Time
to move on from ‘military reform’
(Part
2 0f 2)
Evan A Laksmana ;
The
writer is a researcher with the Centre for Strategic and International
Studies in Jakarta and a non-resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund of
the United States
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JAKARTA
POST, 16 September 2014
The
lack of an institutionalized integrated tri-service culture within the
Indonesian Military (TNI) means that the procurement process is reduced to a
shopping list for the individual services.
According
to MEF documents, arms spending until 2024 divides the pie almost evenly
between the army, navy and air force.
This
policy however does not take into account the different operational readiness
and capability requirements of each service, Indonesia’s predominantly
maritime geostrategic position, and the imbalance between force sizes (the
army is approximately five and ten times the size of the navy and air force
respectively).
President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s defense modernization has eventually been directed
to better equip the services (the hardware) without overhauling the personnel
system and quality (the software) and the organizational infrastructure (the
operating system).
For
one thing, aside from the personnel issues mentioned above, the process of
doctrinal revisions — from political to tactical level — has been uneven.
With the “dual function” gone and the New Paradigm in place, along with the
newly revamped Total People’s Defense, combat and operational doctrines have
only recently received attention.
Indeed,
the TNI’s regular tri-service exercises in recent years were designed to try
out different variations of its joint operations doctrine.
This
process is ongoing and should be supported. But tailoring long-term arms
purchases in the absence of a coherent operational doctrine undermines the
notion of capability-based defense procurement.
For
another, if the TNI is serious about joining the ranks of advanced
militaries, the process to create the Regional Defense Joint Command —
allowing the three services to be integrated under one command — to replace
the existing separate territorial command structure should be accelerated.
A
leaner organization oriented less toward domestic security and more toward
the changing external strategic environment, staffed with better-educated and
qualified officers, and guided by a coherent doctrine, can better capitalize
on advanced technology.
But
focusing on technological modernization alone is akin to spending generously
for a new engine to be fitted onto an old car.
Bottom
line, modernization does not guarantee the creation a more effective and
efficient combat organization. By itself, modernization is a necessary
process, but not sufficient. Equal, if not more, attention should be given to
personnel development, network-centric integration of existing weapons
systems and organizational overhaul.
One
way to start thinking about how to design and implement these different, and
arguably complex, policies is to make a gestalt switch in our conceptual
basis from “military reform” to “defense transformation”.
As
mandated by the 1998 democratic transition, “military reform” implies fixing
certain aspects of the military’s “distorted” roles.
As
we’ve seen above, this meant erasing the legacies of Soeharto’s authoritarian
rule.
“Defense
transformation”, on the other hand, suggests a complete overhaul of the
military’s worldview, institutions and even missions and future development.
It
implies an institutional and paradigm shift on how the military views and
structures itself, educates and trains its members, how it equips itself, and
how it plans to fight.
Also,
the focus on “defense” rather than “military” implies that the actors we need
to focus on bringing into the process are not just the TNI.
Civilian
officials at the defense ministry, civil society groups, academics and
scientists, as well as corporate officials working within the defense
industrial establishment, all play a key role in shaping the transformation
process.
More
importantly however, defense transformation is something for the long haul —
it would take around 10 to 20 years to formulate and implement.
This
means that the process should not be too dependent on who the current
president is. Long-term planning also helps the TNI in dealing with the
sometimes unruly political process of negotiating its strategic and
operational plans with the powers that be.
With
this in mind, the president-elect should consider different policies to
overhaul the TNI’s entire education and training system, accelerate and
synchronize its organizational reform plans and doctrinal revisions, and
revamp the Defense Ministry’s defense budgeting and management process, along
with its acquisition and research and development practices.
These
policies would lay the foundation during Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s first term
for a more thorough defense transformation process. Of course, they would be
better coordinated if Jokowi could make the breakthrough that Yudhoyono
couldn’t — establish a professionally-led National Security Council in the
absence of a long-drawn out national security bill.
That
being said, critics will point out that I am omitting key “unfinished
businesses” from the military reform agenda set in 1998, including the
resolution of past human rights abuses, the overhaul of the military justice
system and the elimination of any sense of impunity for officers acting
beyond the bounds of our legal system.
The
defense transformation vision offered here may not directly address these
concerns head on. But overhauling the personnel and education system is a
pivotal policy to prevent future human rights abuses — rather than remedy
past ones — or other illegal actions taken by our officers.
More
concretely, fixing promotion policies could minimize future internal dissent
among the rank and file, while better education and training systems could
instill a new sense of professional identity.
Replacing
the territorial command structure and putting in place coherent operational
doctrines could provide a new sense of mission and improve readiness amid a
rapidly changing strategic environment.
In
conclusion, fixating on military reform alone will hold us back in the past
at a time when Jokowi’s election should give us more push to look ahead. A
defense transformation agenda gives us the roadmap to do so. ●
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