Revisiting
Indo-Oz defence treaty sans mutual trust
Sabam Siagian and Endy M
Bayuni ; Senior editors at The Jakarta Pos;
Siagian served as
Indonesia’s ambassador to Australia in 1991-1994
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JAKARTA
POST, 09 September 2014
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The
agreement on the code of conduct on surveillance signed by Indonesia and
Australia marks the resumption of full normal ties between the two countries
that drifted apart after revelations in November that Canberra had been
tapping the phone of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, his wife and a
number of top Cabinet ministers.
The
agreement, signed by the countries’ respective foreign ministers Marty
Natalegawa and Julie Bishop in Bali on Aug. 28, should lead to the
restoration of all security and defense cooperation programs that Yudhoyono
revoked when he downgraded bilateral ties.
But
nice diplomatic parlance aside, there is one thing that neither side can
restore immediately, if ever: mutual trust.
An
essential ingredient in any relationship, Australia’s belligerent attitude in
the wake of the espionage scandal made sure that whatever trust the two
governments had painfully built over the years went out of the window.
The
agreement was hastily pushed by both sides, without looking deeper into the implications
the spy revelation had on bilateral ties, presumably to provide Yudhoyono
with a respectable exit as he leaves office in October.
After
all, he had invested his personal reputation in strengthening bilateral
relations more than any Indonesian president had ever done. If he felt deeply
betrayed by his Australian friends, this agreement probably soothed his
feelings a little.
But
the message from Canberra is loud and clear: Australia has no intention of
stopping the espionage activities on Indonesia. It never has, even from the
beginning when the espionage activities were first disclosed by the Snowden
files. The code of conduct signed in Bali flies in the face of Indonesia’s
good neighbor foreign policy.
It
took Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott all this time to agree to sign
this agreement and, even then, Canberra insisted on calling it a “joint understanding”
; hence the wordy official title: The Joint Understanding on a Code of
Conduct between the Republic of Indonesia and Australia in implementation of
the agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and Australia on the
Framework for Security Cooperation.
The
code of conduct, or joint understanding, is supplementary to the existing
umbrella defense and security cooperation agreement the two governments
signed in 2006, known as the Lombok Treaty — so named after the Indonesian
island where it was signed.
Can
the Lombok Treaty seriously be retained given the loss of mutual trust that
had pinned their relationship on defense and security cooperation?
With
the Yudhoyono factor out of the picture, incoming Indonesian president Joko
“Jokowi” Widodo would do well to review this aspect of the relationship with
Australia.
A
recent Reuters item from Sydney reported that Abbott is pursuing “a muscular
foreign policy that has moved him closer to the United States on crises like
Iraq and Ukraine, but has some worried over the risk of alienating China.” In
pursuing relations with its southern neighbor, Indonesia should not allow
itself to be dragged into a position that contradicts its active and
independent foreign policy, which historically has been its principled
position.
Now
Indonesia knows better that Australian intelligence operates independently
from the administration’s declared foreign policy.
Next
time an Australian prime minister states that “no country is more important
to Australia than Indonesia”, echoed first by Paul Keating in 1994 and
repeated by all his successors since, including Abbott, we should take it
with a grain of salt. As far as their intelligence operation is concerned,
Indonesia is still treated as a potential enemy and a threat to Australia’s
security.
The
fact of the matter is that when it comes to intelligence operations,
Australia is beholden to the masters in Washington through a complex web of
alliance treaties dating back to the Cold War era. Then prime minister John
Howard was revealing Canberra’s true identity when he described Australia as
“America’s deputy sheriff” in 2004.
The
Lombok Treaty may not have to be abrogated, but we need to send it back to
the drawing board to allow Indonesia’s foreign and defense officials to
review and adjust to the real Australia we have come to know now.
With
little or no mutual trust, relations in defense and security should be
pragmatic at best, if not strictly businesslike: We should ask what Indonesia
can get out of it, in the same way that Australia will be asking what it can
get out of Indonesia.
Indonesia
and Australia should continue to forge all other aspects of their
relationship, from trade and investment, education and cultural exchanges,
scientific research, to tourism, civil aviation, meteorology and others not
related to security and defense.
Some
security cooperation such as fighting the drug trade and counter-terrorism
can continue, but all others will have to be frozen, terminated or scaled
down.
We
should be cautious about any suggestion to elevate relations up a notch to a
“comprehensive partnership”. Comprehensive partners do not spy on each other.
Given the close linkages between Australia and US intelligence agencies,
clearly Indonesia and Australia have different strategic outlooks.
More
specifically, we recommend that the periodic meeting between the heads of
government be scrapped, as they can always meet on the sidelines of
international summits like APEC, G-20 and the East Asia Summit. The joint
meetings of foreign and defense ministers should also be postponed. They can
meet when the need calls.
Indonesia
should review the many joint strategic cooperation programs since the
countries do not necessarily share the same interests.
On
the perceptions of the China threat, the people-smuggling problem and the
spread of radical Islamic ideology, the overlapping areas of common interests
are not as large as many assume. Cooperation in these areas should be limited
to where Indonesia really benefits from it.
Australia
is coming up with a new 2015 defense white paper, while Indonesia has long
passed the 2013 deadline to publish its own defense white paper.
These
documents will outline their respective threat perceptions. In addition,
Jokowi will likely want to implement his foreign policy vision of Indonesia
as an “Indo-Pacific” axis of power, and a maritime power, which is a major
departure from current policy.
Indonesia,
with a long coastline facing the Indian Ocean, will cooperate with Australia
and other littoral states within the framework of the Indian Ocean Rim
Countries Organization to establish a cooperative regime.
All
these developments as well as the changing nature of the relationship should
be taken into account as Indonesia reviews its defense and security ties with
Australia.
Australia
will continue to be an important neighbor for Indonesia by geographical
definition, although now less so in terms of shared geopolitical interests.
If
Australia regards Indonesia as a potential enemy, Indonesia too should
consider Australia as a potentially hostile neighbor.
As
far as defense and security cooperation, relations beyond this point and for
the foreseeable future should be kept cordial in the absence of mutual trust.
That
probably works in the best interests of the two nations as long as Australia
is not quite ready to conduct an independent and active foreign policy
befitting a sovereign nation. ●
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