Take Aim, fire at will : Australian hypocrisy on a high pedestal

Take Aim, fire at will : Australian hypocrisy on a high pedestal Pierre Marthinus  ;   Executive director for the Marthinus Academy in Jakarta

JAKARTA POST, 24 Januari 2015

                                                                                                                                     

The Australian media is engaged in a surreal form of hypocrisy by criticizing the execution of those convicted of drug trafficking in Indonesia. Canberra’s exceptionalism stands out as it puts its double standards with respect to human lives and dignity on a high pedestal, problematizing the death penalty only when Australians are put before the firing squad. First, Indonesian state treatment of convicted drug traffickers differs only slightly from Australia’s treatment of asylum seekers. Asylum seekers desperately trying to seek refuge in Australia and convicted drug traffickers vacationing in Bali are similar “abject bodies”: individuals that the sovereign state does not want and plans to effectively and efficiently dispose of. In a nutshell, the only difference between Indonesian and Australian treatment of “abject bodies” lies merely in each country’s preferred legal methods and the distance considered comfortable and acceptable by its public. Indonesia provides open and accessible trials, opportunities for appeal, sympathetic media coverage, rehabilitation programs and a chance at being granted presidential clemency. On the other hand, Australia seemingly prefers secretive on-the-spot extra-judicial actions, better known as “on-sea-matters” that the Abbott government refuses to comment on. Furthermore, Indonesia prefers openly using its own firing squad, having solid legal justification and being fully accountable for the lives it takes. Meanwhile, Australia prefers the outsourcing and subcontracting of their deeds to private companies and offshoring them to distant locations that are conveniently out of sight and out of the mind of its public, such as Manus Island, Nauru and Cambodia. In July 2014, the forced return of Australian-bound refugees to Sri Lanka also indicated that Canberra is content with practices bordering on “forced disappearance” of civilians at sea while effectively breaching international legal principles of non-refoulement, the UN Refugee Convention and UN Convention against Torture. Asylum seekers, sometimes including children, in Australian detention facilities have undergone hunger strikes, sewn their lips shut, inflicted self-harm and attempted suicide, swallowed razorblades and even burned themselves to death in protest at the “Australian solution”. Currently, 700 asylum seekers are on hunger strike in Manus Island. Two asylum seekers from the camp, Reza Barati and Hamid Kehazaei, have already died but not a single asylum seeker has been successfully resettled to date. This makes the facility more of a death camp than a resettlement camp. Second, insistence on saving individual Australians misses the bigger picture which should be the abolition of the death penalty and upholding human dignity in Indonesia, Australia and beyond. When former president Yudhoyono left his presidency, he controversially granted Schapelle Corby parole. His act of conceited generosity fostered Australian exceptionalism, giving the impression that the death penalty is avoidable by turning convicted Australians into media darlings, concluding backroom negotiations, having your appeal heard by the president and finding legal loopholes that Australians can exploit. Before concerned Australians can start seeing the bigger picture and join ranks with like-minded liberals and reformists in Indonesia, Australian parents will continue to worry about their youth vacationing in Bali, knowing that once caught experimenting with recreational drugs, their loved ones might be sent to the firing squad. Third, implying that executions will affect bilateral relations to the disadvantage of Indonesia is ridiculous. Former Australian prime minister John Howard and opposition leader Simon Crean were not opposed to the execution of convicted terrorists Amrozi bin Nurhasyim and Imam Samudra in 2008 and Canberra, through its counterterrorism aid, had actually subsidized the bullets used to execute them. Australian media coverage of their executions was surprisingly detailed and even savored many of its graphic moments. Australia’s main ally, the United States, enforces the death penalty in the majority of its states and one of Canberra’s largest trading partners and paymaster, China, performs one of the highest numbers of executions worldwide and has only stopped harvesting organs from executed prisoners this year. If anything, Australian hypocrisy and exceptionalism risks worsening its public image in Indonesia as a neighbor that not only disrespects international law and Indonesia’s borders, but now also Indonesian law and legal corridors. Australian government appeals are neither heroic nor heartfelt; Canberra is merely trying to save their own “subject bodies” from the firing squad, while slowly disposing of “abject bodies” it does not want through inhumane detention camps or returning them to foreign regimes that will probably finish the job for them. Indonesia paying “blood money” to save the “subject bodies” of Indonesian domestic workers in Saudi Arabia from beheading is no less hypocritical as these efforts are done against the backdrop of killing off “abject bodies” that were once warmly received as guests in Bali. Australia and Indonesia betray human rights and violate human dignity alike by abusing the criminalized and illegal “abject bodies” in surprisingly similar ways, differing only in their preferred legal methods and comfortable distance acceptable to their respective publics. All lives matter greatly, not just Australian ones. Any debate that does not start from these fundamental premises of equality of human life and dignity is not worth visiting and is a waste of the Indonesian public’s valuable attention and time. ●

