Indonesia’s
democratization stagnant but not lost
Olle
Tornquist ; Professor of political science and
development research, Senior member of the UGM’s and the UiO’s joint research
project titled “Power, Welfare and Democracy”
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JAKARTA
POST, 25 Februari 2014
Fifteen
years after Soeharto’s New Order, what of the efforts to create a democratic
order? According to mainstream political scientists, democracy equals
institutions for freedom and fair elections, Indonesia is a success story and
liberal democracy is evolving.
For
radical political economists who say that such institutions are subordinate
to material resources, Indonesia is ruled by oligarchs and shock therapy is
needed. What would a more nuanced analysis look like?
Today,
emerging results can be found from the third comprehensive assessment of
Indonesia’s democratization. Previous studies (2003-2004, 2007) were
conducted by Demos (a research-NGO), together with the University of Oslo
(UiO). The current survey is within a broader study titled “Power, Welfare
and Democracy” at Gadjah Mada University (UGM), supported by UiO.
The
questions remain the same: To what extent do institutions and actors really
contribute to the development of
democracy in terms of the popular control of public affairs on the basis of
political equality; and what are the problems and options?
The
method is also replicated: collecting information by systematic in-depth
interviews (six-eight hours each) with the best experts on the ground among
more than 600 committed scholars and experienced activists around the country
as well as in Jakarta.
What
do the early results reveal? There are three key words: stagnation, openings
and excitement.
Stagnation,
most obviously, is about the persistence of corruption, poor rule of law and
political inequalities. This is the ironic outcome of the impressive
combination of stability in a coherent political system and extensive
elections, freedom and citizen organizations. Powerful actors have not just
adjusted to the new rules of the game, they have also decided the details of
these rules to their own advantage, such as by making it very difficult for
new parties to participate in elections.
Similarly,
they have retained their political capacity to dominate the game as such; a
rich soccer team tends to win against a poor one even if they follow the same
rules.
The
media speaks at length of corruption and of the agencies fighting it, but the
basic problem is a lack of representation of those who really are against the
abuse of power and could make a difference.
Indonesia
has not allowed people to form a small pro-democratic anticorruption party on
the basis of social movements and participate and win elections, as recently
in New Delhi.
Such
a victory is certainly not enough, it takes more than a party of discontent
to develop alternative policies. But in Indonesia, scattered civil society
activists and other informal leaders have only been able to “do politics”
individually by invitation from elite-dominated parties, even without
coordination through broad social movements and interest organizations.
Yet
democratization is not lost. The assessment identifies two openings. One is
post-clientelism. As in other parts of the Global South, many Indonesian
leaders cannot win elections by patronage politics only.
People
now have better information and multiple identities and sources of income. It
is increasingly difficult to buy their votes through clientelistic networks.
This calls for populism, direct links between leaders and people.
Fortunately,
Indonesian populism is less focused on identity than it is well-being.
Another supplementary method is that leaders invite their preferred leaders
in civil society to commissions, “stakeholder participation” etc. to gain
support from middle classes and NGO-sponsored poor people.
Both
methods are certainly undemocratic but make it possible for smart actors of
change to negotiate transformative reforms, which may strengthen the social
and political capacity of ordinary people and institutionalize democratic
representation from below. There is much to learn from other countries.
The
second opening is the dramatic shift among citizens from trying to solve
their problems through patrons, civil society and the market to instead
demanding welfare, services and inclusive development through public
programs.
In
short, people themselves want to go beyond populism and invited
participation; they wish to see a democratic welfare state.
But
can progressive actors really take advantage of populism, elitist invitation
and the quest for a welfare state and thus improve the representation of
those who can foster more democracy? Won’t politicians co-opt scattered
pro-democrats, movements and unions?
Excitement
comes in the form of four processes (identified in follow up studies), which
may break this negative pattern.
First,
many poor people are now as dependent on public services and regulations as
middle-class people and thus are similarly frustrated with corruption.
Likewise, many middle-class people realize they cannot force themselves upon
the poor to set up new factories and houses and build livable cities with
better environments and infrastructure.
Rather,
they need to negotiate with the increasing amount of people who protest
against the accumulation of capital and at the dispossession of their land,
forest, water and residential areas.
Third,
more scattered groups and movements pose similar demands for public social
security and welfare policies.
But
who can build strong enough political unity for welfare that acts against
corruption and plunder? Attempts at coalitions and blocs have failed.
Fragmented groups have agreed on some issues and then returned to their
projects.
The
ultimate excitement comes with the informalization of employment relations
(including through outsourcing) under neoliberal development. Many workers in
formal and informal sectors agree they have had to turn to the state and
local governments as there are fewer employers to protest against and
negotiate with.
To
make a difference, then, strong broad alliances are needed. As we know from
recent efforts at social security, labor laws and minimum wages, such broad
struggles have even been propelled by unions in modern sectors.
Together
with a few politicians and civil society activists, they may thus play a most
important role in building broad fronts from outside elite politics for
better representation of the interests and actors that really can fight
injustice, corruption and inequality.
This
would alter the stagnation of Indonesian democratization and if democratic
avenues for representation and negotiations are set up, there is no need to
block the toll roads. ●
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