Stretching public morality from Aceh to Papua

Stretching public morality from Aceh to Papua Pierre Marthinus ;  Executive Director of the Marthinus Academy

JAKARTA POST, 21 Maret 2013

  

Indonesia probably deserves every single criticism in the latest Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, which highlights governmental negligence and even complicity in the persecution of religious minorities. The report opens with a graphic first person account of an Ahmadi who was stripped, robbed of his belongings, faced an attempted genital mutilation yet managed to get away with “only” a stab to his left eye. The report consist of a no-holds-barred naming and shaming of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the Islamic People’s Forum (FUI), the Indonesian Muslim Communication Forum (Forkami), Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia and the Islamic Reformist Movement (Garis) as hardliners that participate in and/or support persecution of minorities they call “infidels” and “blasphemers”. Suryadharma Ali’s Religious Affairs Ministry was repeatedly mentioned in the report by the New York-based organization. The report went further, claiming that Yudhoyono is “part of the problem” due to his passivity that had emboldened militants. A previous report noted the possibility of these intolerant anti-vice groups being recruitment pools for terrorists. Political observers are all too aware of the increasing role of political Islam within secular-nationalist parties like the Democratic Party, who deliberately attempt to appeal to the anti-pluralists. Terrorist attacks were the only area where the government was fairly successful in protecting religious minorities — just as the most influential Muslim groups demand the Special Detachment 88 be disbanded. It is sometimes argued the intolerance is more of a cultural phenomenon than a political one, but I believe intolerance lies in the realm of public morality where the cultural can influence the political and vice versa. Moral distinctions that are cultural can be incorporated into laws. These laws encourage intolerance, constructing it as lawful behavior. The 2008 Anti-Pornography Law was probably the first open battle for public morality, the 2008 Joint Ministerial Decree its first major loss, and Lhokseumawe’s sharia-inspired bylaw forbidding women to straddle motorcycles is the embarrassing joke that Indonesia ends up with. A feminist critique highlights the deficiencies of sharia bylaws, and criticizes the intellectual basis of such policies. Proponents of the bylaws, blame media sensationalists and shadowy international interests in creating public villains, blame the stampeding of Indonesia’s new middle class in electronic herds, and blame concealed political interests for blowing the issue of intolerance out of proportion. Government officials simply brush off the issue of intolerance as “naïve”. Today, any mention of public morality reeks of hypocrisy and is tainted by local political elites manipulating it to push through sharia-inspired agendas or to achieve short-term political gain or popularity — usually at the expense of women, ethnic and religious minorities. Public morality was also problematic in the recent ASEAN declaration of human rights. Public morality plays an extremely important role in nation-building. The public morality of how women straddle their motorcycles in Lhokseumawe, for example, might not have any significant social or economic consequences to ordinary Papuans, but it is an extremely potent political symbol of what the Indonesian ruling class believes and stands for. It is a matter of principle, a common moral compass, and a shared “moral blanket” for the nation. Unfortunately, small blankets reveal everything else when you pull them up to cover your face. Public morality’s heavy focus on the crotch-related issues of prostitution, extramarital cohabitation, abortion, nudity and pornography is repressive of women. The number of Indonesian regulations discriminating against women has nearly doubled from 154 bylaws in 2009 up to 282 bylaws in 2012. However, when not obsessed with genitalia, public morality tackles important questions of racial segregation, ethnic discrimination, war, humanitarian interventions and the distinction between corruption and acceptable political fund-raising. Crimes against religious minorities also climbed from 299 cases in 2011 to 371 cases in 2012. Religious minorities’ places of worships are dismantled, forcibly closed and criminalized under the rhetoric of public order and morality. Facing the “tsunami” of sharia bylaws and local demographic transitions, West Papua capital Manokwari declared itself a gospel city. Many Papuans continue to question their place within the so-called secular Indonesian republic. Public morality debate generates a high degree of public participation. Since the debate is about abstract first principles, everyone considers themselves seasoned experts with valid opinions. The debate also enables the wider public to participate due to its non-technical and non-scientific nature. Although Indonesian elites and lawmakers cannot consult the public in every aspect and detail of government, the moral preference of their constituents can be deciphered through public morality debates. National elites and lawmakers can then consult these moral preferences in making decisions and designing regulations. However, problems arise when local elites use public morality entirely as a substitute for intellectual and technical expertise in formulating sound policies — sometimes imposing their version of “universal” morality on the public. Lastly, public debate on “moral distinctions” may take decades, if not centuries, to settle. Indonesia is no older than most of our grandfathers, therefore, public morality is still being contested both in rhetoric and practice. The public morality of slavery in the US, for instance, took centuries and a bloody civil war to settle. The same can be said of racial segregation in South Africa. In my opinion, Indonesia’s public morality is mainly constructed by moral condemnation. Indonesia is constructed as a political entity that is (1) sovereign, (2) secular, (3) firmly unitarist and (4) adheres to a market economy. This construction was achieved mainly through the moral condemnation of European imperialism, the DI/TII Islamist aspirations, the PRRI/Permesta federalist rebellions and the 1965 communist purge. Reconstructions of public morality can and will occur. However, the basis for public morality must stretch from Aceh to Papua. Religion, as decided by our nation’s founding fathers, failed to make the final cut. ●

China’s fresh diplomatic gambit

China’s fresh diplomatic gambit Christine Susanna Tjhin ;  A Researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta; She is currently pursuing A Doctorate Degree at the School of International Studies, Peking University, China