Indonesia-Australia : The lame-duck gambit Pierre Marthinus  ;   Executive director of the Marthinus Academy in Jakarta

JAKARTA POST, 18 September 2014

                                                                                                                       

                                                      

Taking the one-page code of conduct between Jakarta and Canberra at face value as a signal of restored ties poses a real danger to the future of bilateral relations between the two neighbors. In practice, the document conceals the extent of bilateral damage and might be preventing it from receiving much-needed proper treatment. Instead of “applying pressure” to the wound, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono apparently opted to cover it with a piece of paper instead. First, the outgoing president seemingly pushed the diplomatic process in an unnatural, hurried and somewhat suspect manner that left the public guessing. A “six-step” gradual process of rapprochement, like many aspects of Yudhoyono’s foreign policy, hardly reflects the diplomatic reality on the ground. It is doubtful that anyone other than Yudhoyono himself can feel, let alone claim, any ownership of the diplomatic process and the final signed document. Despite the rhetoric of increasing people-to-people (P2P) relations, the code of conduct indicates that relations have taken a much more elitist turn. Understandably, this introduces a certain degree of volatility in bilateral relations should the next row erupt under president-elect Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s watch. The Indonesian public is also left without proper closure since Yudhoyono could not even manage to extract a simple apology from Canberra. Claims that Australia “won the spy war” and “did not budge an inch” are correct. However, it leaves out the ironic fact that Australia did not win the spy war “against Yudhoyono”, but won it “with Yudhoyono” instead. The latest leaked documents on a graft scandal surrounding the printing of Indonesian banknotes in Australia in 1999 (The Jakarta Post, Aug. 1, 2014) indicates that any future leaks might be — properly or wrongfully — associated with individuals working and events happening under Yudhoyono’s presidency. Understandably, it would be in Yudhoyono’s interests to quickly mend ties and keep himself on Australia’s good side. In contrast, there is very little interest for Jokowi to hand out “get out of jail free” cards to Australia. Unfortunately, ever since the bilateral row took place, it has also become the Australian media’s favorite pastime to “intentionally misread” Yudhoyono’s actions and perceptions as representing the whole of Indonesia. However, such media biases are entirely understandable since the Indonesian public itself is having difficulty figuring out whether policy options concerning Australia are motivated by Yudhoyono’s own political interest or Indonesia’s larger national interest. Second, the signing of the code of conduct should be seen as a note of caution about a larger political maneuvering in the last moments of Yudhoyono’s presidency. A lame-duck president might be tempted to hand out a number of strategic national leverages to secure last-minute praise from the West or simply to politically capitalize on the seemingly chaotic transition period. Jokowi’s transition team has received a bad rap recently due to allegedly being unruly, bypassing procedures and “unnecessarily meddling” in the affairs of certain ministries. Despite being technically sound, these criticisms are substantively irrelevant. President Yudhoyono is currently handing over his “presidential briefcase” to Jokowi. Therefore, it is important for the latter’s team to thoroughly check the briefcase for ticking time bombs before it is passed on. To be fair, though, it is also natural for Yudhoyono to feel untrusted, offended and violated upon being frisked, but this might have more to do with his own insecurities. Amid all the smoke and mirrors, the transition team should be guarding PT Freeport Indonesia renegotiations closely since Jokowi will be at the receiving end of all political externalities, economic consequences and diplomatic difficulties produced by the gold-mining operator. Despite clarifications, the current government is continuously sending mixed and unclear signals, ranging from postponing renegotiations for future leadership to drafting a legally binding memorandum of understanding (MoU) to seal negotiations early on. This is where the message should be made clear — no more last-minute deals behind closed doors. The transition team needs to search thoroughly in anticipation of further “buck-passing” of the more difficult policy decisions to incoming president Jokowi. The postponing of the evaluation of special autonomy in Papua, the drafting of the special autonomy “plus” package for Papua and Yudhoyono’s rejection of requests to perform the long-overdue cutting of fuel subsidies are just a few examples of such buck-passing tendencies. Third, wishful thinking that bilateral relations are fully restored by Yudhoyono’s one-page document is both naive and dangerous. The premature code of conduct swept the trust deficit under the rug and stole away the chance for both countries to learn and appreciate each other’s sensitivities, sensibilities and subtleties. It is the equivalent of breaking off a fight without resolving the underlying problem that initially triggered it. The document unnecessarily placed Indonesia in a vulnerable position and might be incentivizing further breaches in the future. It conveys the wrong message that openly conducting large-scale intelligence operations from a Jakarta embassy and repeatedly breaching Indonesian sovereign waters will only cost a signature on a piece of paper. Let’s not forget that Beijing is also keeping a very close eye on Southeast Asia’s largest country. Just to refresh memories, Chinese destroyers Wuhan and Haikou and the country’s largest amphibious landing craft Changbaishan were deployed for simulation drills through the Lombok Strait soon after the Royal Australian Navy repeatedly breached Indonesian waters six times in early 2014. In Yudhoyono’s dealings with Australia, Indonesia looked entirely like a nation of coolies and a coolie among nations. Despite its growing international stature and being a larger economy than Australia, Indonesia under Yudhoyono has had to receive the coolie treatment from Australia. Jokowi will be walking into the G-20 meeting in Brisbane, Australia, with the difficult challenge of dispelling the image of Indonesia as “the pushover nation, a nation of coolies and a coolie among nations”, thanks to Yudhoyono. ●

