After the naming of former Prosperous
Justice Party (PKS) chairman Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq as a suspect in the recent
beef import bribery scandal, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)
once again made a bold move by naming former Democratic Party chairman Anas
Urbaningrum a suspect for his involvement in the Hambalang graft case.
Several legal and political scholars maintain that the KPK’s decision was
influenced by a certain group of senior people in government who had a
grudge against Anas.
The KPK has denied this speculation, stating that its decision was based
solely on professional judgment without any external interventions. Similar
to the beef import scandal for the PKS, many believe that the Hambalang
scandal will prove to be the Democratic Party’s Achilles’ heel in next
year’s election.
With a number of its high-ranking politicians, including the former
chairman himself, allegedly involved in fraud, regaining public trust and
winning the next election seems like a long-shot for the party.
As reported by mass media, several corruption suspects from the Democratic
Party featured in at least one anticorruption advertisement as part of
their party’s political campaign several years ago, which is now viewed by
the public as a bitter irony. To use a business analogy, this is where the
sellers (i.e. politicians) who, after receiving advance payments (i.e.
votes) from the consumers (i.e. voters), fail to deliver the promised
commodity (i.e. public goods and services).
The cause of politicians’ failures to deliver public goods and services has
been the subject of many studies. Many of these studies argue that
corruption is one major cause for an “agent” (i.e. a politician) failing to
perform his/her duties to their “principle” (i.e. the people). In this
situation, politicians are seen as acting rationally to maximize their own
utility.
In so doing, they may be tempted to engage in “illegal product”
transactions with third parties in which the politicians, in exchange for
some financial reward, may offer to use the power of their positions in
government to assist those parties to meet their own ends. The “product” in
this case is the politicians’ assistance to the third parties.
Many political corruption cases are attributed to politicians’
“rent-seeking and self-serving” behavior as part of their rational mind-set
according to which they weigh the costs and benefits of their actions. As
prominent criminologist Donald Cressey proposed in a well-known study more
than five years ago, “pressure” is a major cause of violating trust among
otherwise honest people. For political parties, studies suggest that lack
of funding puts a great deal of pressure on politicians to find alternative
funding sources, some of which may be shady.
Historically speaking, since the fall of the Soeharto regime, the lack of
political party funding has become a major problem, even for large parties.
Despite several regulatory efforts by the government in the past few years,
political parties are still struggling with this problem. The various
regional elections, for example, often require participating candidates and
their parties to spend a fortune on their campaigns to secure votes. Next
year’s presidential election will undoubtedly increase tension between
political parties and thus create more pressure to obtain funds to win the
race.
Studies on Indonesian politicians have revealed that some chose to enter
politics to pursue their personal interests instead of serving the public.
Some seek the financial benefits of being in government while others, who
were already wealthy, simply seek power and prestige. In relation to
limited political party funding, evidence suggests that one alternative
source of funding comes from the parties’ politicians themselves. Evidence
also suggests that lawmakers, for example, often have to give a portion of
their salaries and allowances to their parties. From a rational
cost-benefit point of view, this means that the politicians need to
compensate for their lost income by seeking alternative income sources.
According to various global studies, the most observable behavioral symptom
of fraudsters is their lavish lifestyle, living well beyond their financial
means. Apparently, such behavior is also commonplace in Indonesia. Many
politicians are often seen living extravagantly, to a degree that even
their high salaries as public officials cannot support. With these
pressures, once an opportunity — albeit unjustifiable — to earn more income
from their political position presents itself, they may be willing to take
the chance to engage in corrupt practices.
The lack of sufficient legal deterrence is often thought to be a major
reason for burgeoning corruption in Indonesia. Moreover, corruption cases
investigated by the KPK cost the nation vast sums of taxpayers’ money.
In other words, those who indulge in corruption can become millionaires
overnight from the proceeds of their offenses. Therefore, the fact that
graft convicts who have gained enormous financial benefits often receive
light sentences in Indonesia increases several-fold the “net benefit” of
committing corruption in the country. Mixed with the pressure from the lack
of political party funding, it is little wonder that many politicians at
regional and state levels “rationally” decide to commit corruption.
Accordingly, reducing the “net-benefit” of corruption should be part of the
nation’s antigraft strategy. To do so, which would include increasing
sanctions on offenders, increasing the chance of detection and increasing
the success rate of investigations and prosecutions, to name just a few,
would be viable ways to increase the cost to graft offenders. Of course,
there are other measures, such as nurturing an anticorruption mentality in
the minds of the younger generation as well as changing the mind-set among
the current generation about tolerating corruption. ●
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