Rabu, 10 April 2013

What actually happened in Cebongan prison (Part 2 of 2)


What actually happened in Cebongan prison (Part 2 of 2)
Sabam Siagian  ;   A Senior Editor at The Jakarta Post, A Recipient of the Nieman Fellowship for Journalists at Harvard University, Class of 1979
JAKARTA POST, 05 April 2013

  
Everywhere, including in democratic countries, gaps are always noticeable between strong and clear statements delivered by their leaders and concrete actions implementing those statements. 

However, it is saddening to observe, in the closing years of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s administration, how that gap is noticeably becoming ever wider. “Trust”, which Gen. Pramono Edhie Wibowo so keenly expected from the public, is indeed becoming a rare commodity.

The formation of an Army investigative panel announced during the Good Friday press conference already creates doubts on its efficacy. It is headed by the deputy commander of the military police, with the eight other members representing the Diponegoro Military Command, the subregional command, the local sectorial command, and last but certainly not least, the Army’s Special Forces (Kopassus). Initial responses from various civil society organizations have been quite positive, but one also notices among the public the keenness to see a concrete result in a short time.

Indeed, Yudhoyono in a Cabinet meeting on Monday again expressed his clear stance that the investigative efforts regarding the prison raid at Cebongan should be “transparent” and “accountable”. He said he would support the separate investigations by the Yogyakarta provincial police and by the Army headquarters.

And herein lies the problem. There are now at least three investigations going on. Besides the two mentioned, the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) is conducting its own investigation. Its chairperson, Siti Noor Laila, is quite ambitious in outlining the commission’s working agenda.

She said she intended to summon the Diponegoro Military Commander, the subregional commander and others. “We will not visit the officials related to this case individually. We will call them to appear before the commission.”

Pramono has diplomatically welcomed the rights commission’s investigative efforts. “However, there are established procedures that should be followed before a military officer is allowed to appear before the commissioner,” the general stated in his Good Friday press conference. One can sense that efforts are in the pipeline, in case, for instance, the commission summon the commander of the Kopassus’ Group II. It’s only logical that the commission would like to find out what sort of movement was recorded on March 13.

Frankly, we are skeptical whether all these investigations will produce the results expected by an anxious public despite the lofty pledges by the President and the Army chief. Differing goals, as pursued by at least the three investigations, will hamper thorough efforts to tackle the roots of the problem.

The Army headquarters’ investigative panel is too incestuous in its make up in which at the end of the day rank will be a determining factor. Let us assume, for discussion sake, that commandos were involved based on records and evidence. Will the Army headquarters’ investigative panel recommend the demotion of the Kartasura-based commander? Or will it “sacrifice” a mere sergeant to protect the reputation of the red berets, especially after prominent former Kopassus commanders appealed to Pramono that he should never forget his red beret roots. The pseudo-tribal culture tends to be pervasive among elite military units.

And the police? As a matter of fact, the Yogyakarta provincial police have plenty of relevant material related to the Cebongan raid, but for obvious reasons — weakened after recent revelations of mind-boggling corruption cases — are reluctant to be “transparent” and “accountable” as instructed by the President to whom the National Police are accountable. After becoming aware of relevant materials circulating in the social media, the police are apparently conducting a sort of psychological warfare by indirectly releasing some of the data available to shape public opinion to their advantage.

The lame duck in this Cebongan drama is the National Commission on Human Rights. It does seem courageous its intention to summon military officials to be intensely interviewed regarding the facts surrounding the Cebongan prison raid. Alas, due to recent internal bickering, the commission has lost considerable weight and prestige. It is not so difficult to predict that its efforts will be stonewalled by all sorts of bureaucratic red-tape.

Most probably, the commission will then publicly complain that the military and the police are being uncooperative and do not respect the basic right of the Indonesian people to learn what actually happen that made blatant cold-blooded murder possible. Consequently, the overall relations between the ruling elite and the public will sour. The “trust” that Pramono is so anxious to seek will remain elusive.

What then needs to be done? The President should set up a national commission on law enforcement related to the Cebongan case. A presidential decree should be issued outlining its mandate and specific tasks. Prominent civil society leaders should be asked to serve, such as Adnan Buyung Nasution (former member of the Presidential Advisory Body), Todung Mulya Lubis (a prominent human rights lawyer), Azyumardi Azra (Muslim scholar from Syarif Hidayatullah Islamic State University) and Mahfud MD (former chief of the Constitutional Court). In order to ensure a level of linkage to the center of power, probably it would be tactical to appoint the coordinating political, legal and security affairs minister and Air chief Marshall (ret.) Djoko Suyanto as the panel chairpersons.

The three existing bodies should complete their investigative tasks. The national commission on law enforcement related to the Cebongan case could benefit from their findings. But it would have to submit its own recommendations.

What is at stake here is safeguarding public trust in state governance in order to prevent social anarchy. That’s why a piecemeal approach in tackling the Cebongan case is so woefully inadequate.

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