Survival
of climate action under new president
Aidy S Halimanjaya and Will
McFarland ; Aidy
Halimanjaya is a research officer on financing climate mitigation at the
Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in London. He acquired a PhD in
international development from the University of East Anglia, the UK. Will McFarland is the research / program
officer and contact point for the ODI’s work on green growth, natural
resources and forests
|
JAKARTA
POST, 16 Juli 2014
Uncertainty
associated with the changing of Indonesia’s leadership besets more than just
the climate community.
Many
investors and international policy actors are in “wait-and-see mode”. Whoever
the new president is, he may change many policies and introduce a new
political agenda. This wholesale change between presidents has been well
renounced domestically, but rules likely change when the leader changes.
The
Agrarian Law and land reform constitute an epic, consistently inconsistent
policy agenda across political leadership. Instead of revisiting the basic
and principal land policies of the 1960 Agrarian Law, as aspired by former
president Megawati Soekarnoputri, under current President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono (SBY), the National Land Agency (BPN) completely changed this set
of policies.
Significant
change on land issues has created overlap and confusion among farmers,
customary (adat) communities, mining and palm businesses, and climate and
development practitioners, who take initiatives in forest conservation and
renewable energy such as the geothermal power supply. Will this experience
mean the existing climate directive will be washed away with the changing
tide?
In
2009 at the Group of Twenty (G20) Pittsburgh Summit, Yudhoyono told
international leaders that Indonesia was committed to reducing greenhouse gas
emissions by 26 percent by 2020. Moreover, he committed Indonesia to reaching
a 41 percent reduction if appropriate levels of international finance were
provided.
However,
neither the President’s commitment, nor the action plans in place to achieve
it, are legally binding. Both can be changed overnight under the directive of
the new president.
It
is therefore important to acknowledge the significant and substantial
national investments to support the country’s shift toward a low carbon
development trajectory. These include the establishment of the National
Council on Climate Change (DNPI), the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation (REDD+) Agency and the Indonesia Climate Change Trust
Fund.
Key
international support has also been secured, the most prominent of which is
Norway’s financing to support Indonesian efforts to combate deforestation.
Germany and the UK have also assisted with strengthening public financial
management for climate activities and the development of low carbon fiscal
policies.
There
is also emerging support from multilateral climate funds. Grants and a mix of
capital are slowly replacing hefty debt and loan arrangements under different
development aid agreements. All of these are combining to create positive
momentum for change in Indonesia, placing the country as a critical voice in
climate debates.
The
question being raised among existing and potential donors and investors is
will the new president echo Yudhoyono’s 2009 exemplary commitment or
reconsider and reposition Indonesia’s climate directive?
Manifestos
from both presidential tickets — Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Rajasa and Joko
“Jokowi” Widodo-Jusuf Kalla — do not
clearly acknowledge the incumbent’s legacy and his political standpoints,
including the emissions reduction commitment, despite Yudhoyono’s recent
position as co-chair of the High Level Panel on post-2015 development goals
at the UN.
Prabowo
states his intention to be actively involved in global efforts to mitigate
climate change, but this target may be deemed too limiting when positioned
alongside ambitions of achieving 10 percent gross domestic product (GDP)
growth per annum leading to high emission growth.
The
grand “big push strategy” of Prabowo, converting deforested lands into space
for agricultural and bio energy production, may not guarantee a slowing
deforestation rate. On the contrary, this strategy may lead to accelerate
deforestation due to competing needs between food security and bio energy
supply.
Jokowi-Kalla
express aspirations related to international climate action in a more subtle
way. Given Jokowi’s experience in local and regional development it may be
too early to decide his international political standpoint on various,
complex global issues. He and Kalla simply state their aspiration to
“reposition the role of Indonesia in addressing global issues”. These issues
presumably include climate change.
Exploring
maritime strategy and lifting up Indonesia’s identity as an archipelagic and
an emerging middle-income country becomes the backdrop of Jokowi-Kalla’s
international aspirations. How these aspirations link with national carbon
development is not self-evident.
The
manifestos of both candidates refer to national low carbon development
strategies separate from the international political agenda and the linkages
between climate and key development priorities such as addressing inequality
— something which has become a pressing issue in the imbalanced economy.
Jokowi-Kalla’s
seventh priority touches upon promoting national energy use; supporting
national exploration, improving the efficiency of state-led companies and
supporting the development of renewable energy. They commit to designing
strategies that reduce fossil fuel subsidies. One of the stated means is by
transforming the transportation sector and promoting a shift of 30 percent
energy use in transport to biofuel.
Inter
alia, budget reallocation from oil subsidies for imports to improve the
provision of biofuel is briefly explained in Jokowi-Kalla’s manifesto. The
implication of this policy on domestic oil prices is vast and an appropriate
road map that assists this transition is key in achieving the intended
transition successfully.
Prabowo-Hatta
proposes to use financial and economic tools to realize low carbon
development. Examples see fiscal incentives used to promote industrial
development on agricultural production and build an energy subsidy system
that is better targeted to those that need it.
They
also express commitment to building geothermal and hydro power plants. Some
major strategies related to energy policy may not be considered as climate
friendly but they address basic energy needs, such as building infrastructure
for energy production and distribution by public and or private companies.
Despite
some scattered concrete climate-related policies, it is clear that for both
candidates the utmost concerns are national issues such as integration,
national identity, food security, energy security and the economy.
Predicting
whether Indonesia’s climate policies will survive, or be washed away by the
incoming president is filled with uncertainty.
Nevertheless,
both candidates show that their different strategies to pursue low carbon
development have foundations in national priorities: answering people’s needs
and delivering on issues that are closest to the hearts of most Indonesians —
although the price is to put Indonesia’s international reputation at stake. ●
|
Tidak ada komentar:
Posting Komentar