The ordinary king and us Dwi Atmanta   ;   A staff writer at The Jakarta Post

JAKARTA POST, 08 Februari 2015

                                                                                                                                     

                                                

Many viewed the popular Javanese wayang (puppet show) fairytale Petruk dadi Ratu (Petruk becomes a king) as a self-fulfilled prophecy with the assumption by Joko “Jokowi” Widodo of the presidency. Like Petruk, one of the four eternal servants of the Pandawa in the Javanese adaptation of the Mahabharata epic, Jokowi is deemed as a representative of the ordinary people who climbs to the throne at the expense of the elite. No one had any doubt about Jokowi’s commitment to the people, as his performance as the mayor of Surakarta in 2005-2012 and governor of Jakarta in 2012-2014 demonstrated. It was the proven track record that lured the majority of voters to choose him in last year’s election over his rival Prabowo Subianto, the antithesis of Jokowi in almost all aspects. But now, less than four months into his term, many, particularly his detractors, have started to sneer at Jokowi as the personification of Petruk. As the story goes, Petruk is unqualified for the throne and therefore his rise to power generates instability, if not a mess. Fortunately his reign is short-lived. So soon? Yes, according to the Javanese folklore, Petruk is catapulted to the throne by accident after the amulet belonging to his ailing master Abimanyu passes to him. Due to the amulet, Abimanyu, son of Arjuna from Subadra, is destined to beget the future king of Hastinapura, Parikesit. As soon as Abimanyu recovers, Petruk surrenders the amulet to the deserving owner voluntarily. In many ways Petruk’s perceived ineligibility to govern is biased in favor of the elite to justify a long-held belief that ordinary men are never born to rule but rather to serve. In fact, in many parts of the world, Indonesia included, rulers mostly come from the elite. Regime change cannot happen without the elite’s say so. In the Indonesian context, the founding fathers belonged to the educated elite and the national leadership circulated within the elite group. Succession strictly involved the political blue blood, by birth or marriage, until a lesser known furniture businessman, Jokowi, emerged. Less than four months since his euphoric inauguration on Oct. 20, 2014, however, Jokowi is facing an uphill, complicated struggle that will prove whether he merits the top executive post. Instead of fighting his opposition, Jokowi is, ironically, pitted against his own allies, who helped him win the presidential race, in particular the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and its paramount leader Megawati Soekarnoputri. What a similarity with Petruk fighting his own Pandawa masters. The rift centers on the nomination of Comr. Gen. Budi Gunawan, formerly an adjutant to Megawati when she was president, as the National Police chief, despite his implication in past corruption cases. Jokowi is torn between his commitment to anticorruption, which earned him popular support and loyalty to his party. Installing Budi, whom the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) has named a suspect, will cost Jokowi his credibility, not to mention his attempts to refute the allegations that he is no more than a puppet president. On the other hand, withdrawing Budi’s nomination will spark a new political brouhaha given his endorsement by the House of Representatives. The worst-case scenario will see the PDI-P withdraw its political support from Jokowi, or if necessary lead a move to impeach him. In fact some in the PDI-P inner circle have expressed disappointment in Jokowi for not paying back enough to the party. Jokowi only awarded three ministerial seats to the PDI-P despite its billing as the election winner, compared with its middle-level coalition partner the NasDem Party, which earned four Cabinet portfolios. Jokowi has reportedly also angered Megawati by appointing Luhut Binsar Panjaitan the Presidential Delivery Unit chief. PDI-P deputy chairman Pramono Anung has dismissed claims of a feud between Jokowi and PDI-P, saying Megawati had three times let Jokowi take decisions that went against her wishes without hard feelings. The first was the formation of the Transition Team prior to Jokowi’s inauguration, the second was the appointment of Cabinet ministers whom Megawati did not endorse and the third was a variety of bills proposed by the government for the national legislative program that ran counter to the PDI-P line, such as the national security bill. One month has passed since the controversy surrounding Budi’s nomination began. Not only have Jokowi’s critics and enemies piled on the pressure for him to act quickly to resolve the matter beyond further doubt, so too have his admirers. The crisis, which has been protracted and has been seen to spiral out of his control, as evinced in the fierce collision between the police and the KPK, has cast Jokowi in a very poor light. Many more now believe the man who they once dubbed Satrio Piningit (the knight in waiting) is no better than Petruk, who became a king by chance. Jokowi has listened to many voices and taken necessary action to anticipate the repercussions of whatever decision he will make on Budi. His surprise approach to his former rival Prabowo and communication with the opposition Red-and-White Coalition, his meetings with leaders of legislative and judicial powers as well as his gathering of Army generals before finally holding a discussion with Megawati and the leaders of the Great Indonesia Coalition indicate that Jokowi is calculating well his moves to ensure he remains in command of the game. That Jokowi went ahead with his tour of three ASEAN neighbors despite the crisis at home signals his confidence that everything is under control and will remain so when he returns home to announce his decision. He would not go overseas had the stalemate got worse. When Jokowi finally withdraws Budi’s candidacy, names a replacement and wins the battle, his resemblance to Petruk will continue. The reason is that behind his modest, down-to-earth appearance, Petruk hides his invincible powers that even gods cannot match. People however do not expect him to show off. They only want him to exercise his power to lead them to prosperity as promised. ●

