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Indonesia probably deserves every single criticism
in the latest Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, which highlights
governmental negligence and even complicity in the persecution of
religious minorities.
The report opens with a graphic first person account of an Ahmadi who was
stripped, robbed of his belongings, faced an attempted genital mutilation
yet managed to get away with “only” a stab to his left eye.
The report consist of a no-holds-barred naming and shaming of the Islamic
Defenders Front (FPI), the Islamic People’s Forum (FUI), the Indonesian
Muslim Communication Forum (Forkami), Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia and the
Islamic Reformist Movement (Garis) as hardliners that participate in
and/or support persecution of minorities they call “infidels” and
“blasphemers”.
Suryadharma Ali’s Religious Affairs Ministry was repeatedly mentioned in
the report by the New York-based organization. The report went further,
claiming that Yudhoyono is “part of the problem” due to his passivity
that had emboldened militants.
A previous report noted the possibility of these intolerant anti-vice
groups being recruitment pools for terrorists. Political observers are
all too aware of the increasing role of political Islam within
secular-nationalist parties like the Democratic Party, who deliberately
attempt to appeal to the anti-pluralists.
Terrorist attacks were the only area where the government was fairly
successful in protecting religious minorities — just as the most
influential Muslim groups demand the Special Detachment 88 be disbanded.
It is sometimes argued the intolerance is more of a cultural phenomenon
than a political one, but I believe intolerance lies in the realm of
public morality where the cultural can influence the political and vice
versa. Moral distinctions that are cultural can be incorporated into
laws. These laws encourage intolerance, constructing it as lawful
behavior.
The 2008 Anti-Pornography Law was probably the first open battle for
public morality, the 2008 Joint Ministerial Decree its first major loss,
and Lhokseumawe’s sharia-inspired bylaw forbidding women to straddle
motorcycles is the embarrassing joke that Indonesia ends up with.
A feminist critique highlights the deficiencies of sharia bylaws, and
criticizes the intellectual basis of such policies. Proponents of the
bylaws, blame media sensationalists and shadowy international interests
in creating public villains, blame the stampeding of Indonesia’s new
middle class in electronic herds, and blame concealed political interests
for blowing the issue of intolerance out of proportion. Government
officials simply brush off the issue of intolerance as “naïve”.
Today, any mention of public morality reeks of hypocrisy and is tainted
by local political elites manipulating it to push through sharia-inspired
agendas or to achieve short-term political gain or popularity — usually
at the expense of women, ethnic and religious minorities. Public morality
was also problematic in the recent ASEAN declaration of human rights.
Public morality plays an extremely important role in nation-building. The
public morality of how women straddle their motorcycles in Lhokseumawe,
for example, might not have any significant social or economic
consequences to ordinary Papuans, but it is an extremely potent political
symbol of what the Indonesian ruling class believes and stands for. It is
a matter of principle, a common moral compass, and a shared “moral
blanket” for the nation.
Unfortunately, small blankets reveal everything else when you pull them
up to cover your face. Public morality’s heavy focus on the crotch-related
issues of prostitution, extramarital cohabitation, abortion, nudity and
pornography is repressive of women. The number of Indonesian regulations
discriminating against women has nearly doubled from 154 bylaws in 2009
up to 282 bylaws in 2012.
However, when not obsessed with genitalia, public morality tackles
important questions of racial segregation, ethnic discrimination, war,
humanitarian interventions and the distinction between corruption and
acceptable political fund-raising.
Crimes against religious minorities also climbed from 299 cases in 2011
to 371 cases in 2012. Religious minorities’ places of worships are
dismantled, forcibly closed and criminalized under the rhetoric of public
order and morality.
Facing the “tsunami” of sharia bylaws and local demographic transitions,
West Papua capital Manokwari declared itself a gospel city. Many Papuans
continue to question their place within the so-called secular Indonesian
republic.
Public morality debate generates a high degree of public participation.
Since the debate is about abstract first principles, everyone considers
themselves seasoned experts with valid opinions. The debate also enables
the wider public to participate due to its non-technical and
non-scientific nature.
Although Indonesian elites and lawmakers cannot consult the public in
every aspect and detail of government, the moral preference of their
constituents can be deciphered through public morality debates. National
elites and lawmakers can then consult these moral preferences in making
decisions and designing regulations. However, problems arise when local
elites use public morality entirely as a substitute for intellectual and
technical expertise in formulating sound policies — sometimes imposing
their version of “universal” morality on the public.
Lastly, public debate on “moral distinctions” may take decades, if not
centuries, to settle. Indonesia is no older than most of our
grandfathers, therefore, public morality is still being contested both in
rhetoric and practice. The public morality of slavery in the US, for
instance, took centuries and a bloody civil war to settle. The same can
be said of racial segregation in South Africa.
In my opinion, Indonesia’s public morality is mainly constructed by moral
condemnation. Indonesia is constructed as a political entity that is (1)
sovereign, (2) secular, (3) firmly unitarist and (4) adheres to a market
economy. This construction was achieved mainly through the moral
condemnation of European imperialism, the DI/TII Islamist aspirations,
the PRRI/Permesta federalist rebellions and the 1965 communist purge.
Reconstructions of public morality can and will occur. However, the basis
for public morality must stretch from Aceh to Papua. Religion, as decided
by our nation’s founding fathers, failed to make the final cut. ●
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