Senin, 01 April 2013

Toward community water supply


Toward community water supply
Mohamad Mova Al’Afghani ;  The writer, who obtained a PhD from the University of Dundee, lectures at Ibn Khaldun University’s school of law in Bogor, West Java;
In 2010, he was involved in the “Review of Legal Framework for Community Water Services” in cooperation with UNICEF and AMPL, East Nusa Tenggara
JAKARTA POST, 22 Maret 2013

  
Under a government policy issued in 2003, the Indonesian water system is divided into “institutional” and “community-based” water services. The institutional category is meant to denote water services provided by ordinary water utilities (PDAM) whereas the “community-based” category is meant to denote water services provided by local community associations.

The community category is predominantly found in rural Indonesia, although in some cases it is also applicable in urban settings untouched by PDAM services. According to some sources, while the majority of PDAM are currently ailing and in financial trouble, the community category has been very successful and now constitutes more than half of Indonesia’s total water services. 

In many ways, the community category — supported by the 2003 policy — has been a successful endeavour of the government, local communities and donors. Nevertheless, there are problems with both the concept and implementation of the community-based system that threatens its sustainability. 

Although cited in various documents by donor institutions, the typology made by the 2003 policy, which categorizes water services into “institutional” and “community” categories, is flawed. 

This is because the community is also a form of institution and delivers water services through formal organisations. 

The second problem is the term “community” itself. What do we mean by it? Perhaps the term community is used to distinguish from other entities such as corporations. But what if, for example, a particular local community owned shares in a water corporation? Could we not say that the corporation was community-based? 

The third problem is the notion of community ownership. Many donors and water activists assume that community ownership is self-explanatory in practice. 

The assumption is that when a donor institution disburses funds to build water service infrastructure in remote villages, the community will “own” that infrastructure. This is incorrect. 

The truth is that the so called “community” in the context of water services cannot be legally identified. Therefore, water services assets can only be owned by a legal entity and not directly by the individuals of 
the community. 

For example, an individual in a village does not directly own a communal toilet. He or she can “own” a toilet via the entity that owns it, such as a cooperative, a foundation or an association that has been accorded legal entity status, or even a corporation. 

Thus, the notion of community ownership is flawed, for it is not the community that owns water services assets, but the legal entity in which the individuals of the community can be members. 

In this respect, the key issue is whether the legal entity owning the water assets is sufficiently democratic in terms of its decision making process. 

The questions that donor institutions should ask are whether women are adequately represented and whether marginal groups’ access to water is guaranteed. 

Activists need to be wary of power politics and whether patriarchal relations are embodied into legal entities. This is done by evaluating the entity’s articles of association and its application.

The fourth problem is with respect to its assets. I said earlier that a community can only “own” water services assets through a legal entity. Under the Indonesian legal system, the process of forming a legal entity is very cumbersome and can take up to more than a year. 

Village communities often do not have means at their disposal to handle this. In one research project, I found no clarity as to who owned the infrastructure assets built by donor funds. 

The fifth problem relates to the fourth, namely, its operation and maintenance. Without clarity on asset ownership, no one is responsible for maintenance. 

In turn, assets will be abandoned by the population due to a lack of maintenance. Ownerless assets also mean that they are vulnerable to confiscation or expropriation from third parties, like developers or powerful village figures.

The sixth problem relates to incoherencies in the national legal framework. Due to (unproductive) debates on water privatization, the government prioritises PDAM to provide water services in Indonesia and leaves the community and private sector only a secondary role. As a result, there is a lack of recognition and standards for non-PDAM services in national law. 

The trend now is for some regions to enact regional bylaws on community-based water services and due to problems number three and four above, resort to village government to own and maintain assets. 

However, the bylaw is often inconsistent with national legislation and often there are areas of overlap and even clashes between PDAM and community-based water services. 

Furthermore, resorting to villages — which in a way, are state instruments — means that we are moving away from community-based water and back toward traditional state provision.

The community-based water system has (so far) been a tremendous success in improving access to water in Indonesia and the credit goes partially to donor funds. 

But without a clear conceptual framework, without clarity on who owns and who is able to own assets and without support from national legislation, the sustainability of community-based water services is of great concern. ●

ASEAN’s Gini : Out of the bottle


ASEAN’s Gini : Out of the bottle
Curtis S Chin ;  US Ambassador to the Asian Development Bank (2007-2010);  He is Senior Fellow and Executive-in-Residence at the Asian Institute of Technology;
A Managing Director with River Peak Group
JAKARTA POST, 21 Maret 2013
  

As the 10 ASEAN member states continue their push toward a more cohesive ASEAN community, much of the focus has been on what more needs to be done by each nation in the countdown to an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) prior to 2015.