Jokowi’s Christmas peace for Papua : Will it last long? Dwi Atmanta  ;  A staff writer at The Jakarta Post

JAKARTA POST, 30 Desember 2014

                                                

                                                                                                                       

The Christmas gift came three days late for Papuans this year, but many in the easternmost territory did not seem to mind. What is a more precious Christmas present for them than getting together with President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, who had promised to care for them on the first day of his presidential election campaign early in June? Jokowi arrived in Papua on Saturday to celebrate Christmas and went on his characteristic field trips across the province and neighboring West Papua until Monday. It was his first Papuan excursion to listen to local people’s grievances and demands since his inauguration in October. There was nothing peculiar about such high expectations as Jokowi set his feet on Papua after a series of bloody incidents, including the shooting of five teenagers by military and police troops during a clash in Paniai regency early this month. Jokowi had refused to comment on the Paniai incident, pending a thorough investigation, and it was his silence on the killings that sparked protests from several Papuan church congregations, which immediately announced their objections to the President’s visit. During the Christmas celebration on Saturday, however, Jokowi broke his silence. He said he had ordered the National Police to thoroughly investigate the Paniai incident. “I want this case to be solved as soon as possible so that such an incident will not recur in the future. We want Papua to turn into a land of peace,” Jokowi told thousands of Christmas revelers. As if to elaborate on the President’s remarks, Coordinating for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Minister Tedjo Edhy Purdijatno said the Indonesian Military, police and the National Commission on Human Rights were conducting a fact-finding mission to find those responsible for the act of violence. The government’s commitment to settling the Paniai shooting beyond a doubt is understandable given the many cases of atrocities in Papua that have remained unaddressed. But leaving the police and military to conduct investigations into an offense involving their own personnel will only raise the question of credibility because of the risk of conflicts of interest and the spirit of the corps facing the investigators. As has happened in the past, the public will be unable to expect a transparent investigation, let alone justice to be delivered. Jokowi realizes the long-standing practice, but the existing criminal justice system gives him limited options. He can hope the rights body will declare the Paniai shooting a crime against humanity, which will then enable him to order the Attorney General’s Office to bring to justice whoever is held responsible for the killings. The human rights trial, however, will not materialize without the consent of the House of Representatives, which currently is controlled by the opposition. Fair settlement of the Paniai case alone is a daunting job for Jokowi. In fact, Papuans have been waiting for a comprehensive solution to decades of being deprived of their rights in their own homeland, which ironically occurred after their official incorporation into Indonesia through the Act of Free Choice in 1969. For years Indonesia had fought for sovereignty over Papua from the Dutch only to throw the Papuans from misery into ordeal. Reform movements led to the granting of special autonomy for Papua, but no significant changes have happened to the lives of Papuans despite trillions of rupiah having been transferred from Jakarta. Poverty and poor access to healthcare and education for Papuans have continued to plague Papua nearly 14 years after the inception of the special autonomy, which the Jakarta elites believed was a decent retribution for Papua. The generous special autonomy funds handed to Papua and later West Papua correlate with the increasing number of corruption cases involving local public officials in the two provinces. The naming of 44 West Papua legislative council members and the province’s regional secretary Marthen Luther Rumadas and former Papua governor Barnabas Suebu graft suspects recently is just proof that corruption thrives while supervision is lacking in Papua. Papua is a paradox of Indonesian development. Blessed with abundant natural resources, Papua and West Papua are home to regencies that rank among the most impoverished and least developed regions in the country. Recurrent acts of violence in the territory, many of them allegedly perpetrated by separatist groups, only indicate that injustice, inequality and marginalization of local people remain unfinished business for Jakarta, no matter who is president.  Then president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono promised a new deal for Papua after taking office 10 years ago, but his government’s approach in dealing with Papua was the same old story. Jakarta’s recipe to tackle the Papua issue has never departed from “divide and rule”, as was apparent in the forcible formation of West Papua province in 2004 and a plan to create two more provinces and a new military command there.  Like his predecessor Yudhoyono, Jokowi made many promises to the Papuans, including his plan to visit the land three times a year. It seems exaggerated, even if Jokowi hopes his frequent trips to Papua will ensure the development agenda and improvement of public services to run in accordance with the plan. To woo Papuan voters back in June, Jokowi underlined Papua’s importance. Now the country’s leader, he has to show why Papua matters to him and the whole nation and how he will translate his pledges into policies. As happened when Indonesia solved the Aceh problem with dignity in 2005, the central government’s policies toward Papua should be based on respect for the local people, which will require a dialogue between two equal parties. A dignified settlement will need efforts on Indonesia’s part to heal Papua’s past wounds, which of course include a formal state’s apology to Papuans for atrocities and the government’s indifference that they have endured for a long time. The most urgent measure is revising the 2001 law on special autonomy for Papua. Prior to the end of its term in October, the Yudhoyono administration submitted the draft revision, which offers Papuan rebels a part in local politics, reminiscent of the deal accepted by the then Aceh separatist group, or GAM, which formed the Aceh Party. Without assurance of an all-inclusive solution, the long-lasting peace Jokowi will try to create in Papua will never come true.  ●

