Bencana Nasional Asap Jonatan A Lassa ;   Research Fellow di RSIS Nanyang Technological University, Singapore; Fellow di IRGSC Kupang, Indonesia

                                                       KOMPAS, 09 Oktober 2015

                                                                                                                                                           

                                                                                                                                                           

Ketika lebih dari 110.000 orang mengalami penyakit pernapasan, seperti infeksi saluran pernapasan akut dan sejenisnya, serta ratusan ribu orang di lebih dari lima provinsi di Kalimantan dan Sulawesi berpotensi harus dirawat inap, pemerintah pusat-termasuk Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana-masih bingung dan terjebak dalam tindak apologi yang tidak kreatif. Mereka tersesat dalam klaim sepihak  yang berlawanan dengan prinsip utama penanggulangan darurat bencana, yakni secara cepat dan efektif menyelamatkan manusia dan secara serius mengembalikan situasi krisis menjadi normal dalam tempo sesingkat-singkatnya. Salah satu argumentasi Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (BNPB) yang perlu dikritisi adalah bahwa BNPB belum melihat kematian literalis 500 orang. Ironisnya, BNPB mengklaim, beberapa kriteria, seperti  kerugian harta benda, kerusakan sarana dan prasarana, cakupan luas wilayah yang terkena bencana, dan dampak sosial ekonomi yang ditimbulkan, belum terpenuhi untuk disebut sebagai bencana nasional. Syarat ini lalu ditambah dengan catatan bahwa kerugian lebih dari Rp 1 triliun, cakupannya beberapa kabupaten/kota lebih dari satu provinsi, serta pemerintah provinsi dan pemerintah kabupaten tidak mampu mengatasinya belum terjadi. Dari pernyataan itu bisa dikatakan bahwa kategori bencana nasional versi BNPB hanya menggunakan kriteria kematian literalis yang hingga kini belum terpenuhi. Berhitung skala bencana Secara epistemologi, pembuktian kematian yang hanya dimaknai sebagai bentuk fisik mayat menunjukkan mentalitas penanggulangan bencana yang buruk dan sama sekali tak mencerminkan komitmen pada ketangguhan dan kedaulatan rakyat. Seolah-olah kita harus menanti 500 mayat untuk kemudian statusnya baru bisa ditetapkan sebagai bencana nasional. Cara pandang ini mengkhianati komitmen Indonesia dalam Kerangka Kerja Sendai untuk Pengurangan Risiko Bencana (Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction) 2030. Selain berfungsi sebagai penunggu kematian, institusi tanggap bencana seharusnya tahu ada cara lain untuk menghitung kematian ex-ante, yang tidak harus menunggu orang meninggal. Dalam satuan mortalitas versi lain dari Organisasi Kesehatan Dunia (WHO) diperkenalkan istilah  quality-adjusted life-year (penyesuaian kualitas hidup/QALY). Apabila ada kematian 500 anak balita, bisa diperkirakan ekuivalen dengan QALY adalah sebanyak hampir 54.000 QALY. Sementara bila dilihat dari laporan Kompas edisi 26 September 2015, ketika indeks polusi mencapai 2,314 (660 persen) dari batas toleransi indeks polusi (PSI 350) dengan exposure harian hingga tahunan, kehidupan rata-rata orang bisa berkurang menjadi 5 persen-15 persen. Secara simplistik, apabila umur harapan hidup manusia Indonesia adalah 70 tahun, akibat keterpaparan asap selama 24 jam dengan skala PSI 350, sama saja dengan membuat terjadinya kehilangan hidup 3,5 tahun per orang (5 persen). Maka, tingkat kehilangan umur hidup manusia yang berjumlah lebih 20 juta yang terpapar asap dalam sebulan ini bisa mencapai 87 juta hingga 250 juta QALY (setara minimum di atas 1 juta orang meninggal) atau jauh lebih tinggi dari  standar 54.000 QALY (setara 500 orang meninggal). Penghitungan di atas bisa dikoreksi jika Anda merasa berlebihan. Hal utama yang perlu dicatat adalah penggunaan QALY (kehilangan