Petty theft : The Russian word for US sanctions Pierre Marthinus  ;   Executive director for the Marthinus Academy in Jakarta

JAKARTA POST,  02 Mei 2014

                                                

                                                                                         

                                                      

Southeastern Ukraine is now officially on fire, “Referendum, Russia!” is ceaselessly chanted by protesters. Pro-Russian militias have successfully seized government buildings, police stations, and military airports in a number of cities in the Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk regions. As the central government in Kiev organizes an “anti-terror” offensive against protesters and invites other countries to join them, satellite images show that Russian ground and air forces are building up neatly at the Ukrainian border, threatening a swift “humanitarian intervention” should Kiev follow through with a violent crackdown against its own Russian-speaking population. The US has followed through with initial threats of “staged sanctions” against Russia, effectively freezing Russian assets and targeting a number of Russian banks. Arguably, sanctions stand as one of the main roadblocks to finding an amicable, negotiated and mutually agreed upon solution for Ukraine. First, US sanctions merely constitute “petty theft” against Russia. US sanctions remain a minor irritant, unable to impose compel or incentivize any policy change within Moscow. Economically, for a country that champions the free market, promotes free flow of goods and capital, and criminalizes government encroachment on businesses and private property, US imposed economic sanctions are problematic. Proportional to its scale, US sanctions incur an economic opportunity cost in which Russian investments are postponed, business expansions halted, potential jobs and opportunities snatched. They are merely a disguised form of spite-inspired political barriers raised to economically hurt an adversary’s economy and general welfare of its people. Sanctions also tend to trigger even harsher retaliatory actions, breach trust and discourage further interactions between nations. In retaliation to US sanctions, Moscow is now tightening its grip on westward gas pipelines supplying energy to Ukraine and Europe — both most likely to be paying the indirect costs of US sanctions.  Second, US sanctions tend to divert international public attention and resources away from real military action and constructive diplomatic efforts. Posing as an equivalent and adequate substitute, sanctions effectively rob international crises of an actual solution.  The primary stocks on the Russian exchange have  lost value, the Russian ruble is down against the US dollar, billions of dollars’ worth of investment was lost to capital flight, escalation into “third phase” sanctions against Moscow was being considered, and Russian growth projections had been slashed. However, it is important to understand that the ultimate objective of sanctions is a change in policy and state behavior, not economic damage per se. In that understanding, sanctions are proven to be effective only 5 percent of the time (Pape 1997). The main political motive of US staged sanctions is mainly to save face at home and abroad — a very American compromise where Democrats can pat themselves on the back saying “at least we are not at war” while Republicans can do the same saying “at least we’ve got economic war”. It spoon feeds the American domestic public, partner countries in Europe and the international media with the illusion that the US is actually doing “something” — when neither meaningful thoughts nor decisive actions have been taken to solve the crisis. Third, US economic sanctions risk deepening international crises. A lot like drone strikes, US sanctions cause enmity to the wider public affected by it, even when sanctions were initially “targeted” only at one person or a small group. Something “international” will often turn into something “political and personal” when its effect is felt by and made visible to the layman. The US has imposed sanctions against Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Sudan and Syria — the list of failures is comprehensive. Costs imposed by US sanctions, ironically, will only harden Russia’s position, making it harder for Moscow to back down, yield and forego previous and future gains from the crisis. Sanctions intended to “make sure that Russia pays” ironically made the annexation of Crimea more “transactional” and had effectively “indicated the market price” for Southeastern Ukraine. US staged sanctions are not only “petty theft” but also literally “staged”. It is the pickpocket going into drama mode, an expensive political soap opera that the world does not want to see, a performance that the people of Ukraine is being held hostage to, with an overpriced invoice most likely to be paid for by Europe. Unfortunately, the US tends to proudly flaunt its staged sanctions like the “emperor wears his new clothes”. Of course, no one will dare to say that Washington is playing Russian roulette with Ukraine’s head and billing Europe for the carpet cleaner’s bill.  The lessons of Ukraine for Indonesia’s coming presidential election are threefold. First, an inclusive national leadership is paramount in stressing that “Indonesianship” is an egalitarian comradeship, irrespective of creed, color and culture.  The big question of EU integration should have been answered by Kiev in consensus, through a democratic, inclusive and participatory manner, and carried out at a pace that was comfortable for the Ukrainian nation as a whole. The question of Europe for Ukraine is the equivalent to the question of political Islam for Indonesia — a touchy, politicized and potentially divisive issue. Leading presidential candidates playing footsie with Islamic parties should be critically scrutinized. Just like Ukraine’s geographic divide, Indonesia is not — and never has been — as monolithic as the moderate Muslim discourse might suggest.  Second, the national leadership must be able to manage the interests and insecurities of hegemonic and rising world powers wisely, or risk predatory dismemberment. Russia has swallowed Ukraine’s Crimea whole and is now eyeing Southeastern Ukraine, meanwhile, another “shock doctrine” highway robbery is about to take place in Kiev where the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is planning a bailout of US$15-18 billion. With a “tradition” of choosing Europeans-only as doctor-in-chief with a long list of malpractice on East Asian patients, which includes Indonesia, many have now sarcastically — and correctly — termed its presence as “the cure much worse than the disease”. Ukraine is now forced to choose between IMF conditionality, European “Greek tragedy” austerity economics, or Russia’s schizophrenic irredentism. With Western ambassadors already courting presidential candidates and China on the “charm offensive”, our elected president will need to navigate our nation, this “arc of diversity” ever so carefully.  Last, the national leadership must have an embedded “regional perspective” that accounts for the security and well-being of 600 million ASEAN citizens. The Ukrainian crisis shows that regional interests are inseparably woven together and the fate of a nation also rests on how the region respond to crises. The West imposing (and lifting) sanctions on Myanmar, China testing the waters in the South China Sea, as well as Australia repeatedly breaching Indonesian waters are creating ripple effects for the region as a whole.  In conclusion, presidential candidates should understand the subnational, regional and international dimensions of national leadership. Unfortunately, leading candidates running on nationalist platforms offer no coherent foreign policy grand design and are either busy playing footsie with Western ambassadors, flirting with Islamic parties and anti-pluralist votes or simply thinking aloud “guns, tanks and warships”. ●

