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Kamis, 12 November 2015

Taming the market tantrum

Taming the market tantrum

Ratih Puspitasari  ;  An economic analyst at Bank Indonesia;
She is currently a PhD student at the University of York, UK
                                               JAKARTA POST, 02 November 2015

                                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                                                           

The speed and complexity of capital flows surpass anything the world has ever seen before.  

When international financial openness was first introduced, it was with the intention of mutual benefits for both the investing and receiving countries. Capital-surplus countries benefit from higher financial returns abroad, while capital-scarce countries enjoy more physical investment opportunities. This is particularly relevant for more structural and long-term foreign investment, like the foreign direct investment.

However, portfolio (stocks and bonds) investment is another story. While portfolio inflows can in some periods be beneficial for the receiving countries, at other times they might be quite detrimental, or useless at best.

An immediate problem associated with the surge or reversal in portfolio flows is its effect on exchange rate volatility of the receiving country. Worse still, it is often market hysteria and herding behaviors that exaggerate exchange rate volatility associated with capital flows.

Herding behavior occurs because there is an asymmetric information problem. Because not everyone in the market holds the same amount of information, transactions initiated by a significant portion of market players could send signals to uninformed players that other players possess some particular information that they themselves are missing, which is of course not always true.

This herding behavior can indeed create waves of hysteria in the market.

This is what seems to have happened to stock prices and exchange rate volatility in emerging economies during the last few weeks.

It is common knowledge that exchange rates and stock price volatility everywhere in the world are particularly hard to predict, but the last few weeks’ ups and downs of the emerging economies’ exchange rates and stock prices were beyond unpredictable.

Financial markets have been erratic, which from the standpoint of any psychologist could be seen as a symptom of bipolar behavior.

Uncertainties regarding the stance of US monetary policy appeared to have increased tensions in emerging financial markets since September 2015, which were exaggerated by excessive market hysteria.

When the Fed finally decided to postpone a policy rate increase in the last Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) Meeting, market fluctuations slowly appeared to subside.

However, as speculations on the timing of monetary policy rate hikes still linger, especially sometimes at the end of this year, it is difficult to expect calmer market behavior anytime soon.

The last few weeks’ market volatility was actually not the first time since the Fed sent some signals about policy normalization. In fact, when the Fed first announced the plan to “taper” the QE by discontinuing the monthly large-scale asset purchase program in May 2013, market reactions (also known later as the “taper tantrum”) was also unexpectedly dramatic especially on the capital flows and asset prices of emerging markets.

During the tapering talk, emerging markets suffered from sharp market corrections, rapid currency depreciations, drops in stock prices, a slowing in capital flows and increases in external financing premiums.

The effect was particularly severe in Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey where on average between May and August 2013 the stock markets in the five countries fell by 13.75 percent, exchange rates depreciated by 13.5 percent, bond yields rose by 2.5 percentage points and reserves declined by about 4 percent.

What lessons should we learn from the “taper tantrum”?

Although negative global sentiments affected all emerging economies alike, there were some country differences in how taper news affected emerging economies, especially in terms of exchange rate depreciation and asset price falls.

It turns out that some macroeconomic fundamentals and policies played a major role in determining how severe taper talks affected these economies.

In particular, countries with larger capital account surpluses, better fiscal positions, lower foreign debt ratios, lower inflation, higher gross domestic product (GDP) growth and more reserves experienced lesser currency depreciation, lower stock price drops and lower increases in bond yields.

In addition, countries that applied active capital flows management before taper talks seems to have fared better because capital flows shifted toward longer-term and less volatile investments. The implementation of macro prudential policies have also been able to reduce vulnerability risks in the run-up to the volatile episodes of 2013.

The country differences in how the 2013 taper tantrums affected emerging economies provide us with at least two lessons. First, the importance of domestic macroeconomic fundamentals and prospects should not be underestimated. Second, credible and long-term oriented macroeconomic policies are far-reaching.

The stated features of necessary macroeconomic fundamentals may seem obvious, but really they are easier said than done because the features of sound macroeconomic fundamentals are the products of long-term macroeconomic policy management discipline and determination.

With the prospects of global economic growth, especially in China, looking gloomier than expected and the decline in commodity prices continuing, emerging economies including Indonesia face problematic challenges in the near future. In particular, it is difficult to expect a rise in exports when global demand is weaker and commodity prices are subdued.

Amidst the uncertainty in the global situation, the latest policy actions by the Indonesian government appeared to have headed toward the right direction. In particular, spending on infrastructure projects is underway, but it has to be particularly speeded up and consistently executed during this period.

In the short run, projects of massive scale create job opportunities, maintain the purchasing power of the working class and thus sustain GDP growth. In the long run, infrastructure encourages industrialization. Transportation infrastructure is also expected to contain inflation in the future.

There may be higher pressure on the current account deficit because of higher imports to support infrastructure projects, or because of foreign direct investments. Nevertheless, current account deficits should not be a major issue as long as the increasing deficit is spent on productive projects to reap economic benefits in the long run.

The launches of economic packages by the Indonesian government are timely and should also send positive sentiments and signals to markets that the government realizes the existence of certain barriers to economic investment and production activities and thus is willing to overcome the obstacles. The message has been delivered, but the real implementation is awaited.