tahun hidup) dalam studi bencana bukan hal baru dan bisa ditemukan dalam Laporan UNISDR 2015 yang diluncurkan dalam Konferensi Bencana Dunia yang dihadiri delegasi Indonesia. Sejauh ini, argumentasi yang dibangun BNPB terkait kebakaran hutan hanya mengantar orang pada gelombang kekeliruan. Dengan klaim prosedural, BNPB mengajukan argumentasi bahwa penetapan status kebakaran hutan saat ini belum layak dijadikan sebagai bencana nasional. Alasannya, "Penetapan status dan tingkatan bencana seperti yang diamanatkan UU No 24/2007 tentang Penanggulangan Bencana dalam bentuk peraturan presiden belum ditetapkan karena dalam praktiknya sulit." Lalu dilanjutkan, "Hingga saat ini PP tersebut belum ditetapkan karena belum adanya kesepakatan berbagai pihak. Draf PP atau Raperpres Penetapan Status dan Tingkatan Bencana ini sudah dibahas lintas sektor dan lembaga nonpemerintah sejak 2009 hingga sekarang. Berulang kali dibahas dengan unsur pengarah BNPB, bahkan dilakukan workshop nasional. Namun, belum ada kesepakatan." Demikian bunyi status Facebook Kepala Pusat Data, Informasi, dan Humas BNPB Sutopo Purwo Nugroho di, Rabu (30/9/2015). Pernyataan ini seolah-olah menyatakan bahwa Presiden tak bisa menetapkan status bencana nasional.  Landasan status bencana nasional lewat Keppres No 112/2004 dan Keppres No 66/1992 hanya didasarkan pada UUD 1945 Pasal 4 Ayat (1) (Presiden memegang kekuasaan pemerintahan berdasarkan UUD) dan Keppres terkait Badan Koordinasi nasional (Bakornas). Padahal, seharusnya status bencana nasional sudah bisa ditetapkan dengan alasan kemanusiaan ataupun kalkulasi potensi risiko nasional/regional meskipun belum ada PP khusus yang mengatur soal standar status bencana nasional karena hak menetapkan status bencana adalah hak prerogatif presiden dan ini tidak semata "perkara prosedur". BNPB juga secara historis keliru ketika mengatakan penetapan status bencana nasional baru sekali terjadi dengan dikeluarkannya Keppres No 112/2004 tentang Penetapan Bencana Alam Gempa Bumi dan Gelombang Tsunami di Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam & Provinsi Sumatera Utara. Padahal, jauh sebelumnya, dengan skala yang lebih kecil, Presiden Soeharto pernah mengeluarkan Keppres No  66/1992 tentang Penetapan Bencana Alam di Flores sebagai Bencana Nasional.  Apabila sejarah penanggulangan bencana secara sadar terlupakan oleh sistem formal, kita tidak selalu harus menerima argumentasi BNPB. Solidaritas kawasan Keterlambatan tindakan tanggap bencana kebakaran hutan 1997/1998  telah mengakibatkan kerugian ekonomis yang tinggi, yakni setara 4,5 miliar dollar AS per 1998 atau sekitar Rp 72 triliun kerugian domestik saat itu. Kerugian riil bisa lebih tinggi, bergantung cara kalkulasi dengan valuasi economic loss, belum termasuk valuasi biodiversity loss, ecosystem services, dan lain-lain. Jika ditambah kerugian regional (Singapura dan Malaysia) yang mencapai 11 miliar dollar AS, ini jelas sebuah bencana regional Asia Tenggara. Asap mungkin berlanjut hingga Oktober-November apabila El-Nino bertambah kuat sesuai prediksi BMKG awal September lalu. Anda tidak harus menunggu agar kelima syarat yang diajukan di atas terpenuhi secara sempurna karena penetapan bencana nasional tidak harus bersifat eksklusif-mutual: satu prasyarat menghilangkan prasyarat lainnya. Sebaliknya, masuknya satu prasyarat seharusnya memberikan legitimasi kepada Presiden untuk menetapkan suatu peristiwa sebagai bencana nasional. Kalaupun rakyat kita begitu tahan menderita atau pemerintah mampu tega kepada penderitaan rakyat, setidaknya kita harus mampu menciptakan ruang solidaritas kawasan atas dampak regional yang sudah dirasakan di tingkat ASEAN. Khusus mengenai bencana asap dan target emisi rumah kaca, tunjukan bahwa Indonesia pun mampu memainkan peran dalam environmental stewardship bukan hanya untuk ASEAN, melainkan juga untuk planet ini. ●