JAKARTA POST, 21 Maret 2013

  

In the midst of public debates on various issues during the recently concluded “Two Sessions” — the first session of the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference (CPPCC) session — the first ever female spokesperson of this politically charged and internationally observed event, Madame Fuying, instantly turned “red” (local slang for “popular”) and topped the list of the most inspirational figures of the Two Sessions on China’s social media outlets.  Many were utterly smitten by her elegant heart-warming style during press conferences. Most notably was her amiable but firm response to a Japanese reporter, who asked whether China would become more aggressive in the future. She cheerfully replied that the Chinese people actually thought the government was not tough enough in responding to the Diaoyu Island issue.  She added that Japan broke the consensus first, therefore, it was inevitable that China should respond. She mentioned, interestingly, the term lai’er buwang feili ye, usually translated as it is impolite not to reciprocate a friend’s gesture. Many netizens concur that China’s diplomacy should be more “Fuying style” (adopting Psy’s popular song “Gangnam Style”) combining elegance and friendliness with confidence and firmness. Over the three decades of her career, Madame Fuying has been a formidable glass-ceiling breaker for women’s empowerment in China. Formerly a minister councilor in Jakarta in 1997, she was transferred to Manila and became China’s youngest and first ethnic-minority female ambassador in 1998.  In 2003, she became the first female ambassador to a major country when she was assigned to Australia. Since 2010 she has been vice minister. To many Chinese, Fuying style, which was summarized by an online public opinion poll as “showing strength while being elegant” is indeed the fresh nuance for Chinese diplomacy they have been craving.  Her amiable presence has soothed domestic audiences’ anxiety at having their country painted by the outside world as a crude threat. At the same time, her firm gestures have satisfied their longing to see a more confident China at the center of the international stage. Now that the fifth generation leadership transition has officially been completed with the appointment of Xi Jinping as president, the showing of strength while maintaining elegance is indeed a style that Chinese people can appreciate. In their eyes, the immediate challenge for China’s diplomacy is how to eloquently articulate the direction of contemporary foreign policy under new leadership at a time when the global order is transforming.  The US pivot to Asia is blatantly directed against a rising China, and escalating tensions with her neighbors are once again propelling the idea of the “Chinese threat”. Of all the domestic discourses on foreign policy that has arisen since the earlier 18th party congress until the conclusion of the Two Sessions, the key message sent by the Chinese government to both domestic and international audiences was that China would continue on the path of peaceful development, but not at the expense of her fundamental interests. The latter part of this message has intrigued many outside observers and some even label it as the herald of a potentially more aggressive China in world and regional affairs, particularly with the overblown tension in the region over maritime border issues. I do not believe that we should be so quick to judge China’s assertiveness as aggressiveness. An assertive China does not mean that China wants to be a bully. We have learned from our own experience throughout history how misunderstanding, lack of knowledge and limited consultation or dialogue has brought ramifications that have bogged down our strategic engagement with China. Despite some differences in characteristics between Indonesia and China as nations, as an aspiring middle power ourselves, perhaps it is easier for us to empathize with China’s growing desire to be more assertive, as we are also trying (and expected by some) to assert a greater leadership role in our own backyard (namely ASEAN), and attempting to express our desire to be an independent power that refuses to be sucked into major power rivalries. This could be detected from the Two Sessions’ press conference, when the hot issues raised by Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi highlighted the growing tension with major powers, namely the US and Japan.  The announcement that Russia and Africa would be the destinations of President Xi’s first official visits abroad also signaled China’s foreign policy priorities, which are seen as logical consequence of the US’ Asia pivot. China’s geostrategic rebalancing effort toward Africa as has been debated for quite some time. Among the initial proponents was Wang Jisi, dean of Peking University’s school of international studies, a prominent strategic thinker and adviser to decision makers. The logic is as follows: Africa is rich in resources but marred by conflict. China’s economic interest is tied to these resources and therefore must take constructive efforts to help reduce the conflict in the area.  Furthermore no US-led military alliance exists there. Negotiations and competition between major powers are ongoing and there is room for constructive cooperation with major powers. The situation is different in the East where US-led military alliances and partnerships exist. The room for constructive engagement between major powers is limited and regional conflicts are prone to become major-power rivalries.  It is therefore crucial for Indonesia, as one of the regional powers, to dig our heels in and counter any efforts to drag us and the region into major power rivalries. Aside from the usual main diplomatic agendas (major power, neighboring countries, developing countries and multilateral diplomacies), what was unique in this year’s agenda was the strong emphasis on two aspects of Chinese diplomacy.  The first is public diplomacy and people-to-people connectivity (aka soft power). The second is constructive engagement in global governance (by providing more public goods). Obviously, in these grand aspects, we share common interests with China. We hope China realizes this and continues to further consolidate the agreement signed by former president Hu Jintao and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and the Indonesia-China strategic partnership becomes the pillar of the ASEAN-China strategic partnership.  Continued cooperation to support an ASEAN-led multilateral framework in the region is important for the development of peace, stability and prosperity in the region. Madame Fuying is no stranger to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). I had the honor of meeting Madame Fuying in person last year during a bilateral strategic consultation in Beijing.  From her thoughtful attentiveness to our concerns and the self-assured feminine grace she exuded in delivering China’s concerns, also from experiences recounted by several CSIS founders that have worked together with her for quite some time, I have to agree with the many Chinese netizens that a “Fuying” style is indeed the fresh nuance that China’s diplomacy needs. ●