A win-win solution possible for South China Sea Rizvi Shihab  ;   A researcher at the Bina Bangsa Foundation, which deals with religious pluralism and politics

JAKARTA POST, 03 September 2014

                                      

                                                      

The South China Sea (SCS) dispute comprises several compelling political features among members of ASEAN and Japan. Furthermore, it is one of many global political/economic battlefronts transpiring between the United States and China; certain analysts even contend that their contrasting relationship in Southeast Asia is a microcosm of the Cold War. The current premise is a challenge not only for China and the US, but also for Indonesia. The age-old quarrel in the SCS involving China, Vietnam, Brunei, the Philippines and Malaysia regarding claims over the Paracel and Spratly islands worsened after a UN report in 1969 unveiled that the locations had high potential reserves of hydrocarbons. According to the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation, the untapped hydrocarbon reserves are estimated to amount to 120 billion barrels of oil and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. International trade worth around US$5.3 trillion also passes through the SCS each year. While Indonesia is not a claimant state, stability in the SCS is vital for Indonesia’s economy. An armed conflict in the region would hinder Indonesia’s trading flexibility and create logistical problems of longer travel distances and higher travel taxes. Recently, Japan considered offering ASEAN military aid to quell China’s influence in the region. Japan’s latest trend of ultra-nationalism and its wariness of China’s rising worldwide influence have contributed to a more aggressive foreign and military policy. Although an armed conflict in the SCS is still unlikely, this latest development is ominous for maintaining peace and stability. A Declaration of Conduct was formulated in 2002, which commits future bilateral/multilateral negotiations in the SCS to, among other things, the principles of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. However, China seems reluctant to take the next step to sign a Code of Conduct (CoC) for the SCS for a number of reasons. First, it would signify that China accepts multilateral engagement, whereas it prefers bilateral negotiations with each of the claimant states. The signing could then potentially lead to international arbitration. Second, it would technically imply that China does not claim sovereignty of the waters within the nine-dash line, which contradicts the map it submitted for UNCLOS in 2009. China would not then have the freedom to continue their unilateral legislation in the SCS. Finally, a signing of a CoC would probably lead to additional involvement by the United States, something China clearly does not want. Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister, hinted at his displeasure with the US — following the ASEAN Regional Forum in Myanmar last month — for being an unnecessary, external meddler in the SCS dispute. The Chinese also believe Vietnam and the Philippines have become increasingly emboldened by Washington’s participation. Conversely, Washington feels it is a stabilizing force to prevent China “bullying” its neighbors in the SCS. The US has also applied economic pressure on China in Africa. Both are competing to be the leading economic player in a range of countries because of the continent’s vast potential. China boasts $200 billion worth of trade per year with African nations compared to America’s $85 billion a year, which helps to explain the US’ increased aggressiveness in Africa. Similarly, China’s rising power has made it the best economic partner for many ASEAN members (China is ASEAN’s largest trading partner overall). There is a significant economic and cultural benefit to dealing with China, so it is reasonable that some ASEAN members are hesitant to openly oppose China and favor the US in the SCS dispute, Malaysia and Brunei being good examples. Indonesia has a strong relationship with the US, but it is also developing a mutually beneficial relationship with China. Consequently, Indonesia is confronted with challenges that emanate from the two powers’ duel. How can Jakarta play an active role in the dispute while still balancing its bilateral relations with Washington and Beijing? Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry needs to approach the SCS disagreement in a different way; a state’s decision in bilateral or multilateral relations does not necessarily result in a win or lose option between the states involved, but can result in a win-win solution. Formulating additional disarmament pacts in the SCS and facilitating more military communication between states are two options for providing greater stability. The Foreign Ministry can also refacilitate additional track-two diplomacy mechanisms (non-governmental agencies comprising non-claimant actors) and utilizing resource-sharing agreements. Resource-sharing was successfully executed by Indonesia and Australia in 1972 for the East Timor Gap; so similarly, the parties in the SCS need to find solutions that shift the focus from claims and boundaries to cooperation and joint development. The process should be incremental and start with the least crucial matters, which become confidence- and trust-building measures. Also, the less formal and less restrictive setting of track-two approaches helps to maintain continual dialogue and builds a stronger rapport between nations. Applying regional economic integration can also strengthen ties between the claimants by managing resource competition among states and providing mutual economic growth; one feature is by reassigning industry/product specializations to each participating state. This shared benefit would then reduce the odds of conflict because economic relations would not be based on mercantilism (regulation of a nation’s economy to enhance state power at the expense of rival national powers). Such an arrangement would focus more on security interests and would be less likely to support military action. Whichever route is taken by the Foreign Ministry, one thing is certain: Indonesia finds itself in a difficult predicament and needs to assert its position in the proper diplomatic arena in the SCS to yield the maximum political, economic and cultural returns. ●