Wanted, a Jakarta governor with listening skills Dwi Atmanta  ;  A staff writer at The Jakarta Post

JAKARTA POST, 31 Agustus 2014

                                                                                                                       

                                                      

Indonesia is bracing itself for a new era under Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, who will take office as the seventh president on Oct. 20. But so is Jakarta, with Jokowi’s departure from City Hall paving the way to the governor’s seat for his deputy Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama. New, however, does not necessarily mean better; it can be the other way around. Take for example the New Order, which offered stability and prosperity at the expense of liberty. After more than 30 years, when demand for reform was irresistible, the New Order faded away (although, like an old soldier, it may never die). Many will welcome Ahok’s succession to Jakarta’s top executive job, and hope the new governor will do more than he has achieved as second-in-command of the capital city. The pairing of Jokowi and Ahok looked likely to live up to their billing as a dynamic duo shortly after they were sworn in on Oct. 5 two years ago. Jokowi hopped from one place to another without prior notice to capture a candid picture of the problems facing the people and his administration, while Ahok revamped the foot-dragging bureaucracy without worrying about possible internal dissent. Both Jokowi and Ahok have emerged as media darlings ever since they declared their bid to contest the Jakarta election. Undoubtedly, Jokowi enjoyed this privilege when he finally shot for the presidential post and won it. The same treatment applies to Ahok. No one, except the minority Islamic hardline groups, would question his eligibility to lead the capital city, let alone his policies. The public was quick to support Ahok in an argument over the relocation of Tanah Abang street vendors against United Development Party (PPP) politician and native Betawi figure Abraham Lulung in September last year. Fearless Ahok has twice been embroiled in a fight with a Cabinet minister. Last year Ahok suggested that Home Minister Gamawan Fauzi read the Constitution in response to the minister’s objection to the appointment of a Christian to lead a predominantly Muslim subdistrict in South Jakarta. More recently, Ahok was involved in a standoff against Youth and Sports Minister Roy Suryo over the Jakarta government’s plan to demolish Lebak Bulus Stadium in South Jakarta. The media, and perhaps the public, tend to stand behind Ahok, as his leadership style is rare in this country. His oftentimes offensive words are buried under his much-vaunted bureaucratic reform, his anticorruption campaigns, his responsiveness and his accessibility. Many have even accepted his bruising remarks as a characteristic that distinguishes him from his predecessors. Ahok’s rise to the gubernatorial post will certainly be welcomed by many, thanks to his decisiveness and zero tolerance of corruption. As acting governor when Jokowi took leave to focus on the presidential race in July, Ahok threatened to dismiss all the civil servants working at a vehicle-test center in West Jakarta after finding sharp practices going on there. Earlier this month, Ahok dismissed and downgraded a number of public housing agency officials for their alleged role in illegal sales of low-cost apartments meant for the poor. In an interview with The Jakarta Post recently, Ahok pledged to immediately fire government officials caught in the act of corruption. He pledged also to seek help from Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) to conduct checks on government officials whose lifestyles did not match their monthly earnings. Ahok envisions a city where the law is enforced indiscriminately for all citizens, whether rich or poor, educated or illiterate. He appears to have learned that inconsistent law enforcement leads to public disorder, as in the cases of slum areas along river banks that have been blamed for exacerbating floods, or congestion as a result of street vendors who choose roadsides over stalls inside markets as their business premises. Certainly, Ahok’s ascent to power has given the poor community of 375,700 people in Jakarta and their defenders a cause for concern. Evictions, as part of the provincial government’s bid to resettle squatters to low-cost apartments, have been rampant since Ahok took over de facto leadership of Jakarta. Urban poor activists consider Ahok’s policies biased toward the middle class. They say Ahok emulates previous governors, particularly Sutiyoso and Fauzi Bowo, who got tough with the poor — primarily through eviction campaigns. Sandyawan Sumardi, founder of Ciliwung Merdeka, which is concerned about education for the poor, says Ahok’s penchant for eviction simply proves his lopsided view of Jakarta’s development. Moving squatters to low-cost apartments will not necessarily solve the problem of poverty, as their relocation also deprives them of their livelihoods. Sandyawan suggests that Ahok listen more to the poor if he really wants to alleviate poverty. Unlike Jokowi, Sandyawan says, Ahok does not like to listen but to talk, which is why he cannot build empathy. “About five months before the gubernatorial election, Ahok came to me to ask for advice. But in fact, the meeting was just two hours of him talking,” Sandyawan recalls. Like Sandyawan, the people of Jakarta are pinning their hopes on Ahok to lead Jakarta to prosperity and justice for all. Ahok has secured public trust — the most precious capital in governing the city. That he quickly responds to any report or complaint related to public services, and that people have direct access to him, are further plus points. Ahok may need to assert his new status as the “godfather of Jakarta” to show his firmness, but without empathy, strong leadership will result in tyranny. ●