In Soviet Russia : A farcical moral comdemnation of Russia

In Soviet Russia : A farcical moral comdemnation of Russia Pierre Marthinus  ;   Executive Director for the Marthinus Academy in Jakarta

JAKARTA POST,  21 Maret 2014

                         

                                                                                         

                                                      

Does the argument that “a choice isn’t a choice when made with a gun to your head” really stand? Unfortunately not. The Indonesian revolutionary rallying call was “merdeka atau mati” — the equivalent of Patrick Henry’s “give me liberty or give me death”. In the early years of the Indonesian revolution, British forces were sent in to quell the nascent Indonesian nation and ordinary Indonesians were forced to make that difficult — if not impossible — decision at gunpoint. The national vote commenced under a heavy British military presence in Surabaya and Bandung, the voting paper was Indonesian soil, the voting ink was Indonesian blood, and the cost of registering was the lives of able-bodied men, women and children — it was Indonesia’s rendition of universal suffrage at its best. Dutch observers, unconvinced the vote was free and fair, decided to organize their own series of “referendums” in other major Indonesian cities, resulting in a very high turnout and an astounding number of Indonesians voting for independence. Yes, such votes were choices made at gunpoint. The foul-smelling truth is that Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine’s Crimea is as legitimate as Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975, Australia’s intervention in East Timor in 1999, and the US intervention in Iraq in 2003. Crimea’s referendum — held under the shadow of Russia’s military presence — is as legitimate as the 1969 Act of Free Choice in Papua held under Indonesian military presence and the Iraq elections held under a heavy US military presence. The only difference is the selection of territorial scale, legal pretexts and moral justifications for each intervention. Undisclosed 30-year-old Australian documents are still being withheld at the moment (The Guardian Australia, Jan. 30, 2014), but their contents are already speculated upon; that Western powers, especially US and Australia, not only permitted, but were likely the main reasons behind Soeharto’s decision to invade East Timor to prevent a communist takeover of East Timor by the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin) in 1975. Australia secured a favorable maritime border with Indonesia and could sleep better at night, knowing there was no East Timorese “Cuba” north of its border. Historically, dealing with Western powers is a lot like sharing your bathtub with a bull shark and a saltwater crocodile while trying to negotiate a recurring Faustian bargain — mostly printed in fine print — on how you can get your rubber ducky back from them. Look no further than Australia’s Aborigines and the native Americans in the US, the first major trading partners of Western powers. Their history will reveal trade “agreements” made at gunpoint, “free and fair” referendums of white male settlers, just wars to conquer “empty and uninhabited land”, as well as “private ownership” over other human beings. Trading whole continents for reservation zones, welfare coupons and university tuition waivers is not really my idea of a “free and fair” trade. Internationally, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) cannot declare the Crimean referendum illegal simply because their boat, carrying a number of unsolicited observers, was turned away and barred from entering Crimea by Moscow. The point is that “the web of international agreements and institutions” that had once failed so miserably in preventing the US intervention in Iraq in 2003 will inevitably perform an encore, this time for a Crimean audience. Interventionist Western powers, however, are far from being the political embodiment of evil. If anything, dancing in uncharted waters with such beautiful beasts is an extremely rewarding political and intellectual venture for any nation. Their long blood-tainted history inspires fear, excitement, contempt and inspiration — all at the same time. Just like the excessive number of teeth that