Korea-Japan
rivalry beyond Asian Games
John Lee ; An adjunct professor at the University of Sydney;
A senior fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington DC;
A visiting fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in
Singapore
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JAKARTA
POST, 27 September 2014
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As we settle in for the 17th Asian Games in Incheon, South Korea the
sporting sub-plot is that South Korea and Japan will be engaging in a rivalry
to see who can win the second most medals after runaway favorite China. But
this sporting rivalry — friendly on the field — has a political context.
South Korea is engaged in a simmering and worsening political spat over
unresolved World War II issues with Japan, Asia’s other shining post-war
example to the world.
Although Korean wartime sores such as the use of its citizens as
“comfort women” for Japanese troops are genuine, Seoul’s tendency to allow
this terrible history to dominate current political interaction with Japan to
the point of refusing bilateral meetings at the head-of-government level is
counter-productive to South Korea’s and the region’s strategic interests.
As these Games, with the slogan “Diversity Shines Here” take place, a
good first step towards political rapprochement is for President Park
Geun-hye to accept Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s offer of a bilateral
summit between the two leaders on the sidelines of an international meeting
before the end of the year.
Putting aside the question of whether the dozens of apologies issued by
Japanese leaders only conceals a profound national reluctance to take
responsibility for past actions, or whether South Korea’s leaders have
periodically moved the goalposts of what constitute genuine remorse for
domestic political gain, Park’s decision to push resolution of these
historical issues as a condition for stronger South Korean-Japanese relations
will not advance Seoul’s interests in a number of ways.
First, it is clear that much of Asia is in a “strategic holding
pattern”, watching intently to see whether the post-World War II American-led
system of alliance and security partnerships can endure but also evolve in a
way that can effectively respond to China’s rise. Gradually, but still
cautiously, countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and even
Vietnam are using their collective weight to create a strategic balance
favorable to America, and offer use of their territories to enhance the
presence of American military assets in Asia.
But it is clear that despite the growing list of countries lining up to
create such a strategic balance, Japan’s size and capabilities make it the
key Asian player. Still the second largest and most advanced economy in Asia,
its highly advanced and world-class Self-Defense Forces remains more than a
match for China’s People’s Liberation Army.
With America’s relative military pre-eminence being continually eroded
by the PLA’s advancing budget and capabilities, the post-war alliance and
security system is unlikely to hold and evolve sufficiently without a more
pro-active Japan, both as a United States alliance partner and a stand-alone
force.
Yet, the South Korea’s persistence in using wartime history to argue
against the desirability of a more pro-active Japan, and erode regional
enthusiasm for such a Japan, is clearly against Seoul’s strategic interest.
After all, South Korea is one of Asia’s great export-manufacturers,
while it imports around 97 percent of its energy. Continued stability in
sea-lines-of-communication (SLOC), and confidence of open access to SLOCs
essential for maritime trade, will increasingly depend on a confident and
outward looking Japan, rather than a permanently chastised and introverted
one.
Second, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s recent reinterpretation of
its Constitution to allow collective self-defense is in the South Korea’s
military interest — meaning that Seoul’s lack of enthusiasm for a more
proactive Japan is counter-productive to its own interests.
If North Korea were to launch an invasion of South Korea, it is likely
that America would need to utilize Japanese airbases and seaports to support
such mass deployments, a logic aided by the vulnerability of South Korean
bases to attack from the north. It is also likely that America would want to
use Japanese airbases for launching attacks against North Korea as airbases
in South Korea would not be adequate. Without Abe’s constitutional
reinterpretation, such assistance would have been prohibited.
Third, every significant capital in Asia — except for Seoul and Beijing
— has put aside still sore wartime memories to welcome the emergence of a
more confident and can-do Japan for the strategic reasons articulated above.
Moreover, and according to a July 2013 Pew Survey, around 80 percent of
populations from countries that suffered at the hands of Imperial Japan
during the war such as Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Australia
viewed Abe’s Japan favorably — no doubt reassured by a post-war Japan that
has been a “model” regional and international citizen for over seven decades.
In contrast, 77 percent of South Korean respondents joined the 90 percent of
Chinese respondents who viewed Japan unfavorably.
Outside China, North Korea and South Korea, a confident and proactive
Japan is seen as essential to the prospects of the Asian Century remaining
peaceful and prosperous. As a result, the weight of regional and American
opinion will eventually grow increasingly critical of countries that use the
past as obstacles to a brighter future.
To persuade the region that “Diversity Shines Here” and advance its
standing beyond putting on a good show, the South Korea will need to show
that it wants to genuinely work with Japan to forgive. ●
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