Everywhere, including in democratic
countries, gaps are always noticeable between strong and clear statements
delivered by their leaders and concrete actions implementing those
statements.
However, it
is saddening to observe, in the closing years of President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono’s administration, how that gap is noticeably becoming ever
wider. “Trust”, which Gen. Pramono Edhie Wibowo so keenly expected from
the public, is indeed becoming a rare commodity.
The formation
of an Army investigative panel announced during the Good Friday press
conference already creates doubts on its efficacy. It is headed by the
deputy commander of the military police, with the eight other members
representing the Diponegoro Military Command, the subregional command,
the local sectorial command, and last but certainly not least, the Army’s
Special Forces (Kopassus). Initial responses from various civil society
organizations have been quite positive, but one also notices among the
public the keenness to see a concrete result in a short time.
Indeed,
Yudhoyono in a Cabinet meeting on Monday again expressed his clear stance
that the investigative efforts regarding the prison raid at Cebongan
should be “transparent” and “accountable”. He said he would support the
separate investigations by the Yogyakarta provincial police and by the
Army headquarters.
And herein
lies the problem. There are now at least three investigations going on.
Besides the two mentioned, the National Commission on Human Rights
(Komnas HAM) is conducting its own investigation. Its chairperson, Siti
Noor Laila, is quite ambitious in outlining the commission’s working
agenda.
She said she
intended to summon the Diponegoro Military Commander, the subregional
commander and others. “We will not visit the officials related to this
case individually. We will call them to appear before the commission.”
Pramono has
diplomatically welcomed the rights commission’s investigative efforts.
“However, there are established procedures that should be followed before
a military officer is allowed to appear before the commissioner,” the
general stated in his Good Friday press conference. One can sense that
efforts are in the pipeline, in case, for instance, the commission summon
the commander of the Kopassus’ Group II. It’s only logical that the
commission would like to find out what sort of movement was recorded on
March 13.
Frankly, we
are skeptical whether all these investigations will produce the results
expected by an anxious public despite the lofty pledges by the President
and the Army chief. Differing goals, as pursued by at least the three
investigations, will hamper thorough efforts to tackle the roots of the
problem.
The Army
headquarters’ investigative panel is too incestuous in its make up in
which at the end of the day rank will be a determining factor. Let us
assume, for discussion sake, that commandos were involved based on
records and evidence. Will the Army headquarters’ investigative panel
recommend the demotion of the Kartasura-based commander? Or will it
“sacrifice” a mere sergeant to protect the reputation of the red berets,
especially after prominent former Kopassus commanders appealed to Pramono
that he should never forget his red beret roots. The pseudo-tribal
culture tends to be pervasive among elite military units.
And the
police? As a matter of fact, the Yogyakarta provincial police have plenty
of relevant material related to the Cebongan raid, but for obvious
reasons — weakened after recent revelations of mind-boggling corruption
cases — are reluctant to be “transparent” and “accountable” as instructed
by the President to whom the National Police
are accountable. After becoming aware of relevant materials circulating
in the social media, the police are apparently conducting a sort of
psychological warfare by indirectly releasing some of the data available
to shape public opinion to their advantage.
The lame duck
in this Cebongan drama is the National Commission on Human Rights. It
does seem courageous its intention to summon military officials to be
intensely interviewed regarding the facts surrounding the Cebongan prison
raid. Alas, due to recent internal bickering, the commission has lost
considerable weight and prestige. It is not so difficult to predict that
its efforts will be stonewalled by all sorts of bureaucratic red-tape.
Most
probably, the commission will then publicly complain that the military
and the police are being uncooperative and do not respect the basic right
of the Indonesian people to learn what actually happen that made blatant
cold-blooded murder possible. Consequently, the overall relations between
the ruling elite and the public will sour. The “trust” that Pramono is so
anxious to seek will remain elusive.
What then
needs to be done? The President should set up a national commission on
law enforcement related to the Cebongan case. A presidential decree
should be issued outlining its mandate and specific tasks. Prominent
civil society leaders should be asked to serve, such as Adnan Buyung
Nasution (former member of the Presidential Advisory Body), Todung Mulya
Lubis (a prominent human rights lawyer), Azyumardi Azra (Muslim scholar
from Syarif Hidayatullah Islamic State University) and Mahfud MD (former
chief of the Constitutional Court). In order to ensure a level of linkage
to the center of power, probably it would be tactical to appoint the
coordinating political, legal and security affairs minister and Air chief
Marshall (ret.) Djoko Suyanto as the panel chairpersons.
The three
existing bodies should complete their investigative tasks. The national
commission on law enforcement related to the Cebongan case could benefit
from their findings. But it would have to submit its own recommendations.
What is at
stake here is safeguarding public trust in state governance in order to
prevent social anarchy. That’s why a piecemeal approach in tackling the
Cebongan case is so woefully inadequate. ●
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