Indonesia
Needs Powerful KPK
Budi Kurniawan, A LECTURER IN GOVERNMENT STUDIES AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF LAMPUNG
Sumber : JAKARTA POST, 7 Desember 2011
In his article that appeared
in the Nov. 28, 2011 edition of The Jakarta Post, House of Representatives
member Fahri Hamzah argues that the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) is
a very powerful institution in a democratic regime.
He further emphasizes that there should be no strong institution or superbody in democratic countries.
However, there is a fallacy in Hamzah’s point of view. The main point is the way Hamzah thinks about democratic regimes. Could democratic countries form strong institutions like the KPK?
The key element of democracy is the supremacy of law. There are no democracies without supremacy of law.
In some countries, an era of transitional democracy indeed creates more massive corruption in the absence of the supremacy of law.
Olson in Power and Prosperity (2002) finds an increase in the number of corruption cases in new democratic regimes in Eastern Europe after the fall of Communist regimes.
The transformation of the political system from authoritarian to democracy in these countries only changed the corruption type. In Olson’s terms, there was a change from “stationary bandits” to “roving bandits”.
In the context of Indonesia as a transitional democracy, corruption is considered a big problem. It is deemed an extraordinary crime that can be found in every institution, even in political parties.
In order to resolve this problem, the KPK was established as a strong institution to deal with the entrenched corruption.
The KPK indeed was designed as an auxiliary state institution. Auxiliary state institutions are needed when formal institutions, such as the police and the Attorney General’s Office, cannot perform.
An auxiliary state institution works like a civil society organization to control the state, including political parties. In a transitional democracy, when an authoritarian system is still working in state institutions, auxiliary state institutions are needed.
However, Hamzah frames democracy as checks and balances among the state institutions, which is an old institutionalism paradigm in political science. In the old institutionalism political paradigm, indeed, the meaning of democracy is about checks and balances among the institutions. However, this paradigm applies only in a normal situation when the state institutions work properly.
The old institutionalism paradigm frames democracy as only a problem of checks and balances among state institutions. It ignores civil society and policy networks, including auxiliary state institutions, as important actors.
Furthermore, nowadays the problem of democracy focuses on the control of the state by civil society. The KPK paves the way for the civil society’s control of the state. This is also the main reason why KPK leaders must have backgrounds in civil society organizations, such as NGO and universities.
The KPK is therefore an ideal model in the context of Indonesia. The Singapore and Hong Kong model suits an authoritarian regime where the state plays a dominant role and civil society is weak.
Furthermore, in Hong Kong and Singapore the state has proven its commitment to eradicating corruption.
On the contrary, in Indonesia, the state as well as political parties lack awareness of corruption eradication and have even acted as main actors of graft. Civil society, on the other hand, has a strong concern for corruption eradication.
Hamzah also forgets that the United States model, in which no strong anticorruption commission has been in place, cannot be compared with Indonesia apple to apple.
The US has from the beginning of its process to establish state institutions never adopted an authoritarian regime like that of Indonesia. The US has never experienced a transitional era from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. This is the reason why the US does not need a commission like KPK.
However, I agree with Hamzah’s argument that the KPK is no longer needed if state institutions like the police and Attorney General’s Office are freed from the old-authoritarian corrupt system. The crucial question now is when that will happen. ●
He further emphasizes that there should be no strong institution or superbody in democratic countries.
However, there is a fallacy in Hamzah’s point of view. The main point is the way Hamzah thinks about democratic regimes. Could democratic countries form strong institutions like the KPK?
The key element of democracy is the supremacy of law. There are no democracies without supremacy of law.
In some countries, an era of transitional democracy indeed creates more massive corruption in the absence of the supremacy of law.
Olson in Power and Prosperity (2002) finds an increase in the number of corruption cases in new democratic regimes in Eastern Europe after the fall of Communist regimes.
The transformation of the political system from authoritarian to democracy in these countries only changed the corruption type. In Olson’s terms, there was a change from “stationary bandits” to “roving bandits”.
In the context of Indonesia as a transitional democracy, corruption is considered a big problem. It is deemed an extraordinary crime that can be found in every institution, even in political parties.
In order to resolve this problem, the KPK was established as a strong institution to deal with the entrenched corruption.
The KPK indeed was designed as an auxiliary state institution. Auxiliary state institutions are needed when formal institutions, such as the police and the Attorney General’s Office, cannot perform.
An auxiliary state institution works like a civil society organization to control the state, including political parties. In a transitional democracy, when an authoritarian system is still working in state institutions, auxiliary state institutions are needed.
However, Hamzah frames democracy as checks and balances among the state institutions, which is an old institutionalism paradigm in political science. In the old institutionalism political paradigm, indeed, the meaning of democracy is about checks and balances among the institutions. However, this paradigm applies only in a normal situation when the state institutions work properly.
The old institutionalism paradigm frames democracy as only a problem of checks and balances among state institutions. It ignores civil society and policy networks, including auxiliary state institutions, as important actors.
Furthermore, nowadays the problem of democracy focuses on the control of the state by civil society. The KPK paves the way for the civil society’s control of the state. This is also the main reason why KPK leaders must have backgrounds in civil society organizations, such as NGO and universities.
The KPK is therefore an ideal model in the context of Indonesia. The Singapore and Hong Kong model suits an authoritarian regime where the state plays a dominant role and civil society is weak.
Furthermore, in Hong Kong and Singapore the state has proven its commitment to eradicating corruption.
On the contrary, in Indonesia, the state as well as political parties lack awareness of corruption eradication and have even acted as main actors of graft. Civil society, on the other hand, has a strong concern for corruption eradication.
Hamzah also forgets that the United States model, in which no strong anticorruption commission has been in place, cannot be compared with Indonesia apple to apple.
The US has from the beginning of its process to establish state institutions never adopted an authoritarian regime like that of Indonesia. The US has never experienced a transitional era from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. This is the reason why the US does not need a commission like KPK.
However, I agree with Hamzah’s argument that the KPK is no longer needed if state institutions like the police and Attorney General’s Office are freed from the old-authoritarian corrupt system. The crucial question now is when that will happen. ●
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