‘Pre-conditions’
for Papua
Vidhyandika D Perkasa ; A
Researcher at the Department of Politics and International Relations, Centre
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta
Sumber : JAKARTA
POST, 14 Juni 2012
This moment could be
considered one of the bleakest times in Papuan history due to escalating
conflict and violence in the region. There have been several causalities
reported both civilians and military/police officers.
What attracted public attention is the locations of violence, which have tended
to shift from isolated areas, normally in the highlands or mountainous areas to
the capital of Papua, Jayapura.
In addition, these “mysterious shootings” have occurred in broad daylight and
have hit their “targets” in public areas and near police and military offices.
There are a few lessons that we could learn from the aforementioned escalating
conflict and violence in Papua. First, we can question whether President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono’s program of the Presidential Unit for the Acceleration of
Development in Papua and West Papua (UP4B) is indeed the right “panacea” to
solve the complex problems in Papua.
Also, is the program effectively implemented and enthusiastically welcomed by
the Papuans? There have been numerous reports which show people’s skepticism
about the program which may be rooted in the failure of Special Autonomy.
Second, escalating violence and conflict is also a sign that the government is
overwhelmed by the complexity of the issues in Papua and an inability to
restore order. Authorities are unable to catch and bring to trial the
perpetrators of such violence.
This is certainly a sad story. Unable to solve the problem, the government
tends to make unnecessary or defensive statements. For example, they claimed
that the violence was caused by a separatist movement.
This statement was indeed premature and lacked evidence, especially when
knowing that in the recent mysterious attacks the victim have been shot in
vital organs. The gunmen are certainly trained |people.
There are just too many “invisible hands” meddling in Papua, especially when
the case in Papua is about power politics and vested economic interests
(Macleod and Martin, 2012).
Therefore, the government needs to update their data on the mapping of violence
and conflict in this region. Various violent incidents in Papua could be
committed by several “actors”. Therefore, the government should not easily
scapegoat local Papuans as perpetrators of such attacks. The government must
also have the courage to publish the conflict and violence mapping as clear
evidence.
An article by Macleod and Martin (2012) clearly stated that there are segments
of the population in Papua which are indeed opting for a nonviolent struggle.
They argued that a nonviolent struggle, is definitely more desirable than an
armed struggle, which causes less loss of life and greater participation of
ordinary people.
Another repetitive and unreasonable statement by the government is that these
perpetrators of conflict are difficult to capture because of the isolated and
geographic conditions in Papua. This may be true in one sense, but as media
reported, quoting from the statement by Neles Tebay, mysterious shootings and
snipers are currently operating in the city of Jayapura. How hard could it be
to locate these shooters in Jayapura, which is geographically a small city?
Third, with the rise of conflict and violence occurring lately, it is a clear
sign of deepening distrust between the Papuans and the government. The
government is seen as incapable or not serious about solving problems in Papua.
The mysterious shootings and snipers only exacerbate the already heated
situation there.
When distrust is deepening between the two parties, what is then the prospect
of dialogue? Dialogue seems to be a more popular word, recently compared to any
other catchword, when one talks about Papua.
The questions that follow in dialogue, which should be publicly understood, are
who should be involved? What should be the content of dialogue? What is the
time frame? What is the measurement of success or failure in a dialogue? What
are the objectives, outcome and output indicators of a dialogue? What are the
key activities in a dialogue and so forth?
Dialogue is only a means or even a tool to solve problems in Papua and not an
end in itself. There are pre-conditions that need to be taken into
consideration before dialogue could be implemented effectively. In other words,
there are “prerequisites” for effective dialogue. We need to remember that
“winning trust” is one of the main objectives of dialogue.
Supported by UNDEF, CSIS is currently conducting a project to promote Social
Accountability in Papua. We have worked with various elements of civil society.
In Australia we have also talked with several academicians to obtain their
insights on the situation in Papua.
It is interesting that during our project activities, elements of civil society
and Australian academicians frequently stressed the importance of meeting these
pre-conditions before any other programs or even dialogue could be effectively
implemented.
When these preconditions are met, there is hope that the government could win
the long awaited trust from the Papuans.
In our discussion with elements of civil society and Australian academicians,
the preconditions for Papua are clarification on the history of Papua’s
integration, investigating human rights violations and bringing to trial the
perpetrators, a fair trial for Papuans “convicted” for involvement in separatist
actions, eliminating Papuan marginalization, and improving the welfare of
Papuans.
Does the government have the political will to deal with these preconditions in
a timely manner? Let’s say Papuan integration is final and not considered a
topic which needs further discussion; there are still other preconditions which
are seemingly manageable to be sorted out.
To conclude, we could say that the current instability and chaos in Papua is
the price that the government must pay for neglecting or even underestimating
the complexity of the problems in Papua. The government and other stakeholders
need a breakthrough and not treating Papua just as business as usual to restore
peace and order.
One possible solution is bringing onto the discussion table a third party
negotiator, whether a prominent national or international figure who is trusted
and respected by the Papuans.
The government should not be paranoid about bringing international parties,
especially when it is clearly stated beforehand that a referendum in not an
option and the history of integration is final. Another solution is again
making more serious efforts to meet the preconditions for Papua mentioned
earlier. These are indeed urgent tasks to help avoid further disruptions in
Papua. ●
