Jumat, 05 September 2014

The forgotten crisis of former East Timorese refugees

The forgotten crisis of former East Timorese refugees

 Kristia Davina Sianipar  ;   The writer is a graduate student at the School of Government and Public Policy and has done field research for her thesis on the resettlement of former East Timorese refugees in Kupang and Belu regencies in East Nusa Tenggara
JAKARTA POST, 04 September 2014

                                                                                                                       
                                                      

It has been 15 years since East Timor, then Indonesia’s 27th and youngest province, decided by a majority vote on Aug. 30, 1999, to be an independent nation.

Tens of thousands of “pro-integration” East Timorese (those who wished East Timor to remain part of Indonesia) left their homeland for West Timor and took refuge in lands not of their own.

“For Merah-Putih!” these East Timorese exclaimed, referring to the red-and-white national flag of Indonesia. They carried with them hopes of a better life as citizens of Indonesia. Yet today many of these former refugees are still living in squalid conditions without secure housing and land ownership.

This casts doubts over the seriousness of the Indonesian government in ensuring their wellbeing, despite the billions of rupiah allocated for the former East Timorese refugees. At the core of the issue is the lack of meaningful collaboration between the government and the former refugees.

Sept. 4 is etched in the minds of the former refugees as a monumental day. On Sept. 4, 1999, Kofi Annan, then UN secretary-general, announced the results of the referendum in East Timor that favored the “pro-independence” movement.

It set into motion the great exodus of East Timorese into West Timor. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that 250,000 East Timorese fled by road, sea, and air into West Timor into neighboring East Nusa Tenggara province. It was a period of great uncertainty and distress. Families were separated. Assets were lost. Soon, diseases in the overpacked camps would take away even their little ones.

The Indonesian and foreign governments, as well as NGOs and aid agencies, poured in various forms of aid — rice, meat, cooking utensils, medicines, money — for the refugees. By 2002, the UNHCR ended refugee status for the East Timorese in Indonesia. By 2005, the Indonesian government declared that there were no more East Timorese refugees and it officially closed down refugee camps. The former refugees gained a new title of warga baru or new residents.

Yet, as of 2014, the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) recorded 4,762 households of former refugees as still living in the former camps.

Thousands more are living as strangers in lands they do not own. Erik Habers, the EU’s head of operations, aptly referred to their condition as “a forgotten crisis”.

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare Agung Laksono expressed bewilderment at the condition of the former refugees. The Public Housing Ministry launched housing projects with a budget of Rp 1 billion (US$85,106.4) for 2012 (then another Rp 1 billion for 2013).

The President declared that by 2014, at the end of his term, all former refugees had to be resettled. Yet, as of mid-2014, the housing issues are still far from settled. Some houses that were recently built have started to crumble. Some were left unfinished, with rusting frames adorning the land. Some were unoccupied or occupied by unintended recipients. Cases of corruption started to emerge. Complaints of the inappropriateness of the house design surfaced.

Despite the best intentions of some of the officials involved in the projects, a close look at the resettlement projects reveal that the crux of the matter is inadequate policy formulation leading to poor implementation, both by the central and the local governments.

The government seemed to be in haste when choosing the locations without much consideration. In Kupang regency, for example, a location for resettlement was selected in Camplong 2 village, which turned out to have customary, or adat, disputes and most of the houses built there remained unoccupied.

In Belu regency, a group of East Timorese, who had been resettled by the government to Umaklaran village in the early 2000s, had to relocate again on their own because the locals argued that the government had not bought the plots from them, but had only rented them for a few years.

Further, resettlements by the government had often been abandoned by the former refugees because the locations were too far, too remote, and lacking the basic necessities.

In the building of houses, other than suspected corruption resulting in sub-standard buildings, the design was considered inappropriate for the areas. The required sand was not easily available in the area. The high amount of required wood was blamed for deforestation.

In a village in Belu regency, it was found that the attached toilet of the government house had been turned into a storage room, the septic tank into water storage, and the family built another toilet further away from the house. Having toilets inside homes is very much a city concept.

Detachment between the government and the people it aimed to serve resulted in failed policies. A local NGO, CIS Timor, contrasted these resettlement efforts by the government with those initiated or led by the former East Timorese refugees themselves. When the former refugees negotiated on their own for plots from local landlords, the resulting land ownership was certain. They also chose plots in locations where they had good relationships with the locals.

Even when the plots they bought were far from the main roads with difficult access to clean water, the former refugees would continue to occupy the lands. When they built their own houses — no matter how austere — these houses were sufficient and appropriate for their daily living.

In contrast, the resettlement efforts by the government indicated a lack of seriousness to settle the issues of the former refugees, leaving many of them with uncertainties.

The government’s solutions were instant — instant locations, instant houses, instant communities. Yet, communities are built over time. The government’s emphasis was on solving a housing issue, focusing on land, bricks, timber and cement.

It has failed to understand that this is a community issue of relationships, customs, and lives. The government needs to facilitate community building, involve the former refugees in the design and implementation of resettlement, and trust them to shape their own future.

The government should look at the former refugees as equal partners, social human beings and the rightful citizens of Indonesia. After all, they have chosen Indonesia as their home.

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