a bull shark or a crocodile has, the West wield weapons in excessive numbers, amassing quantities of arms that no “sane nations” should ever have, let alone use against others. Their fearsome form, preying eyes and killing instincts, designed to elegantly maim and dismember other sovereign nations, have mainly evolved from their “most basic instinct of surviving in places they shouldn’t be in”. These awe-inspiring beasts have earned their place at the very top of the global political food chain and therefore deserve our utmost respect and admiration. A rising Indonesia hould always keep this in mind and at heart. I am merely trying to show that historical, legal and moral condemnations are of little value and at times can be deeply flawed. My point is that diplomatic arguments should be made on the basis of Crimean and/or Ukrainian interests rather than from a Western-biased historical, legal and moral condemnation of Russia alone. Most Western diplomatic criticism of Russia often seems like an uncreative plagiarized fill-in-the-dots template devised by an overpaid Washington-based public diplomacy firm struggling to keep its government contracts and refusing to downsize its employees. Ironically, Moscow has been doing a relatively better job, choosing all the right diplomatic keywords, invoking the rhetoric of a “responsibility to protect” the Russian-speaking population of Crimea and the Crimean “right to self-determination”. Recently, the US organized a discussion on the Crimean crisis in Jakarta, but decided only to invite representatives of Poland and Ukraine — the equivalent of a low blow in public diplomacy. The Russian ambassador, unfortunately, decided to crash the party “Putin-style” and conveyed his utmost displeasure at the organizers for all the participants to see. Russia is unflinching, allowing itself to neither bleed nor show fear to the West. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s brinkmanship was reckless enough to be taken seriously, but not so much that it would inevitably hurt Moscow’s own strategic interest. The West’s response is now “more talk than walk” due to three main factors, namely their economic downturn, Russia’s own leverage, and the asymmetry of interests regarding Ukraine. In the current US economic downturn, any form of military conflict with Russia is unlikely since the costs of deploying troops in combat theaters increases exponentially with distance, far outweighing any perceived benefits. The US, still paying for Afghanistan and Iraq, will most likely resort to military maneuvering and posturing to save face, but is unlikely to take any real action. Australia, the only Western power unaffected by the economic downturn, will continue to be a militarily insignificant cheerleader — instead of a quarterback — for the West. Unfortunately, Ukraine has been taking and measuring risks like a broken calculator and splashing around wildly like a cat thrown into a bathtub — yes, the bathtub with the bull shark and the saltwater crocodile. Kiev could not foresee Western propensity toward inaction and failed to accommodate Russia’s strategic interests, overestimated its own value to the West and underestimated Moscow’s intention to defend its strategic interests by any means necessary. Aggressive military action against the nuclear-powered bear-riding Kalashnikov-wielding Putin is not a very enlightened argument by any standards. Moscow makes it clear that it is only playing “the game” of interventions that Western powers have so long played. Unfortunately, in Soviet Russia, the game plays the West. Again, diplomatic arguments made on the basis of Crimean and/or Ukrainian interests are more appealing to the Indonesian public than a deeply flawed Western-biased historical, legal and moral condemnation of Russia alone. ●

Flipping over the boats : Restoring RI-Oz ties   Pierre Marthinus  ;   Executive Director for the Marthinus Academy in Jakarta

JAKARTA POST,  18 Februari 2014

                                                                                                                       

                                                                                         

                                                                                                                       

