, the Indonesian government had been negotiating to obtain such a title for 12 years. Apart from a feeling of pride as an Indonesian, I am not very sure who will actually benefit with this designation. Subak — as well as the repeated disputation between Indonesia and Malaysia over several cultural products, such as batik painting, song, dances and other performing arts — reminds us of the position of culture in Indonesia. How culture is perceived and what should we do about it? To put it simply, what are the politics of culture in this country?

Subak is an irrigation technique practiced by Balinese farmers for centuries. Subak can be found in several locations in Bali but the most remarkable is at Ubud, a popular tourist destination. This beautiful green landscape of terraced paddy is often depicted in postcards and tourist leaflets.

The Balinese are paddy farmers, as are the Javanese. The irrigation technique that is known as Subak constitutes a part of the agricultural practices embedded within the Balinese social system. Subak is the social structure of the paddy farmers and represent the living culture of the Balinese.

The existence of Subak shows the resilience of Balinese culture against increasing pressure from the tourist industry’s lust for space to construct yet more hotels, malls and related infrastructures.

In Bali and Java, the conversion of rice fields to industrial wastelands has grown at an alarming rate since the 1970s, resulting in the inevitable marginalization of farmers and their families. Recognition of Subak in Bali as a World Heritage Site reflects not only the acknowledgment of a particular living cultural tradition, but, one hopes, the acceptance by authorities of the need to maintain dwindling peasant society over the widespread commoditization of culture in Bali. The designation of Subak as a World Heritage Site, however, will likely attract even more tourists to Ubud and without government protection the lifestyle of the farmers will be put in jeopardy.

In my view, culture belongs to the people who support it. Culture provides its owners with a device for survival and way to move forward. Culture is woven into the social system and only felt through manifestations of both its tangible and intangible forms.

The commoditization of culture through tourism, while benefiting the tourist industries, often threatens people’s survival. Tourism cultivates the tangible aspects of culture into a mere commodity, eroding and ultimately destroying the intangible aspects of culture.

Rendang is Minangkabau’s living culture. Rendang shows that culture is not static, but moves as the people who own the culture move. Malaysia is a country of immigrant and migrant communities who settled in Malaysia brought with them their culture. It is no surprise that many cultural expressions which exist in Indonesia will also appear in Malaysia.

The tensions between Malaysia and Indonesia over cultural expressions belonging to one particular ethnic group, reveals an interesting angle on cultural and ethnic politics. The state regulates and manages society consisting of different cultural groups, differentiated by ethnicity, language, religion or racial groupings.

In Malaysia, politics is strongly based on the three major groups, namely the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians. In the Malaysian constitution, Malays are considered as the owner of the land, or the sons of the soil, the Bumiputera. The Chinese and the Indians are designated as immigrants. In this context of Malaysian politics, we should consider the number of ethnic groups originating in the archipelago — such as Javanese, Minangkabau, Batak and Bugis — who are considered by the Malaysian state as belonging to the Malay race.

The Malay political elites obviously needed the inclusion of migrant groups from Indonesia into the Malay population to maintain their majority position in relation to the Chinese and the Indian population.

As a nation-state, Indonesia is not based on any cultural identity. According to a historian, Anthony Reid, Indonesia is based on civic nationalism and not ethnic nationalism like in Malaysia. What Indonesia as a nation-state should pursue is therefore a civic culture rather than a narrow ethnic culture.

It is the duty of the state to maintain the heterogeneity of cultures through the politics that protects all citizens, regardless of their particular cultural identification. In order to maintain the value of rendang and subak as the world class of Indonesian cultural expressions, the state must first and ultimately be committed to the well-being of all Indonesian citizens. ●

Is Indonesia a nation state in danger of failing

Is Indonesia a nation state in danger of failing

Riwanto Tirtosudarmo ; A Researcher at The Research Center for Society and Culture, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI)

Sumber :  JAKARTA POST, 28 Juni 2012

Indonesia’s slight decline from 64th in 2011 to 63rd in 2012 in the list of 178 countries ranked according to The Failed States Index 2012 recently was predictable and should not be exaggerated. The negative points for Indonesia concern three important indicators: human rights and law enforcement, demography and minority groups.

