‘Exercise
Komodo’ and the South China Sea
Ristian Afriandi Supriyanto ; An
associate research fellow with the Maritime Security Program at the S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore
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JAKARTA
POST, 29 Maret 2014
Today,
naval representatives and warships from 18 different nations are converging
in the southern part of the South China Sea known as Natuna.
Adopting
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) as its main theme,
Exercise Komodo highlights the growing role of the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL)
in international naval diplomacy. But held amid lingering tensions arising
from territorial disputes in the South China Sea, what can we gauge from it?
Certainly,
Exercise Komodo carries mixed messages. At first glance, the exercise
attempts to display Indonesia’s growing role in naval diplomacy. Bringing in
naval representatives from 18 countries is no easy task. Much less is the
choice of timing and location in the South China Sea, where tensions remain
high following incidents among the claimants.
Indeed,
owing to the growing importance of regional maritime security issues,
naval-centric cooperation is becoming increasingly vital, as facilitated by
the ASEAN Navy Chiefs’ Meeting (ANCM).
During
the last ANCM held in Manila, ASEAN navies agreed to establish an ANCM Plus
process with navies from the eight dialogue partners of ASEAN.
By
complementing the ANCM Plus process, Exercise Komodo could foster greater
cooperation among the navies of ASEAN Plus countries. Last year, the TNI-AL
also hosted the International Maritime Security Symposium, which drew nearly
350 participants, including from various navies across the region.
To this
end, Exercise Komodo is certainly something Indonesia, particularly the
TNI-AL, can be proud of. But questions linger on how this exercise could be
sustained in the future, as the TNI-AL expects to make it biennial. Indeed,
hosting an exercise is one thing, but making it continuous and regular is
quite another.
Questions
should also be asked about how this exercise adds value to other
multinational naval exercises held in the region, apart from it being hosted
by Indonesia. For example, how different is Exercise Komodo from India’s
biennial “Milan” and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus
maritime security exercises, as the latter two also carry similar themes on
HADR?
Finally,
given Australia’s recent withdrawal from the event (by only sending
observers), will Exercise Komodo be made exclusive to regional navies
Indonesia feels comfortable to partner with? These are legitimate questions
to pose, especially if Indonesia wishes Exercise Komodo to be recognized well
beyond its symbolic and prestige value.
Beyond
naval diplomacy, the exercise underlines the significance of the South China
Sea in Indonesia’s geostrategic calculus. While proclaiming itself as a
non-claimant country, Indonesia’s 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone
overlaps with China’s nine-dash line claim in the Natuna. It remains to be
seen whether China will establish an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)
in the South China Sea.
But
Beijing will certainly continue probing the limits of what Indonesia can bear
under Jakarta’s so-called “silent diplomacy”. Chinese fishermen are moving
further south into Natuna, which has led to occasional skirmishes between
Indonesian and Chinese maritime authorities.
Earlier
this year, China conducted a naval exercise in the Indian Ocean by transiting
through the Indonesian straits of Sunda and Lombok.
While
nothing was illegal about the exercise, it was clearly meant to show Chinese
determination to protect maritime interests beyond its traditional area of
operations in the Western Pacific defined commonly as the “two island
chains”. It was also an example that China expected principal littoral
countries — Australia, India and Indonesia — to pay serious attention
to.
Despite
these concerns, Indonesia follows a more restrained approach compared to the
“immediate” claimant countries.
For
example, Vietnam and the Philippines protested strongly against China’s
announcement of fishing regulations in the South China Sea earlier this year.
And Manila starkly compared Beijing to Nazi Germany during World War II. Last
year, Malaysia even protested against China’s naval exercise in James Shoal
located well within Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone.
In
contrast, Indonesia prefers to be seen as a neutral broker in dealing with
China through ASEAN diplomatic engagements.
This
might be largely owed to Jakarta’s growing economic and security linkages
with Beijing.
Apart
from being Indonesia’s largest trading partner, China has become an
alternative arms supplier, if inferior, to Indonesia’s Russian and Western
counterparts. This might exhibit increased warmth in political and security
ties between the two countries, which last year elevated bilateral relations
into a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
Exercise
Komodo also demonstrates Indonesia’s own naval aspirations to become a “world
class navy”. Facilitated by increased defense budgets, Indonesia continues to
spur naval modernization with new platforms being gradually inducted into the
fleet.
However,
capabilities aren’t just platforms. Ensuring their effective use is an
equally important task. In this sense, Exercise Komodo provides an
opportunity for the TNI-AL not only to learn lessons from others, but also to
enhance inter-operability with other navies in HADR operations, such as
tsunami relief.
Accomplishing
this task is neither easy nor simultaneous. A comfortable degree of trust and
confidence is required as a prerequisite. Hence, Australia’s withdrawal from
this exercise might signal a considerable trust deficit between the two
countries.
An
unstated aim of the exercise might be to reassure regional countries,
especially neighbors, of Indonesia’s peaceful naval modernization. Aiming to
become a “Green Water Navy”, the TNI-AL aims to acquire up to 274 warships of
various types by 2024.
While
that aim is quite ambitious, Indonesia’s naval acquisitions have drawn
considerable interests from neighboring countries. For example, Singapore
raised objections over the naming of one of TNI-AL’s newly-purchased frigates
due to past historical grievances.
Finally,
it would be wise to neither overvalue nor overestimate the results of
Exercise Komodo. While salutary in itself for the TNI-AL to host an inaugural
multinational exercise, it is only one of many building blocks toward
promoting cooperation among regional navies.
Instead,
the real impact of Exercise Komodo can only be gauged cumulatively with other
regional cooperation initiatives, in the hope that the whole will be greater
than the sum of its parts. That being said, it should be the least of what
regional countries can do to stabilize the volatile waters of the South China
Sea. ●
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