Australian warships will now be frequenting Indonesian waters. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s diplomatic legacy is now vividly clear: A tradition of diplomatic spinelessness and an Australian bully to the south well intent on trampling over Indonesian sovereignty. Although Sukarno was the one who coined the pejorative phrase, “a nation of coolies and a coolie among nations”, it was obviously Yudhoyono who managed to craft that catchphrase into a diplomatic reality for Indonesians today. Yudhoyono’s tuck-tail diplomacy and Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s bull-headed arrogance is the ultimate recipe for a diplomatic disaster. Currently, bilateral relations are intentionally kept to a simmer, ready to be reheated to its boiling point at a whim. Yudhoyono’s legacy will be a decaying pro-Western political powerhouse that is deeply divided, already conquered, easily bought and goes cheaper by the dozen.  The Democratic Party’s (PD) anti-corruption television advertisements trigger both pity and contempt since cast members Angelina Sondakh, Andi Mallarangeng and Anas Urbaningrum are all now ensnared in corruption cases.  The only “diversity” within Yudhoyono’s handpicked Cabinet seems to be that the Islamists prefer dinars while the neoliberal pseudo-nationalists prefer American dollars. This might seem counterintuitive for Yudhoyono’s logic, but taking tangible actions to immediately hurt strategic Australian interests will go a long way toward improving healthy bilateral relations.   The sooner strong actions are taken to hurt strategic Australian interests, the sooner bilateral relations can bounce back. Without any strong retaliatory measures, those in Canberra will never realize the full worth of the wonderful bilateral ties it once had with Indonesia. A relationship that costs nothing will always weigh nothing in Canberra’s future cost and benefit calculations. Jakarta needs to send a clear diplomatic signal that cannot be misinterpreted, spun or downplayed by Canberra. The severing of ties with Canberra should be extended into other strategic areas of cooperation.  The wider framework of counterterrorism cooperation, Australian permits for development-cum-espionage projects in eastern Indonesia and the live cattle and boxed beef trade should be placed firmly on the sacrificial altar to show that Jakarta really means business. Beef trade — not counterterrorism — would be the hardest luxury to sacrifice from Jakarta’s point of view. Indonesia’s shameful dependency on Australian beef imports is also thanks to Yudhoyono’s own handpicked “nationalist-religious” team of ministers.  Entrusting the national beef self-sufficiency program to an Islamist minister whose political party had been deeply embroiled in beef corruption cases and allowing neoliberal pseudo-nationalist ministers to let “market prices” dictate import quotas was Yudhoyono’s sleight of hand.  Of course, “market price” simply means aiming to achieve the lowest possible beef price standards to allow for a huge influx of Australian beef imports.  At the height of the spying row, Yudhoyono’s ministers increased cattle import permits by 66 percent for 2014 — an increase most likely to be filled by a country that had unilaterally halted beef exports, sending prices through the roof, ahead of the holy month of Ramadhan in 2011: Australia.  Yudhoyono will now be forced to choose between catering to top-down Western interests — his errand boy routine — or accommodating the nationalist aspirations of 240 million Indonesians claiming their rightful place and representation in a globalized world. This dilemma will play out into the 2014 elections in three key strategic areas: energy, mining and the diplomatic standoff with Australia.  Bad decisions on any of these areas will most likely condemn Yudhoyono’s party, his “political dynasty” and his own political career to the backwater of Indonesian politics. Further failure by Yudhoyono to take strong action against Australian strategic interest will result in a “carryover”, a “spillover” and a “boilover” effect.  A “carryover” effect refers to Indonesia’s desperate search for a high-note strong nationalist closure to the spying row from the next presidency. Presidential hopefuls with low popularity and the most questionable human rights track record can look more vote-worthy once they take up the anti-Australian rhetoric — “the Abbott effect”. A “spillover” refers to the discrediting of broader relations with Western powers in general. Any hypocritical facade of equality and national sovereignty in dealing with Western powers — which Yudhoyono had painstakingly built over his two presidencies — will be shattered to pieces. It will affirm long held perceptions that power relations are so asymmetrical to the point that Western powers — even lesser ones like Australia — can do anything they please without Jakarta having the ability to retaliate at all.  Should this infuriating image come into play within the Indonesian public imagination, expect greater sustained public pressures to downgrade cooperation on other areas of cooperation — impacting not only Australia, but also the US, the UK, Canada and New Zealand.  A “boilover” effect refers to Indonesians forming a stronger opinion of Australia, shifting away from their ambivalent attitudes and actually acting on those opinions. Indonesia’s international rise, as many note, is starting to take effect on the national psyche.  Indonesian senior diplomats and leading academics find Australian arrogance and insistence on “flipping over the boats” to be extremely infuriating. Ikrar Nusa Bhakti of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), teases out why a more “balanced diplomatic” response targeting other Western powers, especially the US, has not been considered (Kompas, Nov. 22, 2013).  His article was accompanied by a picture of a handheld globe being sliced by a knife on the Indonesian-Australian border — a not-so-subtle hint of the editorial preference of Indonesia’s leading daily, Kompas.  Hikmahanto Juwana, a professor of international law at the University of Indonesia, called Australia’s policy “insulting” and has repeatedly called for declaring Australian Ambassador Greg Moriarty persona non grata.  Those voicing the strongest criticisms are simply trying to give Canberra a heads-up of what is being discussed behind most closed doors since the spying row took place. Ambassador Moriarty obviously deserves an honorary persona non grata for his stellar performance. Australian permits to work in eastern Indonesia, especially on development projects in Papua, need to be frozen until a new intelligence code of conduct has been agreed upon.  As for the beef trade, the Indonesian middle class would surely prefer eating chicken in dignity and most can afford Japanese premium Wagyu beef. Contrary to what the Indonesian Trade Ministry says, poor people do not die from a shortage of beef and no nationwide revolutions have ever been staged due to one.  The Indonesian middle class yearns for one commodity that Yudhoyono has continuously failed to provide and cannot simply be imported from Australia: national dignity. ●

Menakar Retorika “M” di Papua

Menakar Retorika “M” di Papua Pierre Marthinus  ;  Peneliti di Pusat Kajian Papua (Papua Center) UI KOMPAS, 30 September 2013

Pada 15 Agustus 2013 diresmikan kantor Free West Papua Campaign (FWPC) di Den Haag, Belanda. Sebelumnya, 28 April 2013, peresmian kantor serupa di Oxford, Inggris, menuai reaksi dan kecaman keras dari dalam negeri.