Agriculture and fisheries after the tsunami Jonatan A Lassa and Goh Tian  ;  Both authors are researchers in non-traditional security studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

JAKARTA POST, 30 Desember 2014

                                                

                                                                                                                       

Great progress has been achieved in rebuilding the lives of farmers in Aceh 10 years after the catastrophic Indian Ocean tsunami. The hardest hit province is also a fertile learning ground for governments and organizations to develop necessary plans for agricultural restoration after a big disaster. Numerous NGOs stepped in to help the recovery process and a total of US$7 billion in aid was generated for the affected countries. A decade later, have the farmers regained their livelihoods and has Aceh re-established its position as a rice-surplus province? What lessons can be learnt after the disaster in the agricultural and fisheries sector? On Dec. 26, 2004, the Indian Ocean tsunami swept through coastal regions in Southeast Asia, flattening villages and causing massive loss of life. The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) reported that the tsunami affected significant agricultural land, destroyed irrigation canals, affected 92,000 farms, displaced 60,000 farmers and robbed 330,000 people of their livelihoods in fishing and agriculture in the province. The tsunami littered the paddy fields with debris and sediments, destroyed irrigation infrastructure and washed the soil of organic matter. Flooding also resulted in an increase in soil salinity. Because of its proximity to the quake’s epicenter, land levels in Aceh were altered by 1-2 meters. The change in land structure reduced the effectiveness of irrigation canals and caused some coastal agricultural areas to be permanently inundated. Overnight, Aceh was transformed from a rice-surplus province to a rice-deficit province. Government sources show that follow-up tsunamis had flooded 30,000 to 50,000 hectares (ha) of irrigated rice fields concentrated in top production areas, namely East Aceh, North Aceh, West Aceh, Greater Aceh, Pidie and Bireuen. This equaled 120-200 thousands tons of paddy. The total paddy accumulated losses were estimated at 360,000 to 500,000 tons during 2004-2006, nearly the entire annual consumption of rice of the province. Statistical data suggest that marine and fisheries production fell from about 134,000 tons subsequently to 102,500 tons in 2004 and 81,100 tons in 2005 (or year-on-year subsequent losses of 31 percent and 26 percent in 2004 and 2005). Salinity was a major roadblock for crop production after the tsunamis. The silting of irrigation channels prevented the use of irrigation for flushing out salt from agricultural lands. Farmers planted seeds in soil with high salinity and used saline groundwater to irrigate their fields due to a lack of knowledge of salinity conditions. Some studies reported that the first harvest in 2005 was disappointing; only 10 percent of the rice crop in affected regions was harvested. Salinity caused yields to be reduced by 50 percent and in some areas no grain was formed in rice plants. The loss of organic matter in the soil also reduced yields. Low amounts of minerals such as calcium reduced crop growth. Such nutrient deficiencies can be replenished by mixing manure or compost in the soil. The presence of heavy metals also made the soil less fertile. Furthermore, the restoration process was largely focused on the construction of houses and roads. Paddy fields were left to the rain to flush the salt out of the soil. Local manpower was also diverted to construction projects instead of farming. The process to rebuild the livelihoods of farmers was slow and dependency on food aid grew. Yet overtime, soil conditions improved with rainfall and irrigation. The Asian Development Bank spent $20 million on rebuilding infrastructure for 50,000 ha of paddy fields. By the end of 2007, 70 percent of affected rice fields in West Aceh regained their normal yield. The introduction of new irrigation infrastructure and training of farmers also helped to increase yields in some areas above the pre-tsunami period. There have been criticisms against the post-disaster response from both international aid and national governments, including that the lack of coordination among groups or between the NGOs and the government prevented coordination in the rehabilitation of farmlands. The pooling of resources and technical expertise could have helped in research into salt-tolerant rice varieties, identification of new weeds and pests as well as methods to replenish lost organic matter in soils. Aid groups could work with the government to roll out plans for the large-scale adoption of tools to monitor salinity levels, the rapid construction of irrigation canals and distribution of seeds. Other criticism included the fact that the large amount of food and monetary aid after the disaster reduced incentives for farmers to return to their fields quickly. Poor infrastructure and poor harvests further demotivated farmers from returning to their fields. However, there have been some success stories. The most recent data suggests that in 2010 to 2013, Aceh’s agriculture returned to its normal rate. Since 2011, the total area being harvested and total production improved significantly to the level far above pre-2004. Part of the progress is particularly due to a higher paddy yield that has increased from around 4.2 ton per ha in the first half of the 2000s to 4.6 tons per ha since 2011. In most of the rice production centers, things are back to normal, with some notable land expansions. Only a few fractions of damaged rice land cannot be fully recovered. In marine and fisheries there have been positive developments. Households with brackish water ponds in Aceh have also continued to increase from 12,500 households in 2002/2003 to 24,800 in 2013. The number of households with fresh water ponds almost tripled from almost 5,000 in 2004 to about 14,600 in 2012. The total number of households with fish farms in their paddy has gradually recovered from the 2004 loss and increased during 2007-2009; however it may naturally go back to the pre-tsunami period if local and national governments fail to reinvest in the sector. However, the complete story of recovery in marine and fisheries is one of inconsistent progress. Cage and floating cage nets that had been significantly developed soon after the tsunamis during 2007-2010, have been reduced by 60 to 70 percent in the last two years. Furthermore, at least 1,500 fishing ships were either damaged or not functioning — from 9,250 vessels in 2009 to 8,200 in the last two years. Only the number of motorboats increased marginally very recently. There has been a significant increase in marine culture practices where prior to 2004, there was almost no data on such practices. In 2010 and 2011, it grew to almost 533. However, this has been associated with the legacy of post-tsunami aid. Recently, marine culture was practiced in only 176 households in Lhokseumawe, Singkil and Simelue island. The data above suggests the shift to marine culture and larger fishing scales may not be sustainable if the incentives partly created by tsunami aid during 2005-2009 are entirely depleted. Both national and local governments should find ways to ensure continuity of growth in the sectors. ●

