Will Jokowi be a truly great leader for the Papuans? Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi Wangge  ;  An Arryman Scholar and a visiting scholar at the Buffet Center for International and Comparative Studies (BCICS), Northwestern University

JAKARTA POST,  01 Desember 2014

                                                                                                                       

During his presidential campaign, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo visited the easternmost province of Papua three times. He made one key promise to Papuans: he would pay more attention to Papua. This pledge included promoting the welfare approach rather than the security approach, building more infrastructure and providing more access to education and health care. The same promises were made by Jokowi’s predecessor Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono when he took office in 2004 Three factors should be examined in order to measure the extent of Jokowi’s ability to keep his promises to the Papuans, namely affirmative action, welfare policy and the military approach. In this regard, we should review what the previous government did for Papua in the last 10 years. Yudhoyono combined affirmative action and welfare policies without thoroughly reviewing the military approach in Papua. During his 10-year tenure, Yudhoyono appointed three Papuan ministers. In 2010, he initiated the mega investment project called the Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE) at the expense of customary rights on land that belongs to Papuans; in 2012 he proposed the Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua (UP4PB) which has had no impact whatsoever. Yudhoyono failed to review the security approach that has been in place since this province was integrated into Indonesia in 1969. Reports of human-rights abuses allegedly involving the military have continued to be rampant. Military reform that Yudhoyono promoted in his first term has had no impact in Papua. Antonius Made argues that military reform has failed at the domestic level, particularly in conflicted regions (Supriatma, Indonesia, April 2013). Three indicators of the failure are military deployments and their relation to the rise of human-rights violations and the military’s involvement in local politics and business in Papua. When it comes to Jokowi, many Papuans believe that he will overhaul the current situation in Papua. And yet it seems his government will continue what has been done so far. Shortly after he was inaugurated, he appointed Yohana Susana Yembise, the first female Papuan minister, as part of affirmative action. Furthermore, there is no policy yet directly addressing the Papuan issue. Another concern is about how Jokowi deals with development in Papua. This concern is related to the investment-oriented agenda he presented to business leaders at the APEC forum in China a couple of weeks ago. Whether or not there will be another project like MIFEE is still a major question. In terms of welfare reforms, Jokowi’s government has obviously moved one step forward by providing three cards, namely the Prosperous Family Card (KKS), the Indonesia Health Card (KIS) and the Indonesia Smart Card (KIP). All of these cards are related to the welfare program he promised during the presidential campaign. However, these cards seem to have trouble dealing with the conditions in Papua. The basic prerequisite of this program is infrastructure readiness and its stakeholders. In Papua, as Bobby Anderson argues in Inside Indonesia (July-September 2013), it is about not only hospitals or schools, but also who will be working as a doctor, nurse or teacher. In this regard, the central government has to review all welfare programs in Papua before promoting other programs. Another crucial policy that will be launched in the coming months is the transmigration policy. The new Villages, Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration Minister Marwan Jafar proposed a transmigration program for people from other islands, primarily from Java, to go to Papua. Shortly after the announcement, many Papuans raised their concerns and firmly rejected the policy. This concern is perfectly understandable. According to the Justice and Peace Secretariat of the Diocese of Jayapura (2006), huge numbers of transmigrants have affected the indigenous population by subordinating Papuans in the cultural, political, and economic spheres. This shift in population leads to never-ending conflicts between the settlers from the outside islands and the indigenous people. Furthermore, the transmigration policy will exaggerate Papuan demographic structure and also the relation between the central government and the Papuans. The decline in the indigenous population is obvious. According to Anderson, migrants from other islands now compose almost half the population of Papua province. In addition, he presented the ratio of the indigenous people and the non-indigenous people as 52-48 in 2010 (Anderson, 2014). In the security arena, there will not be any significant change, particularly relating to the presence of a huge number of troops in Papua. This tendency can be seen by the appointment of one of the most controversial and conservative generals, Ryamizard Ryacudu, as the Indonesian defense minister. Papuans still remember him as the general who praised as heroes the Kopassus soldiers who killed Theys Elluay. Other former generals with bad human-rights records, such as Hendropriyono, Wiranto and Sutiyoso also have been in Jokowi’s inner circle. All of these figures will maintain the military’s conservative value of defending the unity of the country by wiping out all rebellious groups, even at the expense of civilians — as it has over the years. All the policies and actions have been proposed so far clearly describe the elitist way of thinking on the Papuan issue. For example, Jafar is a former politician from the National Awakening Party (PKB) that has supported Jokowi. As a politician without sufficient background in the Papuan issue, Jafar clearly has been initiating an ill-constructed policy. He thinks by sending many migrants to Papua, the problem of poverty in some densely populated islands, will partly be resolved without looking at the real condition of the Papuan people. Accordingly, one can argue that Jokowi lacks ministers who can absorb his vision deeply. Because he has to compromise with those elites, oligarchs and former generals, he has to sacrifice the people’s hope. This is an irony of democracy. Jokowi has been elected constitutionally, but he cannot fully exercise his right to govern because he has to deal with those shadowy figures who have no constitutional rights whatsoever. Beyond these challenges, Jokowi has to execute a long-awaited dialogue with the Papuans. This is the prominent solution to deal with all problems in Papua. Consultations are the only way to understand deeply and thoroughly what Papuans need. In turn, the central government can form policy that positively affects Papuans. The Papua Peace Network (JDP) formed by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) has been conducting preliminary consultations that can be used as a gateway to create a more intensive and comprehensive dialogue with the Papuans. A network of various political actors in Papua has been set up through these consultations, and it would be constructive if the central government gradually held discussions with various actors, such as local activists, student activists, religious figures, if possible the armed-group representatives and particularly those who are struggling for Papuan independence from abroad. Dialogue itself was one of Jokowi’s “trademarks”, besides the impromptu visit, when he was mayor of Solo, Central Java, and governor of Jakarta. This is a real opportunity for Jokowi to begin a dialogue with the Papuan people. By supporting consultation with the people, the government can send a strong signal about building trust and eliminating suspicions regarding Papua. ●