Superimposition of China’s ‘silk road’ and Indonesia’s maritime fulcrum

Superimposition of China’s ‘silk road’ and Indonesia’s maritime fulcrum CPF Luhulima  ;  A senior researcher at the Center for Political Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta

JAKARTA POST,  13 Desember 2014

                                                                                                                       

The South China Sea conflict has been raging for years with no solution in sight. At a forum on maritime cooperation in East Asia held by the Asian Peace and Reconciliation Council (APRC) on Dec. 2, it was said that finding a solution to the South China Sea conflict would be difficult as the conflict related to the issue of sovereignty. The only way to manage the conflict is apparently to persevere in building confidence among the parties involved in the dispute. China has consistently objected to ASEAN consolidating itself on the South China Sea issue and insist that parties involved in the dispute have to resolve the sovereignty and jurisdictional issues bilaterally, not multilaterally. But ASEAN has always insisted on consolidating its position first before meeting with China. ASEAN could, however, not stick to its 10 plus 1 position as China continued to oppose it. China has always persisted on negotiating South China Sea issues among relevant parties, not with ASEAN as a whole. On Oct. 31 President Xi Jinping proposed the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) of the 21st Century in Indonesia, in an attempt to transform the conflict into a constructive scheme, simultaneously to highlight Indonesia and ASEAN‘s crucial significance in the initiative. It forms a new part of “China’s new foreign cooperation strategy under the new Chinese leadership,” writes the scholar Yu Hong. By promoting ports and other forms of infrastructure cooperation, Yu Hong writes that China “seeks to ease its territorial disputes with other ASEAN claimant states and strengthen mutual trust.” The MSR is also meant, “to narrow the huge infrastructure development gap among ASEAN members […] Expanding bilateral cooperation with ASEAN is contingent on the smooth settlement of disputes in the South China Sea.” Given the magnitude of this scheme, China will indeed have balanced its argument on regional economic cooperation and apprehensions of its Southeast Asian neighbors about its determination. Simultaneously, to finance the initiative, President Xi Jinping proposed the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), primarily meant to support connectivity, integration and boost economic development to increase the competitiveness of Asia’s economies and to finance their infrastructure build-up. Indonesia is active in initiating the ASEAN Caucus on the establishment of the AIIB. In May 2014, ASEAN-5, the original members of ASEAN, agreed to become the founding members of AIIB as a unit. ASEAN-5 agreed to set the minimum amount of contribution to AIIB with their contribution to the Asia Development Bank as the benchmark. Their agreement also took into consideration the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund (AIF) with the view that at a later stage AIIB could become one of AIF’s shareholders. At the bilateral meeting between President Xi and President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo on Nov. 9 during the APEC forum in Beijing, both discussed Indonesia’s participation in the AIIB, in which Jokowi reemphasized Indonesian’s intention to sign the memorandum of understanding (MoU) on the AIIB. It was followed by Indonesia’s signing of the MoU on Nov. 25 in Jakarta. Indonesia’s signing of the MoU is expected to strengthen cooperation between the two countries, to make AIIB a new source of funding for its infrastructure build-up and increase Indonesia’s role in international fora as well as playing a strategic role in the AIIB. Indonesia also intends to play a significant part in deciding the policy and work program of the AIIB for its own national interests. Simultaneously, foreign ministers Wang Yi and Retno LP Marsudi pledged to boost bilateral maritime cooperation. Jakarta’s participation in China’s MSR initiative is indeed crucial for Beijing’s vision of a maritime trade network stretching from Beijing over the South China Sea and Indonesian waters (Sunda and Lombok next to the Malacca Strait) to the Middle East and Europe. Meanwhile, Jokowi’s priority, as outlined in the ninth East Asia Summit in Naypyitaw, Myanmar recently, is to develop Indonesia’s maritime infrastructure and connectivity by constructing sea highways along the shores of Java, establish deep seaports and logistical networks as well as developing the shipping industry and maritime tourism. Jokowi invites nations to cooperate in this project and in the process eliminate the sources of conflicts at sea, such as violations of sovereignty, territorial disputes, illegal fishing, piracy and pollution. Chinese enterprises can help Jokowi’s maritime initiative as they have an “advantage in technology, funds to develop ports, bridges, toll roads, power generators and other infrastructure projects that Indonesia needs,” as signified by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Indonesia’s plan to boost the development of deep-sea harbors in Belawan, Tanjung Priok, Tanjung Perak, Makassar and Sorong and 20 other ports is a manifestation of its maritime-highway concept. This plan will certainly be welcomed by China as it fits suitably with its MSR initiative. The cost of approximately Rp 70 billion (US$ 5.6 million) can certainly be shared with or even covered by the AIIB. However, AIIB’s share may mean that Indonesia’s maritime highways and ports may become integral parts of China’s MSR as well. Indonesia’s sea lanes of communications will then be complemented by the west-east connectivity, through the Java Sea to Makassar and Sorong in Papua and back, in further boosting Indonesia’s maritime economic development. Indonesia’s maritime highway concept may develop into the MSR super maritime highway. China’s financial prowess will guarantee its development as Indonesia’s super maritime highway is definitely in China’s interest. Politically, Indonesia will have to adapt to the materialization of China’s MSR through its waters by insisting on the establishment of the AIIB in Jakarta. Jin Liqun, as chosen by the 21 potential founding members in Beijing on Oct. 24 can remain as AIIB’s secretary-general, but Indonesia should insist on several executive functions in the bank to balance its vital interests in the growth of the MSR and in the process moderate China’s assertiveness. Indonesia should also bolster its maritime defense system with the latest technologies to secure its seas and sea lanes of communications, and supervise traffic flow in its territorial waters. ●