Careful
cabinet reform
Owen Podger ; Professional associate at
the Institute for Governance
and Policy Analysis, University of
Canberra
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JAKARTA
POST, 02 September 2014
Vice
president-elect Jusuf Kalla (JK) desires to keep the current structure of the
cabinet as it is. I agree. When reform of something is very important the
first rule is not to jump in and change it without carefully studying the
risks and assigning the responsibilities.
In
2000 at the beginning of decentralization, I and some friends working on an
Asia Development Bank (ADB) assignment to help decentralization recommended
against massive restructuring of local government. For example, we suggested
keeping the local agency for primary schools as it was, and calling for
incentives for the existing head to improve performance.
The
local office of the ministry of education which controlled junior and senior
high schools would become a local agency, reporting to the regent or mayor
rather to the provincial office of the ministry. And the provincial office of
the ministry for education would report to the governor and no longer to
the
ministry.
And
the first job of the heads of these agencies under their new bosses would be
to map all the decisions that were previously made for them, that now they
would have to make for themselves or ask the regent to make for them.
After
the decisions were mapped, we recommended, then the higher levels of
government would provide assistance to the lower levels for them to be able
to take over making those decisions.
We
suggested this was already a radical reform. But it would also be clear what
had to be done and it was controllable.
The
government took the advice of others and proceeded to “rebuild the ship while
sailing”, combining primary education with high school education in one unit,
creating both intense competition and drastic disconnection.
After
the tsunami, Irwandi Yusuf, the newly elected ex-rebel governor of Aceh
wanted to reform the structure of his government, and took the wrong advice.
He underwent a long process of selecting new heads of agencies and then
suddenly restructured them all. The advantages were very little, the loss of
morale and delay in work were damaging.
A
Joko “Jokowi” Widodo-JK policy of work-work-work was needed but did not
happen.
I
believe that keeping the existing structure of Cabinet is a logical step for
reforming the cabinet. It allows a careful and pragmatic approach to reform rather
than a radical and theoretical one.
So
what are the priorities for reform of the cabinet? The first and foremost is
insubordination. Soeharto could not tolerate it, but even under Soeharto many
ministers suffered serious insubordination.
Like
in the English comedy Yes Minister, Indonesia’s government is full of people
like Sir Humphrey, bent on keeping the status quo and their minister
uninformed. So the first priority is to select competent ministers who will
implement the Jokowi-JK agenda and handle their senior executives.
The
second priority is span of control. Cabinet is too big without an
intermediate level.
Currently
the intermediate level would appear to be made up of coordinating ministers,
but in fact many ministries claim a spot in the middle, particularly finance
for money, the National Development Planning Board (Bappenas) for development
planning, and home affairs for regional governments.
This
all needs to be carefully examined to help the President and VP control the
scope of their government, and may lead to significant changes in
arrangements.
To
start, coordinating ministers should coordinate issues and coordinate
whatever ministries need to be coordinated to resolve issues.
Several
issues come in as third priority. For 15 years, changes in central government
have made it fatter, when with decentralization we would have anticipated
dramatic significant downsizing. There is little that drives productivity or
eliminates overlapping functions and inconsistent policy.
Fat
government, overlapping functions and inconsistent policy are the driving
force for the cabinet reform movement. But if we start with restructuring
Cabinet, everyone works to make the new structure work.
This
gives a false sense of both security and insecurity. Firstly, people feel
insecure because of the upheaval, and feel secure because they feel more
change is unlikely. This combination is not helpful for lasting reform.
Usually it results in no change dressed in new clothing.
If
we start with the existing structure and oblige ministers to come up with
coordinated plans for eliminating inefficiencies, overlaps and
inconsistencies, then we have the right sort of insecurity, that is, the
threat of losing position for failure to continually improve performance.
And
we get feedback from the stakeholders on how to reform. Almost certainly by
starting with the current ministerial positions we could end up with an
increasingly lean and efficient national government.
How
we get feedback from stakeholders is very important. Dramatic change needs
support from two groups who can make it or break it.
The
first is all those conservative parties who can say yes but mean no, who can
look like they support but are actually intent on undermining. We need them
to own the reforms as much as the reformers own them.
The
second is all the public. The public wants to see what Jokowi-JK are thinking
and doing. Making the debate on how Cabinet works and how to improve it is a
high priority public concern.
If
reforms are hard, then they want to know why there are long delays in
decision-making. If the new president cannot deliver on a promise because the
system doesn’t work, they may forgive the delay as long as they know and can
be involved in the process to fix it.
A
decade ago South Korea went through a period of dramatic reform, including
the structure of government. It is only because they took their strategic
planning public that they were able to carry it out.
Let’s
have a Cabinet reform process learning from South Korea to do it even better.
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