New administration, same old story? Dwi Atmanta  ;   A staff writer at The Jakarta Post

JAKARTA POST, 13 April 2014

                                      

                                                                                         

                                                             

If he was still alive, the smiling Gen. Soeharto might have greeted Indonesian voters, who on Wednesday cast their ballots in the fourth legislative election since the end of his New Order regime, in his native Javanese, “Piye kabare? Enak jamanku to?” (How are you? It was better in my time, wasn’t it?). The cynical remarks, which are part of a picture of the former dictator that has been circulating around the country since last year, will pose a challenge to Indonesian democracy as the legislative election on Wednesday is very likely to plunge the nation into yet another coalition trap. The noisy, prolonged, energy-sapping and, in fact, unnecessary war of words among politicians will highlight decision-making at the House of Representatives in news media for the coming five years. Instead of focusing on their legislative roles, in which they have never excelled, the politicians will allocate much of their work hours to political moves, intrigue and plots to indulge their narcissistic instincts — only to show they are doing something, even if it is not really what their constituents need. There could be another Centurygate — Part 1 and Part 2 — interpellation motions or even an impeachment petition for the public to watch with fatigue. The maneuverings will take a break at certain times, with one or two politicians being caught red-handed accepting bribes, found guilty in court and dismissed without feeling humiliated, let alone guilty, because they embezzled state money to help their party cover its operational costs. Following the 2014 election, if nothing changes in the orchestra of Indonesian politics except for the conductor, it will have been the choice of the voters who on April 9 cast their ballots at 550,000 polling stations across the country. With only 12 parties contesting, down from 38 parties five years ago, the next House will see 10 parties fill its 560 legislative seats, up from nine following the 2009 election. As no single party will play a dominant role, the House looks set to emulate the existing pattern that splits the legislative body into pro-government and opposition camps — no matter who wins the presidency — for the 2014-2019 term. For another five years, protracted bickering over unpopular government policies will distract the House from its legislative agenda and other pressing issues facing the country such as infrastructure, energy insecurity, climate change-related disasters and the impending ASEAN free market. That is the price this nation has to pay for forcing Soeharto to step down in May 1998 and choosing democracy as the new vehicle to reach the common goals of prosperity and justice laid out by the founding fathers. The New Order under Soeharto was a period when political stability was non-negotiable and hence translated into a multi-party system that was singlehandedly controlled by the ruling party, the Golkar Party. Golkar won the elections held between 1971 and 1997 by landslides — often with a margin that was double the votes of the two opposition parties combined — to ensure Soeharto’s reelection and an effective government. For more than three decades, Indonesian politics was relatively quiet or, borrowing the political elite’s overused term, “conducive”, thanks to the might of Golkar, the majority faction in the House. The stability of the legislative body was further kept intact due to constant support from the armed forces faction. But Soeharto wanted more, as he coined the term “round democracy”, which referred to unanimous decisions, compared to “oval democracy”, in strategic issues like the selection of the vice president. It was democracy sans opposition that allowed the government to win the House’s approval of any policy, unhindered. On the other hand, it was the absence of the checks-and-balances mechanism that left corruption rife, particularly in the executive branch of power. For better or worse, such an effective government fit the presidential system as mandated by the Constitution. A series of constitutional amendments that followed the fall of Soeharto in 1998 swung the pendulum of power from the executive to the legislative branch. While political reforms put an end to authoritarianism by preventing the president from accumulating power and empowering the legislative body through a checks-and-balances mechanism, the overhaul itself was perhaps the rotten apple of Indonesian democracy. For over 15 years, Indonesia has been practicing a legislative system of government, reminiscent of the chaotic constitutional democracy back in 1955-1959. A grand coalition comprising all of the parties that secured House seats was formed in 1999 to help the government of Abdurrahman Wahid work effectively, but it did not guarantee a stable government. The powerful House impeached the president in 2001, allowing then vice president Megawati Soekarnoputri to take over. Another grand coalition was established in 2004, given the fact that the ruling party of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the Democratic Party, was inferior in the House. Yudhoyono should thank his former vice president Jusuf Kalla, who was also Golkar chairman, for managing the coalition to fend off the opposition’s challenge. Despite the fact that Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party won the 2009 legislative election, and he himself was reelected president and secured support from a coalition that controlled the House, he was stretched to the limit to govern effectively. His weakened coalition failed to stop a House investigation into the suspicious Bank Century bailout, foiled a House probe into tax mafia practices and won the House’s approval to raise fuel prices, all in nerve-wracking votes that demonstrated the vulnerability of the government to political ploys. Nevertheless, the political dynamics that marked the three administrations after the New Order, and particularly the second term of Yudhoyono, are worth learning — albeit not because they set a good example but because they show the flaws of our democracy. For decades, the old regime hid the virtue of democracy. ●

What’s in a name?                              A thorn in the side of RI-S’pore ties Dwi Atmanta  ;   A staff writer at The Jakarta Post

JAKARTA POST,  16 Februari 2014

                                                                                                                        

                                                                                         

                                                      