These three indicators represent an interconnected phenomena rooted in the failure of the state in managing its complex development.

The increasing vulnerability of minority groups, as shown by the persecution of Ahmadiyah followers or in the difficulties for Christians to build their churches, clearly related to poor law enforcement and the absence of the state in protecting its citizens’ basic rights. The cyclical violence in Papua that is worsening has only added to the susceptibility of citizens and the lack of state protection. In this deteriorating security, demographic pressure might be highlighted as the underlying factors, although indirectly.

The inclusion of demographic factors in the measurement of state failure is particularly interesting and unusual. Conventionally, demography is considered a background variable and treated merely as aggregate statistics that can be manipulated to suit the policy end. The increasing pressures from demography indeed reflect the paralyzing structure of the economy and the embedded injustices that have affected the majority of the population.

In terms of demographic size, Indonesia is a giant country. It is the fourth largest country after China, India and the US. According to the 2010 census, Indonesia’s population stood at 237 million. The state has a herculean task in managing such a huge population with a growing birth rate now that the family planning program is no longer a national priority.

Indonesian demography is not only about its large size and rapid growth, but is also about the age structures, gender and ethnic composition, geographic distribution, and more importantly, wealth distribution. Demography and policy are closely interrelated. The demographic structure of a country is a result of a policy, but at the same time the policy is also shaped by the demographic structure.

The current system of general elections, which is based on the one man one vote principle, is strongly dependant on the age structure of the population. Democracy, in other words, is a politics of numbers.

The failure of the state in managing the silent but profound pressures from demography could lead to a massive disaster, as it affects the majority of the population. This logic is behind the reason of using demographic pressure as one of the important indicators for measuring the state’s failure.

It should be noted that the post-Soeharto governments no longer have the luxury of exercising coercive power. The restraint to use coercion, however, should not be the reason for the state to fail in protecting the human rights of its citizens. It is a universal duty of the state everywhere to protect citizens. In exercising its authority, the use of violence to enforce the law and to enhance public order is justified and legitimate.

The state as perceived by the The Fund for Peace that releases the Failed States index constitutes not only the government, but also the judiciary and the legislative powers. The failure of the state therefore cannot be blamed only on the government. The rampant corrupt practices found in the House of Representatives, the judiciary and the government clearly indicate the paralyzed system of politics in this country.

Corruption is no longer a sign of individual greediness but has been systematically embedded within the political system. The promise of reform after the demise of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime is being hijacked by vested interest groups that betray the majority of Indonesian people.

At present there is apparently a misperception, particularly at the global level, that Indonesia could manage its economy in a promising way. Indonesia’s status as a G20 member provides a strong impression that Indonesia is a successful economy. Yet as the membership is solely based on the aggregate data on the macro national economy, it tends to hide many other economic features, especially the income distribution of its population.

The much talked issue, especially among economists, about the increasing number of people known as the middle class while might be the case but still the majority of Indonesian citizens undeniably belong to the poor or near poor groups. The glittering malls and cafes almost in all cities are misleadingly perceived as a sign of modernity and cosmopolitan life, as only a small percentage of Indonesian citizens enjoy them. The majority of Indonesian citizens continue living in very vulnerable economic conditions without job security or social insurance.

With the tag as a state in danger, Indonesia should therefore be perceived as a healthy reminder that the ultimate goal of creating the Republic by our founding fathers is to protect the Indonesian citizens, socially, economically and politically; no more, no less. Indonesian citizens, according to the Constitution, are all Indonesians regardless of their ethnicity, religion or origin.

The Failed State Index 2012 takes us to Thomas Friedman’s perceptive commentary back in the beginning of 2000 that Indonesia (and Russia) are messy states, and they are too big to fail. ●