Stiks and carrots in urban waste management in Indonesia

Stiks and carrots in urban waste management in Indonesia Jonatan A Lassa  ;   A Research Fellow at the Institute of Resource Governance and Social Change (IRGSC), Kupang; Post-Doctoral Fellow of ACCCRN, Indonesia

JAKARTA POST, 05 Maret 2013

The Adipura Award has been used as sticks and carrots to encourage Indonesian cities and urban regions to be clean and green since 1986. It stopped for a few years after the fall of Soeharto in 1998 but was rejuvenated during Megawati’s presidency in 2002.  Every year, there is an Adipura contest among metropolitan cities, big cities, medium cities and small cities in Indonesia. Additional categories include the best cities in urban-forest ratio, the best city markets and the best city parks.  In the 2009 Adipura, Bandar Lampung city won in the big cities category. The perception was, however, that the real face of the city was a lot dirtier. Some people even noted that heaps of garbage could be found in many places. But, yes, the officials were happy.  The situation changed when some of the local and national media broadcast that Bandar Lampung was the dirtiest city in Indonesia in 2012. There are some pretty good reasons why people were not happy with the Adipura assessment in 2012. I talked to taxi drivers, garbage collectors, officials at mayor’s office and city environmental agency and they all seemed to agree that the city had gotten cleaner and better at managing its waste over the last three years. They said it would have been easy to accept if the city had been at the bottom in 2009 but it is not acceptable in 2012. Why? People feel that there has been a wrong stick and wrong carrot.  Rewards and punishments were not dished out at the right time and place. Some people even suggest that there was meddling from the provincial government because of the ceaseless political bickering between the city and provincial administrations: The provincial government picks two out of four Adipura assessors. Suspicion of the provincial government by city officials may be trivial but there is an interesting fact worth mentioning here. The budget for the city parks and cleansing department (CPCD) for 2009 was only US$247,000. When the new mayor of Bandar Lampung took office in 2010, the CPCD budget dramatically increased by 700 percent to $1.8 million.  The city then increased its CPCD budget to $3.2 million and $5.5 million in 2011 and 2012 respectively. The city spent about 20 times more on keeping itself clean in 2012 than it did in 2009.  There is obviously a something going on in Bandar Lampung. There is clearly excellent waste management in the city. One can easily see trash and garbage being removed from streets and roads day and night. I could almost say that the CPCD work 24/7 to clean the city. The question is this: Can this investment in waste management be sustained through future regime changes? When challenged, a few city officials believed the Adipura assessor downgraded the city based on the city’s coastal areas.  Someone at the environmental department argued that almost all coasts in cities in Indonesia are in poor condition. Therefore, apple-to-apple comparison, one cannot use coastal conditions to downgrade any particular city. However, there is a deeper problem here. The coastal littorals of the city were hit by the Krakatau tsunami in 1883 and thousands of people were killed. The area continues to be occupied by vulnerable groups today. In addition, it is true that over the last 30 years, the city was unable to properly clean up its trash. The coastline of Bandar Lampung has expanded into the sea. Local communities use garbage as a raw material to landfill the coast. As a result, the coast has advanced 10 to 100 meters into the sea. This form of community-based coastal reclamation is complemented by uncontrolled reclamation by the private sectors. The “new” settlements resulting from this urban malpractice cannot be fully seen as informal because the government has legally extended electricity and water services to these areas and collects land and housing taxes from the areas too. In October 2012, with help from Lampung University students, I interviewed 14 men and women in seven villages who have been living on the coastline of the city for 30 years or more. What we found is that there are still challenges. There is a big gap in the perception of the communities on the coasts and the local government concerning the definition of garbage. One man’s trash is another man’s raw material. Informal reclamation using waste is an effort to adapt to urban pressure. This activity continues today despite significant reforms by the city government over the last three years.  Future vulnerability toward coastal disasters and climatic extremes is being laid down today. When extreme weather or new tsunamis are unleashed in the future, these coastal communities will  become communal graveyards. There is a polycentric waste management system in Bandar Lampung. Different institutions deal with different sources of trash.  Waste on the coastline and near the shore solid is the responsibility of the marine and fisheries department. Refuse at urban markets is looked after by the market managers. The parks and cleansing department deals with the waste in the streets, canals and selected public spaces.  They are all part of the team that developed the master plan for solid waste management in 2011, supported by Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network (ACCCRN). Funds for the departments have been increased too. Bandar Lampung is moving on the right track, towards an adaptive and resilient city. With the emergence of innovative leaders like Joko Widodo in Jakarta and Herman HN in Bandar Lampung, we can hope for better urban development in Indonesia in the near future. ●