When Singapore expressed its displeasure with the naming of an Indonesian corvette after two marine commandos were hanged in the neighboring country back in 1968, we Indonesians began to understand why the governments and peoples of China and South Korea protested every time Japanese leaders visited Yasukuni shrine. Singapore regards the two Indonesian Marines Usman Janatin and Harun Said as terrorists for carrying out a bombing on MacDonald House, killing three people and wounding 33 others, the way China and South Korea perceive the World War II soldiers memorialized in the Yasukuni shrine as war criminals. Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean told Indonesian Coordinating Political, Legal and Security Affairs Minister Djoko Suyanto during a phone conversation on Feb. 6 that the issue had reopened an old wound. Singapore’s acting labor minister Tan Chuan-jin wrote about his memories of the March 1965 bombing on his Facebook account. Tan’s father, whose office was located in MacDonald House, avoided the attack as he was on sick leave that day. In Jakarta and elsewhere across the archipelago nationalistic views have filled the public sphere, although so far they have not led to anti-Singaporean sentiments which gives us reason to believe that the brouhaha will soon pass. The true extent of the issue will be seen through Singapore’s diplomatic attitude during weekends, given the fact that the city is a popular shopping destination for Indonesians. The diplomatic row has in fact provided both Indonesia and Singapore with an opportunity to get to know each other better. The scuffle could to some extent close the yawning gap that exists between the two nations despite their geographical proximity. There are a lot of misconceptions and misunderstandings, such as the naming of the navy vessel, which President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong have to address when they meet at an annual leaders’ retreat later this year. On Indonesia’s part there is a pressing need to take history seriously simply to find the truth.  Before the diplomatic tension evolved few would have even heard of Usman and Harun, who infiltrated Singapore when Indonesia was at war with Malaysia. The remains of the two soldiers received a hero’s welcome at home and were buried at Kalibata Heroes Cemetery and their military ranks were promoted posthumously to honor their service. The late former vice president Mohammad Hatta, known for his calm demeanor, vented his anger at the execution by pledging never to visit Singapore, a promise that he kept until his death in 1980. Regardless of who started the fire, the warship controversy has given politicians a chance to display a degree of nationalism ahead of the legislative election. Their defense of national dignity against a wealthy neighbor will easily win the hearts of voters. Usman and Harun are currently in the spotlight, but what about other forgotten heroes or those who have been deliberately delisted as war heroes for unknown reasons? Among the unsung heroes is perhaps Ibrahim Datuk Tan Malaka, a freedom fighter known for his leftist ideals, who was executed by Suradi Takebek on the orders of East Java military officer Lt. Soekotjo, according to Dutch historical researcher Harry Poeze. Although then president Sukarno named Tan Malaka a national hero in 1963, there have been no concrete, let alone serious, moves by the current or previous governments to advance Tan Malaka’s famous dogma of “100 percent independence”, which the nation is apparently lacking. For better or worse, it has become increasingly important for the government to encourage revisions of history whenever new findings come to the fore. There are many parts of Indonesian history that are kept in the shade, neglected or removed from people’s memory.  