Stronger US alliances should be expected in the region Ristian Afriandi Supriyanto  ;   An Indonesian visiting fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, An associate research fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore

JAKARTA POST,  06 Mei 2014

                                                

                                                                                         

                                                      

To conclude his tour of Asia, US President Barack Obama signed an important defense agreement with the Philippines. Known formally as the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), it “deepens defense cooperation” between the US and the Philippines, and “maintains and develops their individual and collective capacities”. But given that both countries are already bounded as allies by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement, why is yet another agreement necessary, and why now? Actually, nothing much is novel in the EDCA, except for some operational adjustments. Just like the deployment of 2,500 US Marines in Darwin, Australia, the EDCA is a way for the US to protect its interests and defend allies in the region under its “rebalancing to Asia” strategy. Also, it is operationally more nuanced. For example, US forces will be granted access to “agreed locations” in the Philippines on a “rotational basis”, without having to “establish a permanent military presence or base” nor obliged to pay “rental or similar costs” to the host. What is new is the context in which the EDCA was negotiated and agreed upon. Facing growing Chinese maritime assertiveness, Manila needs to be reassured that the US would stand by its side if conflict erupts. Since the 1995 Mischief Reef occupation by China (and later, the Scarborough Shoal, or potentially, the Second Thomas Shoal), Manila had to reverse its decision in evicting the US from Subic Bay in 1991. In turn, the US has committed to reassure its allies by not leaving them alone in the face of a perceptibly threatening China. But, despite its reassurances, Washington remains vague about how deep its commitment would be to assist Manila during contingencies. Unlike the alliance treaty with Japan, Washington’s commitment does not extend to the features Manila claims in the Spratlys. For example, would the US military promptly intervene if, say, the Chinese rammed a Philippine vessel en route to resupply the Marines stationed on the Second Thomas Shoal? Would ramming be considered an “attack” that would warrant retaliation as per the Mutual Defense Treaty? It remains to be seen, therefore, how rigorous both sides have been planning such contingencies behind closed doors. Apparently, Washington still reserves caution lest Manila becomes overly confident with regards to provoking Beijing while asserting its claims. But clearly, a sharper wedge has already been drawn between China and the US in the South China Sea. China has been trying to isolate the Philippines from other ASEAN claimants, by pressuring them not to follow Manila’s path of seeking international arbitration. At the same time, Beijing is persuading ASEAN countries to remain calm about its “peaceful rise”. In its latest move, Beijing is selling its “21st century maritime silk road” proposal, stressing to implement the 2002 Declaration of Conduct effectively, while flouting to expeditiously agree on a Code of Conduct. Meanwhile, Beijing is sparing no effort to frame the EDCA and the broader US rebalancing strategy as a containment strategy in disguise — in the hope that it would pit ASEAN countries against the US and accuse the latter of destabilizing the region. Facing this conundrum, Manila has little faith to go all the way with ASEAN. While remaining committed to the Code of Conduct process, Manila claims to have exhausted all measures to negotiate its dispute with China. International arbitration is therefore Manila’s last shot. Having thrown its support behind the Philippines’ arbitration move, the US is courting other ASEAN countries to follow suit. In Malaysia, Prime Minister Najib Razak saw the option of international arbitration “as warranted” during his meeting with President Obama. In doing so, Washington is trying to make a clear case that rejecting international arbitration means undermining international law. ASEAN is thus left with an “either-or” option. Either to support international law (support Manila’s arbitration) or reject it (oppose Manila’s move). Having much (or too much) faith only on the Code of Conduct process is therefore not viable. Much less is criticizing or even isolating Manila in its desperate attempt to salvage what little it has left. On the contrary, continuously criticizing Manila could potentially create a sharper wedge within ASEAN, and surreptitiously lead ASEAN precisely into a direction Beijing has desired all along. Against this backdrop, how should Indonesia respond? Jakarta shouldn’t misunderstand stronger US alliances in the region. Nor should it exaggerate the prospect of regional instability arising from them. After all, the US-Philippine alliance is also couched heavily in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, which can prove critical in disaster-prone Southeast Asia. Nor would the EDCA threaten ASEAN’s existence. Despite aspiring to become a single community by 2015, ASEAN remains largely a cobble of diverse nations with different and sometimes, conflicting interests. For Manila and other US allies in the region, alliance treaties go beyond power politics and rest as much on historical experience and common values. Jakarta shouldn’t expect that any form of regionalism would replace bilateral alliances built on these solid foundations. Rather, Jakarta must remain true to ASEAN’s virtue as a loose organization. Due to its geopolitical importance and geostrategic location, Southeast Asia can never be able to escape from major power politics, which can sometimes lead to disagreements or even rivalries among its nations. That’s when ASEAN’s maturity as an organization is tested. Being mature isn’t about agreeing on every common issue we face. Rather, it’s about working together on common issues we can agree on, while working through the issues we happen to disagree, as opposed to working around them and sweep everything under the rug. Recognized as ASEAN’s first among equals, Indonesia must continuously strive for such maturity to always prevail. Short of it, Indonesia’s influence within ASEAN could gradually wane and be potentially taken over by extra-regional players. ●