Pelajaran berharga apa yang dapat diambil bagi rekonsiliasi dan pembangunan Papua? Pernyataan bahwa ”banyak orang Papua berteriak merdeka” mungkin tak sepenuhnya salah. Namun, pernyataan itu masih gagal memberikan gambaran akurat soal tindakan serta aspirasi di belakang retorika merdeka itu.

Para pihak yang mengangkat retorika merdeka di Papua sebenarnya memiliki tingkat ideologisasi dan tendensi kekerasan sangat beragam. Sayangnya, mereka kerap digeneralisasikan sebagai ancaman keamanan yang sama, diberi stigma separatis, dinilai layak menerima respons kekerasan seragam dari negara.

Empat ”M” berbeda

Pada dasarnya, tiap kelompok memiliki ketidakpuasan berbeda dan mengartikulasikannya melalui bentuk-bentuk resistensi yang beragam pula. Dengan demikian, negara seharusnya mampu memberikan respons yang terdiferensiasikan dan proporsional bagi tiap kelompok. Berdasarkan tingkat ideologisasi dan tendensi kekerasan, terdapat empat kategori utama kelompok yang mengangkat retorika merdeka yang akrab disebut sebagai ”M”.

Pertama, kategori hipokritikal, yakni mereka yang kritis tapi tak pernah menolak segala insentif yang ditawarkan Jakarta. Tingkat ideologisasi dan tendensi kekerasan kalangan ini sangat rendah. Ironisnya, retorika ”M” kalangan ini kadang terlontar dari mereka yang sudah PNS. Di kalangan petinggi, tak jarang mereka yang habis masa jabatan dan kehilangan pendapatan ataupun privilese, lalu ”bersuara sumbang” dan mengangkat retorika ”M”.

Retorika ”M” terutama digunakan untuk mengakses berbagai konsesi politik dan ekonomi yang ditawarkan negara. Retorika ”M” juga menyediakan kesempatan untuk menjaga kehormatan sembari menjustifikasikan kelengseran mereka karena kasus-kasus korupsi, inkompetensi dalam tugas, skandal pribadi, ataupun popularitas elektoral yang menurun dalam pentas demokratik.

Kedua, kategori hiperkritikal, yakni mereka dengan sikap kritis selalu menilai semua kebijakan dari Jakarta adalah jebakan, salah kaprah, dan pasti akan gagal. Kalangan ini punya tingkat ideologisasi rendah dan sesekali terlibat kekerasan fisik dengan aparat dalam aksi-aksi demonstrasi. Umumnya, pengalaman pribadi terkait diskriminasi, marjinalisasi, dan kekerasan negara telah menempa sikap nonkooperatif yang sangat kuat di kalangan ini.

Ketiga, kalangan radikal, yakni mereka dengan tingkat ideologisasi tinggi, yang mengartikulasikan ”M” sebagai nasionalisme Papua yang sepenuhnya terpisah dari nasionalisme Indonesia. Dalam perkembangannya, tendensi kekerasan di kalangan ini hampir tak ada dan telah muncul komitmen tinggi dalam melakukan perlawanan non-kekerasan.

Kalangan ini terbukti mampu menyinergikan retorika ”M” dengan retorika global lain, seperti HAM, lingkungan hidup, hak-hak masyarakat asli, hak menentukan nasib sendiri, dan demokratisasi. Bentuk resistensi konvensional mereka, yakni pengibaran bendera, kini telah berevolusi menjadi berbagai bentuk advokasi transnasional, seperti orasi di ruang publik internasional, kampanye internet, serta pentas budaya dengan lagu, cerita, instrumen musik serta tarian tradisional yang mengedepankan akar kebudayaan Melanesia Papua. Kelompok inilah yang cenderung berkembang pesat di luar negeri, berhasil memenangi dukungan dari beberapa simpatisan non-negara, dan merupakan satu-satunya kelompok yang berpotensi ”mempertanyakan” kedaulatan Indonesia di Papua, tanpa mengeluarkan sebutir peluru pun.