In the wake of the uproar over Usman and Harun, Indonesia has an opportunity to prove that its decision to name them as national heroes was legitimate and by virtue of their contribution to the nation’s safety and dignity. But it should not necessarily prompt Indonesia to immortalize them in a way that merely provokes tension with other parties, including Singapore. For Singapore, the allegation regarding Indonesia’s insensitivity could backfire. Singapore’s move to protest the Indonesian Navy’s honoring of Usman and Harun has undoubtedly been perceived as an attempt to meddle with Indonesia’s internal affairs. The more Singapore ups the ante, the more resistant Indonesia will be. So why is Singapore protesting now? Why did it not protest earlier when it knew that Riau Islands named a street, a soccer field, a meeting hall and a heroes cemetery after Usman and Harun? In May last year a street in Jakarta was named after the two marines. Both Singapore and Indonesia had actually declared the case closed when then prime minister Lee Kuan Yew, the father of the current Singaporean Prime Minister, paid homage to Usman and Harun when he visited Jakarta in 1973, regardless of the fact that Lee Sr. was fulfilling the request of then Indonesian president Soeharto as a condition of restoring ties between the two neighbors. Past leaders have certainly set an example on damage limitation. There is no doubt the current ones can follow suit, as evinced when their economic ministers met Tuesday. ●

When ‘reformasi’ devours its children

When ‘reformasi’ devours its children Dwi Atmanta  ;  Staff Writer at The Jakarta Post JAKARTA POST, 06 Oktober 2013

Revolution is like Saturn, it devours its own children, or so the adage goes. In France, the revolution saw Georges-Jacques Danton, who led the overthrow of the monarchy and ensuing mass executions, guillotined by the same tribunal he created himself. In Indonesia, revolutionary Tan Malaka was shot in a military raid at the foot of Mt. Wilis in East Java in 1949 and a number of independence fighters who led a rebellion against the young Republic – some were killed – in 1950s. 

The wind of reform that blew across the archipelago in 1998 is perhaps incomparable to a revolution, but the two have much in common in the way they inflicted pain. The arrest of Constitutional Court chief Akil Mochtar on Wednesday was a glaring example of the sacrifice the nation has to relinquish to keep the reform goals achievable.

Reformasi envisioned a nation free from corruption, collusion and nepotism, known by their Indonesian acronym as KKN, embodied in the administration of long-time ruler Soeharto, which therefore had to go. Public resentment to KKN then prompted the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) to issue a decree on the fight against the practice, but only five years after the inception of the MPR decree, the real combat on corruption commenced, thanks to the formation of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in 2003. 