Adopted and signed by ASEAN leaders in November 2007 in Singapore, during their annual summit meeting, the “Blueprint” for economic integration under the AEC envisioned “a single market and production base” and a Southeast Asian region that would be “highly competitive,” characterized by “equitable economic development” and “fully integrated into the global economy”.

But perhaps lost in all the debate over what the AEC might mean in terms of freer — if not free — trade in goods and services, skilled labor, investment and capital flows are the implications for Southeast Asia if the gap between the rich and the poor grew and grew, and no one noticed.

Equitable development under the AEC does not and should not, after all, necessarily mean equitable results.  It should mean equitable opportunity.

Under Presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush, I served as US ambassador to the Asian Development Bank, an institution focused on reducing poverty in the Asia and Pacific region’s least developed nations in part through finance a range of infrastructure projects and programs, as well as efforts to foster greater regional economic integration. Critically, Southeast Asia’s leaders must also focus on inequality of opportunity if development is to be sustainable. More equal access to public services, such as education, water, electricity and sanitation, should be critical concerns.  

Now based in Thailand at a regional institute focused in part on educating a next generation of future government, civil society and business leaders, including hundreds of students from the ASEAN region, I am often struck by the contrasts between the images governments might seek to project and the realities on the ground. Also striking are people’s own images of the countries in which they live.

While delivering a guest lecture at Chulalangkorn University’s Sasin Graduate Institute of business administration, I asked, “Which nation in Asia is the most ‘unequal’ when it comes to the Gini coefficient, or index — a measure of income inequality?” 

Pakistan, India and Vietnam were among the responses. Imagine the surprise, when I informed them of the CIA World Factbook’s rankings: While the African nations of Namibia, South Africa and Lesotho top the charts as the most unequal in the world, Thailand is ranked as the most unequal in Asia.  Coming in as the 12th most unequal worldwide, Thailand is followed in Asia by No. 13 Hong Kong and No. 19 Papua New Guinea.  Sweden has the most equal distribution of average family income of more than 130 ranked nations and territories.

For the Southeast Asia nations for which data is available, the rankings in order of most unequal to least unequal distribution of family income are:  Thailand (12th most unequal); Singapore (29th), Malaysia (33rd), Philippines (36th), Cambodia (45th), Vietnam (73rd), Indonesia (78th) and Laos (70th).

Some of these figures are startling. Indeed, the rankings also underscore one of the fundamental challenges of policy. That is, the accuracy of data. Rankings are only as good as the source data.  GIGO, as they say: Garbage in, garbage out.

The inconvenient truth is that even as a changing Asia helps drive the global economy, the region remains home to two-thirds of the world’s poor, and an estimated 1.7 billion people still struggle on less than US$2 a day, according to the ADB. Approximately 700 million live on less than $1 a day.

Ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples are often marginalized and excluded from the benefits of the region’s growth. Some 43 percent of the Asia-Pacific population do not have access to improved sanitation facilities, and growing numbers moving to Asia’s teeming cities face deteriorating sanitation and environmental conditions and inadequate housing and infrastructure, according to the ADB. 

So, does the “official” Gini index really matter to ASEAN? 

In some ways, it remains a philosophical question for Southeast Asia — about the role of government, business and civil society, and about what level of inequality a society can accept.

A nation can be made up of equally poor people and would fare much better in the Gini rankings.  Perhaps more important than official Gini coefficients are trends and attitudes as to whether or not things are getting better and for whom. 

Respected Singapore diplomat Tommy Koh once wrote that technology, globalization and domestic policy are the key drivers of inequality today. In discussing Singapore’s relatively high Gini coefficient, Koh wrote that the number did not capture some of Singapore’s strengths: a strong rule of law, a non-corrupt government and most importantly, equality of opportunities and social mobility.

There is indeed more to a nation than its Gini coefficient. 

Certainly, Southeast Asia — like much of Asia and the Pacific — has been transformed these last decades. Poverty has decreased and tens of millions live better lives. And people everywhere should welcome an Asia that is both more prosperous and more at peace with itself.

With the twin jinni’s of technological progress and globalization out of the bottle, there is no putting them back in.

As Southeast Asia moves toward greater economic integration and cooperation, how its leaders, businesses and everyday citizens answer the question, “What if the gap between the rich and the poor grew and grew, and no one noticed?” will help define what kind of community the AEC will truly be. ●