Keempat, kalangan radikal-ekstrem, yakni mereka yang memiliki tingkat ideologisasi tinggi dan mendukung penggunaan kekerasan. Mereka yang bergerak dalam kapasitas sipil kerap dengan sengaja melakukan aksi kekerasan kecil untuk memancing reaksi berlebihan dari aparat yang diharapkan mengakibatkan jatuhnya banyak korban jiwa sipil. Kalangan ini merindukan terjadinya insiden Santa Cruz kedua dan intervensi internasional ala Timor Leste bagi Papua. Popularitas kalangan ini terlihat berkembang di antara segelintir kalangan muda Papua.

Sementara itu, kalangan radikal-ekstrem yang bergerak dalam kapasitas kombatan, yang kerap disebut sebagai Tentara Pembebasan Nasional (TPN), cenderung terlalu terfragmentasi, tidak populer, dan gagal memenangi dukungan, baik dari aktor negara maupun non-negara di tingkat internasional.

Dialog dan insentif

Jadi, apakah kehadiran empat kalangan yang berteriak ”M” ini berarti pendekatan berbasis insentif dalam UU No 21/2001 tentang Otonomi Khusus bagi Provinsi Papua telah gagal dan sudah saatnya kembali ke pendekatan punitif (stick)? Tentu tidak.

Pertama, negara harus bisa membedakan antara politik ”potong jari” dan politik ”potong babi” yang terjadi di Papua. Kelompok ”potong jari”, yakni mereka yang telah betul-betul mengecap kepahitan diskriminasi, marjinalisasi, dan kekerasan negara seyogianya diikutsertakan dalam proses rekonsiliasi berbasis dialog yang inklusif. Di sisi lain, kelompok ”potong babi”, yakni mereka yang mendambakan kemanfaatan dan kesejahteraan dari kehadiran negara, juga perlu dimenangkan dengan menggunakan insentif-insentif yang memiliki nilai tawar sosio-kultural yang tinggi.

Kedua, sebelum memasuki dialog yang inklusif dengan kelompok yang tergolong radikal, harus dipetakan konsesi-konsesi apa saja yang bisa dan mampu ditawarkan negara tanpa melangkahi batasan-batasan konstitusional. Bagi mereka yang menginginkan kedaulatan, negara bisa menawarkan konsesi ”kedaulatan simbolik” di bidang-bidang yang umumnya menjadi ranah eksklusif negara, misalnya moneter, hubungan luar negeri, pertahanan dan keamanan.

Konsesi kedaulatan simbolik bisa berupa mata uang rupiah yang dicetak khusus untuk beredar di Papua (model poundsterling Skotlandia) yang menampilkan simbol-simbol budaya Papua, seperti tifa, rumah honai, tombak, parang, pisau belati, busur dan panah, burung cenderawasih, dan puncak Jayawijaya. Dalam hubungan luar negeri bisa dialokasikan pos-pos diplomatik tertentu atau dibentuk pos-pos baru yang dikhususkan bagi orang Papua untuk mewakili kepentingan Indonesia, seperti duta besar untuk kawasan Pasifik Selatan.

Dalam pertahanan-keamanan, misalnya, bisa dirancangkan lencana kehormatan atau lencana HAM yang akan diberikan oleh gubernur, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua (DPRP) beserta Majelis Rakyat Papua (MRP) kepada perwira TNI/Polri yang dianggap memiliki andil besar bagi perdamaian dan penghormatan HAM di Papua. Jika dilengkapi komponen kepangkatan dan tunjangan ekonomi, tentunya pendekatan HAM yang berbasis insentif ini bisa menjadi suatu alternatif bagi Indonesia untuk memperbaiki kondisi di Papua sembari menjawab berbagai kritik dari luar negeri.

Ketiga, negara harus mencari bentuk-bentuk insentif dengan nilai tawar sosio-kultural yang mampu memenangkan kepatuhan para aktor lokal. Pendekatan punitif dan insentif (stick and carrot) memang penting, tapi pemilihan insentif yang salah kaprah bisa membuat orang Papua merasa selalu dipukuli dengan carrot dan diberi makan stick.

Proyek pembangunan berbasis kelapa sawit, misalnya, dapat dipastikan akan memarjinalkan orang asli Papua yang sudah terbiasa menanam kopi, kakao, dan karet selama 50 tahun terakhir. Proyek pembangunan sekolah dan rumah sakit tanpa tersedia dokter, perawat, dan pengajar yang bertugas rutin pun tidak jarang malah membuat geram masyarakat.

Intinya, skema otonomi khusus ”plus” yang tengah digodok harus cermat dalam mengidentifikasi insentif-insentif dengan nilai sosio-kultural tinggi yang mampu memberdayakan sekaligus memenangkan hati masyarakat Papua. Selain untuk membangun legitimasi politik, proses dialog yang inklusif juga penting untuk mencari dan menyetujui bersama solusi-solusi kreatif serupa dalam membangun perdamaian di Papua. ●