The first five years of reform saw hectic institutionalization of democracy, which was marked by four constitutional amendments that swing the pendulum to the opposite end. 

It was the euphoria of democracy that gave impetus to the reconstruction of the House of Representatives into a powerful legislative body, transformation of the quiet three-party into a noisy multi-party system, implementation of regional autonomy that has forced the central government to transfer its powers related to regional development to local elites, introduction of direct elections of national and local leaders and generated new institutions and the birth of state institutions to support consolidation of democracy.

Among the institutions is the Constitutional Court, which is the last bastion of justice for citizens who have their constitutional rights infringed upon by the state. It gradually gained the public confidence, both at home and overseas, thanks to its rulings that, among others, restored the rights of political prisoners, abolished subversion articles and reinstated freedom of expression.

Oftentimes it sprang surprises, notably when it revoked altogether, the law on the truth and reconciliation commission, the electricity law, “commercialization” of state universities and most recently, an article in the 2001 oil and gas law that justified formation of the upstream oil and gas regulator BPMigas.

But in general, the Constitutional Court has managed to teach policymakers both in the House and the government a lesson to exercise prudence in drafting a national law. Short-term political interests which are prone to creating legal uncertainty and, hence, discrimination are the common flaws the Court has found in dozens of laws it has reviewed.

So far the Court has only yet to exercise its authority to impeach a president, merely because of the complicated procedure and difficult requirements which in practice are unlikely to meet.

But as the case of Akil has shown, the extra mandate to settle disputes over the results of regional elections awarded to the Court in 2009 turns out to be its Achilles heel. With dozens of regional election disputes deluging the Court’s filing cabinet, the chance for parties to the disputes to offer bribes to judges is high. A Constitutional Court judge is more susceptible to bribery attempts than other judges given the Court’s decision which is final and binding.

With about 500 regencies and municipalities and 34 provinces holding elections every five years, laypeople will easily calculate how much a judge could earn for giving a favor to an election contender. In the bribery case implicating Akil, the KPK accused him of receiving Rp 1 billion (US$88,500) in relation to the election dispute in the Banten regency of Lebak and $300,000 he shared with Golkar lawmaker Chairun Nisa from the regent of Gunung Mas in Central Kalimantan, Hambit Bintih.

As the decision to adjudicate an election dispute is collegial, the KPK is expected to disclose whether the bribery involved other Constitutional Court judges. Furthermore the public will be anxiously waiting for an answer to their suspicion that bribery could be behind many other verdicts to settle election disputes.

The shocking bribery scandal implicating Akil underlines that integrity matters in the selection of Constitutional Court judges at the House. Now that Akil has tainted, if not obliterated, credibility of the Court, many will not be surprised if someday another judge is arrested for accepting bribes from a company or businessman whose judicial review motion wins the Court’s nod.

Of course Akil, if found guilty, is entitled to maximum punishment for destroying the Court’s credibility. As a symbol of reform movement this nation cannot let the Court down otherwise the anti-reform force’s prophecy will be fulfilled.

Likewise, the nation does not necessarily call for dissolution of the House just because some of its lawmakers are corrupt, demand termination of direct elections and reinstate the old, indirect mechanism due to the high-cost politics they have created or support a move to reinstate centralization after seeing regional autonomy give a rise to “little kings”.

The excesses of the reform movement this nation embarked on more than 15 years ago are perhaps a difficult stage that we have to deal with through the rule of law. It is our responsibility to complete the reform until a full-fledged democracy we are craving materializes.

Unlike a revolution, however, reformation must not devour its own children. ●

Round or oval, democracy never pleases all

Round or oval, democracy never pleases all Dwi Atmanta  ;  A Staff Writer at The Jakarta Post

JAKARTA POST, 24 Maret 2013

  

