The European Union (EU) received the 2012 Nobel Peace
prize for its contribution to regional and global peace. On the other side
of the world, another very important regional organization that works to
brings peace to its region is the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN).
Although the
two are different in many ways, they share the same difficulties in
building regional identities. On the eurozone crisis and the South China
Sea issue, they try to stay together, integrated and face problems. Both
opt to use the notion of identity as an integrating factor. However, the
outcomes have not been so satisfying.
According to
the pollster Eurobarometer77, the feeling of attachment of Europeans toward
the EU stood at only 46 percent in 2012. While 52 percent of European
citizens surveyed do not feel any connection with the EU, 15 percent felt
no attachment at all.
There are few
reliable surveys on the attachment of ASEAN’s citizens to the region,
although one survey conducted by Thompson and Thianthai in 2008 revealed
that even among elite university students, only 60.7 percent of respondents
were familiar with ASEAN.
So what went
wrong? There are two explanations for this question: the
empirical-practical and the fundamental-conceptual.
The first
reason argues that the EU is still seen by European citizens as an elite
club. Political support for the EU is very limited. The main reason for
this, according to Neil Fligstein, is that the integration has resulted in
uneven outcomes for individuals.
It has only
benefited a small group of people among European elites who have had the
opportunity to travel, speak other languages and communicate with other
Europeans.
Moreover,
according to Yeo Lay Hwee, the development of the EU has been top-down and
elite driven. The push toward market integration was seen as an elite
effort to achieve economic efficiency in a way that disregarded the public
discourse on political and social impact. In other words, the fast
development of the EU as an institution was not followed by the
Europeanization of the citizens.
An example of
this gap between the institution and the Europeanization of the citizens is
the enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25 member states in 2004, which was
seen as “advancement” by EU elites.
However, the
enlargement did not get significant support from the citizens of the first
15 member countries. Eurobarometer data in 2004 said that only 42 percent
of EU citizens agreed to the enlargement, while 39 percent were against.
ASEAN does not
have a different story. There are not as many policies that directly touch
upon the citizens of ASEAN, except the 30-day free visa. There is no single
passport, like in the EU, nor is there as much freedom of movement as the
European Schengen provides.
The second
explanation considers a fundamental reason rather than an empirical policy
basis. We are still living under the Westphalia model of world order where
nation-states are the main international actors. Citizens in regional
organization always feel a greater sense of “nationality” rather than
“regionality”.
In a way, the
concept of the nation-state in the current world order hinders the
establishment of regional identity, as the identity of a nation will always
overshadow the identity of a regional community.
In the global
world community such as in the United Nations, all nation-states represent
themselves. All votes are all based on nationality. Development of a
regional identity, therefore, has been undermined.
The national
government thus creates a national notion of everything within its
territory, such as national language, national history books, national
education system, etc. These national characteristics are the main factors
that help to create the identity of a national citizen. A common national
language is considered a strong foundation in creating a community’s
identity.
An attempt to
have a common language in ASEAN is not there yet and might never be there.
English has commonly been used in ASEAN and in the EU in their
interactions, but its use has been limited to elite groups only.
As long as the
approach of an organization that governs a particular area is still based
on nationality, it will be difficult to have a strong sense of regionality.
So does the government wholeheartedly promote regionalism or still stick to
nationality?
In a seminar
held by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in December,
Joseph Maila said that French identity is more important than the identity
of any other group. In the case of ASEAN, the finding of Farish A. Noor’s
research in 2012 about the history of Indonesia shows a very nationalistic
perspective and very few stories about ASEAN. Sadly, the most frequent
mention of another ASEAN member nation was the case of konfrontasi with the
Federation of Malaysia in 1963-1965.
These examples
show that if a nation-state educates the people in its territory too
narrowly about the history of their nation, say Indonesia or Cambodia, at
the expense of the history of Southeast Asia, it will be very difficult to
build a common identity.
Too
nationalistic an approach will shape their culture, character, and hence
their national identity somewhat underlines the importance of their
regional identity. As a result, the sense of belonging to Europe or
Southeast Asia will be overshadowed.
Only the
willingness of the government and the citizens can save the day. Changing
too nationalistic approaches with a more regional approach may be the
answer, bringing ASEAN to the grass roots. It should start from now as the
clock is ticking. The ASEAN Community 2015 is only two years away. ●
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