As a small open economy, the future global economic and financial situations are mostly exogenous to us. There is literally not much we can do to change the global situation. However, the extent to which the global situation affects our domestic economy depends on how domestic macroeconomic management is carried out.

As Kabat-Zinn, a professor of medicine and an author on mindfulness, once said, “You cannot stop the waves, but you can learn to surf.”

Rabu, 27 Agustus 2014

Current-account deficit and fiscal sustainability

Current-account deficit and fiscal sustainability

Ratih Puspitasari  ;   An economic analyst at Bank Indonesia; She is currently undertaking postgraduate studies at the University of York, UK
JAKARTA POST, 25 Agustus 2014
                                                


Indonesia continued to suffer from a current-account deficit, which amounted to US$9 billion or 4.27 percent of the GDP in the second quarter of 2014. It has been in a state of deficit for the last two-and-a-half years.

The current account is a general reference on how much a country consumes and invests compared to how much it produces, with a deficit meaning that the former is greater than the latter. Deficit is only possible if financed by foreigners, hence it is equivalent to capital-account surplus (inflows) at the same time. Capital inflow is basically debt, thus it is not free and is attached with interest.

To pay the debt, a country must run a current-account surplus some time in the future, thus, “corrections” must eventually be made following a series of current-account deficits.

If a current-account deficit is too large and maintained for a prolonged period of time, the country will find it difficult to pay back. In such a case, the current account deficit condition is said to be unsustainable.

Is a current-account deficit necessarily harmful? Not always. Current-account deficit is worthwhile if the extra spending is aimed at funding projects that give positive returns in the future.

Spending on infrastructure projects is one justifiable reason as to why a country should run a current-account deficit because it creates jobs and attracts foreign investment, thus increasing economic growth potentials. Spending on education and health sectors is equally important because human resource investment boosts the potential of our future generations.

There are, however, some consequences to the current-account deficit. Because imports are higher than exports, the current-account deficit increases depreciation pressures on the rupiah exchange rate and reduces foreign reserves. Reducing a great deal of our reserves is inauspicious as they are our safeguard during a rainy day.

A large and persistent deficit may also deteriorate foreign investors’ confidence on the capability of the government to manage fiscal sustainability in the long-run. Furthermore, if the deficit is funded by short-term portfolio inflows instead of longer-term foreign direct investment (FDI), the inflows are vulnerable to a sudden stop and even capital reversal.

Most of us have already forgotten that prior to the 1997 economic crisis; Indonesia ran a current-account deficit for a consecutive 15 years when our deficit fluctuated between 2 percent and 7 percent of the GDP. It resulted with a substantial amount of matured short-term debts. Foreign investors’ confidence touched the bottom level, leading to abrupt and massive capital outflows.

So, is the existing Indonesia current-account deficit admissible? There are at least two major reasons as to why we are in a deficit state. First, the rising number of middle-class consumers demand more imported goods. The other reason is the inability of the country to increase domestic oil production, causing it to import two-times the amount of oil it exports.

What makes matters worse is that much of the imports are paid for by the generous energy subsidy. In two years time, the energy subsidy increased overwhelmingly by 52 percent from Rp 230 trillion ($19.7 billion) in 2012 to Rp 350 trillion in 2014, or around 15 percent of total government spending.

The amount allocated for energy subsidy is far greater than the funds allocated for infrastructure, education, and health which have been given Rp 145 trillion, Rp 81 trillion, and Rp 47 trillion, respectively.

Therefore the Indonesian current-account deficit entails at least two problems.

First, much of the deficit is a result of the import of consumer goods and fuel consumption. Except for manufacturing industries, those two factors are not good reasons for running a current-account deficit.

Second, the current-account deficit pushes the government to run a fiscal deficit, which may jeopardize fiscal sustainability in the long run if this problem is not well-addressed immediately.

What has the current government done to minimize the deficit? A series of monetary policy tightening measures have been implemented, with a cumulative benchmark rate hike of 175 basis points from June to November 2013 to ease import consumption. Nevertheless, monetary policy alone is far from sufficient because the root of the problem itself is mainly structural.

The next administration is therefore in for a bumpy ride ahead. Major fiscal adjustment measures must be implemented before it is too late. An obvious yet very difficult step is to decrease the fuel subsidy. Of course, political pressures, social, and economic consequences from rising fuel prices are inescapable. But the prolonged fuel subsidy policy has not only been worsening the state budget, it is also askew as it is more likely to be enjoyed by the middle-class instead of poor Indonesians.

This is a crucial time as the 2015 draft state budget is about to be discussed by the House of Representatives for endorsement. The outgoing government has delivered a clear message that the painful adjustment is being left to its successor to decide. No structural change has been proposed to address the fiscal problem.

The House must therefore make fundamental adjustments to the 2015 draft state budget to reflect the long-run gradual plan to reduce the fuel subsidy burden. Some may be skeptical that such a step is viable due to political reasons, but this time around, political interests must take a back seat to macroeconomic considerations for the sake of Indonesia’s long-term sustainability.

It may not be clear to us now what a sustained current-account deficit would lead to, but let us not forget our own past experiences and what has been experienced by Greece, Portugal, and Spain. The three countries accumulated current-account deficit for at least 10 years prior to the 2007-2008 crisis, with 10 to 15 percent deficit of GDP by the end of 2007.

Not surprisingly, these three countries are those that suffered the most from the 2007-2008 global financial crisis.