It looked like a case of déjà vu when Democratic Party leaders, gearing up for the party’s extraordinary congress in Bali next week, expressed their hopes for a unanimous decision on a successor for Anas Urbaningrum, who resigned as party chairman after being named a corruption suspect last month. Syariefuddin Hasan, a member of the party’s supreme council, foretold the likely scenario of the change of leader after a meeting called by the party’s paramount council chairman, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, on March 17. Since then, the issue has become a trending topic, at least among executives and rank-and-file Democrats. “God willing, there will be a consensus. Pray that there will be no turmoil,” said Syariefuddin, who is also the cooperatives and small and medium enterprises minister. Those who take Syariefuddin and his statement lightly will be disappointed. Just before the shock of Anas being implicated and his subsequent exit from the party’s top post, Syariefuddin and fellow party patrons put pressure on Anas to step down, citing the party’s nose-diving popularity. Other party executives like Johnny Allen Marbun and Max Sopacua, but not those linked to Anas, joined the chorus of support for the mechanism to elect a new chairman. The party’s leader at the House of Representatives, Nurhayati Ali Assegaf, went further by tipping First Lady Ani Yudhoyono as the sole candidate.  “Consensus is not necessarily undemocratic. If 80 percent of voters support a particular candidate, a decision is already reached. Voting would be a waste of time in that case,” Nurhayati said. Such an attitude is reminiscent of Indonesia’s Pancasila-based democracy practiced under President Soeharto, who until the final year of his reign, maintained his distaste of the “50 percent plus one” type of democracy adopted in the West, putting his trust instead in the consensus process as the true embodiment of democracy. Soeharto was the first to coin the term “rounded democracy” as an ideal national policy-making process typified by consensus, as opposed to “oval democracy”, which refers to decision-making through voting. It came ahead of the General Session of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) to elect a vice president in 1988, when the Muslim-based United Development Party (PPP) insisted on contesting the post by nominating its chairman, Jaelani Naro, despite Soeharto’s clear preference for his minister/state secretary Soedharmono. Soeharto said he wanted a vice president who was unanimously elected by the MPR, hence all the people, because the second man in command would have to be ready to replace him at any time.  To everybody’s delight, Naro dropped his bid at the last minute, saving the day for rounded democracy. When addressing 500 elected House members at the State Palace on Aug. 9, 1997, Soeharto reiterated the need to preserve rounded democracy for the sake of political stability. Liberal democracy, he said, only resulted in instability as evident in the frequent changes of government, which would give the nation no chance to begin development. Debate was not prohibited under Pancasila democracy, but it had to lead to a consensus, according to Soeharto. None of the elected House members, some of them perhaps still serving today albeit under different party banners, dared to challenge Soeharto’s teaching, which is today perceived as a defiance of democracy. Challenges to rounded democracy did claim their victims. The Armed Forces chief of sociopolitical affairs, Lt. Gen. Harsudiono Hartas, lost his post and career for campaigning for Armed Forces commander Gen. Try Sutrisno as the vice-presidential candidate in 1993, while Soeharto had opted for his technology and research minister, BJ Habibie. Try won Soeharto’s endorsement anyway, but the reelected president only entrusted him with low-key supervisory jobs. During his five-year term, Try went overseas only once — to Australia. When Soeharto could not attend the ASEAN informal meeting in 1997 due to ill health, he assigned foreign minister Ali Alatas to represent Indonesia. Democratic Party elites may have learned from democracy à la Soeharto, which emphasizes unity and minimizes, if not curtails, differences. Yudhoyono who, like Soeharto, was an Army general, is no exception. The party is enduring its worst crisis ever with only one year left until the 2014 legislative election; some have described it as a sinking ship, with one executive after another being convicted or implicated in corruption cases. Various surveys have forecast its falling behind the Golkar Party and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), two parties that grew up under Soeharto’s New Order regime. Yudhoyono and his loyalists may push for a consensus to support a sole candidate to avoid internal splits, which would jeopardize the party’s consolidation agenda. More importantly, allowing a contender to join the race will only give Anas room to maneuver and spoil the agenda. Anas has traumatized Yudhoyono. Despite his apparent preference for Andi Mallarangeng for the party chief’s post in 2010 Yudhoyono, as a champion of democracy, had no choice but to allow Anas to contest the election — which he then won. Many believe, however, that despite his isolation, Anas’ influence on the party’s grass roots should not be underestimated. His bargaining power appears to remain intact, given the fact that the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) has yet to arrest him. History teaches us the clear lesson that consensus is prone to abuses of power to nullify differences and suppress opposition; oftentimes under the guise of “national” or “greater” interests. In the past, consensus led to a fake democracy. The upcoming extraordinary congress is a real test for the Democrats to prove their commitment to democracy, which may be costly. Many will be unhappy with the results of democracy, which will never please everybody all of the time. My feeling, however, is that the Democrats will propose and unanimously elect a sole candidate handpicked by Yudhoyono. I hope, I will be proved wrong. ●