A Hamas representative officce in Jakarta should pose no dilemma

A Hamas representative officce in Jakarta should pose no dilemma Fahlesa Munabari  ;   The writer, a lecturer in international relations at Budi Luhur University, Jakarta, is an Australian Endeavour Award Scholar at the University of New South Wales

JAKARTA POST,  15 Desember 2014

                                                                                                                       

Recent attempts by Hamas to open an office in Jakarta have ended in vain, despite strong support from the House of Representatives. Amid divergent public opinions on this issue, the Foreign Ministry eventually made it clear that despite Indonesia’s unwavering support for the independence of Palestine, it only recognized the Palestine government, not its political factions. This government’s view contradicts that of some community leaders and House politicians who argue that, in Indonesia, Hamas should be given the same political opportunity as the ruling Fatah faction and that the former takes different approaches to appreciating Palestinian fighters from the latter. Many would agree that the prolonged suffering of the Gaza people is due to the Israeli government’s ongoing blockade of Gaza, which has drawn considerable international support and humanitarian assistance in favor of Gaza. In Indonesia, it is not uncommon that the Gaza people’s cries for help spark condemnations of Israel’s grave violations of international law, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. But for some parties and communities in this most populous Muslim-majority country, the expressions of sympathy and support for this suffering are not only aimed at the people of Gaza, but also at Hamas. This faction has transformed into a popular symbol of resistance against the Israeli government among many Muslim communities around the world, including Indonesia, since it emerged during the first intifada in 1987. In it own eyes, the faction epitomizes the humble yet valiant David, the shepherd boy in the old Biblical story who managed to defeat the giant Goliath with nothing more than a sling and a stone.     In light of Israel’s unending oppression in Gaza, particularly since tougher sanctions were imposed on Gaza following Hamas’ electoral victory in 2006, the humble and heroic image of Hamas remains strong among these communities, far surpassing the image of the Fatah faction in the West Bank. This explains the strong support for Hamas’ intention to open an office in Jakarta. Hamas’ efforts to court political support from the Indonesian authorities should come as no surprise given that the faction is in dire need of galvanizing as much international support as possible, not only for easing Israel’s prolonged blockade of Gaza, but also for achieving an independent state for the Palestinian people in Palestine. Nevertheless, from the perspective of Indonesia’s foreign policy, Hamas’ intention to open a representative office in Jakarta is, alas, not free of problems. There are at least two reasons why the establishment of a Hamas office in the country at best should not be expected, and the ministry’s decision to deny Hamas’ request is anything but unsound. This is not to say that Indonesia’s commitment to the Palestinians’ quest for a free and independent Palestinian state is faltering. Far from it. First, the request was problematic because it was made amid heightened tensions between Hamas and Fatah following the end of the six-month Palestinian unity government’s mandate, which recently expired. The Palestinian unity government was formed on June 2 as a result of a Hamas-Fatah agreement signed a few months earlier on April 24, with a view to forging a common political vision and ending the two factions’ protracted conflict in the Israeli-occupied territories. This was lauded by many as an important milestone in the history of Hamas-Fatah rivalry in Palestine. Yet reconciliation between the two factions is too fragile to serve as a genuine foundation for an enduring joint political platform in Palestine’s political milieu. The recent dynamics of the political constellation in the Middle East have played a part in the signing of this half-hearted agreement. Then Gen. Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s takeover of the democratically elected Mursi government in Egypt last year is certainly a serious blow to Hamas. Since his ascension to power, El-Sisi has closed virtually all tunnels along Egypt’s border with Gaza, jeopardizing the very heart of Hamas’ logistical infrastructure extremely vital to its overall activities. Worse still, the situation is exacerbated by the fact that Iran as a Shiite majority country has significantly reduced its financial support of Hamas, which is an unequivocally Sunni group, because of the faction’s support for Sunni opposition fighters in Syria’s seemingly endless civil war. In the meantime, the Fatah-led government in the West Bank has been increasingly frustrated with the uninterrupted expansion of Jewish settlements despite Israel’s pledge to freeze them. It is this tough political backdrop that has led the two factions to attempt to knit themselves together as part of efforts to mend their relations, but to no avail. Instead of improving their relations, the leaderships of the two factions are suffering from a trust deficit. There is nothing much the unity government can do on the ground in Gaza because Hamas remains the de facto ruler of the region despite its denials of running a “shadow government” there. Further, the unity government was tasked with preparing the presidential and legislative elections within six months, yet there is no indication whatsoever that they will be held any time soon, which is indicative of how the trust deficit between the two factions has led to lingering political deadlock in the region. Second, taking into account the political backdrop, denying Hamas’ request to open an office in Jakarta constitutes a strategic option that will save Indonesia from being dragged into the unnecessary and potentially destructive rivalry between Hamas and Fatah. One might argue that had Indonesia accommodated Hamas’ request, the country would have run the risk of throwing itself into an uneasy relationship with Israeli’s powerful allies such as the US and the UK, owing to the fact that Hamas is designated as a terrorist organization by these countries. However, this should never serve as the Indonesian authorities’ reason for such a decision, because Indonesia has, in fact, bilaterally recognized Palestine since 1988. Since then, the country, along with its civil society organizations, has demonstrated its commitment to keeping the Palestinian cause alive through a variety of means. If the Foreign Ministry was to present the reason behind its decision, then primary justification would be refraining from being dragged into the Hamas-Fatah rivalry and encouraging them to keep working toward fully fledged reconciliation for the attainment of Palestinian statehood. ●